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Abstract 
The aim of this research is to enhance fine-grained authorization and encryption 
so that database systems are equipped with the controls necessary to help 
enterprises adhere to zero-trust security more effectively. For fine-grained 
authorization, this thesis has extended database systems with three new 
concepts: Row permissions, column masks and trusted contexts. Row 
permissions and column masks provide data-centric security so the security 
policy cannot be bypassed as with database views, for example. They also 
coexist in harmony with the rest of the database core tenets so that enterprises 
are not forced to compromise neither security nor database functionality. Trusted 
contexts provide applications in multitiered environments with a secure and 
controlled manner to propagate user identities to the database and therefore 
enable such applications to delegate the security policy to the database system 
where it is enforced more effectively. Trusted contexts also protect against 
application bypass so the application credentials cannot be abused to make 
database changes outside the scope of the application’s business logic. For 
encryption, this thesis has introduced a holistic database encryption solution to 
address the limitations of traditional database encryption methods. It too coexists 
in harmony with the rest of the database core tenets so that enterprises are not 
forced to choose between security and performance as with column encryption, 
for example. Lastly, row permissions, column masks, trusted contexts and holistic 
database encryption have all been implemented IBM DB2, where they are relied 
upon by thousands of organizations from around the world to protect critical data 
and adhere to zero-trust security more effectively.
  ii 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis would not have been possible without the help, guidance and support 
from many people. First, I would like to thank my Director of Studies, Dr 
Mohammad Hammoudeh, for all his help, guidance and support throughout this 
thesis.  
    I also want to express my deepest gratitude to my friend and colleague Paul 
Bird, IBM Senior Technical Staff Member, for the opportunity to drive the 
database security research in his team as well as for all the guidance, help and 
support he kindly provided to me throughout this research and during the 
preparation of this thesis. 
    I am also grateful to my friends and IBM colleagues Calisto Zuzarte and 
Mokhtar Kandil for all the time they have spent reviewing and validating design 
documents, research papers, patent applications and for their kind and valuable 
feedback throughout the research and during the preparation of this thesis.  
    My most sincere thanks also go to my IBM colleagues Irene Liu, Greg Stager, 
Mihai Iacob, Mihai Nicolai, Alex Zhang, Hamdi Roumani, Eric Alton, Harley 
Boughton, Jerry Kiernan, Tyrone Grandison, Scott Logan and Quentin Presley 
for all their help and input during the implementation of the concepts introduced 
by this research.  
    Last but not least, I want to thank my family for their love, support and for 
having brought so much joy to my life.  And a very special thanks to my children 
Saif, Safa and Haytham who have filled my life with so much happiness and have 
given me all the energy I needed to write this thesis.  
  iii 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... ii 
Table of contents .................................................................................................. iii 
List of figures ....................................................................................................... vii 
List of tables ........................................................................................................ viii 
List of abbreviations ............................................................................................ ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 2 
1.1.1 Fine-Grained Authorization .................................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Data Encryption ....................................................................................... 3 
1.1.3 Mandatory Access Control ..................................................................... 4 
1.2 Motivation ........................................................................................................ 4 
1.3 Aims and Objectives ...................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Contributions ................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Thesis Organization ....................................................................................... 7 
Chapter 2: Research Portfolio Overview ........................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Fine-Grained Authorization ......................................................................... 11 
2.3 Data Encryption ............................................................................................ 14 
2.4 Mandatory Access Control .......................................................................... 15 
2.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 3: Enhanced Fine-Grained Authorization ......................................... 18 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 19 
3.2 Related Work ................................................................................................. 21 
3.3 Fine-Grained Database Authorization Model ........................................... 24 
  iv 
3.3.1 Row Permissions Enforcement ........................................................... 27 
3.3.2 Column Masks Enforcement ................................................................ 28 
3.4 User Identity Propagation in Multitiered Environments ........................... 29 
3.4.1 Trusted Contexts ................................................................................... 30 
3.4.2 Trusted Context-Based Authorization ................................................ 32 
3.5 Safe Coexistence with Fundamental Database Tenets .......................... 33 
3.5.1 User Defined Functions ........................................................................ 33 
3.5.2 Materialized Query Tables ................................................................... 34 
3.5.3 Database Triggers ................................................................................. 36 
3.6 Performance Evaluation .............................................................................. 37 
3.6.1 Delegating Fine-Grained Authorization to the Database System ... 38 
3.6.2 Scalability of Column Masks ................................................................ 41 
3.6.3 Independence of Column Masks ........................................................ 42 
3.6.4 Row Permissions Impact ...................................................................... 44 
3.7 Use Case Scenario ...................................................................................... 45 
3.8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 49 
Chapter 4: Enhanced Data Encryption ............................................................. 51 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 52 
4.2 Related Work ................................................................................................. 52 
4.3 Holistic Database Encryption ...................................................................... 55 
4.3.1 Encryption Run-Time Placement ........................................................ 55 
4.3.2 Encryption Run-Time Processing ....................................................... 56 
4.3.3 Encryption Key Management .............................................................. 57 
4.4 Implementation ............................................................................................. 58 
4.4.1 Enabling Encryption for a Database ................................................... 58 
4.4.2 Rotating the Database Master Key ..................................................... 58 
4.4.3 Taking an Encrypted Database Backup ............................................. 59 
  v 
4.4.4 Performance Considerations ............................................................... 60 
4.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 5: Enhanced Mandatory Access Control .......................................... 61 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 62 
5.2 Related Work ................................................................................................. 62 
5.3 A Multi-Purpose MAC Implementation for Database Systems .............. 63 
5.3.1 SQL Extensions ..................................................................................... 64 
5.3.2 Access Enforcement ............................................................................. 65 
5.3.3 Enterprise integration ............................................................................ 66 
5.4 Applying Multi-Purpose MAC for XML Fine-Grained Authorization ...... 67 
5.4.1 Methodology ........................................................................................... 69 
5.4.2 Access Enforcement ............................................................................. 70 
5.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 71 
Chapter 6: Towards Zero-Trust Database Security ........................................ 72 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 Database Threat Model ............................................................................... 74 
6.3 Addressing Direct Data Access Challenges ............................................. 76 
6.3.1 Privilege Abuse ...................................................................................... 76 
6.3.2 Application Bypass ................................................................................ 77 
6.3.3 Loss of User Identity ............................................................................. 78 
6.4 Addressing Indirect Data Access Challenges .......................................... 78 
6.5 Separation of Duties ..................................................................................... 80 
6.6 Example Scenario ........................................................................................ 81 
6.7 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 84 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Future Work ......................................................... 86 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 87 
7.2 Key Contributions ......................................................................................... 87 
  vi 
7.3 Future Directions .......................................................................................... 88 
7.3.1 Data Classification ................................................................................ 88 
7.3.2 Machine Learning .................................................................................. 89 
7.3.3 Homomorphic Encryption ..................................................................... 90 
7.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 90 
References ............................................................................................................ 92 
Appendix A: Fine-Grained Authorization Portfolio ........................................ 98 
Appendix B: Data Encryption Portfolio .......................................................... 100 
Appendix C: Mandatory Access Control Portfolio ....................................... 101 
  vii 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1.1– Typical database system deployment and usage ............................... 2 
Figure 2.1– Database security pillars and focus of the thesis .............................. 11 
Figure 3.1– Classical 3-tier application architecture .............................................. 19 
Figure 3.2– Fine-grained authorization as an extension of the SQL Compiler .. 25 
Figure 3.3– Ratio of database vs application enforcement for TPC-H queries .. 39 
Figure 3.4– Scalability of Column Masks ................................................................ 42 
Figure 3.5– Independence of Column Masks ......................................................... 44 
Figure 3.6– Row Permissions Impact (1,000,000 rows) ........................................ 45 
Figure 3.7– Row Permissions Impact (10,000,000 rows) ..................................... 45 
Figure 4.1– Holistic Database Encryption Architecture ......................................... 57 
Figure 5.1– Example XML Document ...................................................................... 68 
Figure 6.1– Database threat model. ......................................................................... 75 
Figure 6.2– Fine-grained database authorization. ................................................. 77 
Figure 6.3– Database encryption. ............................................................................ 80 
  viii 
List of tables 
Table 2.1 – Fine-grained authorization publications .............................................. 13 
Table 2.2 – Data encryption publications ................................................................ 14 
Table 2.3 – Mandatory access control publications ............................................... 16 
Table 3.1 – Application vs Database Enforcement for TPC-H Queries .............. 39 
Table 3.2 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) ................................................................... 41 
Table 3.3 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) ................................................................... 43 
Table 3.4 – Difference with the Baseline ................................................................. 43 
Table 3.5 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) ................................................................... 44 
Table 3.6 – CUSTOMER Table ................................................................................ 46 
Table 3.7 – EMPLOYEE_INFO Table ...................................................................... 46 
Table 3.8 – Outputs for Users Amy, Haytham and Pat ......................................... 49 
Table 5.1 – Access-Decision Cache ........................................................................ 67 
Table 6.1 – Zero-trust database security challenges ............................................. 75 
Table 6.2 – Zero-trust database security challenges and solutions. .............................. 80 
Table 6.3 – Banking application security policy. ............................................................ 82 
Table A.1 – Research Papers .......................................................................................... 98 
Table A.2 – Granted Patents .......................................................................................... 99 
Table B.1 – Research Papers ........................................................................................ 100 
Table C.1 – Research Papers ........................................................................................ 101 
Table C.2 – Granted Patents ........................................................................................ 102 
 
 
  
  ix 
List of abbreviations 
DBA   Database Administrator 
SA    System Administrator 
DBMS   Database Management System  
RDBMS    Relational Database Management System 
SQL    Structured Query Language 
UDF    User Defined Function 
MQT    Materialized Query Table 
MAC   Mandatory Access Control 
LBAC   Label-Based Access Control 
MLS    Multilevel Security 
VPD    Virtual Private Database 
FGAC    Fine-Grained Access Control 
AES    Advanced Encryption Standard 
CBC    Cipher Block Chaining 
IV    Initialization Vector 
RSA    Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 
DES    Data Encryption Standard 
3DES    Triple DES 
SHA    Secure Hash Algorithms 
EFS    Encrypted File System 
SED    Self-Encrypting Disk 
SSL    Secure Socket Layer 
TLS    Transport Layer Security 
HSM    Hardware Security Module 
  x 
LDAP    Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
SIEM    Security Information and Event Management  
KDC    Key Distribution Center 
XML    eXtensible Markup Language 
PCI DSS    Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
HIPAA    Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
GDPR    General Data Protection Regulation 
  1 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This thesis is a PhD by publication. It represents a research journey in database 
security that has resulted in a portfolio of 8 research papers in peer reviewed 
journals and conferences, and 7 peer reviewed patents. The thesis highlights the 
contributions made during the last three years (including the PhD registration 
period), but also builds upon the author’s previous research.  
    This first chapter briefly introduces database systems, their typical deployment 
and usage. Next, the key challenges in fine-grained authorization and encryption 
for database systems are discussed. Then, the chapter presents the motivation, 
aim and objectives of the research. Lastly, the chapter summarizes the key 
contributions made in this thesis and gives the outline for the next chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews the key tenets of database security, positions the research 
portfolio in that field and summarizes the key contributions for each. Chapter 3 
gives the details of this thesis’s contributions to the fine-grained database 
authorization area. Chapter 4 describes the details of this thesis’s contributions 
to the database encryption area. Chapter 5 describes the details of this thesis’s 
contributions to the mandatory access control area. Chapter 6 shows how the 
contributions made in this thesis come together to help organizations effectively 
adhere to zero-trust database security. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and 
explores future directions for database security research. 
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1.1 Background 
Database systems are at the core of an organization’s information system. They 
store critical data such as employee personal data, client transaction data, patient 
medical records and intellectual property information. Organizations rely upon 
database systems to ensure the integrity, availability and security of their critical 
data. They also trust database systems to meet the stringent performance 
expectations of mission critical applications such as financial transactions and 
retail sales. Database systems are also relied upon for their compression 
capabilities to optimize storage costs. 
    Database systems are usually accessed by two types of personas: A Database 
Administrator (DBA) and an application user. DBAs are responsible for the 
installation and ongoing maintenance of the database system software as well as 
the daily operations such as database backups, restores, configurations and 
security. Application users access the database through an application, resulting 
in a multitiered environment where the user’s browser is the first tier, the 
application server is the middle tier and the database server is the third tier. 
Typically, users log on to the application and the application issues queries to the 
database to serve the needs of those users. Figure 1.1 depicts a typical database 
system deployment and usage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1– Typical database system deployment and usage 
    A set of fine-grained authorization and data encryption techniques have been 
proposed to equip database systems with the controls necessary to protect the 
File System 
Storage 
Media 
Database 
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 Application Application access 
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critical data entrusted with them. In the next sub-sections, we briefly review these 
techniques and highlight key challenges.  
1.1.1 Fine-Grained Authorization 
Fine-grained authorization has originally been tackled through the concept of 
database views (Elmasri et al., 2010). A DBA would create the desired views over 
the tables containing the sensitive data and grant access to those views based 
on “need-to-know”. This approach has two major drawbacks. First, it is not data-
centric as the security policy is only enforced when the data is accessed through 
the views. Users with the right privileges can bypass the security policy by 
accessing the base tables directly. Secondly, views can very quickly become 
complex to manage as their number grows in order to satisfy the needs of 
different user groups. Subsequent work around fine-grained database 
authorization has addressed these two shortcomings to some degree.  However, 
there are still two major issues. First, the loss of user identity in multitiered 
environments which renders the fine- grained authorization policies defined in the 
database almost of no value since the identity of the end user is not known. The 
application server is then forced to compensate by implementing the fine-grained 
authorization logic in the application itself. This in turn renders the application 
more complex, error prone, and prevents it from benefiting from delegating the 
security policy to the database system where it can be enforced more efficiently. 
The second major issue is the coexistence of fine-grained authorization with 
important database tenets such as integrity and performance. How do we balance 
integrity and security when both a trigger and fine-grained authorization policy 
are defined on the same table? Similarly, how do we balance performance and 
security when a Materialized Query Table (MQT) is defined on one or more tables 
protected with a fine-grained authorization policy? In both cases, enforcing the 
fine-grained authorization policy blindly can compromise database integrity 
and/or disrupt the accuracy of a query results set. 
1.1.2 Data Encryption 
For database encryption, the solutions available in this space can be grouped 
into four categories: Column encryption, tablespace encryption, file system 
encryption, and self-encrypting disks. Column encryption negatively affects 
database performance as queries with range predicates cannot benefit from 
index-based access plans to limit the data to read from the table. Instead, the 
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database system is forced to read the entire table to evaluate the query. 
Tablespace encryption may leave certain data vulnerable to attacks when, for 
example, a DBA inadvertently takes an action that moves data from an encrypted 
tablespace to an unencrypted one. File system encryption and self-encrypted 
disks provide no protection against privileged users on the operating system. As 
long as the file permissions allow access, such users can easily view the content 
of the database by browsing the underlying files on the operating system. 
1.1.3 Mandatory Access Control 
Within the intelligence and defense communities, Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC) (Rjaibi et al., 2004) is actually the mechanism relied upon for database 
fine-grained authorization. Under this model, each row in a table is assigned a 
classification. Similarly, each database user is assigned a clearance. The 
combination of the MAC rules, the row’s classification and the user’s clearance 
determine whether or not a given user can access a given row. MAC solutions 
for database systems have solely focused on Multilevel Security (MLS) (Rjaibi, 
2004). MLS is a very specific MAC model which came out of the US defense 
community and has rigid classification, clearance and MAC rules. This meant that 
MLS database systems could not be used to meet the needs of the defense and 
intelligence communities from other countries where the classification, clearance, 
and MAC rules may not necessarily match those of the US government. 
Additionally, the issues around the loss of end user identity in multitiered 
environments discussed earlier still apply when MAC models are enforced by the 
database systems. 
1.2 Motivation 
The rise of data breaches has driven many organizations nowadays to implement 
zero-trust security in order to reduce the risk of incurring a data breach. Like 
identity systems and networks (Gilman et al., 2017), database systems also need 
to evolve to help organizations effectively adhere to zero-trust security for at least 
three main reasons. 
    First, database systems store the organization’s most critical data (e.g., 
employee personal data, client transaction data, patient medical records, 
intellectual property information) and are often the primary target of attacks by 
malicious entities such as disgruntled employees or external hackers. Second, 
database systems are the subject of numerous regulations and standards such 
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as the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Voigt et al., 2017) 
and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) (Chuvakin et 
al., 2009) which impose severe financial penalties on any organization that fails 
to adequately protect critical data. Last but not least, traditional encryption and 
fine-grained authorization solutions for database systems are not adequate to 
address the challenges posed by security threats and compliance requirements. 
As pointed out in Section 1.1, traditional database encryption methods either 
negatively affect performance (column encryption) or create attack opportunities 
for malicious users (tablespace encryption, file system encryption, disk 
encryption). Similarly, traditional fine-grained database authorization methods 
can be bypassed (e.g. views) and do not address the loss of user identity 
problem, rendering them unusable in multitiered environments. They additionally 
do not coexist in harmony with fundamental database tenets such as triggers and 
MQT, thus creating potential for data leakage. Also, the loss of user identity in 
multitiered environments diminishes user accountability as auditing at the 
database level will not be able to show who actually performed which action. 
    Clearly, traditional database encryption and fine-grained authorization 
methods are creating a dilemma for enterprises when it comes to meeting their 
security needs. Some traditional encryption methods provide good security, but 
that security comes at the expense of database performance. Other encryption 
methods do not affect database performance, but that advantage comes at the 
expense of database security. Additionally, traditional fine-grained authorization 
methods do not apply in multitiered environments, forcing enterprises to build that 
security in the application. But this renders applications more complex and 
prevents them from delegating fine-grained authorization to the database where 
it can be enforced more effectively. The three key research questions are 
therefore the following: 
1. How can database systems be extended to build an encryption solution 
that meets the security needs but does not come at the expense of core 
database tenets such as performance and compression? 
2. What extensions can be made to database systems to develop a fine-
grained authorization solution that enables applications in multitiered 
environments to delegate the security policy to the database and improves 
overall database security? 
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3. How can database systems be extended to build a mandatory access 
control solution that addresses the limitations of traditional Multilevel 
Security (MLS) which imposes a rigid security label structure and access 
rules?   
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to enhance encryption and fine-grained authorization 
for database systems to help organizations meet their security and compliance 
needs, without having to compromise any core database tenets such as 
performance, integrity, compression and without requiring any changes to 
database applications. 
In order to achieve this aim, this research will: 
1. Develop a holistic database encryption solution that meets the security 
needs while coexisting in harmony with core database tenets such as 
performance and compression. 
2. Build a fine-grained authorization solution that enables applications in 
multitiered environments to delegate the security policy to the database 
while coexisting in harmony with performance, triggers, User-Defined 
Functions (UDF) and Materialized Query Tables. 
3. Enhance Mandatory Access Control (MAC) in database systems to 
broaden its applicability to additional use cases such as fine-grained 
authorization for XML documents stored database tables. 
4. Measure the impact of the enhancements introduced on database 
performance. 
1.4 Contributions 
This thesis has advanced the areas of database encryption, fine-grained 
database authorization and mandatory access control. The key contributions can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. A holistic database encryption solution which allows organizations to meet 
their security and compliance requirements without having to make 
compromises either on the security side or on the database side 
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2. A fine-grained database authorization solution which allows organizations 
to reduce the complexity of their applications and improve overall 
database security 
3. A solution which extends database systems to automatically and 
transparently enforce privacy policies 
4. A multi-purpose mandatory access control solution which addresses the 
limitations of traditional Multilevel Security (MLS) 
5. A fine-grained authorization solution for XML which improves over 
traditional node-based XML access control approaches, by considering 
inter-node relationships as the control granularity, and by using the multi-
purpose mandatory access control above for controlling access to such 
inter-node relationships 
6. The implementation of the enhancements above in several commercial 
database systems including IBM DB2 and Informix, where they are relied 
upon by thousands of clients around the world to protect their critical data 
and meet their compliance mandates. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the key tenets 
of database security, positions the research portfolio in that field and summarizes 
the key contributions for each. Chapter 3 gives the details of this thesis’s 
contributions to the fine-grained database authorization area. Chapter 4 
describes the details of this thesis’s contributions to the database encryption 
area. Chapter 5 describes the details of this thesis’s contributions to the 
mandatory access control area as well as to XML fine-grained authorization. 
Chapter 6 shows how the contributions above come together to help 
organizations effectively adhere to zero-trust database security. Chapter 7 
summarizes the thesis and explores future directions for database security 
research. Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C list the research portfolio for 
fine-grained authorization, data encryption and mandatory access control 
respectively.
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Chapter 2:  Research Portfolio Overview 
This chapter briefly summarizes database security and positions the research 
portfolio within this field. It then gives a high-level overview of the publications in 
the portfolio and shows where each fit with respect to the fine-grained 
authorization, data encryption and mandatory access control areas. Each of 
these portfolio areas are then discussed in full details in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 respectively. The primary focus of this thesis is the portfolio 
developed during the last 3 years (including the PhD registration period), namely 
chapters 3, 4 and 6. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Database security is the set of capabilities organizations depend upon to ensure 
the security of the data they store in databases. It can be broadly divided into five 
main pillars: 
1. Authentication: This is the first protection measure where the database 
system challenges the user to prove who they claim they are. Database 
systems typically support various options for doing this validation such as 
verifying the credentials submitted within the database system itself or 
integrating with an external system to do so. Typical options for an external 
system include the host operating system, an LDAP server or a Kerberos 
KDC (MIT, 2019).  
2. Coarse-grained authorization: This is the next level of protection where 
the database system verifies that the authenticated user has the privilege 
to execute a particular action. For example, when a user issues an SQL 
SELECT statement on given table, the database system must first verify 
that the user has been granted SELECT privilege on that table. DBAs use 
the GRANT and REVOKE SQL statements to grant or revoke a particular 
privilege to/from a user (Elmasri et al., 2010). These privilege assignments 
are stored in the database system catalog tables and are consulted during 
authorization checking. Users can acquire a privilege directly or indirectly 
through membership in a role or group. Memberships in roles and groups 
are also stored in the database system catalog tables and are consulted 
during authorization checking.       
3. Fine-grained authorization: While coarse-grained authorization dictates 
whether or not a user has the privilege to access a table, fine-grained 
authorization goes a level deeper. It controls what specific rows, columns 
or cells of that table the user is allowed to access. Traditionally, database 
views have been used to enforce fine-grained authorization (Elmasri et al., 
2010). A database view represents a dynamically computed set of rows 
from one or more tables. Typically, the DBA creates the desired views and 
grants access on those views to the appropriate users. Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) is another option some database systems offer for 
enforcing fine-grained authorization (Rjaibi et al., 2004). It is an option that 
is typically used by the defense and intelligence communities. In MAC, 
each data row in a table is assigned a classification representing the 
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sensitivity of that row (e.g., SECRET). Similarly, users are assigned 
clearances, defining their access level (e.g., TOP SECRET). The 
combination of row classification and user clearance determines whether 
or not the user can access the given row.  
4. Data encryption: Data encryption can be divided into two categories: 
Encryption for data in transit and encryption for data at rest. Encryption for 
data in transit protects the confidentiality of the data exchange between 
the database system and an application. Most database systems 
implement Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide this protection. The 
goal of encryption for data at rest is to safeguard the data when it is in 
storage. Different implementations exist ranging from column encryption, 
to tablespace encryption, to file system encryption, to self-encryption 
disks.  
5. Auditing: This is the mechanism database systems provide so 
enterprises can hold users accountable for their actions. It is also a 
requirement for complying with various mandates such as the European 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or the Payment Card Industry 
Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Most database systems provide the 
flexibility to decide what type of activity to audit such as auditing a specific 
user, a specific role, a specific table, all users, all tables, and so on.  
Similarly, most database systems offer several options as to where the 
audit records are sent. Options include storing them locally on the host 
operating system or sending them to a Security Information and Event 
Management (SIEM) system where they are aggregated and correlated 
with audit data from other applications.   
    Figure 2.1 highlights the specific database security pillars that are the subject 
of the research portfolio upon which this thesis is based. The portfolio specifically 
focuses on fine-grained authorization and data encryption. The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the portfolio of 
publications related to fine-grained authorization. Section 2.3 highlights the 
portfolio of publications in the data encryption area. Section 2.4 gives an overview 
of the portfolio of publications in the area of mandatory access control. Lastly, 
Section 2.5 concludes this chapter. 
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Figure 2.1– Database security pillars and focus of the thesis 
2.2 Fine-Grained Authorization 
The core element of the research portfolio in this area is the publication 
“Enhancing and Simplifying Data Security and Privacy for Multitiered 
Applications”. This publication was fully developed during the course of this thesis 
and is given in Chapter 3. It builds upon the ideas expressed in the following 
patents1: 
• US Patent US8,234.299B2: “Method and System for Using Fine-Grained 
Access Control (FGAC) to Control Access to Data in a Database”. This 
patent is the foundation for the row permission and column mask 
concepts discussed in the core publication above. 
• US Patent US 7,647,626B2: “Method for Establishing a Trusted 
Relationship Between a Data Server and a Middleware Server”. This 
patent is the foundation for the trusted context concept discussed in the 
core publication above. 
    The research portfolio includes additional contributions to fine-grained 
authorization. Publication “Extending Relational Database Systems to 
 
1 Walid was directly involved in the naming of all 7 patents referred to in this thesis. 
Authentication 
Coarse-grained authorization 
Fine-grained authorization (Thesis focus) 
(Thesis focus) 
Data encryption (Thesis focus) 
(Thesis focus) 
Auditing 
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Automatically Enforce Privacy Policies” describes a model where privacy policies 
such as P3P (Agrawal et al., 2005) can be automatically enforced by the 
database system. This publication builds upon the ideas expressed in the 
following patents: 
• US Patent US7,865,521B2: “Access Control for Elements in a Database 
Object”. This patent is the foundation for the table restriction concept 
discussed in the publication above. 
• US Patent US 7,243,097 B1: “Extending Relational Database Systems to 
Automatically Enforce Privacy Policies”. This patent is the foundation for 
the method to translate privacy policies into table restrictions discussed in 
the publication above. 
    Table 2.1 summarizes the fine-grained authorization publications and their key 
contributions. 
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Table 2.1 – Fine-grained authorization publications 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Rjaibi, W., Hammoudeh, M. (2020). 
‘Enhancing and Simplifying Data 
Security and Privacy for Multitiered 
Applications’. Journal of Parallel and 
Distributed Computing, Special Issue on 
Enabling Technologies for Energy Cloud. 
(Also, Chapter 3 of this thesis) 
Walid’s % contribution: 75. 
- Design of a holistic fine-grained database authorization solution 
which allows organizations to reduce the complexity of their 
applications and improve overall database security. 
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, Unix and 
Windows, IBM DB2 for z/OS and IBM for DB2 for iSeries. 
2 Method and System for Using 
Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) to 
Control Access to Data in a Database  
 
US Patent US8,234.299B2 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the row permission and column 
mask concepts discussed in the core publication #1 above. 
3 Method for Establishing a Trusted 
Relationship Between a Data Server and 
a Middleware Server  
 
US Patent US 7,647,626B2 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the trusted context concept 
discussed in the core publication #1 above. 
4 Agrawal, R., Bird, P., Grandison, T., 
Kiernan, J., Logan S., Rjaibi, W. (2005). 
‘Extending relational database systems to 
automatically enforce privacy policies’. In 
Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE). 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
- Design of a solution which extends database systems to be able 
to automatically enforce privacy policies. 
- Enable organizations to meet privacy requirements for data 
stored in database systems.  
5 Access Control for Elements in a 
Database Object  
 
US Patent US7,865,521B2 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the table restriction concept 
discussed in publication #4 above.  
6 Extending Relational Database Systems 
to Automatically Enforce 
Privacy Policies 
 
US Patent US 7,243,097 B1 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the method to translate privacy 
policies into table restrictions discussed in publication #4 above. 
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2.3 Data Encryption 
The core element of the research portfolio in this area is the publication “Holistic 
Database Encryption”. A summary of this publication is given in Chapter 4 and 
the publication itself is given in Appendix B.  
    Publications “Towards Zero-Trust Database Security – Part 1” and “Towards 
Zero-Trust Database Security – Part 2” show how the solution discussed in 
publication “Holistic Database Encryption” contributes to implementing zero-trust 
security for database systems. These two additional publications have been fully 
developed during the course of this thesis and are the foundation for Chapter 6 
(Towards Zero-Trust Database Security). The publications themselves are given 
in Appendix B.  
    Table 2.2 summarizes the data encryption publications and their key 
contributions. 
Table 2.2 – Data encryption publications 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Rjaibi, W. (2018). ‘Holistic Database 
Encryption’. In Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Security and 
Cryptography (SECRYPT). 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 100. 
- Design of a holistic database encryption solution which allows 
organizations to meet their security and compliance 
requirements without having to make compromises either on the 
security side or on the database side. 
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, Unix and 
Windows. 
2 Rjaibi, W., Hammoudeh, M. (2019). 
‘Towards Zero-Trust Database Security 
Part 1’. IEEE Future Directions Newsletter: 
Technology Policy & Ethics, Issue 
(September 2019). 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 80. 
- Introduces a database threat model and raises awareness of 
the direct and indirect means through which the same data in a 
database can be accessed. 
3 Rjaibi, W., Hammoudeh, M. (2019). 
‘Towards Zero-Trust Database Security 
Part 2’. IEEE Future Directions Newsletter: 
Technology Policy & Ethics, Issue 
(December 2019). 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 80. 
- Outlines solutions (including encryption) to address the direct 
and indirect access challenges and to enable zero-trust database 
security.   
 
  15 
2.4 Mandatory Access Control 
The core element of the research portfolio in this area is the publication “A Multi-
Purpose Implementation of Mandatory Access Control in Relational Database 
Management Systems”. A summary of this publication is given in Chapter 5 and 
the publication itself is given in Appendix C.  It builds upon the ideas expressed 
in the following patents: 
• US Patent US7,568,235B2: “Controlling Data Access Using Security Label 
Components”. This patent is the foundation for the security label concept 
discussed in the core publication above. 
• US Patent US7,860,875B2: “Method for Modifying a Query by Use of an 
External System for Managing Assignments of User and Data 
Classifications”. This patent is the foundation for the enterprise integration 
methodology discussed in the core publication above.   
    Publication “Inter-Node Relationship Labelling: A Fine-Grained XML Access 
Control Implementation Using Generic Security Labels” shows an application of 
the multi-purpose MAC solution discussed in the core publication. The fine-
grained XML access control solution devised improves over traditional node-
based XML access control approaches, by considering inter-node relationships 
as the control granularity, and by using security labels to control access to such 
inter-node relationships. A summary of this publication is given in Chapter 5 and 
the publication itself is given in Appendix C. This publication builds upon the ideas 
expressed in the following patents: 
• US Patent US2009/0063951A1: “Fine-Grained, Label-Based, XML 
Access Control Model”. This patent is the foundation for the inter-node 
relationship labelling concept discussed in the publication above. 
    Lastly, publication “An Introduction to Multilevel Secure Relational Database 
Management Systems” surveys and critiques traditional implementation of 
mandatory access control in database systems (i.e., MLS). This publication is 
also given in Appendix C.  
    Table 2.3 summarizes the mandatory access control publications and their key 
contributions. 
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Table 2.3 – Mandatory access control publications 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Rjaibi, W., Bird, P. (2004). ‘A Multi-
Purpose Implementation of Mandatory 
Access Control in Relational Database 
Management Systems’. In Proceedings of 
the International Conference on Very 
Large Data Bases (VLDB). 
Walid’s % contribution: 75. 
- Design of a mandatory access control solution for database 
systems which addresses the limitations of traditional Multilevel 
Security (MLS).  
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, Unix and 
Windows, and Informix. 
2 Controlling Data Access Using Security 
Label Components  
US Patent US7,568,235B2 
Walid’s % contribution: 75. 
This patent is the foundation for the security label concepts 
discussed in the core publication #1 above. 
3 Method for Modifying a Query by Use of 
an External System for Managing 
Assignments of User and Data 
Classifications  
 
US Patent US7,860,875B2 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the enterprise integration 
methodology discussed in the core publication #1 above. 
4 Zhang, Z., Rjaibi, W. (2006). ‘Inter-node 
Relationship Labelling: A Fine-Grained 
XML Access Control Implementation 
Using Generic Security Labels’. In 
Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Security and Cryptography 
(SECRYPT). 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
- Design of a solution which improves over traditional node-based 
XML access control approaches, by considering inter-node 
relationships as the control granularity. 
- Enable databases to extend fine-grained authorizations to XML 
columns in database tables. 
- Enable organizations to meet privacy requirements and adhere 
to zero-trust security. 
5 Fine-Grained, Label-Based, XML 
Access Control Model  
 
US Patent US2009/0063951A1 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 50. 
This patent is the foundation for the inter-node relationship 
labelling concept discussed in the publication #4 above. 
6 Rjaibi, W. (2004). ‘An introduction to 
multilevel secure relational database 
management systems’. In Proceedings of 
the conference of the Centre for Advanced 
Studies on Collaborative research 
(CASCON). 
 
Walid’s % contribution: 100. 
Survey and critique of traditional implementations of mandatory 
access control in database systems (i.e., MLS). 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has positioned the research portfolio within the database security 
field. It has also given a high-level overview of the publications in this portfolio 
and shows where each fit with respect to the fine-grained authorization, data 
encryption and mandatory access control areas. The next three chapters will 
discuss this research portfolio in full details. The publications themselves are 
given in Appendixes A, B and C.
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Chapter 3:  Enhanced Fine-Grained Authorization 
This chapter highlights the shortcomings of traditional fine-grained authorization 
approaches in database systems, in particular the loss of user identity in 
multitiered application environments which prevents such applications from 
delegating the security policy to the database where it can be enforced more 
effectively. Next, the chapter introduces the row permission, column mask and 
trusted context concepts to extend database systems so that applications can 
safely delegate the security policy to the database as opposed to building such 
policy in the application logic itself. The implementation of such concepts in IBM 
DB2 is then discussed and a performance evaluation is presented. The 
evaluation shows that enforcing the fine-grained database authorization policy by 
the database has not resulted in any significant performance drawbacks for the 
application. This means that the gains in security and the reduction in application 
complexity do not come at the expense of database performance. This chapter 
appears in the research portfolio as publication “Enhancing and Simplifying Data 
Security and Privacy for Multitiered Applications”, which was fully developed 
during the course of the PhD registration. It is a synthesis of the entire research 
portfolio in fine-grained authorization for database systems.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Classical 3-tier applications have become quite complex partly due to the cost of 
implementing data security and privacy rules within the application logic itself. 
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of a classical 3-tier application, where the end 
user browsers, the application server and the database server represent the first, 
second and third tier respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1– Classical 3-tier application architecture 
    Under this model, end users access the application to perform tasks related to 
their job. The application authenticates such users to ensure they are authorized 
to use the application. To meet the needs of the end users, the application makes 
a connection to the database using a generic user ID identifying that application 
to the database. To ensure that the right content of the database is returned to 
the right users, the application logic typically includes a fine-grained authorization 
layer to do the appropriate level of data filtering. This layer is usually implemented 
in one or a combination of these two options: 
• The application builds the SQL queries in such a way that they include the 
appropriate predicates and functions to filter out and mask the table data 
as appropriate. 
• The application builds a set of database views which perform the 
appropriate level of data filtering and routes the SQL queries to the 
appropriate views based on user identities. 
    Besides burdening the application with the task of implementing fine-grained 
authorization, this model also suffers from other security drawbacks including: 
User 1 
User 2  Application Database 
System 
User devices Data 
Application Server 
Database Server 
User N 
Application bypass  
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• The approach is not data-centric. This means that the intended security 
policy is not enforced when the application is bypassed. An example of 
such bypass is when the application administrator chooses to abuse the 
application’s database user ID to access the database directly. This is 
particularly important in today's world where internal threats are as 
concerning as external threats (Zaytsev et al., 2017), (Ghafir et al., 2018). 
• Over granting of database privileges. The application’s database user ID 
is typically granted the privileges of a database administrator so that it can 
be used to do all things on behalf of all users. This means that when such 
user ID is abused, the consequences to the organization can be severe. 
• Loss of end user identity at the database level. This is a consequence of 
the application doing all database accesses on behalf of all users using a 
single user ID. This makes it impossible to leverage database auditing to 
hold end users accountable for their actions. It also prevents the 
application from delegating the fine-grained authorization policy to the 
database as the user ID is lost at that level. 
• Unnecessary exposure of the security policy to application developers. 
    We contend that applications complexity can be reduced by delegating the 
fine-grained authorization task to the database system. We also contend that this 
delegation will additionally address the security concerns raised above and 
enable applications to better adhere to compliance mandates such as the 
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Voigt et al., 2017) and 
the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) (Chuvakin et al., 
2009). 
    The crux of our contribution is the design of a holistic fine-grained database 
authorization approach which allows organizations to reduce the complexity of 
their applications and improve overall database security. We have also 
implemented the solution in a commercial database system (IBM DB2 for Linux, 
Unix, and Windows). Our approach improves over the state of the art as follows: 
• Fine-grained authorization coexists in harmony with fundamental 
database tenets such as performance and integrity so that organizations 
are not forced to make compromises either on the security side or on the 
database side. 
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• Applications can safely delegate the security policy to the database 
system by leveraging the trusted context concept to propagate user 
identities to the database system, thus extending the value of fine-grained 
database authorization to multitiered applications. 
• Organizations can leverage the trusted context concept to ensure that the 
application’s database user ID cannot be abused by malicious entities who 
may want to leverage that user ID for accessing the database outside the 
scope of the application (i.e., application bypass).  
    The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
work. Section 3.3 describes our fine-grained database authorization model. 
Section 3.4 introduces our trusted context concept which addresses the loss of 
user identity problem in multitiered environments. In section 3.5, we discuss how 
the new concepts introduced safely coexist with core database tenets. Section 
3.6 describes the performance evaluation of our fine-grained database 
authorization model. In Section 3.7, we discuss a banking use case and show 
how our solution meets its requirements. Lastly, Section 3.8 summarizes this 
chapter. 
3.2 Related Work 
Traditionally, fine-grained authorization in database systems has been 
implemented using the concept of database views (Elmasri et al., 2010). Like 
database views, our approach is an extension to SQL and is declarative in nature. 
Administrators are not expected to write any code to implement the fine-grained 
authorization rules. However, our solution improves over database views in two 
main ways. First, our approach defines the row and column controls directly on 
the database tables themselves. This means that the row and column 
authorization is always enforced regardless of whether the table is accessed 
directly or indirectly through a database view. In contrast, when implementing 
fine-grained authorization using views, the row and column authorization is 
enforced only when the access is made through those views. In other words, 
views do not provide any protection when the underlying tables are accessed 
directly. Additionally, our approach introduced the notion of trusted context to 
enable user identity propagation in multitiered environments so that applications 
can safely delegate fine-grained authorization to the database system. 
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    Oracle Virtual Private Database (VPD) was, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first database system to introduce a fine-grained authorization model that 
improves over traditional database views (Gaetjen et al., 2015) and is the closest 
to our work. There are however some important differences between Oracle VPD 
and our approach. First, the Oracle VPD approach is not declarative. It requires 
the administrator to code a PL/SQL program which computes a predicate string 
that is appended to any SQL statement accessing the table with which the 
PL/SQL program was associated. This also limits the benefits of SQL statements 
caching only to situations where the PL/SQL program is guaranteed to return the 
same results for all users. Our approach does not limit the benefits of SQL 
statements caching because it does not change the SQL statement text itself. 
Oracle VPD also includes the notion of an Application Context which can be used 
by applications to pass information to the database system such as a user ID in 
a multitiered environment. An Application Context is a set of name-value pairs 
the Oracle database systems stores in memory. Our trusted context concept 
provides a more robust framework for propagating user identities in multitiered 
environments as it first requires the establishment of a trusted relationship 
between the database system and the application before propagating a user ID 
is allowed. It also provides more control on which specific user IDs are allowed 
for propagation as well as the ability to associate the application’s privileges with 
the trusted context only so they cannot be abused elsewhere.  
    The Row Level Security (RLS) and Dynamic Data Masking (DDM) capabilities 
in Microsoft SQL Server are conceptually similar to our row permission and 
column mask concepts (Carter, 2018). But there are some important differences 
between the two approaches. First, the SQL Server DDM is static in the sense 
that the user either has access to the actual value in the column or a masked 
value thereof. The column mask concept in our approach is dynamic in the sense 
that the decision of whether the user sees the actual value, or a masked value is 
determined dynamically based on the conditions expressed in the column mask 
definition. Additionally, the SQL Server RLS requires the administrator to go 
through a two-step process: They first need to create a function which returns a 
filtering predicate, and then create a policy on the table to apply that predicate. In 
our approach, this is all done in a single step using the row permission concept. 
The user identity propagation in multitiered environments is supported through 
an application context concept similar to the Oracle VPD one discussed above. 
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    The Vertica Row Access Policy and Column Access Policy concepts enable 
administrators to enforce access to table data at the row and column level 
respectively (Vertica, 2019). The Vertica SQL syntax is very similar to ours. 
However, and to the best of our knowledge, the Vertica solution does not discuss 
how it enables user identity propagation in multitiered environments. Additionally, 
the Vertica solution does not show any performance evaluation to contrast 
implementing the fine-grained authorization rules within the database versus 
within the application. 
    The Sybase Row Level Access Control (RLAC) enables administrators to 
restrict access to data rows in a table by defining an access rule and binding it to 
a specific column of the table (Garbus, 2015). When a table is accessed, the 
access rules in place are automatically enforced by incorporating them into the 
query at compilation time. Our approach differs from the Sybase RLAC capability 
in several ways. First, RLAC is limited to row level access control only while our 
approach covers both the row and column level. Also, to the best our knowledge, 
the Sybase RLAC does not discuss how it enables user identity propagation in 
multitiered environments. 
    The fine-grained authorization model presented in (Chaudhuri et al., 2007) is 
also a declarative SQL model like ours. But there are some differences between 
the two approaches. The first difference is fairly minor. They have extended the 
GRANT SQL statement to give administrators the tools to define row and column 
authorization rules while our approach introduced these constructs independently 
of the GRANT statement. However, the work presented in (Chaudhuri et al., 
2007) did not cover user identity propagation in multitiered environments. It 
assumed it was taken care of through a method similar to the application context 
concept in Oracle VPD. Lastly, their work did not include any performance 
evaluation to contrast implementing the fine-grained authorization rules within the 
database versus within the application. 
    The fine-grained authorization approach discussed in (Agrawal et al., 2005) is 
also a declarative SQL model but there are some key differences with our 
approach. First, the focus of the work in (Agrawal et al., 2005) is on privacy 
policies. They introduced row and column restriction concepts for the purpose of 
being able to map privacy policies to them so the database system can 
automatically enforce privacy policies. It did not cover user identity propagation 
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in multitiered environment. Also, the model described in (Agrawal et al., 2005) did 
not include any performance evaluation to contrast enforcing the privacy policy 
within the database versus within the application. 
    The model described in (Rjaibi et al., 2004) can be regarded as a special form 
of fine-grained authorization. The focus of this work is more around introducing a 
flexible mandatory access control model which addresses some of the 
shortcoming of classical Multilevel Security (Rjaibi, 2004). It is a declarative SQL 
model and also ensures the security predicates are executed before any 
potentially unsafe predicates to prevent data leakage. However, it did not 
introduce the concept of secure functions as we did in this chapter, so security 
predicates are always executed first even if that does not make sense from a 
performance perspective. Lastly, the approach discussed in (Rjaibi et al., 2004) 
did not cover user identity propagation in multitiered environments. 
    Besides security built into database systems themselves, the importance of 
protecting databases has also led to the emergence of external database security 
tools. The leading tools in this context are Guardium (Chen et al., 2014) and 
Imperva (Imperva, 2019). These tools can be thought of as complementary to our 
solution as they focus more on database auditing, compliance reporting and 
analytics on auditing data as opposed to fine-grained database authorization. 
3.3 Fine-Grained Database Authorization Model 
We extend the SQL table privileges model with two new concepts: Row 
permissions and column masks. Row permissions and column masks implement 
a second layer of security on top of table privileges. When a table is accessed, 
the privileges layer determines whether or not the table can be accessed. Next, 
row permissions are applied to decide what specific set of the table rows the user 
is authorized to access. Lastly, column masks are applied to figure out whether 
the user is allowed to see the actual value in a column or a masked value thereof. 
For example, row permissions ensure that when a doctor queries the patients 
table, they only see rows that represent patients under their care. On the other 
hand, a column mask on the phone number column ensures that the doctor sees 
only phone numbers for patients who consented to share their phone numbers 
with them. Figure 3.2 shows our model as an extension to the SQL compiler. 
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Figure 3.2– Fine-grained authorization as an extension of the SQL Compiler 
    An SQL statement first goes through the parser component where it is 
analyzed for syntactic correctness and a query graph is generated. Next, it goes 
into the query rewrite component where the graph is modified to inject additional 
objects such as integrity constraints and triggers. We have modified this 
component to inject the new row permission and column mask concepts we have 
introduced. The modified graph then goes into the query optimizer component 
where several execution options are examined, and the optimal plan is selected 
based on a cost function. We have also modified this component to protect 
against potential data leakage should an unsafe predicate be evaluated before 
the security rules expressed by the row permissions are evaluated. 
    Unlike database views (Elmasri et al., 2010) where the security policy is 
enforced only when the views themselves are accessed, row permissions and 
column masks are table centric. This ensures that the security policy is enforced 
consistently regardless of how the table is accessed. Row permissions and 
column masks are also applied uniformly across all users, including DBAs, which 
helps organizations better adhere to zero-trust security (Gilman et al., 2017), 
(Walker-Roberts et al., 2018), (Hammoudeh et al., 2018) and in particular 
ensuring that access control is based on “need-to-know”. Additionally, row 
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permissions and column masks are application transparent. Database 
applications can immediately benefit from these concepts without having to incur 
any code changes. The SQL syntax for row permissions and column masks is 
given below. 
create permission permission-name on table-x 
  for rows where predicate-clause 
  enforced for all access [disable | enable]  
 
create mask mask-name on table-x 
  for column column-name 
  return case-expression [disable | enable] 
 
Example 1 
    The following row permission creates a rule that grants access to rows in the 
PAYROLL table only to users who are members of the HR role. 
create permission rpayroll on payroll 
  for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘HR’) = 1 
  enforced for all access enable;  
 
Example 2 
    The following column mask creates a rule that grants access to the salary 
column in the PAYROLL table only to users who are members of the SM role. 
Other users will see NULL when they query the salary column. 
create mask msalary on payroll 
  for column salary  
  return case when verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘SM’) = 1 
           then salary 
           else null 
                end 
            enable; 
 
    Some applications may not desire receiving a NULL value. Instead, they may 
want to receive an alternate and format preserving data value (Goldsteen et al., 
2015). Our model can easily support this use case. All that is needed is to register 
a User Defined Function (UDF) in the database and modify the CREATE MASK 
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SQL statement above such that instead of returning NULL, call the UDF to return 
the desired output. 
    A table can have zero or more row permissions. When more than a single row 
permission is defined on a table, the predicates from each one of them are 
combined together by applying the logical OR operator. In other words, if a row 
permission R1 gives user U1 access to a set of rows S1, and another row 
permission R2 on the same table gives that same user access to another set of 
rows S2, then both row permissions would give that user access to the union of 
S1 and S2. A column can have zero or one mask. We extended the SQL compiler 
so that during query compilation, row permissions and column masks are 
dynamically injected into the query graph. This ensures that the query execution 
plan generated automatically enforces the rules expressed by the row 
permissions and column masks. 
3.3.1 Row Permissions Enforcement 
Row permissions defined on a given table are automatically applied when that 
table is accessed through any table level SQL statements: SELECT, INSERT, 
UPDATE, DELETE, and MERGE. 
    For SELECT statements, the predicates from all the row permissions defined 
on the table are combined together through the logical OR operator to derive a 
master predicate. This master predicate acts as a filter to limit the set of rows 
returned. We extended the query optimizer component of the SQL compiler to 
ensure that this master predicate is evaluated before any other unsafe user 
predicates. This is important to guard against potential data leakage through such 
unsafe user predicates. For example, suppose there is a UDF which emails the 
table rows retrieved to some external party. If such UDF appears in a user 
predicate and that predicate is executed before the master predicate, then by the 
time the master predicate is applied it will already be too late as the row would 
have already been sent out. 
    For INSERT statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on 
that table are used to determine whether or not the row can be inserted into the 
table. To qualify, the user attempting to insert the row must be able to retrieve it 
back through a SELECT statement. This semantic is analogous to how symmetric 
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database views behave. More specifically, a user is not allowed to insert a row 
they cannot retrieve back. 
    For UPDATE statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on 
that table are used to determine whether or not the row can be updated. This is 
a two-step process. First, the row permissions are used to filter out the set of rows 
that can be updated. In other words, a user cannot update rows they are not 
allowed to see. Next, the updated rows (if any) must conform to the same 
semantic as for INSERT processing to ensure that the user does not inject rows 
they cannot retrieve back. 
    For DELETE statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on 
that table are used to filter the set of rows that can be deleted in order to ensure 
that the user can only delete rows they can see. 
    A MERGE statement can be thought of as a combination of an INSERT and 
an UPDATE statements. Therefore, a MERGE statement is processed as an 
INSERT when dealing with new rows and as an UPDATE when dealing with 
existing rows in the table. 
3.3.2 Column Masks Enforcement 
The goal of a column mask defined on a given column C1 is to ensure that when 
C1 appears in the final results set of a query, C1 values are masked out if the 
user is not authorized to see them. This has two important implications. First, the 
SQL compiler will enforce the column mask for SELECT statements only. 
INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, and MERGE statements do not return a result set 
to the user, so the column mask does not apply in these cases. Secondly, the 
SQL compiler must ensure that the enforcement of a column mask does not break 
database applications as this can have severe business impact. For example, 
suppose that a column mask is applied when the column appears in a predicate. 
This may totally change the final results set and the database application may 
end up processing a different set of rows (e.g. giving a raise to the wrong 
employees). Consequently, we have extended the SQL compiler such that 
column masks do not interfere with the computation of the final results set and 
the order or grouping thereof. More specifically, column masks are not applied 
when the column appears in any of these situations: WHERE clauses, GROUP 
BY clauses, HAVING clauses, SELECT DISTINCT, and ORDER BY clauses. 
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One consequence of this approach is that it may create opportunities for 
inferences. But as discussed in Section 1, we focus on application access as 
opposed to free direct SQL access to the database. Furthermore, the trusted 
context concept introduced later in this chapter enables establishing a trusted 
relationship between the application and the database server as well as 
protecting against abuse of the application’s database user ID. 
3.4 User Identity Propagation in Multitiered Environments 
In multitiered environments, the middle tier application serves the needs of 
several users over a pooled database connection. Under this model, the 
database server only sees a generic user ID which identifies the middle tier 
application, not the actual users of that application. Despite being a very popular 
application model, the fact that the database server only sees a generic user ID 
for all accesses poses several challenges. 
    First, the middle tier application cannot benefit from fine-grained database 
authorization because the database server does not see the identity of the 
application user. Thus, instead of delegating the authorization burden to the 
database server where it can be enforced more effectively, the middle tier 
application is forced to implement that fine-grained authorization in the 
application itself. This renders the application more complex, exposes the 
security policy to application programmers, and forces unnecessary patching of 
the application each time the security policy needs to be updated. 
    Additionally, using a single user ID for all database accesses diminishes user 
accountability. For example, one of the very first tasks in a forensic investigation 
is to check the database audit logs for gaining insight into user activities. 
However, if all accesses by all users are made using a single user ID, the 
database audit log would unfortunately provide little to no value. 
    The naïve approach to address this issue is to have the middle tier application 
establish a separate database connection for each user. Unfortunately, this 
approach may not be always feasible as the middle tier application may not have 
access to the end user database credentials. Additionally, even if this were 
feasible, this approach would not be desirable as establishing a large set of 
database connections would introduce a database performance overhead. This 
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is the overhead associated with user authentication and the setting of the actual 
connection structures on the database server side. 
    Clearly, a better approach is needed for relieving the middle tier application 
from the burden of enforcing fine-grained authorization, and for holding users 
accountable for their actions. 
3.4.1 Trusted Contexts 
We extend database systems by introducing a new concept called trusted 
context. A trusted context is a database object which defines a trust relationship 
between the database server and an external entity such as a middle tier 
application server. The trust relationship allows the database security 
administrator (DBSECADM) to specify a set of conditions which, when satisfied 
by a database connection request, instructs the database server to internally 
mark that database connection as trusted. A trusted connection gives the entity 
that established such connection a set of privileges that are not available outside 
the scope of that trusted connection. One example of such privileges is the ability 
to reuse an existing database connection for a different user without having to re-
authenticate that user at the database server. Reusing an existing database 
connection avoids incurring a performance overhead by eliminating the need to 
establish a new database connection. Therefore, a middle tier application server 
can take advantage of the trusted context concept to establish an initial trusted 
connection, and then reuse that trusted connection to propagate an end user 
identity to the database server before submitting database requests on behalf of 
that end user. 
    The DBSECADM can choose from a variety of attributes to set the conditions 
for a trusted relationship such as a user ID, an IP address, a domain name, a 
digital certificate, and the type of encryption used to protect the communication 
channel between the database server and the middle tier application (e.g., SSL). 
The SQL language syntax for our trusted context concept is given below.  
create trusted context context-name 
  based upon connection using system authid authorization-id 
  attributes key-value-pair-list 
  default role role-name 
  with use for user | role | group name [without authentication |  
  with authentication] [role role-name]  
  [disable | enable] 
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Example 3 
    The following trusted context establishes a trusted relationship between the 
database server and a middle tier application. The attributes upon which this 
trusted relationship is based are the user ID identifying the middle tier application 
itself, the IP address of the server where that application is hosted, and the type 
of communication encryption used to protect the communication channel 
between the database server and the middle tier application. 
create trusted context ctx1  
  based upon connection using system authid midtierApp1 
  attributes (address ‘174.94.142.56’ encryption ‘SSL’) 
  with use for role midtierApp1Users 
  without authentication 
  enable;  
 
    In our implementation of trusted contexts in IBM DB2, we have extended the 
database server connection processing as follows. When a database connection 
request is received, we go through the authentication process as usual, but we 
also compare the attributes of that request with the attributes of the trusted 
context objects defined at that database server.  If there is a match, we mark that 
connection as trusted. We have also extended the DB2 Command Level Interface 
(CLI) with a new command to give applications the option to request switching 
the current user ID on a trusted database connection. On the database server 
side, when such request is received, we first verify this is within the scope of a 
trusted connection, and then ensure that the user ID to switch to is authorized as 
per the trusted context object definition. For example, the trusted context 
definition above states that it is only permitted to switch to users who are 
members of the role midtierApp1Users. Lastly, we also check whether the trusted 
context definition authorizes switching users without authentication or requires 
authentication. If authentication is not required as in Example 3 above, then no 
further processing is required. Otherwise, the switch user request must provide a 
valid authentication credential. Once the checks above are completed and the 
switch user request is authorized, we reset the user environment over the current 
physical connection to match the new user, and the application is now ready to 
start sending database commands under the scope of this new user. 
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    Also, in order to ensure database integrity is not compromised, we extended 
the database server processing such that switching users over a trusted 
connection is permitted only on transaction boundary. If such a request is made 
outside of a transaction boundary, the current transaction is rolled back, and the 
connection is put in an unconnected state, thus giving the middle tier application 
the opportunity to recover. 
3.4.2 Trusted Context-Based Authorization 
Traditionally, database security models are such that the privileges granted to a 
user are universally applicable irrespective of any context. For example, if a user 
is granted SELECT privilege on the payroll database table, that user could 
exercise that privilege regardless of how they gain access to the database. The 
lack of control on when a privilege is available to a user can weaken overall 
security since the privilege may be abused. For example, an application 
administrator may choose to use the application’s database credentials to 
connect to the database directly and make changes that are contrary to the 
application business logic. 
    To provide control over when privileges may be exercised, we extend the 
trusted context concept so that a DBSECADM can associate one or more roles 
with a trusted context. Roles that are associated with a trusted context are only 
exercisable when the user is acting within the scope of a trusted connection 
based upon that trusted context. This enables organizations to better adhere to 
zero-trust security, and in particular the “verify and never trust” tenet as the 
database system verifies more security attributes before granting a role to user 
(Gilman et al., 2017), (Walker-Roberts et al., 2018). 
Example 4 
    The definition of the following trusted context is similar to Example 3, but it 
specifies two database roles. The first role is DBCONNECT which the 
DBSECADM decided not to grant to the user ID midtierApp1. Instead, they 
assigned it to this trusted context. This means that if the application administrator 
were to abuse this user ID by attempting to connect to the database from a server 
other than what is stated in the trusted context definition, that connection will be 
refused by the database server. The second role is HR, which is the role that 
grants access to the content of the payroll table as per the row authorization in 
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Example 1. This in turn means that members of the HR role will have access to 
the payroll table only within the scope of the trusted connection based upon this 
trusted context. In other words, they will only have access when they are using 
the application and not otherwise. 
create trusted context ctx1 
  based upon connection using system authid midtierApp1 
  attributes (address ‘srv.dep.org.com’ encryption ‘SSL’) 
  default role DBCONNECT  
  with use for role midtierApp1Users 
  without authentication HR 
  enable; 
 
    In our implementation of trusted context-based authorization in IBM DB2, we 
have extended the database server authorization model as follows. When a 
database connection request is matched with a trusted context object, we check 
if there are any default roles assigned to that trusted context and add them to the 
user’s roles list so they are used when deciding whether or not the user is 
authorized to connect to the database. Similarly, when a request to switch the 
current user on a trusted connection is received, we check if the trusted context 
definition grants any roles to the user to switch to and add any such roles to the 
new user’s roles list accordingly. 
3.5 Safe Coexistence with Fundamental Database Tenets 
Database security needs to safely coexist with fundamental database tenets. 
Failure to do so may create database vulnerabilities and limit adoption of the 
solution. 
3.5.1 User Defined Functions 
A User Defined Function (UDF) is an important database concept which 
applications depend upon to delegate certain tasks to the database system. We 
extended the database system such that, by default, the row permission 
predicates are evaluated first to avoid potential data leakage through UDFs that 
may also appear in the set of predicates to apply on the table. The following 
experiment illustrates this extension and can be consistently repeated on any 
recent IBM DB2 system. The experiment creates a table T1 with 2 integer 
columns A and B. It inserts 3 rows into this table (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3). Then, we 
create a UDF which replaces any value in column A that is greater than 1 by 1. 
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When we run the simple SQL query SELECT A, B FROM T1 WHERE F1(A) = 1, 
we expectedly obtain 3 rows because the values 2 and 3 in column A are changed 
to 1 by the UDF F1. Then we create a row permission with the predicate “A = 1”. 
Now, when we run the SELECT query above any number of times, we 
consistently get back a single row. This is because our design ensures that the 
row permission predicates are executed before any unsafe UDF predicate. This 
is how data leakage is prevented because the UDF could have done anything 
with the data rows such as modifying them to alter the results set (as F1 does). 
But our design ensures that the UDF only sees the rows which are authorized for 
the user running the SELECT query. Below are the exact steps.  
create table T1 (A int, B int); 
insert into T1 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3); 
create function F1 (A int) returns int 
  language SQL contains SQL no external action deterministic 
  return (case when A > 1 then 1 else A end); 
select A, B from T1 where F1(A) = 1; 
create permission P1 on T1  
 for rows where A = 1  
 enforced for all access  
enable; 
    select A, B from T1 where F1(A) = 1; 
 
    While executing the UDF predicate last is good from a security perspective, it 
may not be necessarily good from a performance perspective, particularly if the 
UDF is a trusted function. Therefore, we extended the database system with the 
concept of secure UDF. By default, a UDF is not secure, but the administrator 
can alter the definition of a UDF to mark it secure. This means that the 
administrator confirms that the UDF is trusted. When a UDF is secure, the 
database system can order the evaluation of predicates based on such UDF 
anywhere the SQL compiler sees fit. Secure UDF enable performance and 
database security to coexist in harmony. 
3.5.2 Materialized Query Tables 
A Materialized Query Table (MQT) is a special type of database table which 
contains the results set of an SQL query. It is a critical database concept DBAs 
depend upon to maintain high performance for complex SQL queries. So, why 
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does the design of database security need to pay attention to MQT? Suppose 
that the DBA creates an MQT M1 based on an SQL query affecting two tables T1 
and T2. Further, suppose that table T1 is protected through a set of row 
permissions and column masks. If such row permissions and column masks are 
applied during the creation of MQT M1, the content of that MQT becomes 
dependent on what its creator can or cannot see in base table T1. This would 
negatively affect the accuracy of the database system’s answers. For example, if 
the database system decides to use M1 to answer a query from a user U1, that 
user may get more data or less data than what they are authorized depending on 
whether they have access to more data or less data in base table T1 than the 
creator of MQT M1. A better approach is therefore to not enforce the row 
permissions and column masks on T1 during the creation of MQT M1 (or 
subsequent automatic refresh of its content). But we need to make sure that 
security is not compromised when doing so. In this context, we have extended 
the database system such that: 
• Upon the creation of an MQT, the database system automatically 
generates and applies a default row permission with the false predicate “1 
= 0”. This ensures that direct SQL access to the MQT is blocked (i.e., “1 = 
0” always evaluates to false). If certain users have a business need to 
access the MQT directly, the administrator can create the appropriate row 
permissions on the MQT to give them access. Any such row permissions 
or column masks are enforced only during direct access to the MQT. 
• When the database system decides to answer a user query from an MQT, 
it always ensures that any row permissions and column masks on any 
base table upon which the MQT is defined are automatically carried over 
and applied on the MQT itself. This ensures that users do not inadvertently 
get access to data in the base tables for which they are not authorized. 
The following experiment illustrates how direct access to an MQT is automatically 
blocked when its underlying base table is protected by a row permission. This 
experiment can be consistently repeated on any recent IBM DB2 system.  First, 
we create a table T1 with 2 integer columns A and B. We then insert 3 rows into 
this table, namely (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3). Next, we create an MQT M1 based on 
table T1. When we run the statement SELECT A FROM M1, we get the exact 
same data in base table T1. On the other hand, if we protect T1 with a row 
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permission and retry that exact same statement, we now get zero rows returned. 
This is because our design automatically protects the MQT M1 to guard against 
data leakage. Below are the exact steps.  
create table T1 (A int, B int); 
insert into T1 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3); 
create table M1 (a, b) as (select A, avg(B) from T1 group by A)  
           data initially deferred refresh deferred maintained by system; 
refresh table M1; 
select A from M1; 
create permission P1 on T1  
 for rows where A = 1  
 enforced for all access  
enable; 
select A from M1; 
 
3.5.3 Database Triggers 
A database trigger is a critical database concept which applications depend upon 
to preserve data integrity. For example, a banking application may decide to use 
a trigger to ensure that each time a client’s balance is updated in the clients table, 
a row is inserted into the statements table to record that particular withdrawal or 
deposit transaction. So, why does the design of database security need to pay 
attention to database triggers? Consider the banking application example above. 
Suppose that the clients table is protected with a set of row permissions and 
column masks. If such row permissions and column masks are blindly applied, 
then it may not be possible to update the statements table as the required input 
data could have been filtered out or masked. Clearly, this approach would 
negatively impact data integrity. 
    A better approach is therefore to not enforce the row permissions or column 
masks on the clients table. However, not doing so may affect security as the data 
in the clients table now becomes visible to any triggers defined on such table and 
may be abused. In this context, we have extended the database system by 
introducing the notion of a secure trigger. By default, a database trigger is not 
secure, but the administrator can alter the trigger’s definition to mark it secure. 
This means that the administrator vouches for the trigger as trusted and can be 
applied on a table protected with row permission or column mask constructs. 
Secure triggers enable database security and triggers to coexist in harmony. 
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3.6 Performance Evaluation 
We have conducted 4 different assessments during our performance evaluation. 
The assessments were conducted using IBM DB2, extended with our fine-
grained authorization model, deployed on a dedicated AIX system with 8 
processors @ 1452 GHz and 32GB of RAM.  This is a fully dedicated system 
(CPU, memory, networking and storage) running only our experiment to ensure 
performance data stability. The time elapsed for a given query is measured from 
the time the query is submitted to the time the results are returned. Before a query 
is run, the database system is activated to ensure a fresh database set up. The 
query is run several times. The first run is discarded from the statistics as the 
database bufferpool (i.e., database cache) is cold. 
• Assessment 1: The goal of this assessment is to measure the impact to 
performance when an application chooses to delegate fine-grained 
authorization to the database. One of the key advantages of our fine-
grained authorization model is that it relieves applications from the burden 
of enforcing fine-grained authorization by delegating such task to the 
database. But it is important that this reduction in application complexity 
does not result in any significant performance drawbacks for the 
application. This assessment confirmed that applications can safely 
delegate the enforcement of fine-grained database authorization to the 
database with no performance concerns.  
• Assessment 2:  The objective of this assessment is to measure the 
scalability of column masks. Linear scalability has been confirmed by this 
assessment. 
• Assessment 3: The goal of this assessment is to verify the independence 
of column masks. This assessment has shown that the impact of all 
column masks defined on a table is never higher than the sum of the 
impact of each column mask defined individually. 
• Assessment 4:  The objective of this assessment is to measure the impact 
of row permissions. This test confirmed that the impact of row permissions 
is minimum.  
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3.6.1 Delegating Fine-Grained Authorization to the Database System 
 
Methodology 
    We have selected TPC-H (Thanopoulou et al., 2012) as the application with 
which to conduct our assessment. TPC-H is an industry standard benchmark for 
measuring database performance. It consists of 22 queries representative of 
decision support systems that examine large volumes of data. The performance 
metric reported by TPC-H is called the TPC-H Composite Query-per-Hour 
Performance Metric (QphH) and reflects multiple aspects of the capability of the 
database system to process queries.  
    We focused on two scenarios in our assessment. In the first scenario, we 
created a set of column masks and row permissions on the TPC-H database 
schema to specify a fine-grained authorization policy. Then, we ran the TPC-H 
benchmark and measured the QphH. In the second scenario, we created no 
column masks or row permissions in the database. Instead, we modified the SQL 
queries, so the same fine-grained authorization is enforced by the application. 
    Table 3.1 summarizes our findings. The ratio column represents the QphH of 
the fine-grained authorization policy delegated to the database divided by the 
QphH when that policy is enforced by the application itself and is plotted in Figure 
3.3. The numbers on the x-axis of this figure represent the 22 TPC-H queries 
referred to in Table 1. That is, 1 represents query Q1, 2 represents query Q2 and 
so on.  
Discussion 
    Figure 3.3 shows that almost all the TPC-H queries perform the same or better 
when the policy is enforced by the database than by the application. More 
specifically, 13 queries performed fairly the same in both scenarios. 8 queries 
performed better when the fine-grained authorization policy is enforced by the 
database system (i.e., the ones where the ratio column is coloured in green in 
Table 3.1). The improvement observed ranges from 8 to 68%. Lastly, for query 
Q19, we observed a performance degradation of 15% when the fine-grained 
authorization policy is enforced by the database. 
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Table 3.1 – Application vs Database Enforcement for TPC-H Queries 
TPC-
H Query 
QphH Application 
Enforcement (a) 
QphH Database 
Enforcement (b) 
Ratio 
(b/a) 
Q1 1158.8 370 0.3193 
Q2 19.7 12 0.6091 
Q3 2350.6 2321.6 0.9877 
Q4 6105.6 6103.4 0.9996 
Q5 7352.6 6371.5 0.8666 
Q6 27.8 25.6 0.9209 
Q7 16654.1 16657.5 1.0002 
Q8 884.2 882.5 0.9981 
Q9 9653.8 9475.7 0.9816 
Q10 8376.5 8367.3 0.9989 
Q11 138.7 127.5 0.9193 
Q12 112.6 113.6 1.0089 
Q13 103.5 105.7 1.0213 
Q14 22.8 14.4 0.6316 
Q15 26.7 18.3 0.6854 
Q16 24.3 24 0.9877 
Q17 336.3 336.2 0.9997 
Q18 288.5 291.9 1.0118 
Q19 93.6 107.6 1.1496 
Q20 73.9 70.8 0.9581 
Q21 9655.1 9644.6 0.9989 
Q22 90.9 32.9 0.3619 
 
 
Figure 3.3– Ratio of database vs application enforcement for TPC-H queries 
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    There are two main reasons for the results observed. First, the order in which 
predicates are evaluated is important, particularly for table joins. For example, 
consider the following query where tables T1 and T2 are joined on column C1: 
“SELECT * FROM T1 INNER JOIN T2 on T1.C1 = T2.C1”.  When a row 
permission is enforced by an application, the application will modify the query 
above by adding the row permission predicates to the SQL text directly as follows: 
“SELECT * FROM T1 INNER JOIN T2 on T1.C1 = T2.C1 AND <row permission 
predicate>”. Recall from section 3 that we extended the SQL compiler so that, by 
default, the row permissions predicates are evaluated first on the table to guard 
against potential data leakage by any unsafe predicates in the query. So, when 
the database enforces the fine-grained authorization policy, the query would 
actually look as follows within the SQL compiler “SELECT * FROM (SELECT * 
FROM T1 WHERE <row permission predicate>) INNER JOIN T1 on T1.C1 = 
T2.C1”. However, when there are no unsafe predicates in the query, we do not 
restrict the SQL compiler optimizer component from moving the row permission 
predicates higher or lower in the query graph if it leads to a better query execution 
plan. This was the case in our testing as we had no unsafe predicates. The only 
situation where the SQL compiler optimizer component did not move the 
predicate was for query Q19. This is because the row permission defined on the 
table did not refer to any data in the table itself as it was a simple rule to check 
whether or not the user issuing the query were a member of a given role. 
Consequently, the optimizer selected a merge-join instead of a hash-join (Bruno 
et al., 2014) (Balkesen et al., 2013). Normally, the merge-join would have 
performed better but because the row permission did not actually filter any rows, 
the merge-join ended up being more expensive, thus the observed degradation 
in query Q19. 
    The second reason for the results observed is how column masks are 
processed. When the database system enforces a column mask, it does so 
internally within the actual query graph built by the SQL compiler. So, when the 
same column appears multiple times within a query the SQL compiler does not 
need to duplicate the column masks. However, when the fine-grained 
authorization policy is enforced by the application, the rules representing the 
column mask end up being duplicated in the SQL query text as the application 
can only work with SQL. This explains the performance gain observed when the 
fine-grained authorization policy is enforced by the database. 
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    Our tests have shown that enforcing the fine-grained database authorization 
policy by the database has not resulted in any significant performance drawbacks 
for the application. This means that the gains in security and the reduction in 
application complexity do not come at the expense of application SQL workload 
performance. 
3.6.2 Scalability of Column Masks 
 
Methodology 
    We have created a table T1 with 10 columns, all of the same type. We have 
populated the table with random data. No indices of any type were created on 
this table. We have run a “SELECT * FROM T1” as our baseline. Then, we 
created a column mask on the first column, ran the same query above and 
measured its performance. We have repeated this process for each of the 
remaining columns. The column mask created is exactly the same for each 
column. We have run the experiment twice: One where T1 contains one million 
rows and another one where it contains ten million rows.  Table 3.2 summarizes 
our findings.  
Table 3.2 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) 
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows 
Baseline (No Masks) 4.58 44.26 
1 Mask 4.73 45.97 
2 Masks 4.74 46.45 
3 Masks 4.83 46.85 
4 Masks 4.82 47.06 
5 Masks 4.87 47.48 
6 Masks 5 48.28 
7 Masks 4.97 48.8 
8 Masks 5.02 49.01 
9 Masks 5.08 49.96 
10 Masks 5.10 50 
 
Discussion 
    Figure 3.4 shows that for both the one million and ten million rows cases, the 
execution time of our query scales almost in a linear manner as the number of 
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masks increases. This confirms our expectation as our design and 
implementation of column masks did not introduce any additional logic for 
coordinating the execution of multiple masks when they are present on a given 
table. Essentially, the overhead introduced is only the one associated with the 
execution of the actual rule expressed in the column mask definition itself. In our 
experimentation, the rule was checking user membership in a role to decide 
whether they see the actual column value or a masked version thereof. It used 
the built-in SQL function VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER. This function is highly 
optimized. It keeps an in-memory list of users to roles mappings, making it very 
fast to decide whether or not a user is a member in a given role. We introduced 
this function to support the adoption of our row permissions and column masks 
as security best practices advocate for simplifying the management of 
authorization by assigning privileges to roles and assigning users to roles.  
Authorization then simply becomes checking user membership in roles. 
 
Figure 3.4– Scalability of Column Masks 
3.6.3 Independence of Column Masks 
 
Methodology 
    We have created three column masks on the CUSTOMER table in the TPC-H 
database schema: A simple column mask, an intermediate column mask, and 
complex column mask. The simple column mask is similar to the column mask 
shown in Example 2. It makes use of a single call to function 
VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER to check whether the user is a member of the given 
role. The intermediate column mask has four calls to the 
VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER function. Lastly, the complex column mask is 
similar to the intermediate one but has a sub-select statement on top of that.  
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    Our base line is a “SELECT * FROM CUSTOMER” query with no column 
masks defined on the CUSTOMER table. We ran this query, measured the 
elapsed time, and then performed the following tests: 
• Run the same query with only the simple column mask enabled. 
• Run the same query with only the intermediate column mask enabled. 
• Run the same query with only the complex column mask enabled. 
• Run the same query with all three column masks enabled. 
    Table 3.3 shows the time elapsed for each test when the CUSTOMER table 
contains one million rows, and ten million rows respectively. Table 3.4 shows the 
difference compared to the baseline for each of the tests conducted. 
Table 3.3 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) 
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows 
Baseline (No Masks) 37.464 371.791 
Simple Mask 38.812 387.457 
Intermediate Mask 40.356 404.619 
Complex Mask 58.592 556.439 
All Masks 61.855 589.25 
 
Table 3.4 – Difference with the Baseline 
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows 
Simple Mask 1.348 15.666 
Intermediate Mask 2.892 32.828 
Complex Mask 21.128 184.648 
Sum of all Masks 25.368 233.142 
All Masks 24.391 217.459 
 
Discussion 
    Figure 3.5 contrasts the sum of the differences to the baseline for each of the 
simple, intermediate, and complex mask tests with the difference to the baseline 
for the test where all masks are enabled at the same time for both the one million 
rows and ten million rows cases. For both cases, we can observe that the 
difference with the baseline when all masks are enabled at the same time is never 
higher than the sum of the differences to the baseline for each individual mask. 
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This confirms our expectation as our column masks design and implementation 
did not require introducing any coordination when multiple masks are enabled at 
the same time. The masks are in fact totally independent from each other. 
 
Figure 3.5– Independence of Column Masks 
3.6.4 Row Permissions Impact 
 
Methodology 
    We have created three row permissions on the CUSTOMER table in the TPC-
H database schema: One row permission that returns zero rows, one permission 
that returns 50% of the rows, and another row permission that returns all rows. 
We have run “SELECT * FROM CUSTOMERS” as our baseline. Then, we run 
the same query with each of the row permissions above enabled individually (i.e. 
one row permission at a time).  Table 3.5 shows the time elapsed for each test 
when the CUSTOMER table contains one million rows and ten million rows 
respectively. 
Table 3.5 – Time Elapsed (in seconds) 
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows 
Baseline (No Permissions) 38.163 380.118 
Permission (0 rows) 0.11 3.173 
Permission (50% rows) 19.679 169.154 
Permission (All rows) 38.679 383.93 
 
Discussion 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 contrast the performance for each of the 3 tests with 
our baseline for the one million rows and ten million rows respectively. The results 
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are similar for each case and show that the overhead of row permissions is very 
minimal. For instance, when the row permission returns all rows, the performance 
is almost identical to the baseline. This is expected as the rule expressed in the 
row permission is internally implemented as a predicate. In our case, the 
predicate includes the built-in VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER SQL function. If a 
DBA decides to deploy their own UDF for use in a row permission definition, the 
performance implications may be different depending on several factors such as 
how optimized that UDF is and whether or not it is declared as trusted.  
 
Figure 3.6– Row Permissions Impact (1,000,000 rows) 
 
Figure 3.7– Row Permissions Impact (10,000,000 rows) 
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We describe how our row permissions and column masks can be applied to meet 
the needs of a banking application. All the SQL statements and outputs below 
have been fully verified with our implementation on IBM DB2. These requirements 
can be summarized as follows: 
• Customer service representatives and telemarketers can see all data. 
• Tellers can see only the data for their own branch customers. 
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• The customer account number is accessible only by customer service 
representatives. All other users can only see the last 4 digits.  
    Customer information is stored in a table called CUSTOMER and bank 
employee information is stored in a table called EMPLOYEE_INFO. The SQL 
statements for creating these two tables are given below. 
create table customer (account varchar (9),  
             name varchar (20),  
             income int,  
             branch char (1) ); 
create table employee_info (branch char (1), 
             emp_id varchar (10) ); 
 
    We assume that tables CUSTOMER and EMPLOYEE_INFO are already 
populated. Their content is given by tables 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. 
Table 3.6 – CUSTOMER Table 
ACCOUNT NAME INCOME BRANCH 
1234-5678 Alice 22,000 A 
2345-6754 Bob 71,000 B 
3456-1298 Carl 123,000 B 
4672-8901 David 172,000 C 
 
Table 3.7 – EMPLOYEE_INFO Table 
EMP_ID BRANCH 
Amy A 
Pat B 
Haytham C 
 
    Tellers, customer service representatives, and telemarketers are members of 
database roles TELLER, CSR, and TELEMARKETER respectively. SELECT 
privilege to the CUSTOMER table is granted to these three roles. Users Amy, Pat 
and Haytham are a teller, a customer service representative and a telemarketer 
respectively. The SQL statements for setting up these roles are given below. 
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create role teller; 
grant select on customer to role teller; 
grant role teller to user amy; 
create role csr; 
grant select on customer to role csr; 
grant role csr to user pat;  
create role telemarketer; 
grant select on customer to role telemarketer;  
grant role telemarketer to user haytham; 
 
    To implement the first rule which states that customer service representatives 
and telemarketers can see all customers, the following row permission must be 
created. 
create permission csr_row_access on customer  
 for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘csr’) = 1 or 
                  verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘telemarketer’) = 1 
 enforced for all access 
 enable; 
 
    To implement the second rule which states that tellers can only see customers 
of their own branch, the following row permissions must be created. The sub-
select in the permission definition ensures that the customer’s branch and the 
teller’s branch match. 
create permission teller_row_access on customer  
 for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘teller’) = 1 and 
              branch = (select branch from employee_info 
              where emp_id = USER) 
 enforced for all access 
 enable;  
 
To implement the third rule, the following column mask is created. The mask 
ensures that when the user is not a member of the CSR role, they see only the 
last 4 digits of the account number. The rest of the digits are replaced by “X”s for 
them (masked out).  
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create mask csr_column_access on customer 
 for column account  
 return case when verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘csr’) = 1 
            then account 
            else 'XXXX-‘ || SUBSTR(ACCOUNT,5,4) 
            end 
 enable;    
 
    Now that the row permissions and column masks have been defined, any 
future access to the CUSTOMER table will see the database system 
automatically enforce the security policy. Table 3.8 contrasts the output when the 
application issues the query “SELECT * FROM CUSTOMER” for users Amy, 
Haytham and Pat respectively.  
    When the application issues that query on behalf of user Amy, the database 
only returns the rows for customers from branch A, which is where Amy works. 
Note that the account number is masked out because Amy is not a member of 
the CSR role. 
    On the other hand, when the application issues the exact same query on behalf 
of user Haytham, the database returns all the rows in the table which is in 
accordance with the first rule because Haytham is a telemarketer. Note that the 
account number is still masked out because Haytham is not a member of the 
CSR role. 
    Lastly, when the same query is issued on behalf of user Pat, all the rows in the 
table are returned and the account number is not masked out because Pat is a 
member of the CSR role.  
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Table 3.8 – Outputs for Users Amy, Haytham and Pat 
USER ACCOUNT NAME INCOME BRANCH 
Amy XXXX-5678 Alice 22,000 A 
Haytham XXXX-5678 Alice 22,000 A 
 XXXX-6754 Bob 71,000 B 
 XXXX-1298 Carl 123,000 B 
 XXXX-8901 David 172,000 C 
Pat 1234-5678 Alice 22,000 A 
 2345-6754 Bob 71,000 B 
 3456-1298 Carl 123,000 B 
 4672-8901 David 172,000 C 
 
    This example has shown how the application logic can remain very simple. In 
all 3 user situations, the application simply issues the simple “SELECT * FROM 
CUSTOMERS” SQL query. The database system automatically applies the fine-
grained authorization rules, relieving the application from this burden, which in 
turn contributes to reducing the complexity of the application.  
3.8 Conclusion 
We have introduced a fine-grained database authorization model which allows 
applications to safely delegate the burden of fine-grained authorization to the 
database system, where it is enforced more effectively. In particular, we have 
shown how the trusted context mechanism introduced allows applications to 
propagate user identities to the database system in a controlled manner in 
multitiered environments, strengthening overall database security. We have also 
shown how the trusted context mechanism can be used to provide control on 
when the application privileges can be exercised which helps protect against 
potential abuse of the application user ID (application bypass). 
    The row permission, column mask, and trusted context concepts introduced 
also enable organizations to implement zero-trust security for database systems. 
Row permissions and column masks allow such organizations to ensure that data 
is accessed based on “need-to-know”, which is a key tenet of zero-trust security. 
Additionally, trusted contexts help organizations implement the “verify and never 
trust” zero-trust security tenet, by having the database system verify additional 
attributes before granting access to a user or application. 
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    In our future work, we plan to focus on facilitating the adoption of our fine-
grained database authorization model. For example, defining a column mask is 
a very easy task once you know which column to define it on. But in some 
situations, this knowledge may not be available (e.g., a database inherited 
through a merger or an acquisition). This is where data classification would be 
useful. The main challenges in this context would be to investigate how to do the 
data classification on the database efficiently and accurately. Additionally, we 
want to explore machine learning for automatically generating the appropriate 
row permissions and column masks. Machine learning has been explored for 
detecting threats (Alloghani et al., 2020), (Aljawarneh et al., 2018), (Aldwairi et 
al., 2012), but here we would like to explore it for fine-grained authorization policy 
recommendation.   
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Chapter 4:  Enhanced Data Encryption 
This chapter provides a summary of the research portfolio in database encryption. It is 
based primarily on a research publication “Holistic Database Encryption” that is given in 
Appendix B. The chapter first reviews traditional data encryption methods in database 
systems and contrasts them with holistic database encryption. Then, it introduces 
holistic database encryption and discuss its implementation in a commercial database 
system.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Data encryption is a powerful control for protecting sensitive data. For database 
systems, traditional data encryption approaches come in many shapes and 
forms, but each with a set of challenges forcing organizations to make 
compromises either on the security side or on the database side when adopting 
such approaches. Clearly, a better approach was needed so that data encryption 
coexists in harmony with fundamental database tenets such as performance and 
compression, thus eliminating the need for organizations to make any such 
compromises. In this thesis, this better approach is referred to as “holistic 
database encryption”. Section 4.2 reviews the traditional approaches and 
contrasts them with holistic database encryption. Section 4.3 introduces holistic 
database encryption while Section 4.4 discusses its implementation in IBM DB2. 
Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
4.2 Related Work 
Traditional database encryption solutions can be divided into four main 
categories: Column encryption, tablespace encryption, file system encryption and 
self-encrypting disks. 
    Column encryption allows an application to encrypt data at the column level in 
a database table (Benfield et al., 2001). Typically, the database system provides 
a set of built-in UDFs to give applications the tools to encrypt and decrypt data 
stored in database table columns. The main advantage of column encryption is 
security as the column data remains encrypted from the point of entry in the 
application all the way down to the storage and vice versa. However, this gain in 
security comes at a cost. For example, because standard encryption is not order 
preserving, queries with range predicates cannot benefit from index-based 
access plans to limit the data to read from the table. Instead, the database system 
is forced to read the entire table to evaluate the query. Additionally, encrypting 
data in the application limits the value of database compression as compression 
will be left to operate on encrypted data which typically does not include patterns. 
Last but not least, column encryption complicates adoption of the solution for pre-
packaged applications where the organization does not own the source code for 
the application. Holistic database encryption improves over column encryption. It 
does not interfere at all with query execution and therefore does not negatively 
impact the performance of range queries. It takes place within the database 
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kernel itself, after compression has occurred, thus allowing organization to benefit 
from both database encryption and compression. Also, holistic database 
encryption is totally transparent to applications. Lastly, while holistic database 
encryption does not protect data in transmission, this can be easily mitigated by 
ensuring TLS is turned on to secure the channel between the database system 
and applications.  
    Tablespace encryption provides the DBA with the option to indicate that data 
in given tablespace must be automatically encrypted by the database system 
itself (Boobal, 2018). It improves over column encryption in the same way holistic 
database encryption does. However, tablespace encryption can leave data 
vulnerable to attacks. For example, DBAs often create materialized query tables 
(MQT) to speed up the execution of data warehousing queries (Zilio et al., 2004). 
In doing so, data from an encrypted tablespace may find itself in another 
tablespace which the DBA omitted to specify it must be encrypted upon creation. 
This would leave the data in the MQT vulnerable to attacks. Additionally, data in 
the system-defined tablespaces is not encrypted. For example, the system 
catalogues typically include statistics information which the database system 
relies upon to generate optimal access plans for executing queries. Some of 
these statistics include actual data values such as the most frequent values in a 
column, and the highest and lowest values in that column. This would 
unfortunately leave such data vulnerable to attacks. Holistic database encryption 
improves over tablespace encryption because it automatically encrypts the 
database as a whole including any system-defined or temporary tablespaces. It 
simplifies database administration for the DBA and avoids the risk of creating 
vulnerabilities when inadvertently moving data to an unencrypted tablespace, 
such as when creating an MQT for boosting query performance purposes.  
    File system encryption is an indirect mechanism to encrypt the database 
objects by encrypting their underlying physical files. Examples of file system 
encryption solutions include the Encrypted File System (EFS) on the IBM AIX 
systems (IBM, 2018), the EFS on the Microsoft Windows systems (Microsoft, 
2018), and eCryptfs on Linux systems (Halcrow, 2007). File system encryption 
can also be provided using add-on tools such as Vormetric Transparent Data 
Encryption (Vormetric, 2018) and Gemalto Protect File (Gemalto, 2018). These 
tools deploy an agent on the operating system where data encryption is needed. 
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The agent is a kernel module which extends that operating system to enable file 
encryption. Compared to the native file system encryption above, these tools 
allow an organization to manage file system encryption uniformly across a 
heterogeneous operating systems environment. File system encryption also 
improves over column encryption and shares the same benefits as tablespace 
encryption. However, it is not supported on all file systems. For example, the IBM 
EFS solution for AIX systems is only available on JFS2 file systems. This limits 
the set of database deployments which can benefit from this solution. 
Additionally, some database deployments choose to write their data directly to 
raw devices bypassing the file system altogether. In this case, a file system 
encryption solution cannot be used to encrypt the database objects. Also, native 
file system encryption provides no protection against privileged users on the 
operating system. As long as the file permissions allow access, such users can 
easily browse the content of the encrypted files. Lastly, the division of 
responsibilities between the DBA who is responsible for database administration 
and the SA who is responsible for system administration may introduce security 
vulnerabilities. For example, if a DBA creates a new tablespace and places it on 
an unencrypted file system, the content of that tablespace will not be encrypted 
and would be left open to attacks. Holistic database encryption addresses the file 
system encryption challenges above. It is built in the database kernel itself, so it 
is available anywhere the database is deployed. Also, being part of the database 
kernel means that database can choose to write to raw devices directly and still 
ensure data is encrypted. Additionally, the database content is not vulnerable to 
users browsing the file systems since that content can only be decrypted by the 
database itself. Last but not least, the division of responsibilities between the DBA 
and SA does not create any vulnerabilities as the database is automatically and 
fully encrypted by the database kernel itself.  
    Self-Encrypting Disks (SED) is another indirect mechanism for encrypting the 
database objects by relying on the circuitry built into the hard drive itself to encrypt 
the data (Dufrasne et al., 2016). Examples of SED include IBM DS8000, Seagate 
SED, and Hitachi SED. They too improve over column encryption, share the 
same benefits with tablespace, file system and holistic database encryption. They 
provide the broadest coverage as the full disk is encrypted. With respect to 
performance, SED actually add no overhead to the CPU as the encryption is done 
by the hard drive itself. SED do have certain drawbacks, however. Firstly, they 
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are a disruptive and expensive approach as an organization would need to 
purchase these new devices and replace existing hard drives. Secondly, SED 
provide no protection against privileged users on the operating system. As long 
as the file permissions allow access, such users can easily browse the content of 
the encrypted files. Holistic database encryption addresses these challenges 
because it is part of the database itself, so it creates no disruptions to the 
organization’s IT infrastructure. It also ensures that the content of the database 
is not vulnerable to users browsing the file system as that content can only be 
decrypted by the database itself. 
4.3 Holistic Database Encryption 
The first objective of holistic database encryption is to ensure that the full 
database content is automatically encrypted by the database system itself. This 
needs to include not only user-defined tablespaces, system-defined tablespaces 
and temporary tablespaces, but also data in transaction logs and database 
backups. This is to ensure that no vulnerability is inadvertently introduced as with 
the traditional methods discussed earlier. The second objective is to ensure that 
the first objective is met without negatively impacting core database tenets such 
as application transparency, schema transparency, performance, compression or 
availability. It is achieving both of these objectives together that allows 
organizations to adopt the solution without having to make any compromise either 
on the security side or the database side, as with the traditional methods. In order 
to achieve these two objectives, three requirements need to be carefully 
considered: Encryption run-time placement, encryption run-time processing and 
encryption key management. The design considerations for each of these 
requirements is discussed below. 
4.3.1 Encryption Run-Time Placement 
Holistic database encryption places the run-time processing of encryption right 
above the I/O layer inside the database kernel. This ensures that all data is 
encrypted regardless of whether it is tablespace data, transaction logs data or 
backups data. Additionally, injecting encryption processing this deep inside the 
kernel renders encryption totally transparent to database schemas and 
applications. Recall that the lack of transparency to applications and database 
schemas was one of the major drawbacks of column encryption. Also, being right 
above the I/O layer ensures that encryption does not interfere at all with query 
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execution so the SQL query compiler does not need to impose any restrictions 
on itself when selecting an efficient execution plan for a query as it does in the 
case of queries with range predicates when using column encryption. Last but 
not least, this encryption run-time placement means that encryption comes after 
compression which is the right order to ensure that organizations benefit from 
both database compression and encryption. Recall that with column encryption, 
the order is reversed which limits the value of database compression.  
4.3.2 Encryption Run-Time Processing 
Encryption run-time processing refers to the encryption and decryption functions. 
Data is encrypted when it is pushed out to storage and decrypted when it is 
retrieved from storage. These two functions take place right above the I/O layer 
as indicated above. Encryption and decryption require carefully considering three 
choices: The choice of the encryption algorithm, the choice of the encryption 
algorithm key size and the choice of the encryption granularity.  
    Since database encryption is bulk encryption, symmetric algorithms are the 
natural choice. While holistic database encryption can support any block cipher, 
AES (Chandra et al., 2014) was selected as the default block cipher as it is the 
standard algorithm. Holistic database encryption chose 256 bits as the default 
key size to ensure that the solution is safe against potential future attacks by 
quantum computers (Shor, 1997). In fact, a quantum computer running Grover’s 
algorithm (Grover, 1996) renders AES 256 bits security equivalent to AES 128 
bits so choosing 128 bits AES Keys would not be a good practice as that reduces 
to 64 bits security. AES supports several modes. Holistic database encryption 
uses Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) as that is more secure than Electronic Code 
Book (ECB) for example. However, CBC requires maintaining an Initialization 
Vector (IV) and this affects the choice the encryption granularity. Holistic 
database encryption uses the “page” as the encryption granularity. A page is a 
32KB of data containing the rows of a database table. A database table may 
consist of several such pages. The choice of the page as the encryption 
granularity versus the data row is evident as calling the encryption function for 
each row in the page would result in a higher performance overhead. The choice 
of a “chunk” of pages would in theory have been better. In fact, the database 
kernel I/O layer writes a chunk of pages at a time for performance reasons. 
However, given the chaining nature of CBC, this meant that if the database kernel 
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needs to decrypt page 4, it will first need to decrypt pages 1, 2 and 3. Thus, the 
page level granularity was chosen for performance reasons.  
4.3.3 Encryption Key Management 
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of holistic database encryption as implemented 
in IBM DB2. It uses two levels of keys: A Data Encryption Key (DEK) and a Master 
Key (MK). The DEK is the key used to actually encrypt the database content and 
is fully managed within the database system. For tablespace data, the DEK is 
stored together with the rest of the database configuration. However, this would 
not be sufficient for transaction logs as these are typically needed when the 
database is offline and need to be recovered. Consequently, transaction logs 
have their own DEK that is stored within the transaction logs themselves. This is 
also true for database backups which may need to be restored by a totally 
different database instance.  
 
Figure 4.1– Holistic Database Encryption Architecture 
    The MK is a Key Encrypting Key (KEK). It is used to protect the DEK and is 
stored externally such as in a Hardware Security Module (HSM). There are three 
reasons for this choice: Security, performance and availability. Storing the MK 
externally ensures a better security in case the database system itself is 
compromised (i.e., the attacker will not have access to both the data and the MK). 
The two levels of keys also ensure availability and performance in key rotation 
  58 
scenarios. In fact, rotating the MK is straightforward as it only means decrypting 
the DEK with the old MK and re-encrypting it with the new MK. On the other hand, 
a single level of keys would have meant re-encrypting the entire database with 
the new key. This would affect availability if it is done offline or performance if it 
is done while the database is online serving the needs of its applications.  
4.4 Implementation 
This section discusses the implementation of holistic database encryption in IBM 
DB2 and shows the actual interfaces for adopting the solution.  
4.4.1 Enabling Encryption for a Database 
The DB2 CREATE DATABASE command was extended so that DBAs can 
choose to enable encryption when creating a new database. For example, the 
DB2 command below creates a database called test which will be encrypted 
using AES as the encryption algorithm, 256 bits as the encryption key size, and 
a master key whose unique identification is db-mk. 
create database test  
encrypt cipher AES key length 256  
     master key label db-mk 
 
    When processing the command above, the database system internally 
generates a random 256 bits DEK and call out to the key management system 
that has been set up for this database to encrypt the DEK before safely storing it 
within the database configuration structures. Later on, when the database is 
started to serve applications, the database system internally calls out to the key 
management system to decrypt the DEK with the MK, and then uses the DEK for 
transparently encrypting and decrypting data as it is written to and read from the 
storage system. 
4.4.2 Rotating the Database Master Key 
Like user passwords, encryption keys need to be changed periodically in order to 
minimize the risks when a key is compromised. This process is called key 
rotation. The key rotation frequency is dictated by compliance requirements, 
corporate requirements or both. 
    Holistic database encryption extended the IBM DB2 interfaces by introducing 
a new stored procedure which DBAs can use to rotate the database MK as 
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required. For example, the DB2 stored procedure call below instructs the 
database system to rotate the MK.  
 
CALL admin_rotate_master_key (‘new-db-mk’); 
 
    When processing the stored procedure above, the database system performs 
the following actions: 
• Decrypt the DEK with the current MK. 
• Re-encrypt the DEK with the new MK as identified by it is unique label 
new-db-mk. 
• Update the database configuration structures to reflect the changes 
above. 
    If a new MK unique identifier has not been provided when calling the stored 
procedure above, the database system will automatically generate a new MK and 
assigns a unique identifier to it. 
4.4.3 Taking an Encrypted Database Backup 
Holistic database encryption extended the DB2 BACKUP DATABASE command 
so that DBAs can choose to enable encryption when backing up a database. 
Encryption for the backup is actually automatically enabled when the underlying 
database is encrypted. But the explicit option in the BACKUP DATABASE 
command itself gives DBAs the option to still encrypt a backup even when the 
underlying database is not encrypted. For example, the DB2 command below 
encrypts a backup for a database called test2 using AES as the encryption 
algorithm, 256 bits as the encryption key size, and a master key whose unique 
identification is db-mk2. 
 
backup database test2  
encrypt encrlib db2backupencrlib  
encropts ‘Cipher=AES:Key LENGTH=256:Master Key Label=db-mk2’ 
 
    When processing the command above, the database system internally 
generates a random 256 bits DEK, uses that DEK to encrypt the payload piece 
of the backup, call out to the key management system to encrypt the DEK with 
the MK identified with unique identifier db-mk2, and safely store the encrypted 
DEK and related meta-data in the header piece of the backup. 
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4.4.4 Performance Considerations 
The performance evaluation shows that two factors affect the impact of holistic 
database encryption. The first factor is the availability of hardware acceleration in 
the CPUs where the database system is deployed. Holistic database encryption 
automatically detects and exploits a number of hardware acceleration for 
cryptographic operations built into modern CPUs such as the Intel Advanced 
Encryption Standard New Instructions (AES-NI) and the IBM Power8 in-core 
support for AES. The second factor is how insulated the database workload from 
an increase in the latency of physical I/O requests. Database workloads can be 
insulated for this purpose through standard database tuning. For example, a DBA 
can increase the buffer pool size so that database queries do not have to wait on 
physical I/O. Enabling page prefetchers is another tuning option a DBA can 
perform to avoid having queries wait on physical I/O. Following standard 
database tuning, the encryption overhead observed is typically in the single digits 
for data warehouse workloads on systems with exploitable hardware acceleration 
for cryptographic operations. It is therefore recommended that enterprises deploy 
the solution on systems where such hardware acceleration for cryptographic 
operations is available.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a summary of the research portfolio in database 
encryption. It has reviewed the traditional approaches for database encryption 
and showed how the holistic database encryption proposed improves over such 
approaches. Holistic database encryption has been implemented in IBM DB2 and 
is relied upon by several organizations from across the world to protect their 
sensitive data without having to make compromises either on the security side or 
the database side as the solution coexists in harmony with fundamental database 
tenets as described in this chapter. The research portfolio publication “Holistic 
Database Encryption” is given in Appendix B.  
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Chapter 5:  Enhanced Mandatory Access Control 
This chapter provides a summary of the research portfolio in mandatory access 
control for database systems. It is a synthesis of the research publications given 
in Appendix C. The chapter introduces a new multi-purpose implementation of 
mandatory access control for database systems which improves over traditional 
implementations. This new solution is not limited to the pure Multilevel Security 
(MLS) semantics as the traditional approaches and can be used more broadly. 
The chapter also shows how the multi-purpose implementation of mandatory 
access control introduced can be used to enforce fine-grained authorization to 
XML documents such as those stored in XML columns in database tables.  
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5.1 Introduction 
For database tables, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) can be thought of as a 
special form of fine-grained authorization where each row is tagged with a 
security label representing its classification (e.g., TOP SECRET), each user is 
assigned a security label representing their authorization (e.g., SECERT) and the 
access rules are the standard Multilevel Security (MLS) “No Read Up” and “No 
Write Down” rules. While this model is suitable for the US intelligence and 
defense use cases, it remains a very rigid implementation that is rarely applicable 
elsewhere. Clearly, a better approach is needed to broaden the applicability of 
MAC implementations in database systems. This better approach is referred to 
as “A Multi-Purpose MAC Implementation for Database Systems”. It extends 
the traditional MAC implementations for database systems with the required 
flexibility in order to broaden its applicability. Section 5.2 reviews traditional MAC 
implementations and contrasts them with the multi-purpose MAC implementation. 
Section 5.3 introduces and discusses the multi-purpose MAC implementation in 
IBM DB2. Section 5.4 shows how the multi-purpose MAC implementation can be 
used for fine-grained authorization in XML documents. Lastly, Section 5.5 
concludes this chapter.  
5.2 Related Work 
Traditional MAC implementations for database systems have focused on MLS. 
The MLS model was originally introduced by Bell and LaPadula (Rjaibi et al., 
2004). It is defined in terms of objects and subjects. For database tables, an 
object is a row in that table and a subject is a user requesting access to such row. 
Both objects and subjects are assigned a security label representing their 
classifications and authorizations respectively.  A security label consists of two 
components (Rjaibi et al., 2004): A hierarchical component, usually referred to as 
level and a non-hierarchical component, usually referred to as compartments. 
The level specifies the sensitivity of the data. For example, a military organization 
might define the following levels: Top Secret, Secret and Confidential. 
Compartments are used to categorize the data. For example, a military 
organization might define the following compartments: Navy, Army and Marines. 
    A security label L1 is said to dominate a security label L2 if and only if the 
following two conditions are true: 
1. The level component of L1 is greater than or equal to that of L2. 
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2. The compartments component of L1 includes the compartments 
component of L2. 
    For all data access, the MLS model enforces the following two rules: 
1. No Read Up: A subject is allowed a read access to an object if and only if 
the subject’s security label dominates the object’s security label. 
2. No Write Down: A subject is allowed a write access to an object if and only 
if the object’s security label dominates the subject’s security label. 
    The most noticeable implementations of MLS in database systems include: 
Trusted Oracle (Oracle, 1992), Oracle Label Security (which replaced Trusted 
Oracle) (Oracle, 2019), Informix OnLine/Secure (Informix, 1993) and IBM DB2 
for z/OS MLS (Rayns et al., 2007). The research portfolio publications “An 
Introduction to Multilevel Secure Database Systems” and “A Multi-Purpose 
Implementation of Mandatory Access Control in Database Systems” 
(Appendix C) cover the traditional MLS implementation in more details. But the 
common theme across all these traditional implementations is that they are all a 
rigid implementation and are rarely applicable in scenarios where the pure MLS 
semantics is not desired. The multi-purpose MAC implementation introduced in 
this thesis is a flexible implementation that is not limited to pure MLS semantics 
and can be used more broadly as illustrated in Section 5.4. 
5.3 A Multi-Purpose MAC Implementation for Database Systems 
The first objective of the multi-purpose MAC implementation is to give DBAs the 
tools to define the types of security labels and access rules that best suit their 
needs as opposed to forcing the pure MLS semantics on them. This objective is 
achieved through the SQL extensions discussed in section 5.3.1. The second 
objective is to ensure that access to labelled data is enforced transparently, 
securely and in accordance with the access rules specified. This is achieved 
through the extensions made to the SQL Compiler discussed in section 5.3.2. 
Lastly, the third objective is to enable the database system to integrate with an 
external MAC system, if so desired, to centralize security labels and access rules 
management. This is analogous to integrating with an LDAP server for user 
authentication. This objective is achieved through the SQL and SQL Compiler 
extensions discussed in section 5.3.3.   
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5.3.1 SQL Extensions 
The multi-purpose MAC implementation extended SQL with the following new 
concepts to give DBAs the tools to specify security label types and access rules: 
• Security Label Component: This is the building block for security labels. 
It is essentially a set of elements which can be either ordered or un-
ordered. In an ordered set, the order in which the elements appear is 
important. The rank of the first element is higher than that of the second 
element, and so on.  
• Security Label Type: As a table schema defines the set of columns for 
rows in that table, a security label type defines the set of security label 
components that make up a security label. For example, the classical MLS 
security label can be obtained by creating a security label type that 
consists of two security label components, one that is ordered 
representing the level component and one that is un-ordered representing 
the compartments. On the other hand, if a DBAs wishes to use security 
labels as data tags, they can simply create a security label type that 
consists of a single un-ordered security label component, where each 
element represents the desired tag. 
• Security Label Access Policy: This is where the access rules are 
defined. The access rules bring together an access label and a row label. 
An access label is a security label that is granted to a database user. A 
row label is a label that is assigned to a row in a table. The general form 
of an access rule is “access label component-name <operator> row label 
component-name”. The <operator> varies depending on whether the 
component-name is an ordered set or an un-ordered set. For ordered set, 
it can be anyone of the relational {=, <=, <, >, >=, !=}. For un-ordered sets, 
it can be anyone of the set operators {INCLUDE, INTERSECT}.  
• Exception: In some situations, a user may need to be granted an 
exception from a certain access rule in a security label access policy. For 
example, to allow the user to do a bulk load of data in a table. 
• Labelled Table: A labelled table is a table that is associated with a security 
label policy. Such table will be automatically augmented with a new column 
to hold the security label for each row. The security label is internally 
transformed into a binary representation for efficient comparisons during 
access enforcement.   
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Example 
    The following example shows how a DBA can specify security label and access 
rules definitions to match the pure MLS semantics.  
    // create security label components 
create security label component LEVEL 
    using ordered set {‘TOP SECRET’, ‘SECRET’, ‘CLASSIFIED’}; 
create security label component COMPARTMENTS 
    using unordered set {‘MARINES’, ‘ARMY’, ‘NATO’}; 
 
    // create security label type 
create security label type MLS 
    components LEVEL, COMPARTMENTS; 
 
    // create security label access policy 
create security label access policy MLS-POLICY 
    security label type MLS 
    read access rule rule 1 
             access label level >= row label level 
    read access rule rule 2 
             access label compartments INCLUDE row label compartments 
    write access rule rule 1 
             row label level >= access label level 
    write access rule rule 2 
             row label compartments INCLUDE access label compartments; 
     
    // create a labelled table 
create table T1 (A INT, B INT) 
security label access policy MLS-POLICY; 
 
5.3.2 Access Enforcement 
The multi-purpose MAC implementation extended the SQL compiler to ensure 
that when a labelled table is accessed, the access rules specified in the security 
label access policy are observed. The extensions made are similar to the ones 
done for row permissions and column masks (Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3) with a 
couple of additional considerations. The first consideration is with respect to how 
the user access label and potential exceptions are acquired. If these are acquired 
at query compilation time, it will affect the caching of query execution plans. Some 
database systems such as IBM DB2 cache the execution plan for an SQL query 
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so that the next time it is submitted it does not need to go through the SQL 
compilation process again and performance is better. Imagine that the security 
label and exceptions are acquired during compilation time, this means that logic 
will need to be added to always check that the security label and exceptions of 
the user submitting the query are the same as the ones recorded during query 
compilation time. Otherwise, this could result in a security issue such as a user 
getting more data than what their security label and exceptions permit. For this 
reason, the execution plan generated by the SQL Compiler includes a new logic 
to always acquire security labels and exceptions during run-time. This ensures 
security as well as performance as the cached query execution plan can be 
reused without having to worry about any potential differences between the 
credentials of the user ID under which the query was compiled and the user ID 
that is running the query.  
    The second consideration is index-only query execution plans. To access a 
database table, the SQL compiler typically chooses between three options: (1) 
Accessing the table directly and fetch the desired rows, (2) accessing an index to 
first identify the IDs of the rows that need to be fetched and then access only the 
pages containing such rows, or (3) accessing only an index on the table. The 
latter is possible when all the desired columns are part of the index key. For large 
tables, this is usually an advantageous option as indexes are usually smaller than 
the table on which they are defined. For labelled tables, the row label is required 
to decide whether or not the user should be given access to the row. Therefore, 
to ensure that index only plans still work, we extended the database system so 
that each time an index is created, the row label column is automatically included 
in the index key. 
5.3.3 Enterprise integration 
Some tools such as IBM’s Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) (Winnard et 
al., 2015) provide an MLS implementation where user security labels can be 
centrally managed much like an LDAP server allows user authentication to be 
managed centrally. RACF can also be used for access decisions. That is, given 
a row label and a user ID, it can return true or false indicating whether or not the 
given user can have access to that row according to the MLS rules. To enable 
integration with such enterprise solutions, the multi-purpose MAC was further 
extended as follows: 
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• The labelled table SQL syntax was extended to allow DBAs to indicate that 
the security label access policy is managed by an external system and 
provide the connection details to such system so it can be called for access 
decision responses during access enforcement. 
• The SQL compiler was extended to recognize this special case and inject 
logic to query the external system for an access decision, passing on the 
row label and the ID of the user attempting the access.  
 
    To minimize the overhead of calling out to the external system, the multi-
purpose MAC implementation introduced an access-decision cache. This cache 
records the responses from the external system for each pair of user ID and row 
label. The SQL compiler was then modified so that it consults this cache before 
making a call to the external system. Table 5.1 illustrates the access-decision 
cache. For example, user Amy is allowed read access to rows labelled with 
security label L1, but not user Pat.  
Table 5.1 – Access-Decision Cache 
  USER ID ROW LABEL   TABLE  ACCESS TYPE RESPONSE 
Amy L1 T1 READ YES 
Pat L1 T1 READ NO 
Haytham L2 T1 WRITE YES 
 
5.4 Applying Multi-Purpose MAC for XML Fine-Grained 
Authorization 
While the row permission, column mask and security label concepts introduced 
so far in this thesis permit enforcing fine-grained authorization at the database 
table row and column levels, they do not extend to enforcing fine-grained 
authorization for XML documents stored within a column in such database tables. 
For example, suppose the XML document in Figure 5.1 is stored in some 
database table column. A user who is authorized to access that column will see 
the entire XML document as opposed to the subset of such document they are 
authorized to see.  
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Figure 5.1– Example XML Document 
XML fine-grained authorization can be divided into two main categories. The first 
category considers an XML node as the smallest unit of protection (Bertino et al., 
2001) (Bertino et al., 2002) (Bhatti et al., 2004). The approaches in this category 
differs in terms of how privileges are propagated. Some methods block access to 
the entire subtree rooted at a forbidden node while others would allow access to 
nodes in the subtree but mask out the forbidden ancestor node. The second 
category considers the ancestor-descendent and sibling relationships between 
XML nodes as the smallest unit of protection (Zhang et al., 2006). For example, 
blocking access to the account node “202” in Figure 1 can be achieved by 
blocking the relationship to its ancestor node, the relationship to its descendant 
nodes and the relationship to its sibling nodes. In both categories, the smallest 
unit of protection (i.e., a node or a relationship) is specified through an XPath 
expression (Clark et al., 2006). The Multi-Purpose MAC solution introduced 
earlier could be used with either node-based or relationship-based fine-grained 
authorization approaches. The research portfolio publication “Inter-Node 
Relationship Labelling: A Fine-Grained XML Access Control 
Implementation Using Generic Security Labels” shows that relationship-
based approaches improve over node-based approaches from a security 
perspective. For example, the subtree rooted at node “101” represents VIP 
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account types. Therefore, knowing that an account (e.g., “201”) belongs to that 
subtree reveals that this is a VIP account. Suppose that the relationship between 
nodes “101” and “202” needs to be protected. With node-based approaches, 
access to node “201” would reveal that node “202” is a VIP account since it is a 
sibling to node “201”. This issue can be addressed using a relationship-based 
approach by protecting the ancestor-descendant relationship between nodes 
“101” and “202” as well as the sibling relationship between nodes “201” and “202” 
while allowing the ancestor-descendant relationship between nodes “101” and 
“201”. The rest of this section discusses the methodology for using the Multi-
Purpose MAC solution to enforce fine-grained authorization to XML documents 
using the relationship-based approach.  
5.4.1 Methodology 
The methodology is analogous to how security labels are used to control access 
to rows in a labelled table. In the same way a row label protects a row in a labelled 
table, a path label protects a specific path in an XML document. The path label 
consists of a single security label component which can take anyone of the 
following three values: 
• Existence: Attaching a path label with this value to a relationship between 
two nodes permits users to know that such two nodes are related but does 
not reveal any other details. For example, suppose an existence path label 
is attached to the relationship between the account with AID A2398 and 
its customer name in Figure 5.1. A query that wants to return all the 
accounts’ AIDs that have a customer name would return AID A2398 but 
will not reveal that the customer name is “John”. An example of such query 
in XPath is: //Account[Customer/Name]/AID. 
• Value: Attaching a path label with this value to a relationship between two 
nodes permits users to know that such two nodes are related including the 
actual details of such nodes. For example, suppose a value path label is 
attached to the relationship between the account with AID A2398 and its 
customer name in Figure 5.1. An XPath query such as 
//Account[AID=”A2398”]/Customer/Name would reveal that “John” is the 
customer associated with that account. Evidently, if a relationship is not 
accessible under an existence path label, then it is not accessible under a 
value path label either.  
  70 
• Null: Attaching a path label with value to a relationship between two nodes 
means that this relationship is fully accessible. This is the default.   
    The proposed ATTACH SQL statement allows DBAs to attach a path label to 
the desired relationships in an XML document. This can be either an ancestor-
descendant relationship or a sibling relationship. For example, the following SQL 
statement attaches an existence path label to the relationships between account 
nodes (i.e., ancestor) and their customer name nodes (i.e., descendants). 
  attach existence ancs //Account desc /Customer/Name 
 
    The following example shows how to associate a security label access policy 
with a table T1 which includes a column B of type XML.  
   // create security label components 
create security label component level 
    using ordered set {‘EXISTENCE’, ‘VALUE’, ‘NULL’}; 
 
    // create security label type 
create security label type XML 
    components level; 
 
    // create security label access policy 
create security label access policy XML-POLICY 
    security label type XML 
    read access rule rule 1 
             access label level >= path label level 
    write access rule rule 1 
             access label level = path label level; 
     
    // create a labelled table 
create table T1 (A INT, B XML) 
security label access policy XML-POLICY; 
 
5.4.2 Access Enforcement 
As discussed in section 5.3.2, access enforcement is implemented within the SQL 
compiler. To handle queries on XML document, the following additional 
considerations are observed by the SQL compiler. First, the XPath query 
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semantics is internally changed as follows to take into account any path labels 
attached (Zhang et al., 2006).  
1. If a child axis occurs, the evaluation follows a parent-child path. 
2. If a descendant-or-self axis occurs, the evaluation follows an ancestor-
descendant path.  
3. If a preceding-sibling axis occurs, the evaluation follows a preceding-
sibling path. 
4. If a following-sibling axis occurs, the evaluation follows a following-sibling 
path.  
    As with access to labelled tables, the user access labels are acquired at 
runtime (as opposed to compilation time) to ensure that queries on XML 
documents also benefit from caching of query execution plans. The general 
access enforcement algorithm can be summarized as follows. 
1. Fetch the user access labels and exceptions from the system catalogues. 
2. For all paths accessed 
a. If it is a read access and the read access rules do not allow the 
access, skip the path. 
b. If it is a write access and the write access rules do not allow the 
access, skip the path. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a summary of the research portfolio in mandatory 
access control for database systems. It has introduced a new multi-purpose 
implementation of mandatory access control for database systems which 
improves over traditional implementations. This new solution is not limited to the 
pure MLS semantics as the traditional approaches and can be used more 
broadly. The chapter has also shown how the multi-purpose implementation of 
mandatory access control can be used to enforce fine-grained authorization to 
XML documents such as those stored in XML columns in database tables. The 
multi-purpose mandatory access control solution has been implemented in both 
IBM DB2 and Informix.  
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Chapter 6:  Towards Zero-Trust Database Security 
Zero-trust security is an information security framework which states that 
organizations should not trust any entity inside or outside of their perimeter at any 
time. This chapter explores both the direct and indirect means through which the 
same data in a database system can be accessed and the challenges they pose 
to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security. It is based primarily on the 
research publications “Towards Zero-Trust Database Security Part 1” and 
“Towards Zero-Trust Database Security Part 2” which were fully developed during 
the PhD registration period (Appendix B). The chapter then shows how the 
concepts introduced earlier in this thesis such as row permissions, column 
masks, trusted contexts and holistic database encryption come together to equip 
database systems with the controls necessary to enable enterprises to effectively 
implement zero-trust security for their database installations.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Gartner estimates that the worldwide spending on Cybersecurity in 2018 was 
around 114 billion US dollars, which represents an increase of 12.4% compared 
to 2017 (Gartner, 2019). Unfortunately, despite this significant spending, data 
breaches continue to occur and are becoming more and more costly. For 
example, the Ponemon Institute’s 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study found that 
the global average cost of a data breach was 3.86 million US dollars, an increase 
of 6.4% compared to 2017 (The Ponemon Institute, 2019). The study also found 
that the average number of records lost or stolen following a data breach grew 
2.2% from 2017. As a result of these alarming statistics, organizations are now 
turning to zero-trust security to better protect their assets and reduce risk. 
    Zero-trust security is an information security framework which states that 
organizations should not trust any entity inside or outside of their perimeter at any 
time (Gilman et al., 2017). It assumes that untrusted entities exist both outside 
and inside the enterprise network. The main tenets of zero-trust security can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Tenet 1: Ensure all requests to access resources are always verified, 
regardless of where they originated from. 
2. Tenet 2: Grant access to resources based on “need-to-know” and 
strictly enforce access control. 
3. Tenet 3: Monitor and audit all user activities. 
    While zero-trust security for networks and identity management systems has 
received a great deal of attention (Gilman et al., 2017), (Centrify, 2019), very little 
focus has been devoted to zero-trust security for database systems (Rjaibi et al., 
2019). This is concerning as database systems contain an enterprise’s most 
critical data and are often the primary subject of attacks by both internal and 
external threats. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 
introduces the database threat model and explores both the direct and indirect 
means through which the same data in a database can be accessed. Next, 
Section 6.3 shows how the concepts introduced earlier in this thesis equip 
database systems with the tools necessary to effectively address the challenges 
posed by the direct and indirect means through which data can be accessed. 
Section 6.4 explores the notion of separation of duties as another critical 
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foundation to fully enable zero-trust database security. Lastly, Section 6.5 shows 
a concrete example to illustrate how the row permission, column mask and 
trusted context concepts introduced in this thesis come together to meet an 
enterprise’s zero-trust database security requirements.  
6.2 Database Threat Model 
This threat model focuses on the direct and indirect means for accessing data in 
a database and the challenges they pose to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-
trust security discussed above. The model assumes that enterprises are adhering 
to basic database security hygiene such as user authentication, auditing and TLS, 
which are standard features on all major database systems. The model also 
assumes that standard operational policies such as operating system and 
database system software vulnerability patching are in place.  
    The same data in a database can be accessed in two different ways: Directly 
or indirectly. Direct access occurs using standard database interfaces such as 
Structured Query Language (SQL). This can be divided into two scenarios: 
1. Interactive database access: This access is typically performed by 
database administrators using an interactive interface offered by the 
database system such as SQL. It is usually used to carry out administrative 
tasks such as granting database privileges.  
2. Application database access: This is the most common database access 
scenario. It involves end users interacting with an application which in turn 
interacts with the database system to execute requests on behalf of those 
end users. 
    The key issue with interactive database access is privilege abuse. For 
example, a DBA might abuse their privileges to access sensitive employee data 
such as salary and bonus information. The application database access poses 
two key issues. The first one is application bypass where, for example, the 
application administrator abuses the application’s database credentials to make 
changes to the database that are contrary to the application’s business logic. The 
second issue is the loss of user identity which diminishes the value of database 
auditing to demonstrate compliance and to hold users accountable for their 
actions. This issue stems from the fact that applications use a generic user ID to 
access the database on behalf of all users as opposed to the actual user identity. 
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    Indirect access takes place when a user bypasses the database system 
altogether. This is the most dangerous type of access as it completely bypasses 
all database access control and auditing. This can be divided into two scenarios: 
1. File system access: This access occurs when a user chooses to access 
the data directly on the file system using operating system commands. 
2. Storage media access: This access occurs when a user recovers the 
data from the actual storage media such as a stolen or lost hard drive. 
    Table 6.1 summarizes the challenges direct and indirect access to data pose 
to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security. Figure 6.1 summarizes the 
database threat model. 
Table 6.1 – Zero-trust database security challenges 
Issue Type of data access Zero-trust security tenet 
affected 
Privilege abuse Direct access Tenets 1 and 2 
Application bypass Direct access   Tenets 1 and 2 
Loss of user identity Direct access Tenet 3 
File system access Indirect access Tenets 1 and 2 
Storage media access Indirect access Tenets 1 and 2 
 
 
Figure 6.1– Database threat model. 
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6.3 Addressing Direct Data Access Challenges 
As discussed in section 6.2, privilege abuse, application bypass and the loss of 
user identity are the key challenges to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust 
security when it comes to the direct data access use case. This section describes 
how the concepts introduced in this thesis address these challenges. 
6.3.1 Privilege Abuse 
Historically, database systems have been designed such that the DBA had 
access to all data in all tables in the database. Clearly, this model does not 
prevent privilege abuse. Intuitively, fine-grained database authorization can be 
thought of as the ideal solution for preventing privilege abuse as it controls access 
at the row, column or cell level, thus ensuring that users have access to only the 
subset of the data for which they are authorized. However, fine-grained database 
authorization comes in many forms and not all such forms adequately protect 
against privilege abuse.  
    Chapter 3 introduced row permissions and column masks. It also showed how 
these concepts improve over traditional database views and application-based 
security. In particular, row permissions and column masks are data-centric and 
cannot be bypassed like database views and application-based security. 
Similarly, Chapter 5 introduced the multi-purpose MAC implementation and 
showed how it improved over traditional MLS implementations by providing more 
flexibility around the specification of security label types and access policies. Both 
row permissions and column masks, and the multi-purpose MAC implementation 
effectively address the privilege abuse challenge. Figure 6.2 contrasts all the fine-
grained authorization options. Row permissions and column masks are ranked 
slightly higher than the multi-purpose MAC because it is more flexible. In fact, 
their authorization rules are expressed in SQL, thus provide more flexibility than 
rules that only manipulate security labels. Therefore, row permissions and 
column masks are most suitable for addressing the privilege abuse challenge. 
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Figure 6.2– Fine-grained database authorization. 
6.3.2 Application Bypass 
A key drawback to application-based security is that applications can be 
bypassed. For example, a malicious application administrator can choose to 
abuse the application’s database credentials in order to access the database 
directly, thus bypassing the application altogether. The malicious application 
administrator can then gain access to sensitive data or make modifications to the 
database that are contrary to the application’s business logic.  
    This application bypass is made possible because traditional database 
authorization does not provide control around when a particular privilege can be 
exercised. Section 3.4 in Chapter 3 introduced the concept of trusted context. 
One of the benefits of this new concept is the ability to address application bypass 
by linking database privileges to a trusted context. When a privilege is linked to a 
trusted context, a user can exercise that privilege only when they are interacting 
with the database system within the confines of a trust relationship. Application 
bypass can be addressed in this manner by requiring the database system to 
authorize the application’s user ID only and only if additional attributes have been 
verified such as the IP address of the application server and the application’s 
digital certificate. Therefore, an application administrator who wishes to abuse 
the application credentials by connecting to the database outside the scope of 
the application will find it much harder to do so. 
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6.3.3 Loss of User Identity 
In multitiered database environments, the application interacts with the database 
system using a generic user ID identifying the application itself, and not the actual 
end users. One major implication of this is diminished user accountability. 
Typically, database users are held accountable for their actions through auditing. 
Unfortunately, when the application uses a generic user ID for all database 
accesses, the database audit log will only show that user ID with no references 
to the actual end user behind the application. 
    The trusted context concept introduced in Chapter 3 is a formal mechanism for 
defining a trust relationship between the database system and an external 
application based on a series of attributes such as the application’s user ID, the 
IP address of the application server and the application’s digital certificate. One 
of the capabilities that an application gains once it is working within the confines 
of that trust relationship is the ability to switch the current user on a given 
database connection. This enables the application to propagate the user identity 
to the database where it is used for access control and auditing purposes, and 
thus addressing the loss of user identity problem. The high-level steps for 
leveraging the trusted context concept to address the loss of user identity problem 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. The database security administrator creates a trusted context object to 
define a trust relationship between the application and the database. 
2. The application establishes a trusted connection with the database. 
3. Before issuing any request to the database on behalf of an end user, the 
application switches the current user of the connection to the new user. 
This automatically propagates the end user identity to the database where 
it is used for all access control and auditing till the application switches 
user again. 
6.4 Addressing Indirect Data Access Challenges 
As discussed in section 6.2, file system access and storage media access are 
the key challenges to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security when it 
comes to the indirect data access use case. A powerful countermeasure to 
protect against indirect access is data encryption as encrypted data is of no value 
to an attacker. However, data encryption for database systems comes in many 
forms and not all such forms of encryption effectively protect against indirect data 
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access. There are also performance implications that need to be taken into 
account when selecting an encryption solution for a database. 
    Chapter 4 contrasted the traditional database encryption methods with the new 
solution proposed in this thesis: Holistic database encryption. Figure 6.3 provides 
a different perspective for contrasting these approaches. SEDs and file system 
encryption provide the broadest coverage (i.e., they encrypt entire disks or file 
systems), but they only protect against storage media access. In other words, 
these methods do not stop a user from browsing the database files using 
operating system commands. Tablespace encryption, holistic database 
encryption and column encryption protect against both storage media access and 
file system access. When these methods are employed, a user browsing the 
database files using operating system commands will only see encrypted data, 
which is of no value to them. Column encryption, however, is intrusive to 
application and negatively affects performance. Tablespace encryption may 
create a vulnerability when a DBA inadvertently moves data from an encrypted 
tablespace to an unencrypted one, or when data is held in temporary 
tablespaces. Therefore, holistic database encryption is most suitable for 
protecting against indirect access and in turn adhering to the basic tenets of zero-
trust security. 
    Table 6.2 summarizes the issues around the direct data access and indirect 
data access use cases. It also shows how the concepts introduced in this thesis 
solve these issues. Row permissions and column masks address the privilege 
abuse issue. Trusted contexts and in particular the conditional authorization 
aspect of it solve the application bypass issue. The user identity propagation 
aspect of trusted contexts solves the loss of user identity issue in multitiered 
database environments. Finally, holistic database encryption addresses the 
issues around file system access and storage media access.  
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Figure 6.3– Database encryption. 
Table 6.2 – Zero-trust database security challenges and solutions. 
Issue Type of data access Zero-trust 
security tenet 
affected 
Solution 
Privilege abuse Direct access Tenets 1 and 2 - Row permissions 
- Column masks 
Application bypass Direct access   Tenets 1 and 2 Trusted contexts  
- Conditional authorization 
Loss of user identity Direct access Tenet 3 Trusted contexts 
- User identity propagation 
File system access Indirect access Tenets 1 and 2 Holistic database encryption 
Storage media 
access 
Indirect access Tenets 1 and 2 Holistic database encryption 
 
The performance evaluations for row permissions/column masks and holistic 
database encryption have been covered in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. 
For trusted contexts, the performance evaluation (Bruni et al., 2007) has shown 
that the overhead is in the low single digits regardless of whether or not user 
authentication is required during the switch user processing. Intuitively, this is 
expected as the database system reuses the existing database connection as 
opposed to creating a new one to process requests on behalf of a new user.  
6.5 Separation of Duties 
Historically, database systems have been designed such that DBAs manage all 
aspects of the database including security and auditing. Additionally, DBAs have 
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had implicit access to all data in all tables in the database. With the rise of internal 
threats as a security concern equally important to external threats (Verizon, 
2017), this traditional model makes it difficult for organizations to fully adhere to 
zero-trust database security. It is therefore critical that database systems be 
extended to provide the capabilities to allow organizations to vest security 
administration and database administration into two non-overlapping roles so 
separation of duties can be enforced. 
    Consequently, during the research, design and implementation of row 
permissions, column masks, trusted contexts and holistic database encryption, I 
have also made the following corollary enhancements: 
1. Redesigned the role of the DBA to remove the implicit ability to access all 
data in all tables as well as the ability to manage database security and 
auditing. 
2. Vested the ability to manage database security and auditing into a new 
and independent database role, called Security Administrator (SECADM) 
(Chen et al., 2008). In this context, row permissions, column masks, 
trusted contexts and holistic database encryption are solely managed by 
the SECDAM.  
3. Implemented the new SECADM role and also ensured that such role 
cannot make any privilege grants to itself either directly or indirectly 
through membership in a role or a group. This automatically covers row 
permissions and column masks as they are an additional level of control 
on top the required table level privileges. 
    With this enhancement in place, organizations can now vest database security 
and database administration into two separate roles, enabling them to remove 
any notion of inherent trust in DBAs and consequently fully adhere to zero-trust 
security for their database systems. It is paramount that organizations consider 
separation of duties as they choose the type of database system to adopt 
because not all database systems necessarily provide the required capabilities 
to enforce separation of duties.  
6.6 Example Scenario 
The goal of this example is to show in great detail how the concepts introduced 
in this thesis enable organizations to implement zero-trust database security. The 
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example will cover all the enhancements made, namely holistic database 
encryption, trusted contexts (both the conditional authorization and the user 
identity propagation aspects), row permissions and column masks. It builds upon 
the example shown in Section 3.7 of Chapter 3. All SQL statements shown here 
are the actual interfaces for the contributions made in this thesis as they have 
been fully implemented in IBM DB2.  
    The example represents a banking application which stores and manages 
customer sensitive data. It is a classical 3-tier application. The first tier is the set 
of bank employees using the application through a standard web browser. The 
second tier is the application server running the actual application logic. We 
assume that the application server’s IP address is 72.137.255.114. Lastly, the 
third tier is the database where the application stores and manages customer 
data. Table 6.3 summarizes the bank’s security policy which must be 
implemented by the application. 
Table 6.3 – Banking application security policy. 
# Requirement Rationale 
1 All customer data must be protected against 
online threats. 
Protect against users browsing the database files 
on the operating system – file system access. 
2 All customer data must be protected against 
offline threats. 
Protect against loss or theft of storage media – 
storage media access. 
3 All customer data must be accessed through 
the application only. 
Protect against customer data changes outside 
the application business logic – Application 
bypass. 
4 All application user activities must be tracked. Ensure application users are held accountable for 
their actions – Loss of user identity. 
5 All customer data must be accessed on a need-
to-know basis. 
Protect against DBAs abusing their privileges – 
Privilege abuse. 
6 Customer service representatives and 
telemarketers can see the data about all 
customers. 
Ensure customer data is accessed on a need-to-
know basis. 
7 Tellers can see only the data for their own 
branch customers. 
Ensure customer data is accessed on a need-to-
know basis. 
8 The customer account number is accessible 
only by customer service representatives. All 
other users can only see the last 4 digits. The 
rest of the account number digits are masked 
out for such users. 
Ensure customer data is accessed on a need-to-
know basis. 
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    As discussed earlier in this chapter, requirements 1 and 2 (file system access 
and storage media access) are addressed through holistic database encryption. 
Below is the actual SQL statement to create the banking application’s database: 
   
  create database AppDB  
  encrypt cipher AES key length 256  
  master key label AppDB-MK; 
     
    The SQL statement above instructs the database system to create a new 
database called AppDB and ensure that data stored within that database is 
automatically encrypted using AES with a key that is 256 bits in size. The master 
key label AppDB-MK is a unique identifier for a key wrapping key that is stored 
outside the database such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM). This master 
key is used to protect the Data Encryption Key (DEK) that is stored inside the 
database. The DEK is the key that is actually used to encrypt and decrypt the 
data stored in the database. The database system automatically interacts with 
the HSM each time it needs to encrypt or decrypt the DEK with the master key. 
    To address requirements 3 and 4, we need to create a trusted context object 
in the database to define a trust relationship between the database and the 
application. Below is the actual SQL statement to create such trusted context. 
  create trusted context AppCtx 
  based upon connection using system authid AppUserID 
  attributes (address ‘72.137.255.114’ 
                     encryption ‘SSL’) 
  default role DBCONNECT  
  with use for Amy without authentication, 
                       Pat without authentication, 
                       Haytham without authentication 
  enable; 
 
 
    There are two parts to the SQL statement above. The first one is the definition 
of a trust relationship between the database and an application that is identified 
by a series of attributes, namely the application’s user ID (AppUserID), the IP 
address from which the application initiates database connections 
(72.137.255.114) as well as the nature of the protection over the communication 
channel between the application and the database (SSL). Each time a database 
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connection is attempted using AppUserID, the database system automatically 
assesses the additional attributes of that incoming database connection. If the 
incoming connection attributes fully match the attributes specified in the definition 
of trusted context AppCtx, then that incoming connection automatically gains two 
key capabilities that are not available to it otherwise. More specifically: 
1. The incoming connection inherits the role DBCONNECT. This is the role 
that actually authorizes the database connection to take place. In other 
words, if the application administrator chooses to abuse the application 
credentials to access the database directly, the database system will not 
allow that database connection to take place. This is how requirement 3 is 
addressed. 
2. The incoming connection inherits the ability to switch user IDs on the 
database connection established. In this specific example, the application 
will be allowed to switch the current user on the established database 
connection to users Amy, Pat and Haytham. So, each time the application 
needs to issue database requests on behalf of any of these users, it will 
first switch the current user on the connection to the desired user ID. This 
is how requirement 4 is addressed.  
    Requirements 5, 6, 7 and 8 are about direct data access. This is where row 
permissions and column masks come into play. Once these are in place, 
customer data will be accessed based on the bank’s application security policy 
(requirements 6, 7 and 8). Additionally, DBAs cannot abuse their privileges to 
access such customer data because row permissions and column masks are 
enforced uniformly across all users regardless of their privilege or authority 
(requirement 5). The row permissions and column masks SQL to implement 
requirements 6, 7 and 8 has already been given in Section 3.7 in Chapter 3 and 
will not be repeated here. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explored both the direct and indirect means through which the same 
data in a database system can be accessed and the challenges they pose to 
adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security. Privilege abuse, application 
bypass and the loss of user identity in multitiered database environments 
represent the key challenges for the direct access scenarios while file system 
access and storage media access represent those for the indirect access use 
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cases. The chapter then showed how the concepts introduced in this thesis 
around holistic database encryption, trusted context’s conditional authorization, 
trusted context’s user identity propagation, row permissions and column masks 
come together to equip database systems with the controls necessary to help 
enterprises effectively implement zero-trust security for their database 
installations. Lastly, the chapter provided a concrete example showing the actual 
interfaces for the concepts introduced in this thesis as implemented in a 
commercial database system.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summarizes the thesis and outlines potential future research 
directions in database security. Row permissions, column masks, trusted 
contexts and holistic database encryption are the key contributions made in this 
thesis. They equip database systems with the controls necessary to help 
enterprises effectively implement zero-trust database security. Data 
classification, machine learning and homomorphic encryption are three potential 
research directions for database security. Data classification would help facilitate 
the adoption of concepts such as row permissions and column masks. Machine 
learning can be used to detect unknown threats such as SQL injections. 
Homomorphic encryption would remove any privacy concerns when adopting 
cloud database services.  
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7.1 Introduction 
Database systems are at the core of an organization’s information system. They 
store the organization’s most critical assets such as client personal data, patient 
healthcare records, employee personal data, financial transactions, intellectual 
property and are consequently the primary target of attacks by both insiders and 
outsiders. They are also the subject of numerous compliance mandates such as 
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the US Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). These compliance mandates 
combined with the continuous increase in data breaches and the rise of internal 
threats as a security concern equally important to external threats (Verizon, 2017) 
have driven organizations towards zero-trust security to better protect their assets 
and reduce risk.  
7.2 Key Contributions 
This thesis enhanced database systems to equip them with the necessary 
controls to help enterprises effectively implement zero-trust database security. 
The most noticeable contributions in this regard can be summarized as follows: 
1. Holistic database encryption: This solution enables organizations to 
effectively protect their data including the file system access and storage 
media access challenges discussed in Chapter 6. Unlike other database 
encryption methods (Rjaibi, 2018), this solution does not force 
organizations to make any compromises on either the data side or the 
security side. For example, unlike column encryption, holistic database 
encryption does not negatively affect database performance because it 
does interfere at all with query processing. 
2. Row permissions and column masks: This solution enables enterprises to 
ensure that data is accessed solely on a need-to-know basis. Unlike 
previous methods (Rjaibi et al., 2020), this solution ensures that the 
security policy is enforced uniformly across all users regardless of their 
privilege or authority. This also addresses the privilege abuse challenge 
discussed in Chapter 6. It also integrates thoughtfully with the rest of the 
database tenets, so organizations do not have to make any compromises 
when adopting the solution. For example, the solution harmonically 
integrates with Materialized Query Tables (MQT) so organizations can still 
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benefit from the MQTs performance boost without having to compromise 
database security.  
3. Trusted contexts: This solution provides two key benefits. First, it extends 
database systems with the required controls to address the application 
bypass and the loss of user identity challenges outlined in Chapter 6. Next, 
it enables applications to safely delegate the fine-grained authorization 
policy to the database system where it can be enforced more effectively. 
Without trusted contexts, fine-grained authorization solutions such as row 
permissions and column masks are of little value in a multitiered database 
environments because the database system only sees a generic user ID 
representing the application itself and not its end users.  
    Throughout the research, emphasis has been on both innovation and 
practicality. This is paramount for database systems as security innovations that 
come at the expense of core database tenets such as performance, integrity, 
compression or require changes to database applications are unlikely to be 
adopted by a commercial database system, and even more unlikely to be used 
in practice by clients. For example, a bank is unlikely to adopt a column masking 
solution if that requires changing hundreds of applications. Similarly, the bank is 
unlikely to enable database encryption if that causes a significant performance 
degradation to a mission critical application or if encryption nullifies the benefits 
of compression and forces the bank to purchase more storage hardware. In this 
regard, the enhancements proposed in this thesis have been fully implemented 
in several commercial database systems such as IBM DB2 and Informix, where 
they are relied upon by thousands of banking, insurance, retail, government and 
other types of organizations from around the world to protect their critical data 
and meet their compliance mandates. 
7.3 Future Directions 
Database security needs to continue to evolve to facilitate the adoption of security 
capabilities and address emerging challenges and use cases. In this context, data 
classification, machine learning and homomorphic encryption are key future 
directions for database security. 
7.3.1 Data Classification 
Data classification would facilitate the adoption of fine-grained authorization 
solutions such as the row permission and column mask concepts introduced in 
  89 
this thesis. The concepts themselves are very easy to implement once the data 
to protect is known. But in some cases, the nature of this data may not be known. 
For example, consider a database inherited from another department or perhaps 
from an acquisition. The data needs to be analyzed and classified so the sensitive 
tables and sensitive columns are identified. While data classification tools exist 
(IBM, 2019), they either take a long time to classify a large database or they are 
forced to sample the data and create room for false negatives. Building data 
classification in the database system itself and enable the database to do this 
automatically and transparently as the data is ingested would help solve this 
problem. Besides the expected challenges around how to perform data 
classification in a way that minimizes both false positives and false negatives, it 
is critical that this data classification does not compromise other key tenets such 
as database performance.  
7.3.2 Machine Learning 
Machine learning would enable the database system to address another class of 
external threats. For example, consider a classical 3-tier application. Suppose 
that it is an internet facing application and that an external attacker exploits an 
SQL injection vulnerability in the application. While an SQL injection is an 
application problem (as opposed to a database problem), the attacker can still 
compromise the database by fooling the application into executing unintended 
SQL statements such as retrieving the content of the application’s users table or 
dropping actual database tables. In this case, the database system cannot figure 
out that it is being attacked since the requests are coming from a legitimate 
application which holds all the proper privileges to execute the requests it issued. 
Machine learning can be used to enable the database system to build a model of 
the database and user activities so that deviations from such model can be 
detected. For example, if the application suddenly starts downloading massive 
amounts of data, that may be a sign of an SQL injection attack. Besides the 
expected challenges around what type of machine or deep learning models are 
more effective for a database system, the solution must not compromise 
database performance during model creation or subsequent online updates of 
such model. While anomaly detection tools based on machine learning exist (Adir 
et al., 2017), they often lack visibility into full database activities. Therefore, 
implementing such capability in the database system itself would be more 
effective as the database system has full visibility into all the user activities it 
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processes.  
7.3.3 Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption would allow enterprises to take full advantage of cloud 
computing. For example, cloud database services relieve enterprises from the 
burden of deploying, configuring, patching, upgrading, scaling, backing up and 
recovering database systems. However, despite these significant gains 
enterprises are still reluctant to adopt these database services. This is due to 
security concerns around storing sensitive data in the cloud. While virtually all 
cloud vendors provide encryption solutions for their database services, the mere 
fact that data is encrypted on the cloud vendor premises means that there is a 
time at which that sensitive data exists in clear text and may be abused by a 
malicious entity. The ultimate solution would be to ensure that data is encrypted 
on premises with keys managed by the client also on premises before it is 
ingested into the cloud database service. The challenge would then be to enable 
the database system to perform queries over the data without having to decrypt 
it first. This is where homomorphic encryption may be able to help. The idea 
would be to encrypt the data in such a way that the database system can evaluate 
queries over the encrypted data directly and still return the same results as if the 
evaluation were done over clear text data. While some research solutions exist 
(Popa et al., 2011), they tend to restrict the type of SQL that can be executed 
over the encrypted data. Clearly more research is needed here to ensure that the 
benefits of homomorphic encryption does not come at the expense of key 
database tenets such as functionality and performance.   
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter summarized the thesis and discussed potential future research 
directions in database security. Row permissions, column masks, trusted 
contexts and holistic database encryption are the key contributions to the 
database security field made in this thesis. These enhancements equip database 
systems with the controls necessary to help enterprises effectively implement 
zero-trust database security and meet security and privacy compliance 
mandates. Data classification, machine learning and homomorphic encryption 
are three potential research directions for database security. Data classification 
would help facilitate the adoption of concepts such as row permissions and 
column masks by automatically identifying where sensitive data resides so those 
  91 
constructs can be applied to the appropriate tables and columns. Machine 
learning can be used to detect unknown threats such as SQL injections and would 
equip database systems with an additional layer of defense. Homomorphic 
encryption would remove any privacy concerns when adopting cloud database 
services and permit organizations to fully benefit from cloud computing.  
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Appendix A: Fine-Grained Authorization Portfolio 
 
Table A.1 – Research Papers 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Enhancing and Simplifying Data 
Security and Privacy for Multitiered 
Applications 
Journal of Parallel and Distributed 
Systems, Special issue on Enabling 
Technologies for Energy Cloud 
(Also, Chapter 3 of this thesis) 
- Design of a holistic fine-grained database authorization 
solution which allows organizations to reduce the 
complexity of their applications and improve overall 
database security. 
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, 
Unix and Windows, IBM DB2 for z/OS and IBM for DB2 
for iSeries. 
2 Extending Relational Database 
Systems to Automatically Enforce 
Privacy Policies 
International conference on Data 
Engineering (ICDE) 
- Design of a solution which extends database systems to 
be able to automatically enforce privacy policies. 
- Enable organizations to meet privacy requirements for 
data stored in database systems.  
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Abstract
Databases are at the core of successful businesses. Due
to the voluminous stores of personal data being held by
companies today, preserving privacy has become a crucial
requirement for operating a business. This paper proposes
how current relational database management systems can
be transformed into their privacy-preserving equivalents.
Specifically, we present language constructs and implemen-
tation design for fine-grained access control to realize this
goal.
1. Introduction
The pervasive use of computing technology and the in-
creased reliance on information systems have created a
heightened awareness and concern about the storage and use
of private information. This worldwide phenomenon has
ushered in a plethora of privacy-related guidelines and leg-
islations, e.g. the OECD Privacy Guidelines in Europe, the
Canadian Privacy Act, the Australian Privacy Amendment
Act, the Japanese Privacy Code, the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Consumer Privacy Rule. Compliance with these leg-
islation has become an important corporate concern. The
current methods employed to address the disclosure com-
pliance problem involve training individuals to be cognizant
of the various regulations and changing organizational pro-
cesses and procedures. However, these approaches are only
a partial solution and need to be augmented with technology
support.
We present constructs for imbuing relational database
systems with fine grained access control (FGAC) and show
how they can be used to enforce disclosure control enun-
ciated in the vision for Hippocratic databases [1]. These
constructs have been designed to be integrated with the rest
of the infrastructure of a relational database system. We
also discuss the implementation of the proposed FGAC con-
structs, building upon the ideas from [6]. Finally, we show
how privacy policies written in a higher-level specification
language such as P3P [3] can be algorithmically translated
into the proposed constructs.
The users of relational databases are requiring that an
FGAC implementation meets the following desiderata:
• The implementation must solve the problem within the
database itself without application changes or applica-
tion awareness of the implementation.
• The implementation must ensure that all users of the
data are covered, regardless of how the data is ac-
cessed.
• The implementation must minimize the complexity
and maintenance of the FGAC policies.
• The implementation must provide the ability to control
access to rows, columns, or cells as desired.
Traditional methods of database access control have re-
lied upon the use of statically defined views, which are logi-
cal constructs imposed over database tables that can alter or
restrict the data seen by a user. Using predefined views as
the method for FGAC works well only when the number of
different restrictions is few or the granularity of the restric-
tions is such that it affects large, easily identified groups of
users. When these conditions are not true, view definitions
may become complex in an effort to accommodate all the
restrictions in one view. This complexity can strain system
limits and can make maintenance of the views difficult.
Consider the use of a large number of views, each one
implementing restrictions for a specific set of users. One
issue that arises immediately is how to correctly route user
requests to the view that is appropriate to them. Often, the
solution chosen is to resolve the request in the application,
not in the database. Moreover, if a user can bypass the view
when accessing data, for example by having direct access to
the underlying tables, then the restrictions are not enforced.
Given the shortcomings of the traditional methods of im-
plementing FGAC, some database vendors have proposed
solutions that do not rely on the use of views to control ac-
cess to tabular data. For instance, the Oracle Virtual Private
Database [5, 7] solution allows users to define a security
policy, which is a function written in PL/SQL that returns
a string representing a predicate, and to attach the security
policy to a table. When that table is accessed, the secu-
rity policy is automatically enforced. Sybase Row Level
Access Control [9] allows users to define access rules that
apply restrictions to retrieved data. The related work sec-
tion further discusses the Oracle and Sybase approaches.
Microsoft SQL Server primarily supports traditional view
based access control, though they have a feature called row
level permissions. However, row level permissions seem
to be usable only with table hierarchies. In DB2, support
for FGAC is currently provided through traditional mecha-
nisms based on views, triggers and special registers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 proposes FGAC constructs that allow restrictions to
be expressed on database accesses. Aside from row and
column level restrictions that respectively restrict the set of
rows and columns of a table, cell level restrictions can be
specified to limit access to specific fields of a row. Sec-
tion 3 describes how restrictions expressed in terms of the
proposed constructs can be enforced using dynamic views.
Section 4 presents an algorithm for translating a P3P pri-
vacy policy into the proposed FGAC constructs. Section 5
discusses related work, and Section 6 presents concluding
remarks. Appendix A argues for extending the function-
ality of current relational database systems with cell level
access control.
2. Language Constructs
We provide constructs that allow restrictions to be spec-
ified on access to data in a table at the level of a row, a col-
umn, or a cell (i.e., individual column-row intersections).
Privacy policies specified in high-level languages such as
P3P can be translated into these constructs, or one could
specify the policy directly using these constructs.
The proposed facility is complimentary to the current ta-
ble level authorization mechanisms provided by commer-
cial database systems using the grant command [2]. While
grant controls whether a user can access a table at all, the
proposed constructs define the subset of the data within a
table that the user is allowed to access. Conceptually, a re-
striction defines a view of the table in which inaccessible
data has been replaced by null values. As discussed in [6], it
is possible to use either “table semantics” or “query seman-
create restriction restriction-name
on table-x
for auth-name-1 [ except auth-name-2]
( ( (to columns column-name-list)
| (to rows [ where search-condition ] )
| (to cells (column-name-list [ where search-condition ] )+ )
)
[ for purpose purpose-list ]
[ for recipient recipient-list ]
)+
command-restriction
Figure 1. Fine grained restriction syntax
tics”. With query semantics, if all the values in a row are
hidden by a restriction, then the row is omitted altogether
from the view. With table semantics, the row would instead
be retained.
Figure 1 gives the syntax of a fine grained restriction
command. It states that those in auth-name-1 except those
in auth-name-2 are allowed only restricted access to table-x.
The keywords public (i.e., all users), group, role, and user
can be used to qualify the authorized names. Table-x can be
any table expression.
A restriction can be specified at the level of a column
(Section 2.1), a row (Section 2.2), or a cell (Section 2.3).
More than one restriction can be specified on a table for the
same user (Section 2.4).
A restriction may additionally specify purposes and/or
recipients [1, 3, 6] for which the access is allowed. If no
purpose or recipient is specified, then the restriction applies
to all purposes and recipients respectively. If a purpose or
recipient is specified, the user’s access is limited to only the
specified purpose-recipient combinations.
Akin to the database system variable user that can be
referenced in queries and returns the id of the user issuing
the query, the new system variables purpose and recipient
return the list of purposes and recipients from the current
query context [6]. These values in turn determine the re-
strictions for the current query.
The command-restriction that appears as the last element
of the syntax has the following form and states that access
can be restricted to any combination of select, delete, insert,
or update commands:
restricting access to (all | (select | delete | insert | update)+ )
The discussion below will use, for illustration, the Cus-
tomer table with the following schema: Customer (id inte-
ger, name char(32), phone char(32)).
2.1 Column Restriction
A column restriction specifies a subset of the columns in
table-x that auth-name-1 is allowed to access. The follow-
ing restriction, named r1, ensures that only the id column of
Customer is accessed by any database user:
create restriction r1
on Customer
for public
to columns id
restricting access to all
The restriction r2 below ensures that members of the
account group and user Bob have only select access to
columns name and phone.
create restriction r2
on Customer
for group acct, user Bob
to columns name, phone
restricting access to select
2.2 Row Restriction
A row restriction gives the subset of rows in table-x that
auth-name-1 is allowed to access. This subset is specified
using a search-condition over table-x. The restriction r3 be-
low ensures that every access to Customer is qualified by
the predicate, name = user.
create restriction r3
on Customer
for public
to rows where name = user
restricting access to all
If user Bob issues select * from Customer, he would
see id, name and phone for those rows where name equaled
Bob.
2.3 Cell Restriction
A cell restriction defines the row-column intersections
that auth-name-1 is allowed to access. It is possible to
specify multiple column-name lists, each possibly anno-
tated with a search-condition. A search-condition is a cor-
related subquery with an implicit correlation variable t de-
fined over the tuples of table-x. Access to the columns in
column-name-list for each individual row identified by t
is conditionally granted depending upon the result of the
search condition. If no search-condition is given, then ac-
cess is granted to all column values in column-name-list in
table-x. If the search condition ignores correlation variable,
then access is granted or denied to all columns values in
column-name-list in table-x, depending upon the result of
the search-condition.
The following is an example of a cell restriction used to
enforce individual user’s privacy preferences expressed as
opt-in/out choices. Assume that for the purpose of market-
ing, Bob is allowed to see name, but his access to phone is
allowed only if the user has opted-in to revealing her phone
number.
create restriction r4
on Customer for user Bob,
to cells name,
(phone where exists (
select 1
from SysCat.Choices Customer c
where c.ID = Customer.ID and c.C1 = 1))
for purpose marketing
for recipient others
restricting access to select
The above restriction specifies cell restrictions for two
column-name-lists: The first list contains the name column,
and the second contains the phone column. The restriction
allows Bob access to name, only if the variable purpose in-
cludes marketing, and recipient includes others. Otherwise,
all values of the name column will be null for Bob.
The second list of columns has a search-condition asso-
ciated with it since access to phone is dependent upon indi-
vidual user choices. The search-condition comprises an ex-
istential subquery that uses the implicit correlation variable
Customer. For each row in Customer, the subquery verifies,
using the SysCat.Choices Customer table that stores indi-
vidual opt-in/out choices, whether the user has opted-in for
the disclosure of her phone number (represented by a col-
umn value of 1).
2.4 Combining Multiple Restrictions
If multiple restrictions have been defined for a user u and
a table T , then u’s access to T is governed by the combina-
tion of these restrictions.
Assume initially that a user associates with a query a sin-
gle purpose and a single recipient. We consider two design
choices for combining multiple restrictions:
• Intersection—User u is allowed access to data defined
by the intersection of all applicable restrictions. The
details are shown in Table 1.
• Union — User u is allowed access to data defined by
the union of all applicable restrictions. The details are
shown in Table 2.
If the commands specified in the command-restriction
clauses of the restrictions being combined are different, they
row column cell
row
The search-conditions of individual row
restrictions are and’ed together to define
the intersection of rows accessible to a
user.
The row restriction limits the rows ac-
cessible to the user. The column restric-
tion further limits the columns within the
rows accessible to the user.
The row restriction limits the rows acces-
sible to the user. Within each row, the
cell restriction further limits the access
to the cells that qualify the cells’ search-
condition.
column
The user’s access is limited to those
columns that appear in both of the col-
umn restrictions.
Column and cell restrictions intersect
to limit access to only those columns
that appear in both the restrictions. In
addition, the cell restriction’s search-
condition further limits accessible cells
within a column.
cell
The search-conditions are and’ed to-
gether and the user is allowed access to
a cell if the composite condition is satis-
fied for the cell. The value of the com-
posite condition for a cell that does not
appear in both the restrictions is false.
Table 1. Combining restrictions with intersection
row column cell
row
The search-conditions of individual row
restrictions are or’ed together to define
the union of rows accessible to a user.
The user is given access to all the cells
for any row that satisfies the row restric-
tion. Additionally, the user is allowed ac-
cess to all the cells in any of the columns
that satisfies the column restriction, ir-
respective of whether the corresponding
rows satisfy the row restriction.
The user is given access to all the cells
in any of the rows that satisfy the row
restriction. Additionally, the user is al-
lowed access to all other cells that satisfy
the cell restriction’s search-condition, ir-
respective of whether the corresponding
rows satisfy the row restriction.
column
The user is allowed access to a column
if it appears in either of the two column
restrictions.
The user is given access to all the cells
in any column appearing in the column
restriction, regardless of whether the cell
restriction is satisfied for these cells. For
cells in a column for which the column
restriction does not apply, access is given
if the cell restriction is satisfied.
cell
The search-conditions are or’ed together
and the user is allowed access to a cell
if the composite condition is satisfied for
the cell.
Table 2. Combining restrictions with union
Policy Translator
Query Rewriting
FGAC 
Restrictions
Privacy 
Policy User Query 
with purpose 
& recipient
Privacy Catalogs
RDBMS
PR PT
Figure 2. Implementation architecture
are respectively and’ed or or’ed depending upon the choice
of intersection or union semantics.
Multiple restrictions can be combined in any order, both
with intersection and union semantics. With the intersec-
tion semantics, the user’s access to data decreases as addi-
tional restrictions are applied. Conversely, with union se-
mantics, access to data increases as additional restrictions
are applied.
We prefer intersection semantics over union since addi-
tional restrictions should intuitively decrease a user’s access
to information.1
Finally, if a query is annotated with multiple purpose-
recipient pairs, instead of a single pair, then restrictions gov-
erning access to any of the pairs become relevant for the
query. These restrictions are then combined as above. Note
that once a user’s access to a table has been restricted, the
user can only access the data allowed for the purposes and
recipients specified in the restrictions.
3. Implementation
We next present a design for implementing the proposed
constructs, building upon the ideas presented in [1, 6]. In
this and the remainder of the paper, we focus on cell re-
strictions limited to select statement access. Figure 2 shows
the overview of the design. The policy translator accepts a
privacy policy (written in, for example, P3P) and metadata
1It is conceivable to use mixed modes for combining restrictions. For
example, intersection could be used to combine multiple row restrictions
while union could be used to combine multiple column or cell restric-
tions. However, the semantics of such combinations can become quite
complex as the restriction imposed by a combination may no longer be
order-independent.
stored in privacy catalogs and generates cell restrictions that
implement the policy. The schema of the privacy metadata
catalogs shown in Figure 2 used to drive the translation of
P3P privacy policies into cell level restrictions are given be-
low.
PR ( purp-recip char(18),
p3ptype char(32),
choice tabname char(32),
choice colname char(32))
PT (p3ptype char (32), tabname char(32), colname char(32))
Table PR stores, for each purpose, recipient and p3p data
type pair, the (table name-column name) pair that records
individual user opt-in/out choice, should any choice be
available for that combination. Table PT stores, for each
P3P data type, the table names and column names which
store values of these P3P types.
Figure 3 gives the algorithm used for enforcing the fine
grain restrictions. For ease of exposition, we assume there is
a single purpose-recipient pair associated with a query and
there is at most a single restriction which is relevant for the
query. The enforcement algorithm combines the restrictions
relevant to individual queries annotated with purpose and
recipient information and transforms the user’s query into
an equivalent query over a dynamic view that implements
the restriction.
In detail, Line 1 iterates over each table reference t in
a query Q. Line 2 accesses metadata to determine if there
is a restriction r governing the usage of t by user u who is
submitting the query Q. If no such restriction exists, then t
remains unmodified in Q. Otherwise, Lines 3 and 4 replace
each reference to table t in query Q with a reference to a
dynamic view v.
The generation of the dynamic view v is implemented in
Lines 5 through 25. The view v is a select statement which
conditionally projects each column c 2 t. Line 7 searches
for a column reference to c 2 r. If no such reference exists
with the purpose/recipient of queryQ, then the user u is not
allowed access to c and Line 8 thus projects a null value
for all values of c. Otherwise, Line 10 searches for a where
clause associated with c 2 r. If no such clause exists, then
u is granted unconditional access to c. Otherwise, Line 15
outputs the condition of the where clause into a SQL case
statement which verifies the condition before outputting the
value of c (on Line 18). If the condition is false, access to
the column value is denied and Line 19 outputs a null value
for c.
4. Translating Privacy Policies
It is expected that the privacy policies will likely be writ-
ten in some high-level policy language. The following illus-
1 for each table reference t in query Q do begin
2 if (exists a restriction r pertaining to t for Q) then begin
3 create a dynamic view v 2 Q over t
4 replace each reference to t 2 Q with a reference to v 2 Q
// create the dynamic view v using
// the following print statements
//
5 print ”select”
6 for each column c 2 t do begin
// cp, cr are the purposes, recipients
// of column c in restriction r
// Qp, Qr are the purpose, recipient of query Q
//
7 if (c 62 r|Qp 2 cp ^Qr 2 cr
// c isn’t included in the restriction r
// access to c is thus prohibited
//
8 print ”null”
9 else begin
// The whereClause function returns
// the predicate associated with c
// that is specified in the restriction
//
10 let w = whereClause(c)
11 if w = null then
// There is no “where” condition
// governing the use of c 2 r, thus access
// to all column values is granted unconditionally
//
12 print c.colname
13 else begin
// Implement the “where” condition
// using a SQL case statement to grant
// only conditional access to the column c
//
14 print ”case when exists (”
15 print w.condition
16 print ”)”
17 print ”then”
18 print c.colname
19 print ”else null end as”
20 print c.colname
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 print ”from”
25 print t.tablename
26 end
Figure 3. Algorithm for enforcing fine grained
cell level restrictions using a Hippocratic
database system
trates the basic syntax of the P3P policy specification lan-
guage [3].
<POLICIES> ...
<POLICY name = "Policy_Name1" > ...
<STATEMENT>
...
<PURPOSE>
stated-purpose
[ required = ("always"|"opt-in"|"opt-out") ]
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT>
stated-recip
[ required = ("always"|"opt-in"|"opt-out") ]
</RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION> retention_val </RETENTION>
<DATA GROUP>
<DATA ref = data-ref-val>
...
</DATA GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
<POLICY>
...
</POLICY>
...
</POLICIES>
The process of transforming a policy like the one above
into fine grained restrictions involves: (1) parsing the policy
to extract the list of statements, (2) mapping data abstrac-
tions into their implementation specific equivalents, e.g. in
the above specification this would mean mapping data-ref-
val to its corresponding table name(s) and column name(s),
(3) structuring the choice tables which record individual
user opt-in/out choices (in some cases, this may not be nec-
essary since there may be no such choices), and (4) gener-
ating the restriction statements. Assuming that data-ref-val
maps to columns A and B of table T, the above abstract
specification would lead to the following restriction being
constructed:
create restriction Policy Name1
on T
for public
to cells A,B
[ where opt-in-out-conditions ]
for purpose stated-purpose
for recipient stated-recip
restricting access to select
Figure 4 is a detailed example of a privacy policy, for a
fictional Healthcare provider.
The metadata contains the information needed to asso-
ciate ”#personal” (personal information) and ”#medical”
(medical information) with database tables which store this
information. Personal information maps to the name, SSN,
address, email and DOB fields of the Patients table, while
medical information maps to the xray, pharmacy, family,
appointment and lifestyle fields of the Patients table. Thus,
...
<!-- Statement1 -->
<STATEMENT>
<CONSEQUENCE>
Encodes that personal and medical information
can be accessed for emergency purposes
by ourselves
</CONSEQUENCE>
<PURPOSE>
<other-purpose>
Emergency
</other-purpose>
</PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref = "#personal"/>
<DATA ref = "#medical">
<CATEGORIES>
<health/>
</CATEGORIES>
</DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<!-- Statement2 -->
<STATEMENT>
<CONSEQUENCE>
Encodes that we and drug companies
with the same data usage policies
can access personal and medical information
for new_drug_research on an opt-out basis
</CONSEQUENCE>
<PURPOSE><develop/></PURPOSE>
<RECIPIENT>
<ours required="opt-out"/>
<same required="opt-out"/>
</RECIPIENT>
<RETENTION><stated-purpose/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
<DATA ref = "#personal"/>
<DATA ref = "#medical">
<CATEGORIES>
<health/>
</CATEGORIES>
</DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
...
Figure 4. A sample privacy policy written for
a health care provider
create restriction Statement1
on Patients
for public
to cells Name, SSN, Address, Email, DOB,
XRay, Pharmacy, Family,
Appointment, Lifestyle
purpose Emergency
recipient ours
restricting access to select
create restriction Statement2.1
on Patients
for public
to cells Name, SSN, Address, Email, DOB,
XRay, Pharmacy, Family,
Appointment, Lifestyle
where
exists (
select 1
from SysCat.Choices Patients cp
where cp.ID = Patients.ID
and cp.C1 = 1 )
for purpose develop
for recipient ours
restricting access to select
create restriction Statement2.2
on Patients
for public
to cells Name, SSN, Address, Email, DOB,
XRay, Pharmacy, Family,
Appointment, Lifestyle
where
exists (
select 1
from SysCat.Choices Patients cp
where cp.ID = Patients.ID
and cp.C2 = 1 )
for purpose develop
for recipient same
restricting access to select
Figure 5. Translation of the privacy policy in
Figure 4 into fine grained cell level restric-
tions
the P3P healthcare policy given in Figure 4 is translated into
the restrictions given in Figure 5.
For simplicity, the restrictions in Figure 5 assume that all
data types in a P3P statement are contained in a single table.
The Choices Patients table is created by the database
administrator to record individual opt-in/out decisions de-
scribed in the privacy policy. In Figure 5, C1 represents the
choice to allow Drug Research to see personal and medical
data if the drug research is being conducted by the health-
care company itself. Choice C2 is the option to allow usage
of the personal and medical data for drug research by other
healthcare companies having the same privacy policy as this
company. The example illustrates the basic steps involved
in the translation process.
Figure 6 gives the pseudo-code showing the steps in-
volved in transforming P3P policy into our proposed
constructs. A unique restriction name, needed for the
command, is generated on Line 5. Line 7 uses the
mapP3PStatementToTable function to recover the table
name which stores the information described by the data
types in the P3P statement. This metadata has been pop-
ulated by the database administrator. On Line 8, the the
restriction is set to public to apply to all users. Line 10 uses
the mapP3PDataTypeToColumns function to retrieve the
column names that store information described by the P3P
data types in the statement. Again, this information has
been prepared and supplied by the database administrator
and stored in metadata tables.
The function mapP3PPurposeToChoiceTable accepts
a statement id and returns the table storing individ-
ual user choices for this statement. The function
mapP3PPurposeToChoiceColumn accepts a statement-
purpose pair and returns the column in the choice table
which records the corresponding users’ choices. Both these
functions are driven from metadata.
5. Related Work
5.1 Oracle
Oracle has introduced a fine-grained access control ca-
pability via their security policy concept [5, 7] which, once
defined on a table or view, modifies any future query against
that table by adding a predicate into the query. In essence,
they have allowed row restrictions traditionally handled by
views to be dynamically added to queries [8].
The fundamental difference between the Oracle ap-
proach and the one in this paper is that Oracle modifies the
query by adding predicates while the approach in this paper
leaves the query alone and effectively modifies the table be-
ing accessed by injecting a dynamically created view of the
table between the query and the target table.
1 for each statement s in policy do begin
2 for each purpose p in s do begin
3 for each recipient r in s do begin
4 print ”create restriction ”
5 print generate-unique-restriction-name()
6 print ” on table ”
7 print mapP3PStatementToTable(s)
8 print ” for public ”
9 print ” to cells ”
10 print mapP3PDataTypeToColumns(s)
11 if (p.required != always) then
12 print ”where exists (select 1 from ”
13 + mapP3PPurposeToChoiceTable(s)
14 + ” p where p.ID = ”+ mapP3PStatementToTable(s) +”.ID
15 and ”+ mapP3PPurposeToChoiceColumn(s,p) + ”= 1))”
16 if (r.required != always) then
17 print ”and exists (select 1 from ”
18 + mapP3PRecipientToChoiceTable(s)
19 + ” r where r.ID = ”+ mapP3PStatementToTable(s) +”.ID”
20 + ”and ”+ mapP3PRecipientToChoiceColumn(s, r) + ”= 1))”
21 print ”for purpose” + p.name
22 print ”for recipient” + r.name
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 print ”restricting access to select”
Figure 6. Algorithm for translating a P3P pri-
vacy policy into fine grained cell level restric-
tions
The Oracle approach shares the following advantages
with our design:
• It is pervasive to all users of the table.
• It does not require application modification.
• It does not require a large number of statically defined
views.
Its primary disadvantages are:
• It requires user programming of a strictly defined
“predicate producing” procedure in order to implement
a security policy.
• It does not address column or cell restrictions.
5.2 Sybase
Sybase Adaptive Server version 12.5 has introduced a
feature called row level access control [9] that enables the
database owner or table owner to restrict access to a table’s
rows by defining access rules and binding those rules to the
table. Access to data can be further controlled by setting
application contexts and creating login triggers.
Access rules apply restrictions to retrieved data, enforced
on select, update and delete operations. Adaptive Server
enforces the access rules on all columns that are read by
a query, even if the columns are not included in the select
list. Using access rules is similar to using views, or using
an ad hoc query with where clauses. The query is compiled
and optimized after the access rules are attached, so it does
not cause performance degradation. Access rules provide
a virtual view of the table data, the view depending on the
specific access rules bound to the columns.
Our proposal differs from the Sybase row level access
control solution as follows:
• It allows restrictions to be defined on columns and cells
in addition to rows.
• A restriction can contain as many predicates as desired
and this is done in a single statement (i.e., create re-
striction). Sybase would need to create a separate ac-
cess rule for each predicate, and’ing them, and then
binding them to the appropriate columns.
6. Conclusion
Databases of the future must ensure the privacy of the
data subjects that they store information on. The security
functionality offered by current commercial database prod-
ucts is not adequate to enforce privacy compliance. The
main contributions of this paper are:
• Language constructs for specifying restrictions at the
level of a row, a column, or a cell that integrate well
with the rest of the relational database infrastructure.
• Semantics of combining multiple restrictions.
• Design for implementing the proposed constructs.
• Algorithm for translating a P3P privacy policy into the
proposed constructs.
Our fond hope is that this paper will serve to create dia-
log on the right functionality that the database systems must
support and the efficient ways of its implementation.
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ID Name HomePhone WorkPhone Salary
1 Alicia Campbell 408-418-5198 408-419-9111 10,000
2 Bob Bobbett 408-418-5198 408-419-9112 20,000
3 Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113 30,000
4 Dan Charmer 408-432-8644 408-419-9114 40,000
5 Ellen Generous 408-555-1235 408-419-9115 50,000
Table 3. Table of BlueCo’s clients
Name HomePhone OfficePhone
Alicia Campbell - 408-419-9111
Bob Bobbett 408-418-5198 -
Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113
Table 4. Cell level enforcement
A. The Case for Cell Level Enforcement
Compliance with current privacy legislation mandates
that the user’s consent be obtained for the use/disclosure
of the personal information stored about them. Row or col-
umn level restriction are not adequate for modeling scenar-
ios where individuals may make opt-in/out choices with dif-
ferent aspects of their information. To achieve this goal of
minimal disclosure while allowing useful tasks to be per-
formed on relevant information, cell level enforcement is
key. A similar case for cell level enforcement has been
made in [6].
Consider a scenario requiring adherence to the HIPAA
regulation [4]. BlueCo is a healthcare provider that stores
personal data on individuals who enroll in its plans. BlueCo
has affiliations with a number of hospitals, research institu-
tions, and marketing companies. Under HIPAA, any indi-
vidually identifiable healthcare information held or trans-
mitted by BlueCo is considered protected information. For
any use or disclosure of protected health information that is
not for treatment, payment, or health care operation and that
is not otherwise permitted (e.g. law enforcement), BlueCo
must get the data subject’s consent.
Assume a simplified version of BlueCo’s database given
in Table 3. ResearchCo is an epidemiological research
institute that periodically harvests BlueCo’s data. Under
HIPAA, all clients must give their consent for release of
their home and office numbers.
Alicia Campbell opts out of having her home phone
number, but does not mind if BlueCo discloses her office
number. Suppose John Seeker, a researcher at ResearchCo
issues the following query:
select name, homephone, officephone
from clients where salary ∑ 30000
Given the choices that Alicia has made, only her name
and office phone number should be displayed as shown in
Table 4.
Name HomePhone OfficePhone
Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113
Table 5. Row level enforcement
Database systems employing row level controls restrict
disclosure to all information in a particular row, when a re-
striction is only on particular columns in that row. Thus, us-
ing conventional row level controls, the results for the query
are those shown in Table 5. Both Alicia and Bob are no
longer present in the result, even though they have agreed
that one of their two phone numbers can be disclosed.
This simple example illustrates the inadequacy of row
level restrictions. Similar arguments can be made for col-
umn level restrictions. They are not flexible enough to allow
disclosure of non-sensitive data and suppression of sensitive
data on a subject by subject basis.
  99 
Table A.2 – Granted Patents 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Method and System for Using 
Fine-Grained Access Control 
(FGAC) to Control Access to Data 
in a Database  
 
US Patent US8,234.299B2 
This patent is the foundation for the row permission and 
column mask concepts discussed in the core publication 
#1 in table A.1 above. 
2 Method for Establishing a Trusted 
Relationship Between a Data 
Server and a Middleware Server  
 
US Patent US 7,647,626B2 
This patent is the foundation for the trusted context 
concept discussed in the core publication #1 in table A.1 
above. 
3 Access Control for Elements in a 
Database Object  
 
US Patent US7,865,521B2 
This patent is the foundation for the table restriction 
concept discussed in publication #2 in table A.1 above.  
4 Extending Relational Database 
Systems to Automatically Enforce 
Privacy Policies 
 
US Patent US 7,243,097 B1 
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1. 
METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR USING 
FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL (FGAC) 
TO CONTROL ACCESS TO DATA INA 
DATABASE 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates generally to data processing, 
and more particularly to techniques for controlling access to 
data in a database. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
Business enterprises typically maintain data in database. 
For both legal and business reasons, business enterprises are 
increasingly becoming sensitive to unauthorized access to 
data in their databases. One type database system that is 
commonly used by enterprise businesses is a relational data 
base in which data is organized in rows and columns of one or 
more tables (or table objects). Accordingly, business enter 
prises are exploring and implementing a number of mecha 
nisms to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access to row 
and/or column data. In a relational database management system (RDBMS), table object privileges granted to a user 
control whether or not access to the data in the table object is 
allowed. In general, such privilege control does not conven 
tionally extend to the column-level or the row-level. 
One technique for controlling access to data in a table on a 
column-level or a row-level includes use of a label-based 
access control (LBAC) mechanism—i.e., unless a label of a 
user is compatible with a label associated with a row or 
column of a table, then the data for that row or column is not 
returned to the user. Business enterprises, however, have gen 
erally been less accepting of label-based access control 
mechanisms due to the restrictive nature of label components, 
the need to provide a label for rows and columns, the lack of 
flexibility in terms of what can be expressed within labels. 
Business enterprises have turned to more flexible mecha 
nisms—e.g., fine-grained access control (FGAC) mecha 
nisms including views, triggers, Oracle’s virtual private data 
base, and so on. Such fine-grained access control mechanisms 
all have one thing in common—the mechanisms supplement, 
but do not supplant, access control provided by privileges. 
That is, if a user has a SELECT privilege on a table, the user 
has access to all row and column data in the table; with 
conventional fine-grained access control mechanisms, that 
access is restricted by the addition of predicates and other 
logic to reduce the rows (and columns) seen by the user. But, 
by default, every user with privileges on a table has full access 
to all row and column data until and unless a fine-grained 
access control restriction is applied to rows or columns. This leaves open the possibility that a user, with privileges on a 
table object, can inadvertently be missed or not affected by 
fine-grained access control mechanisms, and therefore the 
user may be able to access data that the user would otherwise 
not be allowed to access. 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
In general, this specification describes a method, system, 
and computer program for method for controlling access to 
data stored in a table of a database. In one implementation, the 
method includes marking the table of the database as being 
protected with fine-grained access control (FGAC), creating a 
system authorization class for the table of the database, the 
system authorization class having a default row authorization 
that prevents access to all rows in the table, the system autho 
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rization class being unmodifiable, creating a user authoriza 
tion class for the table of the database, the user authorization 
class having a default row authorization that prevents access 
to all rows in the table, the user authorization class being 
modifiable, and associating the system authorization class 
and the user authorization class with the table of the database. 
The details of one or more implementations are set forth in 
the accompanying drawings and the description below. Other 
features and advantages will be apparent from the description 
and drawings, and from the claims. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a data processing system 
including a data access control module in accordance with one implementation. 
FIG. 2 illustrates one implementation of a method for 
controlling access to data in a table of a database. 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a data processing system 
Suitable for assisting a user increating software code inaccor 
dance with one implementation. 
Like reference symbols in the various drawings indicate 
like elements. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates generally to data processing, 
and more particularly to techniques for controlling access to 
data in a database system. The following description is pre 
sented to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and 
use the invention and is provided in the context of a patent 
application and its requirements. The present invention is not 
intended to be limited to the implementations shown but is to 
be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles 
and features described herein. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a data processing system 100 in accor 
dance with one implementation. Data processing system 100 
includes input and output devices 102, a programmed com 
puter 104, and a database 106. Input and output devices 102 
can include devices Such as a printer, a keyboard, a mouse, a digitizing pen, a display, a printer, and the like. Programmed 
computer 104 can be any type of computer system, including 
for example, a workstation, a desktop computer, a laptop 
computer, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a cell phone, a 
network, and so on. Database 106 can be a relational database 
including one or more tables (not shown) for storing data. 
Running on programmed computer 104 is a database man 
agement system (DBMS) 108 including a data access control 
module 110. In one implementation, the database manage 
ment system (DBMS) 108 and data access control module 
110 are features of DB2 available from International Business 
Machines, Corporation of Armonk, N.Y. In one implementa 
tion, the data access control module 110 implements a fine 
grained access control (FGAC) to control user access to data 
stored in one or more tables of the database 106. The FGAC 
can be used to deny access to particular row(s) or column(s) 
of the one or more tables in the database 106, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
In one implementation, the data access control module 110 
implements row authorization and column authorization as 
the FGAC on the one or more tables in database 106. In 
addition to the row/column authorization, there may also be traditional object-level (or table-level) privileges on each 
table (e.g., SELECT privilege on a table EMPLOYEE). In 
one implementation, a row authorization allows the holder of 
such authorization access to a subset of rows of an FGAC 
protected table. In one implementation, a column authoriza 
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tionallows the holder of such authorization access to a subset 
of values (or cells) in a column of an FGAC protected table. In 
one implementation, row authorizations take precedence over 
column authorizations—i.e., if a user is not authorized to see 
any rows in an FGAC protected table, a column authorization 
for some column in that table will not allow that user to see 
any values in that column. 
In one implementation, row and column authorizations are 
associated with a higher level entity called an authorization 
class. An authorization class (in one implementation) is asso 
ciated with one and only one FGAC protected table, and 
contains one or more row authorizations and Zero or more 
column authorizations. When an authorization class is cre 
ated, a default row authorization that denies all access (e.g., a 
row predicate of “1 =0) is created and implicitly granted to 
PUBLIC. This default row authorization cannot be deleted 
from the class nor can the default row authorization be 
revoked as it represents the default access available to users 
(which is none) through this authorization class. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a method 200 for controlling access to 
data in a table of a database in accordance with one imple 
mentation. A table (e.g., in database 106) is marked as being 
protected on a table-level (step 202). For example, the table 
can be marked as being protected on a table-level by a data 
base management system assigning one or access privileges 
to the table—i.e., access to the table is defined to the table as 
a whole. In one implementation, a fine-grained access control 
mechanism is applied to the table to protect (or control access 
to) the table on a table-level. Other suitable techniques for 
protecting access to a table on a table-level (or object-level) 
can be implemented. An authorization class is created (e.g., 
by the database management system) that, as a default, pre 
vents access to all rows and columns of a table (step 204). In 
one implementation, a default system authorization class is 
created as well as a default user authorization class. Both of 
these classes contain the normal class default row authoriza 
tion described above. The system authorization class enforces 
the default access rule of “no access” for an FGAC protected 
table and this class cannot be dropped or modified in any way. 
The default user authorization class is provided as a location 
for any authorizations for which no authorization class is 
specified (i.e. it is a convenience to allow for authorizations to 
be defined without creating an authorization class); while the 
default user authorization class cannot be dropped, it can be 
modified like any other user defined authorization class. 
An authorization class can be granted to (or revoked from) 
users, roles, groups, or PUBLIC. Granting an authorization 
class implicitly includes all authorizations defined within that 
class. If subsequent changes are made to the contents of that 
authorization class, those changes are automatically inherited 
by anyone granted the authorization class. If desired, row 
authorizations and column authorizations from an authoriza 
tion class can be individually granted (with the exception of 
the class default row authorization); this would be of value in 
those cases where one or more of the authorizations, but not 
all, within an authorization class are to be granted or where 
there is no desire to have future changes to the contents of the 
authorization class automatically inherited. 
The authorization class (or classes) is associated with the 
table to enforce a default rule of “no access” to rows and 
columns of the table (step 206). All authorization classes 
defined on the same table affect and are considered for each 
and every query against that table. When more than one 
authorization of the same type (e.g., row or column) from the 
same authorization class apply to the same user, these autho rizations are logically OR'ed together allowing that user 
access to the union of data authorized through those authori 
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zations. For example, if user Joe is authorized to see all blue 
rows according to one row authorization in class AC1, and is 
authorized to see all red rows according to another authori 
Zation from the same authorization class AC1, then user Joe is 
allowed access to the union of blue and red rows. 
By default, (in one implementation) the contents of differ 
ent authorization classes on the same table are logically 
OR'ed together to achieve a union. However, sometimes this 
is not the desired behavior—i.e., in some cases, the contents 
of one or more of the authorization classes are considered to 
refine the contents of other authorization classes and the 
desire is to have the intersection of these authorization classes 
be used rather than the union. In Such cases, the relationship 
between two authorization classes can be explicitly defined to 
be an intersect and the aggregate of authorizations present in 
the query from each authorization class will be logically 
AND’ed together instead. Specifically, when two classes are 
defined as intersecting, authorizations from the same autho 
rization class will be OR'ed together to form a set and then 
logically AND'ed with the set from the other authorization 
class. For example, if user Joe is authorized to see all blue 
rows according to a row authorization in one authorization 
class AC1, and is authorized to see all rows for Canadian 
residents according to another authorization from a different 
authorization class AC2, where authorization class AC2 has 
been defined as intersecting with authorization class AC1, 
then user Joe is authorized to see a view that contains the blue 
rows representing Canadian residents only (not all the blue 
rows). An authorization class can be defined to intersect with 
one or more (or all) authorization classes on the same FGAC protected table. 
EXAMPLE 
The following example illustrates one implementation of 
the techniques discussed above. Assume the following envi 
rOnment: 
CREATE TABLE MYSCHEMAT1 (C1 INT, C2 INT 
WITH ALTERNATE VALUE 99, C3 INT) PRO 
TECTED BY FGAC 
CREATE ROLE WAREHOUSE 
CREATE ROLE ACCOUNTING 
CREATE ROLE TEMPORARY ACCOUNTING 
GRANT SELECT ON MYSCHEMA.T1 TO ROLE 
WAREHOUSE, ROLE ACCOUNTING, ROLE TEM 
PORARY ACCOUNTING 
GRANT ROLE WAREHOUSE TO FERNANDO 
GRANT ROLE ACCOUNTING TO BOB 
GRANT ROLE TEMPORARY ACCOUNTING TO 
HALEY 
The introduction of FGAC protection causes two authoriza 
tion classes to be created: 
the system authorization class SYSIBM DEFAULT con 
taining the row authorization ROWDEFAULT with the (1-0) predicate which is implicitly granted to PUBLIC 
the default user authorization class USER DEFAULT con 
taining the row authorization ROWDEFAULT with the (1-0) predicate which is implicitly granted to PUBLIC 
Bob, Fernando, and Haley all have SELECT privilege on 
MYSCHEMA.T1 from their role membership, but they do 
not have access to any rows in that table. If any of them issues 
a SELECT * FROMMYSCHEMA.T1, the internal represen 
tation of the query within the SQL compiler is the equivalent 
of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 WHERE (1=0) OR (1=0)) 
US 8,234,299 B2 
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Observe that there are two "1=0 predicates injected in 
SELECT query statement. The first predicate represents the 
default row authorization contained by the default user autho 
rization class that was created when the table was marked as 
FGAC protected; the second predicate represents the default 
row authorization from the system defined authorization 
class. Since there are no column authorizations granted to any 
of them, DB2 injects just the alternate value for column C2 in 
the column. (NOTE: the SQL compiler is smart enough to 
remove the redundant 1-0 predicates above but leaving them 
in makes the description easier to follow). 
Let us assume that the job definition for the members of the 
ACCOUNTING role requires them to see all rows where the 
column C1 equals 5. To allow this, a row authorization needs 
to be created and granted to the role. The security adminis 
trator decides to create an authorization class to represent the 
access needed for the ACCOUNTING job definition, creates 
a row authorization within the authorization class, and grants 
the set as a whole to the ACCOUNTING role. 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION CLASS ACCOUNTING 
ONMYSCHEMAT1 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION ROWAUTH1 WITHIN 
MYSCHEMAT 1 ACCOUNTING 
FOR ROWS WHERE C1 =5 
GRANT AUTHORIZATION 
MYSCHEMA.T1ACCOUNTING 
ACCOUNTING 
Now, if Bob issues a SELECT * FROMMYSCHEMA.T1, 
he will be able to access some rows in this table based on the 
following reasons. First, Bob has SELECT privilege on 
MYSCHEMA.T1 granted to him via the role ACCOUNT 
ING. Second, this same role has been granted an authoriza 
tion class, ACCOUNTING, defined on table MYSCHE 
MA.T1. The ACCOUNTING class contains a row 
authorization which allows Bob to see all rows in MYSCHE 
MA.T1 where column C1 =5. However, Bob does not hold 
(directly or indirectly) a column authorization for protected 
column C2. Therefore, Bob will still see the alternate value 99 
for all rows in MYSCHEMA.T1 where column C1 =5. The 
internal representation of the query within the SQL compiler 
is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 
WHERE (C1 =5) OR (1=0)) OR (1=0) OR (1=0)) The first row predicate of ((C1 =5) OR (1=0)) represents the 
authorizations granted to Bob indirectly when the authoriza 
tion class ACCOUNTING was granted to the role 
ACCOUNTING. The first row predicate represents all the 
current authorizations in this authorization class. The next 
row predicate (1-0) is the default row authorization from the 
default user authorization class. The last row predicate (1–0) 
is the default row authorization from the system defined 
authorization class. Since no class intersects with any other, the predicates are OR'ed together to get the union. 
To allow Bob access to values in column C2, a column 
authorization must be defined and granted to him, or to a role 
he is member in, or to a group he is memberin, or to PUBLIC. 
Let's assume that the ACCOUNTING job definition requires 
access to column C2 so the security administrator defines a 
new column authorization in the existing ACCOUNTING 
authorization class which contains a condition allowing 
access only to a set of specific values in column C2. 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION COLUMNAUTH1 
WITHINACCOUNTING 
FOR COLUMN C2 WHERE C2>10 
CLASS 
TO ROLE 
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Now, if Bob issues a SELECT * FROM MYSCHEMA.T1, 
the internal representation of the query within the SQL com 
piler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, (CASE WHEN C2>10 
THEN C2 ELSE 99 END), C3 FROM MYSCHE 
MAT1 
WHERE (C1 =5) OR (1=0)) OR (1=0) OR (1=0)) 
The row predicates are as they were in the previous case but 
now Bob has automatically inherited the new column autho 
rization in the ACCOUNTING authorization class as well. 
Meanwhile, Haley is still unable to access any rows in the table. As a temporary employee in accounting, let us assume 
that she is only allowed to see the same rows as Bob but not 
the contents of column C2. The security administrator could 
define an authorization class to represent this particular case, 
but instead the security administrator chooses to simply grant 
the ROWAUTH1 authorization, but not the ACCOUNTING 
authorization class itself, directly to the role TEMPORARY 
ACCOUNTING since the security administrator plans to 
later remove it (i.e., it is a temporary Solution:) 
GRANT AUTHORIZATION ROWAUTH1 WITHIN 
MYSCHEMA.T1ACCOUNTING TO ROLETEMPO 
RARY ACCOUNTING 
Now, if Haley issues a SELECT * FROM MYSCHEMA.T1, 
the internal representation of the query within the SQL com piler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 
WHERE (C1 =5) OR (1=0)) OR (1=0) OR (1=0)) 
Since Haley does not have column authorization for column 
C2, she will simply get the alternate value. Also, since she was 
granted a specific authorization and not the authorization 
class, she will not automatically inherit the rest of the autho 
rizations, or any future changes, that exist in the class. 
Suppose that the security administrator wishes to stop all 
access as he tracks a security problem. To do so, the security 
administrator quickly alters the default user authorization 
class, which currently only has the default row authorization, 
to intersect with all other authorization classes on the table as 
follows: 
ALTER AUTHORIZATION CLASS USER DEFAULT 
ONMYSCHEMA.T1 INTERSECTS WITH ALL 
At this point, if Bob or Haley issues a SELECT * FROM 
MYSCHEMA.T1, they will see no rows at all for the follow 
ing reason. The change to make the USER DEFAULT autho 
rization class intersect with all other authorization classes 
now means that the granted authorizations from USER DE 
FAULT, in this case the default row authorization for the class, 
are logically AND'ed with all the others. The internal repre 
sentation of the query within the SQL compiler is the equiva 
lent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, (CASE WHEN C2>10 
THEN C2 ELSE 99 END), C3 FROM MYSCHE 
MAT1 
WHERE (1 =0) AND (((C1=5) OR (1=0)) OR (1=O))) 
In this case, the relevant authorizations from the intersecting 
authorization class have been placed in the first predicate and 
then logically AND'ed with the union of the relevant autho 
rizations from all the other classes. Obviously, Bob sees no 
rows this way. To remove the emergency access stoppage, the 
security administrator modifies the USER DEFAULT autho 
rization class so that is not longer intersecting with all others. 
Accordingly, authorization classes can dynamically adjust to 
change (e.g., changes to class are automatically seen by all 
who have access to class). Fernando can still not see any rows as nothing has changed 
for him. As a member of the Warehouse team, it is decided 
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that Fernando is allowed to see any rows where column 
C3<100. The security administrator decides not to create a 
new authorization class for this case and does the following: 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION ROWAUTH2 
FOR ROWS WHERE (C3<100) 
This causes a row authorization to be created in the USER 
DEFAULT authorization class. The security administrator 
now grants this to the Warehouse role so that Fernando 
acquires the row authorization, as follows: 
GRANT AUTHORIZATION ROWAUTH2 WITHIN 
MYSCHEMA.T1..USER DEFAULT TO ROLE 
WAREHOUSE 
Now, if Fernando issues a SELECT * FROM MYSCHE 
MA.T1, the internal representation of the query within the 
SQL compiler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 
WHERE (1 =0)) OR ((C3<100) OR (1=0)) OR (1=0)) 
Since Fernando does not have column authorization for col 
umn C2, he will simply get the alternate value. The first row 
predicate (1-0) is the default row predicate from the 
ACCOUNTING authorization class while the second row 
predicate ((C3<100) OR (1–0)) shows the union of all autho 
rizations available to Fernando in the USER DEFAULT 
authorization class. The last row predicate is the default row 
predicate from the system defined authorization class. 
Suppose that the security administrator wishes to limit the 
rows that can be seen on the weekend by anyone inaccounting 
to those for which column C3 is equal to Zero. To do so, the 
security administrator creates a new authorization class 
WEEKEND ACCESS that intersects with authorization 
class ACCOUNTING as follows: 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION CLASS WEEKEND AC 
CESS ON MYSCHEMA.T1 Intersects with Accounting 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION ROWAUTH3 WITHIN 
WEEKEND ACCESS 
FOR ROWS WHERE (IS WEEKEND() AND C3=0) 
GRANT AUTHORIZATION CLASS MY SCHEMAT1 
WEEKEND ACCESS TO PUBLIC 
Now, if Bob issues a SELECT * FROM MYSCHEMA.T1, 
the internal representation of the query within the SQL com piler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, (CASE WHEN C2>10 
THEN C2 ELSE 99 END), C3 FROM MYSCHE 
MAT1 
WHERE (((IS WEEKEND() AND C3=0) OR (1=0)) 
AND ((C1=5) OR (1=O))) OR (1=0) OR (1=0))) 
In this case, the predicate ((IS WEEKEND() AND C3-0) 
OR (1-0)) represents all the relevant authorizations from the 
new authorization class WEEKEND ACCESS and these are 
logically AND'ed with all the relevant authorizations from 
the intersecting authorization class ACCOUNTING in the 
form of the predicate ((C1 =5) OR (1-0)). Finally, the relevant 
authorizations from the other, non-intersecting authorization 
classes are OR'ed in (for this example, they are simply the 
class default authorizations for the system and user default 
classes). 
Note that this new intersecting class also affects Haley but 
not Fernando. If Haley issues a SELECT * FROMMYSCHE 
MA.T1, the internal representation of the query within the 
SQL compiler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 
WHERE (((IS WEEKEND() AND C3=0) OR (1=0)) 
AND ((C1=5) OR (1=O))) OR (1=0) OR (1=0))) Since Haley's access is dependent on the authorizations in the 
ACCOUNTING class, the new authorization WEEKEN 
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D ACCESS class can close off that access since its authori 
Zations are AND’ed with those in the ACCOUNTING class. 
If Fernando issues a SELECT * FROM MYSCHEMA.T1, 
the internal representation of the query within the SQL com 
piler is the equivalent of: 
SELECT * FROM (SELECT C1, 99, C3 FROM 
MYSCHEMAT1 
WHERE (((IS WEEKEND() AND C3=0) OR (1=0)) 
AND (1=O))) OR (C3<100) OR (1=0)) OR (1=0))) 
In this case, Fernando is not dependent on authorizations 
from ACCOUNTING and so his access is not affected by the 
new authorization class. 
In the example above, rather than modify the column defi 
nition to implement FGAC, an administrator can simply cre 
ate a column authorization as follows: 
CREATE AUTHORIZATION AUTHX 
ONTABLE T1 
FOR COLUMN C2 
(Case when C2>10 then C2 Else 99 End) 
Hence, the alternate value need not be specified together with 
the table definition and could be done separately within the 
column authorization definition. 
Implementation 
In one implementation, SQL DDL statements are used to 
create authorization classes and authorizations as well as to 
grant and revoke the authorization classes. Modified SQL 
statements can be used to modify table attributes to activate 
FGAC protection. When an SQL/XML statement is com 
piled, for each reference to a table marked as FGAC pro 
tected, the authorization classes defined for that table, be it the 
one created explicitly by the administrator or the default one 
created by the system when the table is marked protected, are 
searched and any relevant row or column authorizations in 
that class for the statement authorization information (pri 
mary and secondary authorization IDs) are gathered; rel 
evancy is determined by whether the authorization class, or 
individual authorization, has been granted to one of the autho 
rization IDs in the statement authorization information. 
A “pseudo-View' definition is created by: gathering all the 
relevant row authorizations from the same authorization class 
and logically ORing them together in a "authorization class 
expression'; identifying which authorization classes, if any, 
are defined as intersecting with each other and logically 
AND'ing the “authorization class expression' for each of 
these classes with the other to create a “intersecting authori Zation class expression set; logically ORing any remaining 
“authorization class expression with each other and then logically ORing them with all “intersecting authorization 
class expression' sets; using the final result as the predicate 
portion of the “pseudo-View' definition. Similar logic is fol 
lowed for dealing with the expressions from all relevant col 
umn authorizations with the end result for each unique col umn being implemented as CASE logic in the appropriate 
location for the column in select list of the “pseudo-View' 
definition. If no column authorizations are found, then the 
defined alternate value is implemented as a constant in that 
location. 
One or more of method steps described above can be per formed by one or more programmable processors executing a 
computer program to perform functions by operating on input 
data and generating output. Generally, the invention can take 
the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely 
Software embodiment or an embodiment containing both 
hardware and Software elements. In one implementation, the 
invention is implemented in software, which includes but is 
not limited to firmware, resident software, microcode, etc. 
US 8,234,299 B2 
Furthermore, the invention can take the form of a computer program product accessible from a computer-usable or com 
puter-readable medium providing program code for use by or 
in connection with a computer or any instruction execution system. For the purposes of this description, a computer 
usable or computer readable medium can be any apparatus 
that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport 
the program for use by or in connection with the instruction 
execution system, apparatus, or device. The medium can be 
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or 
semiconductor system (or apparatus or device) or a propaga 
tion medium. Examples of a computer-readable medium 
include a semiconductor or Solid state memory, magnetic 
tape, a removable computer diskette, a random access 
memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), a rigid mag 
netic disk and an optical disk. Current examples of optical 
disks include compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM), 
compact disk read/write (CD-R/W) and DVD. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a data processing system 300 suitable for 
storing and/or executing program code. Data processing sys 
tem 300 includes a processor 302 coupled to memory ele 
ments 304A-B through a system bus 306. In other implemen 
tations, data processing system 300 may include more than 
one processor and each processor may be coupled directly or 
indirectly to one or more memory elements through a system 
bus. Memory elements 304A-B can include local memory 
employed during actual execution of the program code, bulk 
storage, and cache memories that provide temporary storage 
of at least Some program code in order to reduce the number 
of times the code must be retrieved from bulk storage during 
execution. As shown, input/output or I/O devices 308A-B (including, but not limited to, keyboards, displays, pointing 
devices, etc.) are coupled to data processing system 300. I/O 
devices 308A-B may be coupled to data processing system 
300 directly or indirectly through intervening I/O controllers 
(not shown). In one implementation, a network adapter 310 is coupled to 
data processing system 300 to enable data processing system 
300 to become coupled to other data processing systems or 
remote printers or storage devices through communication 
link 312. Communication link 312 can be a private or public 
network. Modems, cable modems, and Ethernet cards are just 
a few of the currently available types of network adapters. 
Various implementations for controlling access to data in a 
database have been described. Nevertheless, various modifi 
cations may be made to the implementations. For example, 
steps of the methods described above can be performed in a 
different order and still achieve desirable results. Accord 
ingly, many modifications may be made without departing 
from the scope of the following claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A computer-implemented method for controlling access 
to data stored in a table of a database, wherein the computer 
performs the functions in the following method, the method comprising: 
marking the table of the database as being protected with 
fine-grained access control (FGAC); 
creating a system authorization class for the table of the 
database, the system authorization class having a default 
row-level authorization that prevents access to all rows 
in the table, the system authorization class being 
unmodifiable; 
creating a user authorization class for the table of the data 
base, the user authorization class having a default row 
level authorization that prevents access to all rows in the 
table, the user authorization class being modifiable 
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wherein the user authorization class is provided as a 
location for any authorizations for which no authoriza 
tion class is specified; 
associating the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class with the table of the database, 
wherein the association of the system authorization class 
with the table of the database operates to deny access to 
the rows and columns of the table; 
receiving a request from a user seeking to access data in the 
table of the database; 
determining whether any other user authorization class is 
applicable to the user; 
responsive to no other user authorization class being appli 
cable to the user, 
determining whether the system authorization class and 
the user authorization class are defined as intersecting 
classes; 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class being defined as intersecting 
classes, preventing the user from accessing any row in 
the table of the database; 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting 
classes, permitting the user to access rows or columns 
in the table of the database based on the union of 
authorizations. 
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1 further comprising: 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting 
classes, 
forming a union of authorizations by logically ORing 
authorizations from the system authorization class 
and the user authorization class. 
3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2, wherein 
responsive to at least one other user authorization class being 
applicable to the user, the method further comprises: 
determining whether the system authorization class and the 
at least one other user authorization class are defined as 
intersecting classes; and 
responsive to the system authorization class and the at least 
one other user authorization class being defined as inter secting classes, preventing the user from accessing any 
row in the table of the database. 
4. The computer-implemented method of claim3, wherein 
responsive to the system authorization class and the at least 
one other user authorization class not being defined as inter 
secting classes, the method further comprises: 
determining whether the user authorization class and the at 
least one other user authorization class are defined as 
intersecting classes; 
responsive to the user authorization class and the at least 
one other user authorization class being defined as inter Secting classes, 
forming a first set of authorizations by logically ORing 
authorizations from the user authorization class; 
forming a second set of authorizations by logically 
ORing authorizations from the at least one other user 
authorization class; 
forming an intersection of authorizations by logically 
AND'ing the first set of authorizations and the second 
set of authorizations; and 
permitting the user to access rows or columns in the table 
of the database based on the intersection of authori 
Zations. 
5. The computer-implemented method of claim 4, wherein 
responsive to the user authorization class and the at least one 
US 8,234,299 B2 
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other user authorization class not being defined as intersect- responsive to the system authorization class and the at least 
ing classes, the method further comprises: one other user authorization class being defined as inter 
forming a union of authorizations by logically ORing secting classes, preventing the user from accessing any 
authorizations from the user authorization class and the row in the table of the database. 
at least one other user authorization class; and 5 10. The non-transitory computer program product of claim 
permitting the user to access rows or columns in the table of 9, wherein responsive to the system authorization class and 
the database based on the union of authorizations. the at least one other user authorization class not being 
6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein defined as intersecting classes, the computer program product 
the database is a relational database. further comprises computer executable code for: 
7. A non-transitory computer program product comprising 10 determining whether the user authorization class and the at 
a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, the non- least one other user authorization class are defined as 
transitory computer readable storage medium for controlling intersecting classes; 
access to data stored in a table of a database, the computer responsive to the user authorization class and the at least 
program comprising computer executable code for: 15 one other user authorization class being defined as inter 
marking the table of the database as being protected with Secting classes, 
fine-grained access control (FGAC); forming a first set of authorizations by logically ORing 
creating a system authorization class for the table of the authorizations from the user authorization class; 
database, the system authorization class having a default forming a second set of authorizations by logically 
row-level authorization that prevents access to all rows 20 ORing authorizations from the at least one other user 
in the table, the system authorization class being authorization class; 
unmodifiable wherein the user authorization class is pro- forming an intersection of authorizations by logically 
vided as a location for any authorizations for which no AND'ing the first set of authorizations and the second 
authorization class is specified; set of authorizations; and 
creating a user authorization class for the table of the data- 25 permitting the user to access rows or columns in the table 
base, the user authorization class having a default row- of the database based on the intersection of authori 
level authorization that prevents access to all rows in the Zations. 
table, the user authorization class being modifiable; and 11. The non-transitory computer program product of claim 
associating the system authorization class and the user 10, wherein responsive to the user authorization class and the 
authorization class with the table of the database, 30 at least one other user authorization class not being defined as 
wherein the association of the system authorization class intersecting classes, the computer program product further 
with the table of the database operates to deny access to comprises computer executable code for: 
the rows and columns of the table; forming a union of authorizations by logically ORing 
receiving a request from a user seeking to access data in the authorizations from the user authorization class and the 
table of the database; 35 at least one other user authorization class; and 
determining whether any other user authorization class is permitting the user to access rows or columns in the table of 
applicable to the user; the database based on the union of authorizations. 
responsive to no other user authorization class being appli- 12. The non-transitory computer program product of claim 
cable to the user, 7, wherein the database is a relational database. determining whether the system authorization class and 40 13. A non-transitory computer system comprising: 
the user authorization class are defined as intersecting a processing System; 
classes; a storage medium; 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user a database; and 
authorization class being defined as intersecting a database management system controlling access to data 
classes, preventing the user from accessing any row in 45 stored in a table of the database, the database manage 
the table of the database; ment system 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user marking the table of the database as being protected with 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting fine-grained access control (FGAC); 
classes, permitting the user to access rows or columns creating a system authorization class for the table of the 
in the table of the database based on the union of 50 database, the system authorization class having a 
authorizations. default row-level authorization that prevents access to 
8. The non-transitory computer product of claim 7. all rows in the table, the system authorization class 
wherein the computer program product further comprises being unmodifiable; 
computer executable code for: creating a user authorization class for the table of the 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 55 database, the user authorization class having a default 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting row-level authorization that prevents access to all 
classes, rows in the table, the user authorization class being 
forming a union of authorizations by logically ORing modifiable wherein the user authorization class is pro 
authorizations from the system authorization class vided as a location for any authorizations for which no 
and the user authorization class. 60 authorization class is specified; 
9. The non-transitory computer program product of claim associating the system authorization class and the user 
8, wherein responsive to at least one other user authorization authorization class with the table of the database, 
class being applicable to the user, the computer program wherein the association of the system authorization 
product further comprises computer executable code for: class with the table of the database operates to deny 
determining whether the system authorization class and the 65 access to the rows and columns of the table; 
at least one other user authorization class are defined as receiving a request from a user seeking to access data in 
intersecting classes; and the table of the database; 
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determining whether any other user authorization class 
is applicable to the user; 
responsive to no other user authorization class being 
applicable to the user, 
determining whether the system authorization class and 
the user authorization class are defined as intersecting 
classes; 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class being defined as intersecting 
classes, preventing the user from accessing any row in 
the table of the database; 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting 
classes, permitting the user to access rows or columns 
in the table of the database based on the union of 
authorizations. 
14. The non-transitory computer system of claim 13, 
wherein the database management system further 
responsive to the system authorization class and the user 
authorization class not being defined as intersecting 
classes, 
forms a union of authorizations by logically ORing 
authorizations from the system authorization class 
and the user authorization class. 
15. The non-transitory computer system of claim 14, 
wherein responsive to at least one other user authorization 
class being applicable to the user, the database management 
system further 
determines whether the system authorization class and the 
at least one other user authorization class are defined as 
intersecting classes, and 
responsive to the system authorization class and the at least 
one other user authorization class being defined as inter secting classes, prevents the user from accessing any 
row in the table of the database. 
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16. The non-transitory computer system of claim 15, 
wherein responsive to the system authorization class and the 
at least one other user authorization class not being defined as intersecting classes, the database management system further 
determines whether the user authorization class and the at 
least one other user authorization class are defined as 
intersecting classes, 
responsive to the user authorization class and the at least 
one other user authorization class being defined as inter 
Secting classes, 
forms a first set of authorizations by logically ORing 
authorizations from the user authorization class, 
forms a second set of authorizations by logically ORing 
authorizations from the at least one other user autho 
rization class, 
forms an intersection of authorizations by logically 
AND'ing the first set of authorizations and the second 
set of authorizations, and 
permits the user to access rows or columns in the table of 
the database based on the intersection of authoriza 
tions. 
17. The non-transitory computer system of claim 16, 
wherein responsive to the user authorization class and the at 
least one other user authorization class not being defined as intersecting classes, the database management system further 
forms a union of authorizations by logically ORing autho 
rizations from the user authorization class and the at 
least one other user authorization class, and 
permits the user to access rows or columns in the table of 
the database based on the union of authorizations. 
18. The non-transitory computer system of claim 13, 
wherein the database is a relational database. 
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1. 
METHOD FORESTABLISHING ATRUSTED 
RELATIONSHIPBETWEENA DATASERVER 
AND AMIDDLEWARE SERVER 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to the field of establishing a 
trusted relationship between a data server and a middleware 
SeVe. 
BACKGROUND 
Access to sensitive data in a database is often managed by 
relying on the use of user identifications and passwords. If a 
user desires access to data in the database, a user id and 
password are often checked to determine if the user is regis 
tered to access data from the database. If the user is registered 
and the correct password has been provided then a connection 
with the database may be established. 
Frequently, access to databases relying on user ids and 
passwords originate from a few primary locations. However, 
in Such a case multiple user ids may access this data from the 
same location. Since these locations may be known and 
trusted, there may not be a requirement to authenticate every 
different user id and password for these locations. 
SUMMARY 
In accordance with an aspect of the present invention there 
is provided for a data server of a data processing system 
operably coupled to a database, a method of managing a 
connection with a middleware server, the middleware server 
sending a request for a connection to the data server, the 
request comprising request attributes, the method compris 
ing: instituting a set of attributes identifying trusted middle 
ware servers with the data server, establishing a connection 
with the middleware server based on a request therefrom; and 
establishing a trust indicator for the connection according to 
a trust status identified by the set of attributes for the middle 
Ware Sever. 
In accordance with an aspect of the present invention there 
is provided for a middleware server of a data processing 
system, a method of establishing a connection with a data 
server operably coupled to a database, the method compris 
ing: transmitting a connection request to the data server, the 
connection request having request attributes including iden 
tifying the connection request as being for a new connection 
or reuse of an existing connection with different connection 
request attributes; and receiving a connection status message 
from the data server indicating a status of the connection 
request. 
In accordance with an aspect of the present invention there 
is provided for a data server of a data processing system 
operably coupled to a database, a computer program product 
for managing a connection with a middleware server, the 
middleware server sending a request for a connection to the 
data server, the request comprising request attributes, the computer program product comprising: a computer readable 
medium for tangibly transporting computer executable code 
to the middleware server, the computer executable code com 
prising: code for instituting a set of attributes identifying 
trusted middleware servers with the data server, code for 
establishing a connection with the middleware server based 
on a request therefrom; and code for establishing a trust 
indicator for the connection according to a trust status iden 
tified by the set of attributes for the middleware server. 
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In accordance with an aspect of the present invention there 
is provided for a middleware server of a data processing system, a computer program product for establishing a con 
nection with a data server operably coupled to a database, the computer program product comprising: a computer readable 
medium for tangibly transporting computer executable code 
to the middleware server, the computer executable code com 
prising: code for transmitting a connection request to the data 
server, the connection request having request attributes 
including identifying the connection request as being for a 
new connection or reuse of an existing connection with dif 
ferent connection request attributes; and code for receiving a 
connection status message from the data server indicating a 
status of the connection request. 
A data server of a data processing system is operably 
coupled to a database and in communication with a middle 
ware server. A connection between the data server and the 
middleware server is established and managed. A set of 
attributes identifying trusted middleware servers is instituted 
with the data server. The middleware server transmits a con 
nection request to the data server. The connection request has 
request attributes including identifying the connection 
request as being for a new connection or reuse of an existing 
connection with different connection request attributes. A 
connection with the middleware server is established by the 
data server based on the connection request. A connection 
status message is received by the middleware server from the 
data server indicating a status of the connection request. A 
trust indicator for the connection is established at the data 
server according to a trust status identified by the set of 
attributes for the middleware server. 
Other aspect and features of the present invention will 
become apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art upon 
review of the following description of embodiments of the 
invention in conjunction with the accompanying figures. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The present invention will be described in conjunction with 
the drawings in which: 
FIGS. 1A and 1B show a data server operatively coupled to 
a middleware server; 
FIG. 2 shows another middleware server attempting to 
negotiate data with the data server of FIG. 1; 
FIG.3 shows the middle ware server of FIG. 1 attempting 
to negotiate data with the data server of FIG. 1; 
FIG. 4 shows a response taken by the middleware server 
and the data server of FIG. 1 when a user command requests 
a copy of data from the data server 134; 
FIG. 5 shows interaction between the middleware server 
and the data server of FIG. 1 when another user attempts to 
send a command requesting data servable by the data server; 
FIG. 6 illustrate a method of managing connections with 
the middleware server for the data server; and 
FIG. 7 illustrates a method of establishing a connection 
with the data server for the middleware server. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
FIG. 1A shows two data processing systems (A 100 and B 
130) in operable communication via network 118. Both data 
processing systems 100 and 130 contains a bus 108 that 
operatively couples a central processing unit (CPU) 109, an 
input/output interface 110 and a memory 102/132. The input/ 
output interface 110 manages communications between the 
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bus 108 and a display 112, a keyboard 114, a disc 116 and the 
network 118 for each of the data processing systems 100 and 
130. 
The memory 132 of data processing system B 130 includes 
a data server 134, a database 136 operatively coupled to the 
data server 134, and an operating system 133. The data server 
134 may be, for example, an information retrieval system of 
a database management system. The data server 134 includes 
computer executable code 135 with a collection of modules 
135A to 135K. These modules 135A to 135K perform func 
tions (when compiled and executed) that compose a data 
server method. The functions of the data server method may 
include using the network 118 to communicate with data 
processing system A 100. In an alternate embodiment, the 
database 136 may be located in another data processing sys 
tem, in which case, the data processing system B 130 may use 
the network 118 for communication with the database 136. 
The memory 102 of the data processing system A 100 
includes a middleware server 104 and an operating system 
103. The middleware server 104 includes computer execut 
able code 105 with a collection of modules 105A to 105K. 
These modules 105A to 105K perform functions (when com 
piled and executed) that compose a middleware server 
method. The functions of the modules 105A to 105K may 
include directing the middleware server 104 to negotiate for 
data with the data server 134. 
The data server 134 of the data processing system B 130 
acts as an intermediary between the database 136 and the 
middleware server 104. 
A data server administrator 152 administers the data server 
134 according to a verbal agreement 154. A middleware 
server administrator 150 administers the middleware server 
104 according to the verbal agreement. The verbal agreement 
154 contains an agreement between the data server adminis 
ter 152 and the middleware server administer 150 regarding 
the characteristics of connections and data transfers between 
the middleware server 104 and the data server 134. For 
example, the verbal agreement 154 may set forth that the data 
server 134 is to be set up such that connection requests from 
the middleware server 104 received thereat are treated by the 
database 136 as trusted connection. To perform Such an exem 
plary set up, the data server administrator 152 registers (in the 
database 136, for example) connection trust attributes that are 
associated with the trusted connections. The connection trust 
attributes may include a user id associated with a trusted 
connection, an IP (internet protocol) address of data process 
ing system from which connection requests are received, or 
other attributes. The middleware server 104 includes user 
identification attributes 105 for the middleware server admin 
istrator 140. 
It will be appreciated that the middleware server 104, the 
data server 134 and the database 136 may be present on the 
same or on different data processing systems. 
FIG. 1B shows an alternative to storing the database 136 in 
the memory 132 of the data processing system B 130 of FIG. 
1A. The database 136 maybe stored in a memory 152 of a data 
processing system C 150. The data processing systems A100, 
B 130 and C 152 are in operable communication via the 
network 188. 
FIG. 2 illustrates another middleware server 204 in com 
munication with the data server 134 via the network 118. The 
middleware server 204 contains code 208 with a module 
208A. The middleware server 204 is located in a memory 202 of a data processing system 201. 
The data processing system 201 includes known modules 
that facilitate communication via the network 118 and is 
indicated as a connection line 216. Sucha connection line 212 
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is also used to connect the data processing system B 130 with 
the network 118. The connection lines 216 and 212 are used 
for establishing a connection 206 (via the network 118) 
between the data processing system B 130 and the data pro cessing system 201. 
The middleware server 204 has not been set up as being 
trusted on the data server 134 by the data server administrator 
152. This may be because an agreement was not previously 
set between administrators of the data server 134 and the 
middleware server 204 to govern interactions between these 
two servers 134 and 204. 
The middleware server 204 is attempting to negotiate to 
obtain data through the data server 134. The code 208 directs 
a CPU (not illustrated) of the data processing system 201 to 
establish the connection 206 with the data server 134. Once 
the connection 206 is established, the code 208 directs the 
data processing system 201 to issue a request 214 for request 
ing access to the data associated with the data server 134. The 
request 214 is sent to the data server 134 via the connection 
line 216 through the connection 206 and over to the connec 
tion line 212. 
A list 210 is stored in the memory 132 of the data process 
ing system A 130 indicating currently active connections 
established with the data server 134. The code 135A directs 
the data processing system B 130 to update the list 210 in 
response to the data processing system B 130 establishing a 
connection with the middleware server 204. Once the con 
nection 206 is set up, the code 135B directs the data process 
ing system B 130 to set a trust indicator in the list 210 to “do 
not trust' (for example, a bit may be used and set to a value of 
“0” for this case) because the middleware server 204 has not 
bee previously registered with the data server 134 as a trusted entity. 
The decision to trust or not to trusta requesting middleware 
server is performed by the data server 134 on the basis of 
verbal agreements 154 between the database 136 and various 
middle ware servers that have been registered with the data 
server 134. Such verbal agreements 154 are registered with 
the data server 134 by the data server administrator 152 to 
provide an indication of connections that are to be trusted. 
This information may be stored in a table that the data server 
134 can search each time a request connection is received. 
For each connection request received, the data server 134 
compares attributes of the connection request (e.g. user id, IP 
address, etc.) with information stored in the database 136 
about the connections that are to be trusted. If there is a match 
then the current connection is marked as a trusted connection; 
otherwise, the connection is marked as untrusted. 
The data server 134 will establish a connection with the 
middleware server 204 based on the request; however, that 
connection will be marked as not trusted because the middle 
ware server 204 has not been registered as trusted on the data 
server 134. The data server 134 will continue to honor 
requests from the middleware server 204 but since the con 
nection between these two is not trusted the data server 134 
will reject a request from the middleware server 204 to reuse 
the connection under a different user id without Supplying a 
password. On the other hand, a middleware server that is 
registered as being trusted with the data server 134 will have 
requests to reuse the existing connection under a different user granted without requiring that a password be Supplied. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a connection between the middleware 
server 104 and the data server 134 of FIG.1. The middleware 
server 104 has a connection line312 with the network 118 and 
the data server 134 has a connection line 314 with the network 
118. The memory 132 of the data processing system B 130 
may include a list 310 of trusted middle ware servers in 
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addition to the data server 134 and the list of current active 
connections 210. The list 310 of trusted middleware server 
may also be derived when examining a request by looking at 
the list 210 and selecting those connections that have a posi 
tive trust indicator. 
The list 210 of current active connections includes an indi 
cation as to whether or not the connection is trusted. A con 
nection is trusted when the data server 134 determines that the 
connection's source attributes match the attributes of a con 
nection source (i.e. middle ware server) registered in the 
database 136 as to be trusted. 
The middleware server 104 attempts to make a connection 
with the data server 134. The code 105A directs the middle 
ware server 104 to establish a connection 302 with the data 
Server 134. 
The data processing system 100 includes known modules 
that facilitate communication via the network 118 and is 
indicated as a connection line312. Sucha connection line314 
is also used to connect the data processing system B 130 with 
the network 118. The connection lines 312 and 314re used for 
establishing a connection 302 (via the network 118) between 
the data processing system B 130 and the data processing 
system 100. 
A request 306 to establish a connection along with a copy 
308 of the user id 106 currently associated with the middle 
ware server 104 are sent as a package 304 from the middle 
ware server 104 to the data server 134 via the network 118. 
There are two possible scenarios for processing of this request 
by the data server 134: either this is a new connection between 
the middleware server 104 and the data server 134 or a con 
nection already exists between these two parties and the 
request contains a request to maintain the connection ther 
ebetween using a different user id (and possibly a password). 
If the package 304 is for a request for a new connection, 
then the data server 134 receives the request and authenticates 
the user id and the password before the connection is estab 
lished. As part of the authentication process, the data server 
updates the list 210 of current active connections. The data 
server 134 then examines attributes of the connection with the 
middleware server 104 and if such attributes match attributes 
in the database 136 of a trusted server then the middleware 
server 104 is identified as being trusted and marks the con 
nection as trusted. Once this is complete, the middleware 
server 104 can start requesting services from the database 136 
through the data server 134 via this connection. 
If the package is for a request to maintain a connection with 
a different user id, then the data server 134 receives the 
request and examines the list 210 to determine if the middle 
ware server 104 is a trusted connection. If the existing con 
nection between the middleware server 104 and the data 
server 134 is trusted then the current connection between the 
parties is maintained with the different user id without requir 
ing a password associated with the different user id; other 
wise, a password is required and the connection can be bro 
ken. 
The connection source attributes in the database 136 may 
indicate that all connections from a particular source are to be 
trusted, irregardless of the user id. Alternatively, the connec 
tion source attributes may indicate only specific user ids that 
may be interchanged on a trusted connection without the 
requirement of a password, other user ids from the same 
Source may require passwords. 
FIG. 4 illustrates a situation when a user command 402 is 
received by the middleware server 104 requesting a copy of 
data from the data server 134. 
In response to receiving the user command 402, the code 
105C directs the middleware server 104 to transmit a reuse 
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connection command 401 to the data server 134 via the estab 
lished connection 302. The connection 302 shows a copy of 
the reuse connection command 401 which is then received by 
the data server 104. 
In response to the data server 134 receiving the reuse con 
nection command 401, the code 135H directs the data server 
134 to determine whether to reuse the established connection 
302 for executing the user command 402 received by the 
middleware server 104. The code 135H may direct the data 
server 134 to issue a notice indicating that the established 
connection 302 may be reused for executing the user com 
mand 402 submitted by the middleware server 104 if the 
trusted indicator (as shown in table 210) indicates that the 
middleware server 104 may be trusted. If the middleware 
server 104 may be trusted, the code 135H may direct the data 
server 134 to transmit an acceptance notice 404 to the middle 
ware server 104 via connection 302. The code 135H may 
direct the data server 134 to decline executing the user com 
mand 402 received by the middleware server 104 if the trusted 
indicator (as shown in table 210) indicates that the middle 
ware server 134 may not be trusted. If the middleware server 
104 is not to be trusted, the code 135H may direct the data 
server 134 to transmit a decline notice (to the middleware 
server 104) for declining the reuse of the connection 302 for 
the user command 402. 
In response to receiving the acceptance notice 404, the 
code 105D may direct the middleware server 104 to transmit 
the user command 402 to the data server 134 (via connection 
302); thus, the connection 302 is reused for transmitting the 
user command to the data server 134. In response to receiving 
the decline notice, the code 105D may direct an error message 
(not shown) to the user who submitted the user command 402 indicating that the user command 408 for requesting data 
access was declined by the data server 134. In response to the data server 134 receiving a copy of the 
user command 408 from the middleware server 104, the code 
1351 directs the data server 134 to receive the copy of the user 
command 408, and then to execute the user command 408. 
In an alternative, before the data server 134 executes the 
user command 408, the code 135I may direct the data server 
143 to determine whether the user associated with the user 
command 408 has predetermined data access privileges (for 
accessing the data being requested) that were previously 
established with the data server 134. For example, the data 
server 134 may decline execution of the user command 408 
because the data server 134 determines that the user as no 
predetermined access rights established for accessing that 
data identified in the user command 408. In this case, the data 
server 134 transmits a decline execution notice 410 to the 
middleware server 104. For the case when the data server 134 
determines that the user is associated with access privileges 
with the data, the data server 134 may execute the user com 
mand 408 to access the data stored in the database 136, then 
the data server 134 transmits the accessed data 412 via con 
nection 302 over to the middleware server 104. 
In response to receiving the decline notice 410 declining 
access to data, the code 105E directs the middleware server 
104 to transmit an error message (not shown) to the user. In 
response to receiving the accessed data 412, the code 105E 
directs the middleware server 104 to transmit the accessed 
data 412 to the user. 
FIG. 5 shows an interaction between the data server 134 
and the middleware server of FIG. 1 when another user 
attempts to send a command from the middleware server 104 
for accessing data via by the data server 134. The code 105 
includes the code 105F. The code 135 includes the code 135J 
and the code 135K. 
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In response to receiving a release signal from the user, the 
code 105F directs the middleware server 104 to transmit a 
type of connection reset command 501 to the data server 134. 
The reused connection command 501 is shown in the connec 
tion 302. 5 
In response to receiving the reused connection command 
501 via the established connection 302, the code 135J directs 
the data server 134 to set a type of connection indicator ofuser 
to indicate that the user is currently connected. For example, 
the data server 134 may set the user ID to the name of the 10 
current user of the connection. Once the user has completed 
using the connection 302, the user may wish to either request 
more data from the data server 134 or reset the type of con 
nection indicator which permits other users to interact with 
the data server 134. 15 
In response to receiving a release indicator from the user, 
the code 105F directs the middleware server 104 to transmit a 
type of connection reset command 502 to the data server 134 
via the established connection 302. 
The code 135J, in response to the data server 134 receiving 20 
the type of connection reset command 502 via the connection 
502, directs the data server 134 to permit another user to use 
the connection 302. The table 210 contains indications for 
each user id of the trust and use status; for example, the 
non-user status connection indicator is '1' (which indicates 25 
the user JOE is reusing the connection 302), and the user 
status connection indicator is set to “0” to indicate that the 
administrator 150 of the MDW (W) 104 is not using the 
connection 302. This arrangement provides a mechanism 
which permits user JOE exclusive channel to submit user 30 
commands to the data server 134. 
In response to receiving the reset command 502 from the 
middleware server 104 via the connection 302, the code 135K 
directs the data server 134 to set the type of connection 
indicator to indicate a non-user connection status, which 35 
includes setting the currently connected Status to of user 
ID=Admin (the administrator 152) to “1” (the “1” indicates 
the administrator has control of the connection 302), and 
setting the currently connected status of user JOE to “0” (the 
“O'” indicates that user JOE is no longer the active user using 40 
the connection 302). Now another user of the middleware 
server may reuse the connection 302. 
FIG. 6 illustrates a method 600 for the data server 134 of 
managing a connection with a middleware server. A verbal 
agreement is formed between the middleware server and the 45 
data server in step 602. The verbal agreement indicates 
whether or not the data server will trust the middleware server 
and to what degree the middleware server will be trusted. This Verbal agreement is then registered with the data server in step 
604. 50 
A connection request is received from the middleware 
server in step 606. The connection request includes request 
attributes such as whether the request is for a new connection 
or a reuse of an existing connection, a user identification (and 
possibly password) for a user of the middleware server, an IP 55 
address for the middleware server, etc. In step 608 the request 
attributes are examined to determine if the request is a reuse 
of an existing connection using different attributes (e.g. dif 
ferent user identification). If the request is not to reuse the 
connection then it is a request for a new connection. 60 
The request for a new connection is examined in step 610 
to determine if the request attributes contain access privileges 
for the database (e.g. does the user identification and pass 
word match a user id and password registered in the data 
base). If the request contains access privileges, then a con- 65 
nection between the data server and the middleware server is 
created in step 612. A connection status message is transmit 
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ted to the middleware server in step 614 indicating that the 
connection was established. A connection indicator is 
updated in step 616 to indicate that the middleware server is 
connected with the data server. A trust indicator is then set and 
checked for the middleware server in step 618. Based on 
attributes of the middleware server in the request (e.g. IP 
address) and attributes of servers that can be trusted (as found 
in the registered verbal agreement), the trust indicator is set as 
trust or not trust for the middleware server. 
If the connection request for a new connection does not 
contain database access privileges then an error message is 
transmitted to the middleware server in step 628. 
If the connection request is to reuse a connection then the 
trust indicator for the middleware server is examined in step 
620. If the trust indicator indicates that the middleware server 
is not a trusted server then an error message is transmitted to 
the middleware server in step 634. 
If the trust indicator indicates that the middleware server is 
a trusted server then the connection may be reused with new 
attributes. These new attributes are set for the connection in 
step 622. A connection status message is transmitted to the 
middleware server in step 624 indicating that the connection 
is being reused with the new attributes. 
After a new connection has been established or the existing 
connection is set up to be reused, a command to obtain data 
from the database is received from the middleware server in 
step 626. The command to obtain data is executed in step 630 
and the obtained data is transmitted to the middleware server 
in step 632. 
FIG. 7 illustrates a method 700 of establishing a connection 
with the data server by the middleware server. A request for a 
new connection is transmitted from the middleware server to 
the data server instep 702. A connection status message is 
received from the data server in step 704 indicating whether 
or not the connection has been established. 
After a connection has been established a request to reuse 
the connection with different attributes 9e.g. different user id) 
is transmitted to the data server in step 706. A connection 
status message is received form the data server in step 708 
indicating whether or not the request to reuse the connection 
was granted. 
The connection status message is examined in step 710 to 
determine if the request to reuse the connection was granted. 
If the request was not granted then a user is informed in step 
716 that the request was unsuccessful. 
If the request was successful thena command to obtain data 
from the database is transmitted to the data server in step 712. 
The requested data is received form the data server in step 
714. 
The detailed description of the embodiments of the present 
invention does not limit the implementation of the embodi ments to any particular computer programming language. 
The computer program product may be implemented in any 
computer programming language provided that the OS (Op 
erating System) provides the facilities that may support the 
requirements of the computer program product. A preferred 
embodiment is implemented in the C or C++ computer pro 
gramming language (or may be implemented in other com 
puter programming languages in conjunction with C/C++). 
Any limitations presented would be a result of a particular type of operating System, computer programming language, 
or data processing system and would not be a limitation of the 
embodiments described herein. 
It will be appreciated that the elements described above 
may be adapted for specific conditions or functions. The 
concepts of the present invention can be further extended to a 
variety of other applications that are clearly within the scope 
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of this invention. Having thus described the present invention 
with respect to preferred embodiments as implemented, it 
will be apparent to those skilled in the art that many modifi 
cations and enhancements are possible to the present inven 
tion without departing from the basic concepts as described in 
the preferred embodiment of the present invention. 
The invention claimed is: 
1. For a data server of a data processing system operably 
coupled to a database, a method of managing a connection 
with a middleware server, the middleware server sending a 
request for a connection to the data server, the request com 
prising request attributes, the method comprising: 
storing a set of attributes identifying middleware servers 
trusted by the data server; 
establishing a connection between the middleware server 
and the data server based on a request, having connec 
tion request attributes, received from the middleware 
server; and 
setting a trust indicator for the connection, according to a 
trust status determined by comparing the set of attributes 
identifying the middleware server to the received con 
nection request attributes, the trust status indicating 
whether the connection is one of a trusted connection 
and a non-trusted connection, 
wherein if the connection between the middleware server 
and the data server is a trusted connection, the data 
server permits use of the connection by the middleware 
server when a first user is connected to the middleware 
server and permits reuse of the connection by the 
middleware server when a second user, different from 
the first user, is connected to the middleware server 
without requiring authentication of the second user. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of establishing 
a connection comprises: 
updating a connection indicator after the connection has 
been established to indicate that the connection has been 
established. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of setting a trust indicator comprises: 
determining if the trust indicator is set for the connection; 
and 
if the trust indicator is set, determining whether the con 
nection is trusted after the connection indicatorindicates 
the connection is established. 
4. The method of claim 1 wherein the step of storing com prises: 
forming an agreement between the data server and the 
middleware server containing the set of attributes; and 
registering the set of attributes with the data server. 
5. The method of claim 1 wherein the step of establishing 
a connection comprises: 
receiving a request from the middleware server to establish 
a connection therebetween; and 
determining whether the request attributes indicate a 
request for a new connection or a reuse of an existing 
connection with different request attributes. 
6. The method of claim 5 wherein the step of establishing 
a connection further comprises: 
determining if the request attributes include access privi 
leges for the database if the request attributes indicate a 
request for a new connection; 
creating the connection if the request attributes include 
access privileges; and 
transmitting a connection status message to the middle 
ware server indicating that the connection has been 
established. 
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7. The method of claim 5 wherein the request attributes 
comprises a user identification and the different request 
attributes comprises a different user identification. 
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the step of establishing 
the connection further comprises: 
determining whether the existing connection can be reused 
based on the trust indicator of the existing connection. 
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the step of determining 
whether the existing connection can be reused comprises: 
transmitting a connection status message to the middle 
ware server indicting that the connection may be reused 
if the trust indicator indicates that the middleware server 
is trusted. 
10. The method of claim 8, wherein the step of determining 
whether the existing connection can be reused comprises: 
transmitting a connection status message to the middle 
ware server indicating that the existing connection may 
not be reused if the trust indicator indicates that the 
middleware server is not trusted. 
11. The method of claim 1 further comprising: 
receiving a command via the connection for obtaining data 
in the database from the middleware server; and 
executing the command in the request if the trust indicator 
for the middleware server indicates that the middleware 
server is trusted. 
12. The method of claim 11, wherein the step of executing comprises: 
transmitting a decline execution notice to the middleware 
server if the request attributes do not include access 
privileges for the data identified in the command; and 
transmitting obtained data to the middleware server in 
response to the command if the request attributes 
include access privileges for the data identified in the 
command. 
13. The method of claim 1, wherein the middleware server 
receives the request for connection to the data server from a 
user connected to the middleware server over a network. 
14. The method of claim 1, wherein the connection request 
attributes comprise attributes of a user connected to the 
middleware server and attributes of the middleware server. 
15. The method of claim 1, wherein the trust indicator is 
stored at the data server. 
16. The method of claim 1, wherein the storing the set of 
attributes identifying middleware servers trusted by the data 
server occurs prior to the establishing the connection between 
the middleware server and the data server based on the 
request. 
17. For a middleware server of a data processing system, a 
method of establishing a connection with a data server oper 
ably coupled to a database, the method comprising: 
transmitting a connection request to the data server, the 
connection request having request attributes that iden 
tify the connection request as being one of a new con 
nection and reuse of an existing connection having dif 
ferent connection request attributes; and 
receiving a connection status message from the data server 
indicating a status, when the data server determines that 
the middleware server is one of a trusted middleware 
server and a non-trusted middleware server by compar 
ing the request attributes to a stored set of attributes 
identifying the middleware server, of the connection as 
being one of a trusted connection and a non-trusted 
connection, 
wherein if the connection between the middleware server 
and the data server is a trusted connection, the data 
server permits use of the connection by the middleware 
server when a first user is connected to the middleware 
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server and permits reuse of the connection by the 
middleware server when a second user, different from 
the first user, is connected to the middleware server 
without requiring authentication of the second user. 
18. The method of claim 17, wherein the step of transmit ting a connection request comprises: 
transmitting the connection request with the request to 
reuse the existing connection to the data server via the 
existing connection, 
wherein the request attributes comprises a user identifica 
tion and the different request attributes comprises a dif 
ferent user identification than the existing connection. 
19. The method of claim 17, further comprising: 
transmitting a command for obtaining data in the database 
to the data server if the connection status message indi 
cates that the connection has been established. 
20. The method of claim 19 further comprising: 
receiving obtained data from the data server in response to 
the command. 
21. For a data server of a data processing system operably 
coupled to a database, a computer program product having 
computer executable codes embodied on a computer-read 
able storage medium for managing a connection with a 
middleware server, the middleware server sending a request 
for a connection to the data server, the request comprising 
request attributes, the computer program product comprising: 
code storing a set of attributes identifying middleware 
servers trusted by the data server; 
code establishing a connection between the middleware 
server and the data server based on the request received 
from the middleware server; and 
code setting a trust indicator for the connection according 
to a trust status determined by comparing the set of 
attributes identifying the middleware server to the 
received connection request attributes, the trust status 
indicating whether the connection is one of a trusted 
connection and a non-trusted connection, 
wherein if the connection between the middleware server 
and the data server is a trusted connection, the data 
server permits use of the connection by the middleware 
server when a first user is connected to the middleware 
server and permits reuse of the connection by the 
middleware server when a second user, different from 
the first user, is connected to the middleware server 
without requiring authentication of the second user. 
22. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the code establishing a connection comprises: 
code updating a connection indicator after the connection 
has been established to indicate that the connection has 
been established. 
23. The computer program product of claim 22, wherein 
the code setting a trust indicator comprises: 
code determining if the trust indicator is set for the con 
nection; and 
code, if the trust indicator is set, determining whether the 
connection is trusted after the connection indicator indi 
cates the connection is established. 
24. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the code storing comprises: 
code forming an agreement between the data server and the 
middleware server containing the set of attributes; and 
code registering the set of attributes with the data server. 
25. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the code establishing a connection comprises: 
code receiving a request from the middleware server to 
establish a connection therebetween; and 
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code determining whether the request attributes indicate a 
request for a new connection or a reuse of an existing 
connection with different request attributes. 
26. The computer program product of claim 25, wherein 
the code establishing a connection further comprises: 
code determining if the request attributes include access 
privileges for the database if the request attributes indi 
cate a request for a new connection; 
code creating the connection if the request attributes 
include access privileges; and 
code transmitting a connection status message to the 
middleware server indicating that the connection has 
been established. 
27. The computer program product of claim 25, wherein 
the request attributes comprises a user identification and the 
different request attributes comprises a different user identi 
fication. 
28. The computer program product of claim 27, wherein 
the code establishing the connection further comprises: 
code determining whether the existing connection can be 
reused based on the trust indicator of the existing con 
nection. 
29. The computer program product of claim 28, wherein 
the code determining whether the existing connection can be 
reused comprises: 
code transmitting a connection status message to the 
middleware server indicting that the connection may be 
reused if the trust indicator indicates that the middleware 
server is trusted. 
30. The computer program product of claim 28, wherein 
the code determining whether the existing connection can be 
reused comprises: 
code transmitting a connection status message to the 
middleware server indicating that the existing connec 
tion may not be reused if the trust indicator indicates that 
the middleware server is not trusted. 
31. The computer program product of claim 21, further comprising: 
code receiving a command via the connection for obtaining 
data in the database from the middleware server; and 
executing the command in the request if the trust indicator 
for the middleware server indicates that the middleware 
server is trusted. 
32. The computer program product of claim 31, wherein the step of executing comprises: 
code transmitting a decline execution notice to the middle 
ware server if the request attributes do not include access 
privileges for the data identified in the command; and 
code transmitting obtained data to the middleware server in 
response to the command if the request attributes 
include access privileges for the data identified in the 
command. 
33. For a middleware server of a data processing system, a computer program product having computer executable 
codes embodied on a computer-readable storage medium for 
establishing a connection with a data server operably coupled 
to a database, the computer program product comprising: 
code transmitting a connection request to the data server, 
the connection request having request attributes that 
identify the connection request as being for one of a new 
connection and reuse of an existing connection having 
different connection request attributes; and 
code receiving a connection status message from the data 
server indicating a status, when the data server deter 
mines that the middleware server is one of a trusted 
middleware server and a non-trusted middleware server 
by comparing the request attributes to a stored set of 
US 7,647,626 B2 
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attributes identifying the middleware server, of the con- wherein the request attributes comprises a user identifica 
nection as being one of a trusted connection and a non- tion and the different request attributes comprises a dif 
trusted connection, ferent user identification than the existing connection. wherein if the connection between the middleware server and the data server is a trusted connection, the data 35. The computer program product of claim 33, further 
server permits use of the connection by the middleware compr1S1ng: 
server when a first user is connected to the middleware code transmitting a command for obtaining data in the 
server and permits reuse of the connection by the database to the data server if the connection status mes 
middleware server when a second user, different from Sage indicates that the connection has been established. 
the first user, is connected to the middleware server 10 
without requiring authentication of the second user. 
34. The computer program product of claim 33, wherein 
the code transmitting a connection request comprises: 
code transmitting the connection request with the request response to the command. 
to reuse the existing connection to the data server via the 15 
existing connection, k . . . . 
36. The computer program product of claim 35, further 
comprising: 
code receiving obtained data from the data server in 
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ACCESS CONTROL FOR ELEMENTS INA 
DATABASE OBJECT 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates generally to database man agement systems. More particularly, the present invention is 
directed to controlling access to elements in a database object. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
In a Database Management System (DBMS), data is stored 
in tables made up of records (e.g., rows) having one or more 
fields (e.g., columns). A view is a logical construct imposed 
over a table and is defined by metadata in the DBMS known 
as a view definition. The view definition contains mappings to 
one or more rows and columns in one or more tables stored in 
a database. Tables and views are considered to be database 
objects. 
Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) is a mechanism by 
which the DBMS controls access to database object records 
and/or fields based on the identity of the user attempting to 
access the database object. FGAC complements the tradi 
tional Discretionary Access Control (DAC) implemented by 
many DBMS by allowing the DBMS to enforce two levels of 
access control: DAC is enforced at the object level (e.g., does 
the user have the right to access that table'?) and FGAC is 
enforced at the element level (e.g., does the user have the right 
to access that row or column?). 
Traditional methods of implementing FGAC within 
DBMS have relied upon the use of views. A view can be used 
to alter or restrict the data seen by a user using the view to 
access the underlying table(s). Views, however, have a num 
ber of shortcomings. For example, when the number of dif 
ferent restrictions is numerous, view definitions may become 
quite complex in an effort to incorporate all of the restrictions 
in one view, which strains system limits and makes mainte 
nance of the view difficult. 
Additionally, if a large number of simple views are desired, 
e.g., each one implementing a unique view of a table based on 
the restrictions for a specific set of users, the routing of user 
requests becomes difficult with the solution often being 
resolved within the database application rather than the 
DBMS. Furthermore, a user may be able to bypass the FGAC implemented through the views by accessing the base tables 
directly. 
Another known implementation of FGAC is the use of user attributes to modify queries by adding predicates into the 
queries. A predicate is a condition that must be satisfied for 
the DBMS to return a value. In this approach, the user 
attributes (e.g., user identifier) are compared against a secu 
rity policy defined within a procedure provided by the user on 
a table or view to make decisions regarding access to data. 
This approach allows row restrictions, traditionally handled 
by views, to be dynamically added to queries without requir 
ing application modification. 
One drawback of the query modification approach is that it 
only allows the DBMS to control access at the row-level. 
Views still have to be used to control access at the column 
level. Additionally, the approach requires user programming 
of a strictly defined “predicate producing procedure in order 
to implement a security policy. Moreover, query modification 
interferes with dynamic query caching because the modified 
queries will no longer match the original text of the queries, 
which makes query matching problematic and impacts the 
performance benefits of caching. 
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Further, the solutions described above fail to address the requirements from emerging privacy applications. Generally, 
a privacy policy indicates who can access what information, 
for what purpose, and resulting in what obligations. For 
example, a user John Doe may be allowed to access the credit 
card column from a customer table if he is using the billing 
application to process a customer order, but he may not be 
allowed to access that column for the purpose of sending 
marketing information to the customer. Existing FGAC solu 
tions cannot address this requirement because they either do 
not support controlling access at the column level or they 
provide control access at the column level, but only for col 
umns that have been statically defined (i.e., view-based tech 
niques). Hence, a user is always restricted to a set of columns, 
regardless of the purpose for which he or she is accessing 
those columns. 
Privacy applications are only one example where such 
flexibility is needed. Recent user requirements in the area of 
database security indicate that there is a need for database 
Vendors to provide the notion of a session context. A session 
context is uniquely identified by a set of session attributes that 
may include the ID of the user who established that session, 
the IP address of the computer from which the user initiated 
the session, as well as other attributes as dictated by a par 
ticular implementation or scenario. Within a particular con 
text, a user can have one or more privileges on one or more 
database objects that are not necessarily available to them 
within a different context. Thus, it is only natural that the next 
logical user requirement would be to allow certain columns to 
be accessible within one context, but not within another con 
text. Currently, the only way to accomplish this would be to 
define a set of views that restrict access to certain columns and 
grant access on those views to users depending on their ses 
sion context. Maintaining several views, however, has the 
same drawbacks mentioned earlier. 
Accordingly, there is a need for a flexible mechanism to 
control access to elements in a database object based on one 
or more dynamic conditions, such as a session context or an 
access purpose without requiring the creation and mainte 
nance of static views or the modification of queries. The 
present invention addresses Such a need. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
A method, computer program product, and system for con 
trolling access to elements in a database object are provided. 
In this document, a group of one or more users is denoted as 
a user group and a set of one or more of the elements in a 
database object is denoted as an element set in the database object. The method, computer program product, and system 
provide for receiving a request from a user to access the 
database object, determining whether an access restriction is 
imposed on the database object, the access restriction speci 
fying a first user group to which the access restriction is 
applicable, defining a first dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the database object, and 
identifying a first element set in the database object accessible 
to the first user group when the first dynamic condition is 
satisfied, and controlling access to the elements in the data 
base object by the user based on the access restriction. 
Controlling access to elements in a database object using 
access restrictions, rather than views or modified queries, 
eliminates the worries concerning the creation and mainte 
nance of complex views, the users bypassing restrictions by 
accessing underlying tables directly, the difficulties associ 
ated with routing user requests when there is a large number 
of views, the ability to control access at both the row and 
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column level, the need to program strictly defined “predicate 
producing procedures, and the problems of dynamic query 
caching interferences. In addition, because the access restric 
tions are defined using one or more dynamic conditions, the 
flexibility needed to address current privacy and security 
concerns is achieved. 
Particular implementations can include controlling access 
to the elements in the database object by confirming whether 
the user is in the first user group when the access restriction is 
imposed on the database object, verifying whether the user 
satisfies the first dynamic condition when the user is in the 
first user group, and allowing the user to access the first 
element set when the user satisfies the first dynamic condi 
tion. 
Verifying whether the user satisfies the first dynamic con 
dition may include obtaining one or more session variables 
associated with the user when the user is in the first user group 
and comparing the one or more session variable associated 
with the user to the first dynamic condition to determine 
whether the user satisfies the first dynamic condition. In an 
implementation, allowing the user to access the first element 
set in the database object comprises generating a dynamic 
pseudo-View of the database object comprising only the first 
element set in the database object when the user satisfies the 
first dynamic condition and responding to the request from 
the user using the dynamic pseudo-View of the database object. 
In some embodiments, the database object is a table or a 
view, at least one element in the first element set is a column, 
the first dynamic condition is a session context or a session 
purpose associated with a user in the first user group, and the 
access restriction is stored in a database. Additionally, the 
access restriction can further define an additional dynamic 
condition the first user group must satisfy in order to access 
the first element set. 
In other implementations, the access restriction further 
defines a second dynamic condition the first user group must 
alternatively satisfy in order to access the database object and 
further identifies a second element set in the database object 
accessible to the first user group when the second dynamic 
condition is satisfied. At least one element in the first element 
set may also be an element in the second element set. 
Further aspects may include determining whether another 
access restriction is imposed on the database object, the other 
access restriction specifying a second user group to which the 
other access restriction is applicable. The other access restric 
tion can also define another dynamic condition the second 
user group must satisfy in order to access the database object 
and identify another element set in the database object acces 
sible to the second user group when the other dynamic con 
dition is satisfied. In one embodiment, at least one user in the 
first user group is also a user in the second user group. 
Another implementation also includes deciding whether 
an exception to the access restriction is applicable to the user 
requesting access to the database object and permitting the 
user to access the elements in the database object when the 
exception to the access restriction is applicable to the user. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 is a process flow of a method for controlling access 
to elements in a database object according to an aspect of the 
invention. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a system according to one embodiment of 
the invention. 
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FIGS. 3-5 depict flowcharts of methods for controlling 
access to elements in a database object according to various 
implementations of the invention. 
FIG. 6 shows a sample database object and exemplary 
dynamic pseudo-Views generated based on the sample data 
base object according to one aspect of the invention. 
FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a data processing system with 
which embodiments of the present invention can be imple 
mented. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The present invention relates generally to database systems 
and more particularly to controlling access to elements in a 
database object. The following description is presented to 
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
invention. Various modifications to the preferred implemen 
tations and the generic principles and features described 
herein will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Thus, 
the present invention is not intended to be limited to the 
implementations shown, but is to be accorded the widest 
Scope consistent with the principles and features described 
herein. 
FIG. 1 depicts a process 100 for controlling access to 
elements in a database object. At 102, a request to access the 
database object is received from a user. A determination is 
then made at 104 as to whether an access restriction is 
imposed on the database object. In an embodiment, the access 
restriction specifies a first user group comprising one or more 
users to which the access restriction is applicable, defines a 
first dynamic condition the first user group must satisfy in 
order to access the database object, and identifies a first ele 
ment set comprising one or more of the elements in the 
database object accessible to the first user group when the first 
dynamic condition is satisfied. In this document, a group of 
one or more users is denoted as a user group and a set of one 
or more of the elements in a database object is denoted as an 
element set in the database object. 
Access to the elements in the database object by the user is 
controlled based on the access restriction when the access 
restriction is imposed on the database object and the user is in 
the first user group (106). In some implementations, the data 
base object is a table or a view, at least one element in the first 
element set is a column, and the first dynamic condition is a 
session context or a session purpose associated with a user in 
the first user group. 
A session purpose could be determined based on the type of 
application the user is employing when requesting access to 
the database object, for example, a purchasing application or 
a marketing application. A session context could be the loca 
tion from which the user is requesting access to the database 
object, for instance, from the office or at home. The location 
may be determined based on the IP address of the computer 
from which the user is requesting access. 
Session context and session purpose are just two examples 
of dynamic conditions. A dynamic condition can also be a 
function. For example, the condition can be “F(current time) 
is TRUE' where “F” is a function that compares the current 
time to the time of the day when access can be granted. 
Illustrated in FIG. 2 is a system 200 including a server 202 
interconnected to clients 210-1 to 210-in via a network 208. 
Server 202 and clients 210-1 to 210-n may be any data pro 
cessing system, such as computers, workstations, and hand 
held portable devices. In addition, system 200 may include 
more or less clients in other embodiments. Network 208 may 
be the Internet or World Wide Web (WWW) in some imple 
mentations. 
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System 200 also includes a database 204 and resources 
206a-206b. Each resource may be a storage media, a data 
base, a set of XML (eXtensible Markup Language) docu 
ments, a directory service, such as LDAP (Lightweight Direc 
tory Access Protocol) server, or a backend system. Other 
embodiments of system 200 may include more or less data 
bases and/or resources. 
Database 204 and resources 206a-206b are coupled to 
server 202. The interface between server 202 and database 
204 and resources 206a-206b may be a local area network, 
Internet, a proprietary interface, or any combination of the 
foregoing. Clients 210-1 to 210-in can access database 204 
and resources 206a-206b through server 202. Any of server 
202, database 204, resources 206a-206b, and clients 210-1 to 
210-n may belocated remotely from one another or may share 
a location. 
The configuration of system 200 is not intended as a limi 
tation of the present invention, as will be understood by those 
of ordinary skill in the art from a review of the following 
detailed description. For example, network 208 may com 
prise a wireless link, a telephone communication, a radio 
communication, or a computer network (e.g., a Local Area 
Network (LAN) or a Wide Area Network (WAN)). In one implementation, database 204 is operable to store a 
database object comprising a plurality of elements and server 
202 is operable to receive a request from a user to access the 
database object. The request may be submitted by the user 
through one of clients 210-1 to 210-in. Server 202 is also 
operable to determine whether an access restriction is 
imposed on the database object. The access restriction speci 
fies a first user group to which the access restriction is appli 
cable, defines a first dynamic condition the first user group 
must satisfy in order to access the database object, and iden 
tifies a first element set in the database object accessible to the 
first user group when the first dynamic condition is satisfied. 
Server 202 is then operable to control access to the ele 
ments in the database object by the user based on the access 
restriction when the access restriction is imposed on the data 
base object and the user is in the first user group. In some 
embodiments, database 204 is further operable to store the 
access restriction. The access restriction may be stored in a 
catalog of database 204 (not shown). 
FIG. 3 shows a process 300 for controlling access to ele 
ments in the database object according to an aspect of the 
invention. A request to access the database object is received 
from a user at 302. At 304, a determination is made as to 
whether an access restriction is imposed on the database 
object. The access restriction specifies a first user group to 
which the access restriction is applicable, defines a first 
dynamic condition and an additional dynamic condition the 
first user group must satisfy in order to access the database 
object, and identifies a first element set in the database object 
accessible to the first user group when the first dynamic 
condition and the additional dynamic condition are satisfied. 
If no access restriction is imposed on the database object, 
the user is permitted to access the elements in the database 
object (306). However, if the access restriction is imposed on 
the database object, process 300 confirms whether the user is 
in the first user group to which the access restriction is appli 
cable (308). When the user is not in the first user group, process 300 proceeds to 306 and the user is permitted to 
access the elements in the database object. 
When the user is in the first user group, process 300 verifies 
whether the user satisfies the first dynamic condition (310). If 
the user does not satisfy the first dynamic condition, the user 
is prohibited from accessing the elements in the database 
object (312). If the user does satisfy the first dynamic condi 
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tion, process 300 verifies whether the user satisfies the addi 
tional dynamic condition (314). When the user fails to satisfy 
the additional dynamic condition, process 300 proceeds to 
312 and prohibits the user from accessing the elements in the 
database object. 
A dynamic pseudo-View of the database object comprising 
only the first element set is generated when the user satisfies 
the first dynamic condition and the additional dynamic con 
dition (316). The request from the user is then responded to 
using the dynamic pseudo-view of the database object (318). 
A dynamic pseudo-View is a view-like entity with attributes 
similar to a predefined regular view. However, because it is 
dynamically created, it does not exist in a database, such as 
database 204 in FIG. 2, and has no dependencies. 
Depicted in FIG. 4 is another process 400 for controlling 
access to elements in a database object. At 402, a request is 
received from a user to access the database object. A deter 
mination is then made at 404 as to whether an access restric 
tion is imposed on the database object. The access restriction 
specifies a first user group to which the access restriction is 
applicable, defines a first dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the database object, and 
identifies a first element set in the database object accessible 
to the first user group when the first dynamic condition is 
satisfied. 
In the embodiment, the access restriction also defines a 
second dynamic condition the first user group must alterna 
tively satisfy in order to access the database object and iden 
tifies a second element set in the database object accessible to 
the first user group when the second dynamic condition is 
satisfied. In some implementations, at least one element in the 
first element set is also an element in the second element set. 
When no access restrictions are imposed on the database 
object, the user is permitted to access the elements in the 
database object (406). When the access restriction is imposed 
on the database object, process 400 confirms whether the user 
is in the first user group (408). If the user is not in the first user group, process 400 proceeds to 406 and permits the user to 
access the elements in the database object. 
If the user is in the first user group, one or more session 
variables associated with the user is obtained (410). In one 
embodiment, when the user establishes a session through 
Some application, a session start trigger will populate one or 
more session variables associated with the user with the 
appropriate values based on information from the user and the 
application. The session start trigger is a program that is 
automatically executed when a session is established. Process 
400 then compares the one or more session variables associ 
ated with the user to the first dynamic condition to determine 
whether the user satisfies the first dynamic condition (412). 
The user is allowed to access the first element set in the 
database object when the user satisfies the first dynamic con 
dition, i.e., the one or more session variables match or corre 
spond to the first dynamic condition (414). When the one or 
more session variables do not match the first dynamic condi tion, process 400 compares them to the second dynamic con 
dition (416). If they also fail to match the second dynamic 
condition, the user is prohibited from accessing the elements 
in the database object (418). However, if the one or more 
session variables associated with the user match the second 
dynamic condition, the user is allowed to access the second 
element set in the database object (420). 
FIG. 5 illustrates a process 500 for controlling access to 
elements in a database object according to a further embodi 
ment of the invention. A request to access the database object 
is received from a user at 502. A determination is then made 
at 504 as to whetheran access restriction has been imposed on 
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the database object. The access restriction specifies a first user 
group to which the access restriction is applicable, defines a 
first dynamic condition the first user group must satisfy in 
order to access the database object, and identifies a first ele 
ment set in the database object accessible to the first user 
group when the first dynamic condition is satisfied. 
If no access restrictions are imposed on the database object, 
the user is permitted to access the elements in the database 
object (506). If, however, the access restriction has been 
imposed on the database object, process 500 decides whether 
an exception to the access restriction is applicable to the user 
requesting access to the database object (508). When the 
exception to the access restriction is applicable to the user at 
block 508, a determination is made as to whether another 
access restriction is imposed on the database object, the other 
access restriction specifies a second user group to which the 
other access restriction is applicable (510). In an implemen 
tation, at least one user in the first user group is also a user in 
the second user group. 
The other access restriction may further define another dynamic condition the second user group must satisfy in 
order to access the database object and identify another ele 
ment set in the database object accessible to the second user 
group when the other dynamic condition is satisfied. Addi 
tionally, the other element set in the database object may be a 
subset of the first element set. 
Process 500 will proceed to 506 to permit the user to access 
the elements in the database object when no other access 
restrictions are imposed on the database object. However, it 
will decide whether an exception to the other access restric 
tion is applicable to the user requesting access to the database 
object when the other access restriction is also imposed on the 
database object (512). The user is permitted to access the 
elements in the database object if the exception to the other 
access restriction is applicable to the user (506). In contrast, 
access to the elements in the database object by the user is 
controlled based on the other access restriction if the excep 
tion to the other access restriction is inapplicable to the user 
(514). When the exception to the access restriction is not appli 
cable to the user at block 508, a determination is made as to 
whether another access restriction is imposed on the database 
object (516). If no other access restrictions are imposed on the 
database object, access to the elements in the database object 
by the user is controlled based on the access restriction (518). 
However, if another access restriction is imposed on the data 
base object, process 500 will decide whether an exception to 
the other access restriction is applicable to the user requesting 
access to the database object (520). 
Access to the elements in the database object by the user 
will be controlled based on the access restriction when the 
exception to the other access restriction is applicable to the 
user (518). Conversely, access to the elements in the database 
object by the user will be controlled based on both access 
restrictions when the exception to the other access restriction 
is not applicable to the user (522). 
Shown in FIG. 6 is a sample database object 600 with 
elements 602–610. Database object 600 is a table called “cus 
tomer data' with a column 602 for names, a column 604 for 
addresses, a column 606 for phone numbers, and a column 
608 for credit card numbers. Table 600 has n number of rows 
610-1 to 610-in. Embodiments of the present invention 
enables access restrictions to be created Such that it becomes 
possible to express which elements 602–610 in database 
object 600 are accessible by a user and under what condition. 
For example, suppose a user named “Bob” is allowed to 
access columns 602, 604, and 608 in table 600 for the purpose 
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of “Billing” and only columns 602 and 604 for the purpose of “Marketing.” The following Structured Query Language 
(SQL) statement illustrates how an access restriction can be 
created to limit user Bob's access to columns 602–610 intable 
600 based on the purpose of access. 
CREATE RESTRICTION r1 
ON TABLE customer data 
FOR Bob 
TO COLUMNS 
(name, address, credit card) WHEN (SessionVari ablePurpose =Billing) 
(name, address) WHEN (SessionVariablePurpose =Marketing) 
Thus, when table 600 is queried by user Bob, server 202 in 
FIG. 2 for example, can determine that an access restriction 
applies for user Bob. Server 202 may then look up a session 
variable “SessionVariablePurpose' associated with user Bob 
and read its value. If it is set to “Billing, server 202 will 
implement access restriction “r1 in the query plan as if that 
restriction was statically defined as follows: 
CREATE RESTRICTION r1 
ON TABLE customer data 
FOR Bob 
TO COLUMNS (name, address, credit card) 
A dynamic pseudo-View 612a of table 600 that is depicted in 
FIG. 6 can be generated to respond to user Bob’s queries to 
table 600. 
However, if the value of the session variable "SessionVa 
riablePurpose' was “Marketing, then server 202 will imple 
ment restriction “r1 in the query planas if that restriction was 
statically defined as follows: 
CREATE RESTRICTION r1 
ON TABLE customer data 
FOR Bob 
TO COLUMNS (name, address) 
A dynamic pseudo-view 612b of table 600, which is illus 
trated in FIG. 6, will be generated to respond to user Bob's 
queries on table 600. For more information regarding the 
creation and use of access restrictions, see 'A Method for 
Implementing Fine-Grained Access Control Using Access 
Restrictions.” U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/837,387, 
filed on Apr. 30, 2004, which is hereby incorporated by ref 
erence in its entirety for all purposes. 
The invention can take the form of an entirely hardware 
embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an 
embodiment containing both hardware and software ele 
ments. In one aspect, the invention is implemented in Soft 
ware, which includes, but is not limited to, firmware, resident 
Software, microcode, etc. 
Furthermore, the invention can take the form of a computer 
program product accessible from a computer-usable or com 
puter-readable medium providing program code for use by or 
in connection with a computer or any instruction execution system. For the purposes of this description, a computer 
usable or computer-readable medium can be any apparatus 
that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport 
the program for use by or in connection with the instruction 
execution system, apparatus, or device. 
The medium can be an electronic, magnetic, optical, elec 
tromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system (or apparatus 
or device) or a propagation medium. Examples of a computer 
readable medium include a semiconductor or Solid State 
memory, magnetic tape, a removable computer diskette, a 
random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), 
a rigid magnetic disk, and an optical disk. Current examples 
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of optical disks include DVD, compact disk-read-only 
memory (CD-ROM), and compact disk-read/write (CD-R/ 
W). 
FIG. 7 depicts a data processing system 700 suitable for 
storing and/or executing program code. Data processing sys 
tem 700 includes a processor 702 coupled to memory ele 
ments 704a–b through a system bus 706. In other embodi 
ments, data processing system 700 may include more than 
one processor and each processor may be coupled directly or 
indirectly to one or more memory elements through a system 
bus. 
Memory elements 704a–b can include local memory 
employed during actual execution of the program code, bulk 
storage, and cache memories that provide temporary storage 
of at least Some program code in order to reduce the number 
of times the code must be retrieved from bulk storage during 
execution. As shown, input/output or I/O devices 708a-b (including, but not limited to, keyboards, displays, pointing 
devices, etc.) are coupled to data processing system 700. I/O 
devices 708a-b may be coupled to data processing system 700 
directly or indirectly through intervening I/O controllers (not 
shown). 
In the embodiment, a network adapter 710 is coupled to 
data processing system 700 to enable data processing system 
700 to become coupled to other data processing systems or 
remote printers or storage devices through communication 
link 712. Communication link 712 can be a private or public 
network. Modems, cable modems, and Ethernet cards are just a few of the currently available types of network adapters. 
Various implementations for controlling access to ele 
ments in a database object have been described. Nevertheless, 
one of ordinary skill in the art will readily recognize that 
various modifications may be made to the implementations, 
and any variations would be within the spirit and scope of the 
present invention. For example, the above-described process 
flows are described with reference to a particular ordering of 
process actions. However, the ordering of many of the 
described process actions may be changed without affecting 
the scope or operation of the invention. Accordingly, many 
modifications may be made by one of ordinary skill in the art 
without departing from the spirit and scope of the following 
claims. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method of controlling access to elements in a database 
object, the method comprising: 
receiving a request from a user to access the database 
object, wherein the request includes a query to retrieve 
information from the database object; 
determining whether an access restriction is imposed on 
the database object, the access restriction specifying a 
first user group to which the access restriction is appli 
cable, defining a first dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the database object, 
and identifying a first element set in the database object 
accessible to the first user group when the first dynamic 
condition is satisfied, wherein the first element set 
includes at least one, and less than all, table columns of 
the database object to restrict access to one or more table 
columns, wherein the first dynamic condition indicates 
access information including one or more of a session 
context and session purpose for the user to access the 
database object, and whereintwo or more of said session 
contexts and purposes for the user to access the database 
object enable access to be restricted to at least one dif 
ferent table column of said database object; and 
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controlling access to the elements in the database object by 
the user based on the access restriction, wherein control 
ling access to the elements in the database objects com prises: 
confirming whether the user is in the first user group 
when the access restriction is imposed on the database object; 
verifying whether the user satisfies the first dynamic 
condition when the user is in the first user group by 
ascertaining session information for the user from one 
or more session variables associated with the user, 
wherein the session information includes one or more 
of the session context and session purpose for access 
of the database object, and comparing the session 
information for the user against the access informa 
tion indicated by the first dynamic condition to deter 
mine satisfaction of that condition; and 
allowing the user to access the first element set when the 
user satisfies the first dynamic condition, wherein 
allowing the user to access the first element set com prises: 
dynamically generating a dynamic pseudo-View of 
the database object comprising only the first ele 
ment set in response to said verification of the user 
satisfying the first dynamic condition; and 
responding to the request from the user by applying 
the received query to the dynamic pseudo-View of 
the database object to retrieve the information. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the database object is a 
table or a view. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the access restriction 
further defines a second dynamic condition the first user 
group must alternatively satisfy in order to access the data 
base object and further identifies a second element set in the 
database object accessible to the first user group when the 
second dynamic condition is satisfied. 
4. The method of claim 3, wherein at least one element in 
the first element set is also an element in the second element 
Set. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the access restriction 
further defines an additional dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the first element set. 
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
determining whether another access restriction is imposed 
on the database object, the other access restriction speci 
fying a second user group to which the other access 
restriction is applicable. 
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the other access restric 
tion further defines another dynamic condition the second 
user group must satisfy in order to access the database object 
and identifies another element set in the database object 
accessible to the second user group when the other dynamic 
condition is satisfied. 
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the other element set is 
a subset of the first element set. 
9. The method of claim 6, wherein at least one user in the 
first user group is also a user in the second user group. 
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
deciding whether an exception to the access restriction is 
applicable to the user requesting access to the database 
object; and 
permitting the user to access the elements in the database 
object when the exception to the access restriction is 
applicable to the user. 
11. A system comprising: 
a database operable to store a database object, the database 
object comprising elements; and 
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a server coupled to the database, the server comprising a 
processor and a memory, the server being operable to: 
receive a request from a user to access the database 
object, wherein the request includes a query to 
retrieve information from the database object; 
determine whether an access restriction is imposed on 
the database object, the access restriction specifying a 
first user group to which the access restriction is appli 
cable, defining a first dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the database 
object, and identifying a first element set in the data 
base object accessible to the first user group when the 
first dynamic condition is satisfied, wherein the first 
element set includes at least one, and less than all, 
table columns of the database object to restrict access 
to one or more table columns, wherein the first 
dynamic condition indicates access information 
including one or more of a session context and session 
purpose for the user to access the database object, and 
wherein two or more of said session contexts and 
purposes for the user to access the database object 
enable access to be restricted to at least one different 
table column of said database object; and 
control access to the elements in the database object by 
the user based on the access restriction, wherein con 
trolling access to the elements in the database object comprises: 
confirming whether the user is in the first user group 
when the access restriction is imposed on the data 
base object; 
verifying whether the user satisfies the first dynamic 
condition when the user is in the first user group by 
ascertaining session information for the user from 
one or more session variables associated with the 
user, wherein the session information includes one 
or more of the session context and session purpose 
for access of the database object, and comparing 
the session information for the user against the 
access information indicated by the first dynamic 
condition to determine satisfaction of that condi 
tion; and 
allowing the user to access the first element set when 
the user satisfies the first dynamic condition, 
wherein allowing the user to access the first ele 
ment set comprises: 
dynamically generating a dynamic pseudo-View of 
the database object comprising only the first ele 
ment set in response to said verification of the 
user satisfying the first dynamic condition; and 
responding to the request from the userby applying 
the received query to the dynamic pseudo-View 
of the database object to retrieve the information. 
12. The system of claim 11, wherein the database object is 
a table or a view. 
13. The system of claim 11, wherein the access restriction 
further defines a second dynamic condition the first user 
group must alternatively satisfy in order to access the data 
base object and further identifies a second element set in the 
database object accessible to the first user group when the 
second dynamic condition is satisfied. 
14. The system of claim 13, wherein at least one element in 
the first element set is also an element in the second element 
Set. 
15. The system of claim 11, wherein the access restriction 
further defines an additional dynamic condition the first user 
group must satisfy in order to access the first element set. 
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16. The system of claim 11, wherein the server is further operable to: 
determine whether another access restriction is imposed on 
the database object, the other access restriction specify 
ing a second user group to which the other access restric tion is applicable. 
17. The system of claim 16, wherein the other access 
restriction further defines another dynamic condition the sec 
ond user group must satisfy in order to access the database 
object and identifies another element set in the database 
object accessible to the second user group when the other 
dynamic condition is satisfied. 
18. The system of claim 17, wherein the other element set 
is a subset of the first element set. 
19. The system of claim 16, wherein at least one user in the 
first user group is also a user in the second user group. 
20. The system of claim 11, wherein the server is further operable to: 
decide whether an exception to the access restriction is 
applicable to the user requesting access to the database 
object; and 
permit the user to access the elements in the database object 
when the exception to the access restriction is applicable 
to the user. 
21. A computer program product comprising a computer 
readable storage medium, the computer-readable storage 
medium including a computer-readable program for control 
ling access to elements in a database object, wherein the computer-readable program when executed on a computer 
causes the computer to: 
receive a request from a user to access the database object, 
wherein the request includes a query to retrieve infor 
mation from the database object; 
determine whether an access restriction is imposed on the 
database object, the access restriction specifying a first 
user group to which the access restriction is applicable, 
defining a first dynamic condition the first user group 
must satisfy in order to access the database object, and 
identifying a first element set in the database object 
accessible to the first user group when the first dynamic 
condition is satisfied, wherein the first element set 
includes at least one, and less than all, table columns of 
the database object to restrict access to one or more table 
columns, wherein the first dynamic condition indicates 
access information including one or more of a session 
context and session purpose for the user to access the 
database object, and whereintwo or more of said session 
contexts and purposes for the user to access the database 
object enable access to be restricted to at least one dif 
ferent table column of said database object; and 
control access to the elements in the database object by the 
user based on the access restriction, wherein controlling 
access to the elements in the database object comprises: 
confirming whether the user is in the first user group 
when the access restriction is imposed on the database object; 
verifying whether the user satisfies the first dynamic 
condition when the user is in the first user group by 
ascertaining session information for the user from one 
or more session variables associated with the user, 
wherein the session information includes one or more 
of the session context and session purpose for access 
of the database object, and comparing the session 
information for the user against the access informa 
tion indicated by the first dynamic condition to deter 
mine satisfaction of that condition; and 
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allowing the user to access the first element set when the 
user satisfies the first dynamic condition, wherein 
allowing the user to access the first element set com prises: 
dynamically generating a dynamic pseudo-View of 5 
the database object comprising only the first ele 
ment set in response to said verification of the user 
satisfying the first dynamic condition; and 
responding to the request from the userby applying 
the received query to the dynamic pseudo-View 
of the database object to retrieve the information. 
22. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the database object is a table or a view. 
23. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the access restriction further defines a second dynamic con 
dition the first user group must alternatively satisfy in order to 
access the database object and further identifies a second 
element set in the database object accessible to the first user 
group when the second dynamic condition is satisfied. 
24. The computer program product of claim 23, wherein at 
least one element in the first element set is also an element in 
the second element set. 
25. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the access restriction further defines an additional dynamic 
condition the first user group must satisfy in order to access 
the first element set. 
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26. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the computer-readable program when executed on the com 
puter further causes the computer to: 
determine whether another access restriction is imposed on 
the database object, the other access restriction specify 
ing a second user group to which the other access restric tion is applicable. 
27. The computer program product of claim 26, wherein 
the other access restriction further defines another dynamic 
condition the second user group must satisfy in order to 
access the database object and identifies another element set 
in the database object accessible to the second user group 
when the other dynamic condition is satisfied. 
28. The computer program product of claim 27, wherein 
the other element set is a subset of the first element set. 
29. The computer program product of claim 26, wherein at 
least one user in the first user group is also a user in the second 
user group. 
30. The computer program product of claim 21, wherein 
the computer-readable program when executed on the com 
puter further causes the computer to: 
decide whether an exception to the access restriction is 
applicable to the user requesting access to the database 
object; and 
permit the user to access the elements in the database object 
when the exception to the access restriction is applicable 
to the user. 
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EXTENDING RELATIONAL DATABASE 
SYSTEMIS TO AUTOMATICALLY ENFORCE 
PRIVACY POLICES 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates generally to the field of 
database systems. More specifically, the present invention is 
related to privacy preserving relational database manage 
ment systems. 
DISCUSSION OF PRIOR ART 
The pervasive use of computing technology and the 
increased reliance on information systems have created a 
heightened awareness and concern about the storage and use 
of private information. This worldwide phenomenon has 
ushered in a plethora of privacy-related guidelines and 
legislations, e.g. the OECD Privacy Guidelines in Europe, 
the Canadian Privacy Act, the Australian Privacy Amend 
ment Act, the Japanese Privacy Code, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and Gramm 
Leach-Bliley Consumer Privacy Rule. Compliance with 
these legislations has become an important corporate con 
cern. The current methods employed to address the disclo 
Sure compliance problem involve training individuals to be 
cognizant of the various regulations and changing organi 
Zational processes and procedures. However, these 
approaches are only a partial Solution and need to be augmented with technological Support. 
The users of relational databases require that a fine 
grained access control (FGAC) implementation meet the 
following desiderata: 
the implementation must solve the problem within the 
database itself without application changes or applica 
tion awareness of the implementation. 
the implementation must ensure that all users of the data 
are covered, regardless of how the data is accessed. the implementation must minimize the complexity and 
maintenance of the FGAC policies. 
the implementation must provide the ability to control 
access to rows, columns, or cells as desired. 
Traditional methods of database access control have 
relied upon the use of statically defined views, which are 
logical constructs defined over database tables that can alter 
or restrict the data seen by a user. Using predefined views as 
the method for FGAC works well only when the number of 
different restrictions is few or the granularity of the restric 
tions is such that it affects large, easily identified groups of 
users. When these conditions are not true, view definitions 
can become complex in an effort to accommodate all the 
restrictions in one view. This complexity can strain system 
limits and can make maintenance of views difficult. 
If a large number of views are used, each one implement 
ing restrictions for a specific set of users, one issue that 
arises is how to correctly route user requests to the view that 
is appropriate to them. Often, the Solution chosen is to 
resolve the request in the application, not in the database. 
Moreover, if a user can bypass the view when accessing 
data, for example by having direct access to the underlying 
tables, then the restrictions are not enforced. 
Given the shortcomings of the traditional methods of 
implementing FGAC, Some database vendors have proposed 
solutions that do not rely on the use of views to control 
access to tabular data. For instance, OracleTM Virtual Private 
Database solution as described in article titled, “Fine 
grained access control’ by Kyte and pages 240–253 of book 
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titled, “Oracle Privacy Security Auditing” by Nanda et al., 
allows users to define a security policy, which is a function 
written in PL/SQL that returns a string representing a 
predicate, and to attach the security policy to a table. When 
that table is accessed, the security policy is automatically 
enforced. In essence, row restrictions traditionally handled 
by views are allowed to be dynamically added to queries as 
described in article entitled, "Access control in a relational 
database management system by query modification', by 
Wong et al. The disadvantages of this approach are that 
OracleTM requires user programming of a strictly defined 
“predicate producing procedure in order to implement a 
security policy and it does not address column or cell 
restrictions. Sybase R. Row Level Access Control as 
described in e-book entitled, “Sybase Sybase Adaptive 
Server Enterprise 12.5, System Administration Guide', 
allows users to define access rules that apply restrictions to 
retrieved data. Sybase R Adaptive Server Enterprise 12.5 
enables the database owner or table owner to restrict access 
to a table's rows by defining access rules and binding those 
rules to the table. Access to data can be further controlled by Setting application contexts and creating login triggers. 
Access rules apply restrictions to retrieved data, enforced on 
select, update and delete operations. Adaptive Server 
enforces the access rules on all columns that are read by a 
query, even if the columns are not included in the select list. 
Using access rules is similar to using views, or using an 
adhoc query with where clauses. The query is compiled and 
optimized after the access rules are attached, so it does not 
cause performance degradation. Access rules provide a 
virtual view of the table data, the view depending on the 
specific access rules bound to the columns. Sybase R needs 
to create a separate access rule for each predicate, anding 
them, and then binding them to the appropriate columns. 
Microsoft(R) SQL Server primarily supports traditional view 
based access control, though it has a feature called row level 
permissions, but it seems to be usable only with table 
hierarchies. In IBMR, DB2, the only support for FGAC is 
currently provided through the view mechanism. 
The following references provide for creating views of 
datasets in database systems. 
U.S. patent assigned to Microsoft Corporation, (U.S. Pat. 
No. 6,065,012), discloses rows and columns with data 
source control which will be asked for data in a particular 
cell. A dynamic Summary view is generated by defined 
HTML page that links data binding HTML tables and other 
HTML controls to predetermined data within a storage of 
data. Accessing the Subset of the program module is done at 
the cell level and may be done by executing a script to call 
defined methods of the objects within the program module 
or accessing a control module defined within the program 
module. 
U.S. patent assigned to NCR Corporation, (U.S. Pat. No. 
6.253.203), uses a large number of statically defined views 
to handle restrictions. 
U.S. patent assigned to University of Minnesota, (U.S. 
Pat. No. 6,496,832), discloses a system for analyzing data 
organized into data sets and for transforming datasets into a 
visual representation. The visual representation appears to 
provide a dynamic view of cell structure and transformed 
data sets with the value of cells linked. 
U.S. patent application publication assigned to Interna 
tional Business Machines Corporation, (2004/0215626 A1), 
discloses a method and system for improving performance 
US 7,243,097 B1 
3 
of database queries within an RDBMS system with metadata 
objects. The view of the data in support of one or more 
Summary tables is automatically identified and adjusted. 
Article entitled, “Query Evaluation Techniques for Large 
Databases, by Graefe, discloses enforcement of access 
control within a relational database environment. 
Article entitled, “Hippocratic Databases” by Agrawal et 
al., discusses a vision of database systems that take respon 
sibility for the privacy of data they manage, inspired by the 
Hippocratic Oath. The article also enunciates the key pri 
vacy principles that Hippocratic Databases should support. 
Article entitled, “Limiting Disclosure in Hippocratic 
Databases” by LeFevre et al., discusses the incorporation of 
privacy policy enforcement into an existing application and 
database environment. Privacy policies (prescribed rule and 
conditions) are stored in the database where they can be used 
to enforce limited disclosure. Every query is associated with 
purpose and recipient pairs. SQL queries issued to the 
database are intercepted and augmented to reflect the pri 
vacy policy rules regarding the purpose and recipient issuing 
the query. 
Whatever the precise merits, features, and advantages of 
the above cited references, none of them achieves or fulfills 
the purposes of the present invention. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention provides for a method of providing 
fine grained access control within a database, the method comprising the steps of receiving a user query; identifying 
and combining restrictions relevant to the user query, the 
restrictions specifying access to data in a table in the 
database at the level of at least one of or a combination of: 
individual rows, individual columns or individual cells, and 
the restrictions comprising a combination of access control 
and privacy policy restrictions; transforming the user query 
into an equivalent query which implements the restrictions; 
and accessing the data based on the equivalent query. 
The present invention provides for a system providing 
fine grained access control (FGAC) within a database, 
wherein the system comprises a policy translator which 
accepts as input a least a privacy policy and privacy meta 
data catalogs; and a relational database which stores the 
privacy metadata catalogs and FGAC restrictions. The 
FGAC restrictions specify access to data in a table in the 
relational database at the level of at least one of or a 
combination of individual rows, individual columns or 
individual cells, these restrictions comprising a combination 
of access control and privacy policy restrictions. 
The present invention provides for an article of manufac ture comprising a computerusable medium having computer 
readable program code embodied therein which provides 
fine grained access control within a database, the medium comprising: computer readable program code aiding in 
receiving a user query; computer readable program code 
identifying restrictions on access to data in a table in the 
database at the level of at least one or a combination of: 
individual rows, individual columns or individual cells, the 
restrictions comprising a combination of access control and privacy policy restrictions; computer readable program code 
transforming the user query into an equivalent query which 
implements the restrictions; and computer readable program 
code aiding in accessing the data based on the equivalent 
query. 
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 illustrates fine grained restriction syntax, as per the 
present invention. 
FIG. 2 illustrates implementation architecture for con 
structs, as per the present invention. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a method of providing fine grained 
access control within a database, as per the present inven 
tion. 
FIG. 4 illustrates an algorithm for enforcing fine grained 
restrictions, as per the present invention. 
FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a privacy policy for a 
healthcare provider, as per the present invention. 
FIG. 6 illustrates the translation of a privacy policy into 
fine grained cell level restrictions, as per the present inven 
tion. 
FIG. 7 illustrates an algorithm for translating a P3P 
privacy policy into fine grained cell level restrictions, as per 
the present invention. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED 
EMBODIMENTS 
While this invention is illustrated and described in a 
preferred embodiment, the invention may be produced in 
many different configurations. There is depicted in the 
drawings, and will herein be described in detail, a preferred 
embodiment of the invention, with the understanding that 
the present disclosure is to be considered as an exemplifi 
cation of the principles of the invention and the associated 
functional specifications for its construction and is not 
intended to limit the invention to the embodiment illustrated. 
Those skilled in the art will envision many other possible 
variations within the scope of the present invention. 
Databases of the future must ensure the privacy of the data 
subjects whom they store information on. The security 
functionality offered by current commercial database prod 
ucts does not adequately address the key issues necessary to 
enforce privacy compliance: cell level policy enforcement. 
Compliance with current privacy legislation mandates that 
the user's consent be obtained for the usef disclosure of their 
personal information. Row or column level restrictions are 
not adequate for modeling scenarios where individuals may 
have opt-in/out choices with different aspects of their infor 
mation. To achieve this goal of minimal disclosure while 
allowing useful tasks to be performed on relevant informa 
tion, cell level enforcement is key. A similar case for cell 
level enforcement is made in article titled, “Limiting dis 
closure in Hippocratic Databases” by LeFevre et al. 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
website provides a scenario requiring adherence to the 
HIPAA regulation. BlueCo is a healthcare provider that 
stores personal data on individuals who enroll in its plans. 
BlueCo has affiliations with a number of hospitals, research 
institutions, and marketing companies. Under HIPAA, any 
individually identifiable healthcare information held or 
transmitted by BlueCo is considered protected private infor 
mation. For any use or disclosure of protected health infor 
mation that is not for treatment, payment, or health care 
operation and that is not otherwise permitted (e.g. law 
enforcement), Blue Co must get the data subjects consent. 
A simplified version of BlueCo’s database is given in 
Table 1. ReasearchCo is an epidemiological research insti 
tute that periodically harvests BlueCo’s data. Under HIPAA, 
all clients must give their consent for release of their home 
and office numbers. 
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TABLE 1. 
Table of BlueCo's clients 
ID Name Home Phone Work Phone Salary 
1 Alicia Campbell 408-418-51.98 408-419-9111 10,000 
2 Bob Bobbett 408-418-5198 408-419-9112 20,000 
3 Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113 30,000 
4 Dan Charmer 408-432-8644 408-419-9114 40,000 
5 Ellen Generous 408-555-1235 408-419-9115 50,000 
Alicia Campbell opts out of having her home phone 
number, but does not mind if BlueCo discloses her office 
number. A researcher at Research Co issues the following 
query: 
Select name, homephone, officephone 
from clients where salary.<=30000 
Given the choices that Alicia made, only her name and 
office phone number should be displayed as shown in Table 
2. 
TABLE 2 
Cell Level Enforcement 
Name Home Phone Office Phone 
Alicia Campbell 408-419-9111 
Bob Bobbett 408-418-51.98 
Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113 
Database systems employing row level controls restrict 
disclosure of all information in a particular row, when a 
restriction is only on particular columns in that row. 
Thus, using conventional row level controls, the results 
for the query are those shown in Table 3. Both Alicia and 
Bob are no longer present in the result, even though they 
have agreed that one of their two phone numbers can be 
disclosed. This simple example illustrates the inadequacy of 
row level restrictions. Similar arguments can be made for 
column level restrictions. They are not flexible enough to 
allow disclosure of non-sensitive data and Suppression of 
sensitive data on a subject by Subject basis. 
TABLE 3 
Row Level Enforcement 
Name Home Phone Office Phone 
Carl Abrahams 408-333-6633 408-419-9113 
The present invention presents constructs for imbuing 
relational database systems with fine grained access control 
and show how they can be used to enforce disclosure control 
enunciated in the vision for Hippocratic databases as 
described in article entitled, “Hippocratic Databases” by 
Agrawal et al. These constructs have been designed to fit 
well with the rest of the infrastructure of a relational 
database system. The present invention also provides for the 
implementation of proposed FGAC constructs. The present 
invention further describes how privacy policies written in a 
higher-level specification language Such as P3P can be 
algorithmically translated into the proposed constructs. 
Constructs defined according to the present invention, 
allow restrictions to be specified on the access to data in a 
table at the level of a row, a column, or a cell (i.e. individual column-row intersections). Privacy policies specified in 
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high-level languages Such as P3P can be translated into these 
constructs, or the policy could be specified directly using 
these constructs. 
The proposed construct is complimentary to the current 
table level authorization mechanisms provided by commer 
cial database systems using the grant command as 
described in pages 122–128 of book entitled, “A complete 
Guide to DB2 Universal Database' by Don Chamberlin. 
While the grant command controls whether a user can 
access a table at all, the constructs of the present invention 
define the subset of the data within a table that the user is 
allowed to access. Conceptually, a restriction defines a view 
of the table in which inaccessible data has been replaced by 
null values. As discussed in article entitled, “Limiting dis 
closure in Hippocratic Databases” by LeFevre et al., it is 
possible to use either “table semantics” or "query seman 
tics’. With query semantics, if all the values in a row are 
hidden by a restriction, then the row is omitted altogether 
from the view. With table semantics, the row would instead 
be retained unless a primary key column is restricted. 
FIG. 1 gives the syntax of a fine grained restriction 
command, as per the present invention. It states that those in 
auth-name-1 except those in auth-name-2 are allowed only 
restricted access to table-X. As a short hand, the restriction 
can be defined for public (i.e., all users), and in that case the 
exception to all users can be provided in auth-name-2. The 
keywords group and user can be used to qualify the autho 
rized names. FIG. 1's table-X can be any table expression. 
A restriction, as per the present invention, presents a 
single command that comprises a combination of access 
control and privacy policy restrictions. A restriction can be 
specified at the level of a column, a row, or a cell. More than 
one restriction can be specified on a table for the same user. 
A restriction may also specify purposes and/or recipients for 
which the access is allowed. If no purpose or recipient is 
specified, then the restriction applies to all purposes and 
recipients respectively. If a purpose or recipient is specified, 
the user's access is limited to only the specified purpose 
recipient combinations. 
Akin to the database system variable user that can be 
referenced in queries and returns the id of the user issuing 
the query, the new system variables purpose and recipient 
return the list of purposes and recipients from the current 
query context. These values in turn determine the restric 
tions for the current query. 
The command-restriction that appears as the last element 
of the syntax has the following form and states that access 
can be restricted to any combination of select, delete, insert, 
or update commands: 
restricting access to (all(select/delete/insertilupdate)+) 
The Customer table with the following schema: Customer 
(id integer, name char(32), phone char(32)) is used below for 
illustration purposes. 
Column Restriction: 
A column restriction specifies a Subset of the columns in 
table-X that auth-name-1 is allowed to access. The following 
restriction, named r1, ensures that only the id column of 
Customer is accessed by any database user: 
create restriction r1 
on Customer 
for public 
to columns id 
restricting access to all 
The restriction r2 below ensures that members of the 
account group and user Bob have only select access to 
columns name and phone. 
US 7,243,097 B1 
create restriction r2 
on Customer 
for group acct, user Bob 
to columns name, phone 
restricting access to select 
Row Restriction: 
A row restriction gives the subset of rows in table-X that 
auth-name-1 is allowed to access. This Subset is specified 
using a search-condition over table-X. The restriction r3 
below ensures that every access to Customer is qualified by 
the predicate, name user. 
create restriction r3 
on Customer 
for public 
to rows where name=user 
restricting access to all 
If user Bob issues select from Customer, he would see 
id, name and phone for those rows where name equaled Bob. 
Cell Restriction: 
A cell restriction defines the row-column intersections 
that auth-name-1 is allowed to access. It is possible to 
specify multiple column-name lists, each possibly annotated 
with a search-condition. A search-condition is a correlated 
subquery with an implicit correlation variable t defined over 
the tuples of table-X. Access to the columns in column 
name-list for each individual row identified by t is condi tionally granted depending upon the result of the search 
condition. If no search-condition is given, then access is 
granted to all column values in column-name-list in table-X. 
If the search condition ignores the implicit correlation 
variable, then access is granted or denied to all columns 
values in column-name-list in table-X, depending upon the 
result of the search-condition. 
The following is an example of a cell restriction used to 
enforce individual user's privacy preferences expressed as 
opt-in/out choices. Assume that for the purpose of market 
ing, Bob is allowed to see name, but his access to phone is allowed only if the user has opted-in to revealing her phone 
number. 
restrictions are anded 
together to define the 
OW 
OW 
of individual 
intersection of rows 
accessible to a user. 
column 
cell 
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The search conditions 
create restriction ra. 
on Customer for user Bob, 
to cells name, 
(phone where exists ( 
select 1 
from SysCat.Choices Customer c 
where c.ID = Customer.ID and c.CI = 1)) for purpose marketing 
for recipient others 
restricting access to select 
The above restriction specifies cell restrictions for two 
column-name-lists: The first list contains the name column, 
and the second contains the phone column. The restriction 
allows Bob access to name, only if the variable purpose 
includes marketing, and recipient includes others. Other 
wise, all values of the name column will be null for Bob. 
The second list of columns has a search-condition asso 
ciated with it since access to phone is dependent upon 
individual user choices. The search-condition comprises an 
existential Subquery that uses the implicit correlation vari 
able Customer. For each row in Customer, the subquery 
verifies, using the SysCat.Choices Customer table that stores 
individual opt-in/out choices, whether the user has opted-in 
for the disclosure of her phone number (represented by a 
column value of 1). 
Combining Multiple Restrictions: 
If multiple restrictions have been defined for a user u and 
a table T, then us access to T is governed by the combina 
tion of these restrictions. 
Assume initially that a user associates with a query a 
single purpose and a single recipient. Two design choices for 
combining multiple restrictions have been considered 
Intersection User u is allowed access to data defined by 
the intersection of all applicable restrictions. The 
details are shown in Table 4. 
Union User u is allowed access to data defined by the 
union of all applicable restrictions. The details are 
shown in Table 5. 
TABLE 4 
Combining Restrictions with Intersection 
column cell 
The row restriction limits the rows 
accessible to the user. Within each 
row, the cell restriction further limits 
the access to the cells that qualify the 
cells search condition. 
The row restriction 
limits the rows 
accessible to the user. 
The column restriction 
further limits the 
columns within the 
rows accessible to the 
St. 
Column and cell restrictions intersect 
to limit access to only those columns 
that appear in both the restrictions. In 
addition, the cells restriction's search 
condition further limits accessible cells 
within a column. 
The user's access is 
limited to those 
columns that appear in 
both of the column 
restrictions. 
The search-conditions are and ed 
together and the user is allowed access 
to a cell if the composite condition is 
satisfied for the cell. The value of the 
composite condition for a cell that does 
not appear in both the restrictions is 
false. 
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TABLE 5 
Combining Restrictions with Union 
10 
OW column cell 
OW The search The user is given The user is given access to all the 
conditions of access to all the cells cells in any of the rows that satisfy 
individual for any row that the row restriction. Additionally, 
restrictions are 
ored together to 
define the union of 
rows accessible to a 
St. 
satisfies the row 
restriction. 
Additionally, the 
user is allowed 
access to all the cells 
in any of the 
the user is allowed access to all 
other cells that satisfy the cell 
restrictions search-condition, 
irrespective of whether the 
corresponding rows satisfy the row 
restriction. 
columns that 
satisfies the column 
restriction, irrespective of 
whether the 
corresponding rows 
satisfy the row 
restriction. 
The user is allowed 
access to a column if 
it appears in either 
of the two column 
restrictions. 
column The user is given access to all the 
cells in any column appearing in the 
column restriction, regardless of 
whether the cell restriction is 
satisfied for these cells. For cells in 
a column for which the column 
restriction does not apply, access is 
given if the cell restriction is 
satisfied. 
cell The search conditions are ored 
together and the user is allowed 
access to a cell if the composite 
condition is satisfied for the cell. 
If the commands specified in the command-restriction 
clauses of the restrictions being combined are different, they 
are respectively anded or ored depending upon the choice 
of intersection or union semantics. 
Multiple restrictions can be combined in any order, both 
with intersection and union semantics. With the intersection 
semantics, the user's access to data decreases as additional 
restrictions are applied. Conversely, with union semantics, 
access to data increases as additional restrictions are applied. 
Finally, if a query is annotated with multiple purpose 
recipient pairs, instead of a single pair, then restrictions 
governing access to any of the pairs become relevant for the 
query. These restrictions are then combined as above. Note 
that once a user's access to a table has been restricted, the 
user can only access the data allowed for the purposes and 
recipients specified in the restrictions. 
A system for implementing the constructs of the present 
invention is shown in FIG. 2. Cell level restrictions limited 
to select statement access are discussed in the remainder of 
the application; however, FGAC restrictions also apply to 
row and column level restrictions. 
A policy translator 202 accepts a privacy policy 201 
(written in, for example P3P) and metadata stored in privacy 
catalogs 206 in database 208 and generates restrictions that 
implement the policy. FGAC restrictions 204 are a combi 
nation of the privacy policy restrictions generated by policy 
translator 202 and access control restrictions that may be 
defined in the database. The FGAC restrictions relevant to 
individual queries annotated with purpose and recipient 
information 210 are identified and combined, and the user's 
query is transformed into an equivalent query over a 
dynamic view that implements the restriction. The schema 
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of the privacy metadata catalogs shown in FIG. 2 used to 
drive the translation of P3P privacy policies into cell level 
restrictions are given below: 
PR (purp-recip char(18), 
p3ptype char(32), 
choice tabname char(32), 
choice colname char(32)) 
PT (p3ptype char (32), tabname char(32), colname char 
(32)) 
Table PR stores, for each purpose, recipient and p3p data 
type pair, the (table name-column name) pair that records 
individual user opt-in/out choice, should any choice be 
available for that combination. Table PT stores, for each P3P 
data type, the table names and column names which store 
values of these P3P types. 
FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary method as 
per the teaching of the present invention to provide fine 
grained access control within a relational database. A user 
query is received at step 300. The user query is annotated 
with purpose and recipient information. FGAC restrictions 
which are a combination of privacy policy and access 
control restrictions are stored in the database. These FGAC 
restrictions may be specified at the level of individual rows, 
columns, cells, or a combination of these. In step 302, the 
FGAC restrictions relevant to the user query are identified 
and combined. The user query is then transformed into an equivalent query over a dynamic view that implements the 
restriction, in step 304. The data from the database is 
accessed based on the equivalent query, in step 306. 
FIG. 4 illustrates an exemplary algorithm, as per the 
teaching of the present invention, which enforces the fine 
grain restrictions. For ease of exposition, it is assumed that 
there is a single purpose-recipient pair associated with a 
query and there is at most a single restriction which is 
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relevant for the query. The enforcement algorithm combines 
the restrictions relevant to individual queries annotated with 
purpose and recipient information and transforms the user's 
query into an equivalent query over a dynamic view that 
implements the restriction. 
In detail, Line 1 iterates over each table reference tin a 
query Q. Line 2 accesses metadata to determine if there is a 
restriction r governing the usage of t by user u who is 
Submitting the query Q. If no such restriction exists, then t 
remains unmodified in Q. Otherwise, Lines 3 and 4 replace 
each reference to table tin query Q with a reference to a dynamic view V. 
The generation of the dynamic view V is implemented in 
Lines 5 through 25. The view V is a select statement which 
conditionally projects each column cet. Line 7 searches for 
a column reference to cer. If no such reference exists with 
the purpose/recipient of query Q, then the user u is not 
allowed access to c and Line 8 thus projects a null value for 
all values of c. Otherwise, Line 10 searches for a where 
clause associated with cer. If no such clause exists, then u is 
granted unconditional access to c. Otherwise, Line 15 out 
puts the condition of the where clause into a SQL case 
statement which verifies the condition before outputting the 
value of c (on Line 18). If the condition is false, access to the 
column value is denied and Line 19 outputs a null value for 
C 
The following illustrates the basic syntax of the P3P policy specification language: 
&POLICIESs . . . 
<POLICY name = “Policy Name1"> . . . 
STATEMENT 
PURPOSEs 
stated-purpose 
required = (always 
PURPOSEs 
RECIPIENT 
stated-recip 
required = (always 
RECIPIENT 
<RETENTIONs retention wall &RETENTION 
&DATA GROUPs 
<DATA ref= data-refvals 
“opt-in"opt-out) 
“opt-in"opt-out) 
&DATA GROUP 
&STATEMENT 
&POLICY 
POLICY 
&POLICY 
&POLICIES 
The process of transforming a policy like the one above 
into fine grained restrictions involves: (1) parsing the policy 
to extract the list of statements, (2) mapping data abstrac tions into their implementation specific equivalents, e.g. in 
the above specification this would mean mapping data-ref 
Val to its corresponding table name(s) and column name(s), 
(3) structuring the choice tables which record individual user 
opt-in/out choices (in some cases, this may not be necessary 
since there may be no Such choices), and (4) generating the 
restriction statements. Assuming that data-ref-val maps to 
columns A and B of table T, the above abstract specification 
would lead to the following restriction being constructed: 
create restriction Policy Name 1 
on T 
for public 
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to cells AB 
where opt-in-out-conditions 
for purpose stated-purpose 
for recipient stated-recip 
restricting access to select 
FIG. 5 is a detailed example of a privacy policy, for a 
fictional Healthcare provider. The metadata contains the 
information needed to associate “ipersonal' (personal infor 
mation) and “imedical' (medical information) with data 
base tables which store this information. Personal informa 
tion maps to the name, SSN, address, email and DOB fields 
of the Patients table, while medical information maps to the Xray, pharmacy, family, appointment and lifestyle fields of 
the Patients table. Physician, Healthcare and Drug Research 
are assumed to be user roles and thus do not require refining. 
Thus, the P3P healthcare policy given in FIG. 5 is translated 
into the restrictions given in FIG. 6. For simplicity, the 
restrictions in FIG. 6 assume that all columns in a P3P policy 
are contained in a single table. 
The creation and population of the Choices Patients table 
should be coordinated to synchronize with the creation and 
update of the patients table. The policy translator modifies 
the structure of the choices patients table to ensure that the 
correct number of choice fields are present for recording 
opt-in/opt-out decisions for a particular table. In the above 
example, C1 represents the choice to allow Drug Research 
to see personal data if the drug research is being conducted 
by the healthcare company itself. Choice C2 is the option to 
allow usage of personal data for drug research by other 
healthcare companies having the same privacy policy as this 
company. The example illustrates the basic steps involved in 
the translation process. FIG. 7 gives the pseudo-code show 
ing the steps involved in transforming P3 policy into the 
present invention’s language constructs. 
A unique restriction name, needed for the command is generated on Line 2. Line 3 uses the mapP3PPolicyToTable 
function to uncover the table name which stores the infor 
mation described by the data types in the P3P statement. 
This metadata is populated by the database administrator. 
On Line 4, the set of users who are authorized to access data 
specified by the policy are obtained using the 
mapp3PPolicyTo Authorized Users command which uses 
database metadata to derive the set of authorized users. The 
database administrator is responsible for populating this 
information in the database metadata tables. Line 10 uses the 
mapp3PDataTypeToGolumns function to retrieve the col 
umn names that store information described by the P3P data 
types in the statement. Again, this information has been 
prepared and Supplied by the database administrator and 
stored in metadata tables. 
The function mapP3PPurposeToChoiceTable accepts a 
statement id and returns the table storing individual user 
choices for this Statement. The function 
mapp3PPurposeToChoiceColumn accepts a statement-pur 
pose pair and returns the column in the choice table which 
records the corresponding users' choices. Both these func 
tions are driven from metadata. 
Although the present invention, as described, provides 
restrictions specified for tables and at least one or a combi 
nation of rows, columns or cells in a relational database; it 
should be noted that restrictions can also be specified for 
collection of objects and attributes of these objects in an 
object database, or collection of documents and attributes of 
elements in these documents in an XML database. Hence, 
how such restrictions are specified should not be used to 
limit the scope of this invention. 
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Additionally, the present invention provides for an article 
of manufacture comprising computer readable program code 
contained within implementing one or more modules to 
provide fine grained access control in a relational database. 
Furthermore, the present invention includes a computer 
program code-based product, which is a storage medium 
having program code stored therein which can be used to 
instruct a computer to perform any of the methods associ 
ated with the present invention. The computer storage 
medium includes any of, but is not limited to, the following: 
CD-ROM, DVD, magnetic tape, optical disc, hard drive, 
floppy disk, ferroelectric memory, flash memory, ferromag 
netic memory, optical storage, charge coupled devices, mag 
netic or optical cards, smart cards, EEPROM, EPROM, 
RAM, ROM, DRAM, SRAM, SDRAM, or any other appro priate static or dynamic memory or data storage devices. 
Implemented in computer program code based products 
are software modules for: 
(a) aiding in receiving a user query: 
(b) identifying and combining restrictions relevant to the 
user query, the restrictions specifying access to data in a 
table in the database at the level of at least one or a 
combination of individual rows, individual columns or 
individual cells, and the restrictions comprising a combina 
tion of access control and privacy policy restrictions; 
(c) transforming the user query into an equivalent query 
which implements the restrictions; and 
(d) aiding in accessing the data based on the equivalent 
query. 
CONCLUSION 
A system and method has been shown in the above 
embodiments for the effective implementation of extending 
relational database systems to automatically enforce privacy 
policies. While various preferred embodiments have been 
shown and described, it will be understood that there is no 
intent to limit the invention by such disclosure, but rather, it 
is intended to cover all modifications falling within the spirit 
and scope of the invention, as defined in the appended 
claims. For example, the present invention should not be 
limited by Software/program, computing environment, or 
specific computing hardware. Moreover, the present inven 
tion should not be limited to how the restrictions are 
specified. All programming and data related thereto are 
stored in computer memory, static or dynamic, and may be 
retrieved by the user in any of conventional computer 
storage, display (i.e., CRT) and/or hardcopy (i.e., printed) 
formats. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method of providing fine grained access control 
within a database, said method comprising: 
receiving a user query; 
identifying and combining restrictions relevant to said 
user query, said restrictions specifying access to data in 
a table in said database at the level of at least one of or 
a combination of individual rows, individual columns 
or individual cells, and said restrictions comprising a 
combination of access control and privacy policy 
restrictions, said privacy policy restrictions being gen 
erated by transforming a privacy policy by the follow ing steps: 
parsing said privacy policy to extract a list of state 
ments, 
mapping data abstractions in said privacy policy into 
their implementation specific equivalents, 
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structuring choice tables which record individual user 
opt-in/out choices, and 
generating restriction statements; 
transforming said user query into an equivalent query 
which implements said restrictions; and 
accessing said data based on said equivalent query. 
2. A method of providing fine grained access control 
within a database, according to claim 1, wherein said restrictions are generated by transforming said privacy 
policy and using privacy metadata catalogs. 
3. A method of providing fine grained access control in a 
database, according to claim 1, wherein said restrictions are 
combined by union or intersection. 
4. A method of providing fine grained access control in a 
database, according to claim 2, wherein said privacy policy 
is written in high-level policy language. 
5. A method of providing fine grained access control in a 
database, according to claim 4, wherein said high-level 
policy language is P3P. 
6. A method of providing fine grained access control in a 
database, according to claim 2, wherein said privacy meta 
data catalogs store individual opt-in/opt-out choices. 
7. A method of providing fine grained access control in a 
database, according to claim 1, wherein said restrictions specify purposes and/or recipients for which access is 
allowed. 
8. A system providing fine grained access control (FGAC) 
within a database, said system comprising: 
a database to store privacy metadata catalogs and FGAC 
restrictions, said FGAC restrictions specifying access 
to data in a table in said database at the level of at least 
one of or a combination of individual rows, individual 
columns or individual cells and said FGAC restrictions 
comprising a combination of access control and privacy 
policy restrictions, said data of said database being 
accessed based on a transformed equivalent query 
which implements said FGAC restrictions; and 
a policy translator to accept as input a least a privacy 
policy and said privacy metadata catalogs, said policy 
translator transforming said privacy policy into said 
privacy policy restrictions by: parsing said privacy 
policy to extract a list of Statements, mapping data 
abstractions in said privacy policy into their implemen 
tation specific equivalents, structuring choice tables 
which record individual user opt-in/out choices, and 
generating restriction statements. 
9. A system providing fine grained access control (FGAC) 
within a database, according to claim 8, wherein said privacy policy is written in high-level policy language. 
10. A system providing fine grained access control 
(FGAC) within a database, according to claim 9, wherein said high-level policy language is P3P. 
11. A system providing fine grained access control 
(FGAC) within a database, according to claim 8, wherein 
said privacy metadata catalogs store individual opt-in/opt 
out choices. 
12. A system providing fine grained access control 
(FGAC) within a database, according to claim 8, wherein 
said FGAC restrictions specify purposes and/or recipients 
for which access is allowed. 
13. An article of manufacture comprising a computer 
usable medium having computer readable program code 
embodied therein which provides fine grained access control 
within a database, said medium comprising: 
computer readable program code aiding in receiving a 
user query: 
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computer readable program code identifying restrictions 
on access to data in a table in said database at the level 
of at least one or a combination of individual rows, 
individual columns or individual cells, said restrictions 
comprising a combination of access control and privacy 
policy restrictions; computer readable program code transforming a privacy 
policy into said privacy policy restrictions by: parsing 
said privacy policy to extract a list of Statements, 
mapping data abstractions in said privacy policy into 
16 
their implementation specific equivalents, structuring 
choice tables which record individual user opt-in/out 
choices, and generating restriction statements; 
computer readable program code transforming said user 
query into an equivalent query which implements said 
restrictions; and computer readable program code aiding in accessing said 
databased on said equivalent query. 
k k k k k 
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Appendix B: Data Encryption Portfolio 
 
Table B.1 – Research Papers 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 Holistic Database Encryption 
International Conference on Security 
and Cryptography (SECRYPT) 
- Design of a holistic database encryption solution which 
allows organizations to meet their security and 
compliance requirements without having to make 
compromises either on the security side or on the 
database side. 
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, 
Unix and Windows. 
2 Towards Zero-Trust Database 
Security – Part 1 
 
IEEE Future Directions Newsletter: 
Technology Policy & Ethics 
- Introduces a database threat model and raises 
awareness of the direct and indirect means through which 
the same data in a database can be accessed. 
3 Towards Zero-Trust Database 
Security – Part 2 
 
IEEE Future Directions Newsletter: 
Technology Policy & Ethics 
- Outlines solutions (including encryption) to address the 
direct and indirect access challenges and to enable zero-
trust database security.   
 
 
 
 
Holistic Database Encryption 
Walid Rjaibi 
IBM Canada Lab, 8200 Warden Avenue, Markham, Ontario, Canada 
wrjaibi@ca.ibm.com 
Keywords: Databases, Encryption, Key Management, Security, Compliance. 
Abstract: Encryption is a key technical control for safeguarding sensitive data against internal and external threats. It 
is also a requirement for complying with several industry standards and government regulations. While 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is widely accepted as the standard solution for encrypting data in transit, no 
single solution has achieved similar status for encrypting data at rest. This is particularly true for database 
encryption where current approaches are forcing organizations to compromise either on the security side or 
on the database side. In this paper, we discuss the design and implementation of a holistic database 
encryption approach which allows organizations to meet their security and compliance requirements without 
having to sacrifice any critical database or security properties.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Internal threats, external threats, government 
regulations, and industry standards require 
organizations to implement security controls to 
ensure information is adequately protected. Failure 
to do so can have a negative impact on an 
organization such as loss of customer data, damage 
to brand reputation, and even financial penalties. 
Encryption is a key technical control for protecting 
information. It is also an explicitly stated 
requirement for compliance with many regulations 
and standards such as the General Data Protection 
Regulation (Voigt, 2017) and the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (Chuvakin, 2009). 
 
While TLS is widely accepted as the standard 
solution for encrypting data in transit, no single 
solution has achieved similar status for encrypting 
data at rest. This is particularly true for database 
encryption where current approaches are forcing 
organizations to compromise either on the security 
side or on the database side. Indeed, database 
encryption poses some very unique challenges as not 
only the solution needs to be sound from a security 
perspective, but it also needs to coexist in harmony 
with critical database properties such as 
performance, integrity, availability, and 
compression. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the related work around database 
encryption. In section 3, we state our contributions. 
Section 4 defines the threats our database encryption 
solution defends against. In section 5, we describe 
our solution design in full details. Lastly, section 6 
summarizes our approach and outlines our future 
work. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Current database encryption solutions can be divided 
into four main categories: Column encryption 
(Benfield, 2001), tablespace encryption (Freeman, 
2008), file system encryption (Anto, 2018), and self-
encrypting disks (Dufrasne, 2016). Unfortunately, 
each of these solutions forces the organization to 
make a compromise either on the database side or on 
the security side.  
 
Column encryption negatively affects database 
performance as queries with range predicates cannot 
benefit from index-based access plans to limit the 
data to read from the table. Instead, the database 
system is forced to read the entire table to evaluate 
the query. Tablespace encryption may leave certain 
data vulnerable to attacks when, for example, an 
administrator inadvertently takes an action that 
moves data from an encrypted tablespace to an 
unencrypted one. An example of such action would 
 be the creation of a materialized query table (MQT) 
to speed up the execution of data warehousing 
queries. File system encryption and self-encrypted 
disks provide no protection against privileged users 
on the operating system. As long as the file 
permissions allow access, such users can easily view 
the content of the database by browsing the 
underlying files on the operating system. 
3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The crux of our contribution is the design of a 
holistic database encryption approach which allows 
organizations to meet their security and compliance 
requirements without having to make compromises 
either on the security side or on the database side. 
Our solution improves over the state of the art 
discussed above as follows:  
 
• Pervasiveness: All data is encrypted 
whether it is user tablespace data, system 
tablespace data, temporary tablespace data, 
transaction logs data, or database backups 
data. 
• Security: The database content is not 
vulnerable to attacks by malicious 
administrators who may choose to bypass 
the database and access the database 
indirectly through the file system 
interfaces. 
• Performance: The database system is not 
forced to dismiss index-based access plans 
to answer queries with range predicates.  
• Breadth: The solution is built into the 
database engine itself which means that it is 
available on all platforms where the 
database system itself runs. Also, it does 
not force the database system to dismiss the 
opportunity to bypass the file system and 
write data directly to raw devices in order 
to boost performance. 
• Quantum-safety: The implementation does 
not make use of asymmetric encryption to 
wrap data encryption keys. Data encryption 
keys are wrapped with symmetric 
encryption (Chandra, 2014). Therefore, the 
implementation is safe against future 
attacks by quantum computers 
implementing Shor’s algorithm which is 
known to break asymmetric encryption that 
is based on integer factorization such as 
RSA or on discrete logarithms such as 
Diffie-Hellman (Shor, 1997). Additionally, 
the default encryption key size is 256 bits. 
This also makes the implementation safe 
against future attacks by quantum 
computers implementing Grover’s 
algorithm which is known to offer a 
quadratic improvement in brute-force 
attacks on symmetric encryption schemes 
like AES (Grover, 1996). 
We have also implemented the solution in a 
commercial database system (IBM DB2 for Linux, 
Unix, and Windows). 
4 THREAT MODEL 
We focus on protecting data at rest. For protecting 
data in transit between a database server and a client 
application against eavesdroppers, we assume TLS 
has been configured to provide this protection. TLS 
is the standard for protecting data in transit and is 
implemented by all major database systems. 
 
The content of a database deployed on a given 
database server can be accessed in two different 
ways: Directly and indirectly. Direct access is when 
users interact with the database using the usual 
database interfaces such as querying the database 
tables using SQL. In this context, we assume that the 
database authentication and authorization 
mechanisms have been configured to ensure that 
data is accessible only to the appropriate users. 
Authentication ensures that users are who they claim 
they are while authorization ensures that 
authenticated users have access only to those objects 
or elements within objects for which they have been 
granted permissions (Rjaibi, 2004). 
 
Indirect access is when a user chooses to bypass 
the database system altogether and uses operating 
system commands to browse the content of the 
database. For example, on Linux, the following 
command would display the content of the physical 
file associated with a given tablespace: 
 
strings 
‘/u01/database/payroll_tbspace’ 
 
This command will be executed by the operating 
system bypassing all the database authentication and 
authorization controls.  
 Our solution addresses this threat by encrypting 
the database and ensuring that such encryption is 
under the control of the database system itself. This 
means that if a user chooses to bypass the database 
system as shown above, the operating system 
command will return cipher text which will be of no 
value to the attacker.  
 
An attacker may also choose to access the 
database content from decommissioned hard drives 
or by physically stealing such hard drives. Our 
solution addresses this concern as well because the 
attacker will only find cipher text on those drives. 
Figure 1 gives a high level overview of our database 
threat model. 
 
 
Figure 1: Database threat model. 
5 DATABASE ENCRYPTION 
DESIGN 
5.1 Encryption Key Management 
Encryption key management is a critical aspect of an 
encryption solution. Our solution uses two types of 
encryption keys: A Data Encryption Key (DEK) and 
a Master Key (MK). 
 
The DEK is the encryption key used to encrypt 
the actual data in the database. It is automatically 
generated by the database system at database 
creation time. The DEK is encrypted with the MK 
and stored within the database configuration 
structures together with the following attributes: 
 
• The encryption key size: This is the length 
of the encryption key in bits (e.g., 256 bits).  
• The encryption algorithm: This is the 
symmetric encryption algorithm used to 
encrypt the data with the DEK (e.g., AES). 
• The master key label: This is the unique 
identifier of the master key within the 
external management system. For example, 
if the external management system is a 
Hardware Security Module (HSM), then 
the database system will call out to the 
HSM and ask it to either encrypt or decrypt 
the DEK as required. A call to decrypt the 
DEK is done once when the database 
system starts up. A call to encrypt the DEK 
is also done once when the database is 
created.  
• The master key integrity value: To guard 
against the (rare) event where the MK 
acquired at some future point in the life of 
the database is not the one that was actually 
used to encrypt the DEK, we calculate an 
integrity value for the MK. We do this by 
applying a Hash Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) function to the MK and 
store the result. Before making use of the 
DEK, we first compute an HMAC based on 
the MK acquired. If the computed HMAC 
and the stored HMAC match this implies 
that the master key acquired is indeed the 
one that was used to encrypt the DEK. 
Although rare, this is important to avoid 
corrupting data through decryption with the 
wrong key. 
 
The MK is the encryption key used to encrypt 
the DEK. Only a unique identifier of the MK is 
stored within the database configuration structures. 
The MK itself is stored in an external key 
management system such as an HSM. 
 
The reasons for choosing these two types of keys 
are security, performance, and availability. By 
storing the MK physically away from the database 
system, we are assured that compromise of the 
database system infrastructure does not give the 
attacker access to both the encrypted data and the 
encryption keys. Additionally, the concept of MK 
allows database administrators to rotate encryption 
keys without impacting the database performance or 
worse requiring the database to be taken offline to 
complete the operation. In fact, rotating the MK only 
requires decrypting the DEK with the old MK and 
re-encrypting it again with the new MK. In contrast, 
rotating the DEK requires reading the whole 
database, decrypting the data with old DEK, re-
encrypting it with the new DEK, and writing it back 
to disk. Thus, the two types of keys we chose in our 
solution design (DEK and MK) allow administrators 
 to meet their regulatory compliance needs around 
rotating encryption keys without necessarily having 
to incur a performance penalty or take a downtime. 
 
5.2 Data Encryption 
Implementing security in database systems is always 
a delicate balance between meeting the security 
requirements, and ensuring that security coexists in 
harmony with other critical database features such as 
performance, compression, and availability. For 
database encryption, this means that the placement 
of the encryption run-time processing is key to 
designing an effective solution. 
5.2.1 Encryption Run-time Placement 
Our design places the encryption run-time 
processing just above the database I/O layer in the 
database kernel stack. The reasons for this choice are 
the following: 
 
• Pervasiveness: This ensures that all data is 
encrypted whether it is user tablespace data, 
system tablespace data, temporary 
tablespace data, or transaction logs data. 
• Transparency: This ensures that encryption 
has no impact on database schemas and 
user applications. In fact, encryption can be 
thought of as invisible to them. 
• Performance: This ensures that data stored 
in the database buffer cache remains in 
clear text. Consequently, encryption 
imposes no restrictions on the database 
system when it comes to selecting the most 
efficient plan to execute a query (e.g., 
queries with range predicates). 
• Compression: Database systems implement 
compression techniques to reduce the size 
of the data stored on disk. Typically, these 
techniques look for repeating patterns in 
order to avoid storing all copies of such 
patterns. Encryption, by definition, removes 
all patterns. This means that the order in 
which compression and encryption are 
performed is important. For example, if 
encryption is performed first, then the 
compression rate will be zero as encryption 
will leave no patterns. Thus, placing our 
encryption run-time processing just above 
the database I/O layer ensures that 
encryption and compression can coexist in 
harmony. 
 
5.2.2 Encryption Run-time Processing 
The encryption run-time processing consists of two 
functions: Encryption and decryption. Encryption 
takes place when the database system is writing data 
out to the storage system. Decryption happens when 
the database system is reading data in from the 
storage system. 
 
While the solution can easily support any 
symmetric block cipher for encryption/decryption, 
we have chosen to implement support for only AES 
and 3DES as they are the most commonly used 
block ciphers. AES is actually the standard 
symmetric block cipher. Block ciphers support many 
modes of operations. Electronic Code Book (ECB) 
is the easiest mode to implement but is also the 
weakest from a security perspective. This is because 
in ECB mode the same clear text input will always 
result in the same cipher text. This may be fine for 
encrypting small pieces of data such as a password, 
but not for database encryption as this will introduce 
patterns and may compromise the encryption 
solution.  Instead, we have chosen to use the Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode as it does not introduce 
patterns. This means we need to provide an 
initialization vector when calling the block cipher in 
CBC mode for encryption, as well as maintain that 
initialization vector in our meta-data so that it is 
available for decryption purposes. Note that the 
initialization vector is not meant to be a secret. It 
only needs to be random. 
 
When writing data to the file system, the 
database system writes them in chunks to minimize 
the I/O overhead. A chunk is a collection of data 
pages where each page is 4KB in size. A page is set 
of rows, and a database table is a collection of pages. 
This poses an interesting question as to the level of 
granularity to adopt for encryption. We have chosen 
the data page to be that level granularity.  A row 
level granularity would have had a higher impact on 
performance as encryption calls would have to be 
made for each row separately. A chunk level 
granularity would have created a dependency 
between the pages in that chunk due to the chaining 
inherent to the CBC mode. For example, to decrypt 
page 5, one must first decrypt pages 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
This would have had a negative impact on query 
performance as it diminishes the value of index-
based access. 
 
It is also worth noting that the data page level 
granularity has allowed us to avoid having to 
 needlessly increase the database size due to 
encryption. In fact, encryption block ciphers such as 
AES and 3DES encrypt data one block at a time. For 
example, the block size for AES is 16 Bytes. This 
means that when the clear text to encrypt is not an 
exact multiple of the block size, padding is required 
and this obviously increases the cipher text 
compared to the original clear text. Fortunately, the 
choice of a data page for the encryption granularity 
avoids this problem as data pages are always an 
exact multiple of the encryption block size. 
5.2.3 Transaction logs 
Transaction logs are files where the database system 
logs transactions such as insert, delete, and update 
operations. They are a critical component for 
ensuring the integrity of the database as well as for 
allowing recoverability of the database following a 
database crash. The structure of a transaction log file 
consists of two pieces: A header which contains 
meta-data about the file, and a payload which 
contains the actual database transaction details. 
 
In section 5.2.2 above, we have seen how the 
placement of the encryption run-time ensures that all 
data written to disk, including transaction logs, is 
automatically encrypted. However, transaction logs 
pose one additional challenge. In a database 
recovery scenario, we must be able to decrypt the 
transaction logs even when the database system is 
down. This means that we cannot rely on the DEK 
related information (section 5.1 above) to decrypt 
the transaction logs as the database system may be 
offline. To address this challenge, the transaction 
logs structure has been extended so that these logs 
are self-contained when decryption is required. More 
specifically, the header piece of the transaction logs 
structure has been extended so that it contains its 
own copy of the DEK related information. This also 
opens the door for an opportunity to further boost 
security by generating a separate DEK for the 
transaction logs that is distinct from the DEK for the 
database. 
5.2.4 Database backups 
A database backup is a copy of the database content 
at a given point in time. Database systems provide a 
command and/or API to allow users to take those 
backups. In the case of a database crash, the 
database can be recovered to the state it was at when 
the last backup was taken. Additionally, when 
healthy transaction logs from the damaged database 
are available, it is possible to recover the database to 
a further point in time by reapplying the database 
transactions from the transaction logs. Like 
transaction logs, a database backup consists of two 
pieces: A header which contains meta-data about the 
backup, and a payload which contains the actual 
copy of the database. 
 
Database backups pose the same challenge as 
transaction logs in the sense that they too need to be 
self-contained when decryption is required. 
Consequently, this challenge is addressed in the 
same way by extending the database backup header 
piece so that it contains its own copy of the DEK 
related information. Like transaction logs, database 
backups have their own unique DEK. 
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
WORK 
In this paper, we have presented a holistic approach 
to database encryption which allows organizations to 
meet their security and compliance needs without 
having to make compromises either on the security 
side or on the database side. Figure 2 gives a high 
level overview of the architecture, which we 
implemented in IBM DB2 for Linux, Unix, and 
Windows.  
 
 
Figure 2: Database encryption architecture. 
 
In our future work, we intend to enhance our 
holistic database encryption solution to better 
address two challenges. The first challenge is 
encrypting existing databases. Unlike newly created 
databases, an existing database already has data and 
turning encryption on for that database means not 
 only encrypting new incoming data, but also 
encrypting that existing data. The current solution 
requires the organization to turn on the encryption 
for the existing database during a scheduled database 
maintenance window. This is because the current 
approach for encrypting an existing database works 
by having the database administrator take a backup 
of the existing database and then restoring it using 
the RESTORE DATABASE command. While 
processing the restore, the database system encrypts 
the data as that is analogous to new incoming data. 
We would like to allow database administrators to 
turn on encryption for their existing databases 
without having to wait for a scheduled maintenance 
window. To do so, we plan to investigate creating a 
background process which encrypts the database 
incrementally while the database system continues 
to serve applications. The main challenge would be 
finding out how to perform this incremental 
encryption without compromising the data integrity. 
 
The second challenge is rotating the DEK online. 
Currently, our solution allows rotating only the MK 
online. While rotating the MK is usually sufficient, 
there may be situations where rotating the DEK 
itself is required. Currently, the only way to do this 
is during a scheduled maintenance window 
following the same database backup and restore 
discussed above. We believe that the solution for 
encrypting existing databases without having to wait 
for scheduled maintenance window would also 
allow rotating the DEK online as that is 
fundamentally the same problem. That is, in both 
cases, the database content needs to be read, re-
encrypted with a new DEK, and written back to disk. 
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Towards Zero-Trust Database Security –  
Part 1 
Walid Rjaibi, Mohammad Hammoudeh 
Abstract—The rise of external threats, internal threats and data breaches is driving enterprises to implement zero-trust security 
to better protect their IT assets and reduce risk. While zero-trust security for networks and identity management systems have 
received a great deal of focus, very little attention has been devoted to zero-trust security for database systems. This is a major 
issue as database systems are the custodian of enterprises most critical data and are often the primary target of both external 
and internal attacks. After all, databases contain valuable data such attackers want to steal. In Part One of this series, we 
explore both the direct and indirect means through which the same data in a database system can be accessed and the 
challenges they pose to adhering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security. In Part Two, we outline a set of solutions that are 
most suitable to address these challenges and enable enterprises to implement zero-trust database security without negatively 
impacting core database tenets such as query performance. 
Index Terms—Databases, Security, Zero-Trust. 
——————————   u   —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
HE 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study, conducted by 
the Ponemon Institute and sponsored by IBM, found 
that the global average cost of a data breach was $3.86 
million [1]. This was an increase of 6.4% compared to 2017 
according to the same study. The study also found that 
the average size of a data breach (in terms of number of 
records lost or stolen) grew 2.2% from 2017. Meanwhile, 
Gartner estimates that worldwide spending on cyberse-
curity in 2018 was around $114 billion, an increase of 
12.4% compared to 2017 [2]. Recognizing that current ap-
proaches aren’t sufficiently adequate, several organiza-
tions are now turning into zero-trust security to better 
protect their assets and reduce the risk of incurring a data 
breach. So, what exactly is zero-trust security? 
 
Zero-trust security was coined by Forrester’s John 
Kindervag in 2010 [3], [4]. In its essence, zero-trust securi-
ty removes the notion of trust from the enterprise net-
work (e.g., no more trusted users, devices, or applica-
tions). It assumes that untrusted entities exist both out-
side and inside the enterprise network. The basic tenets of 
zero-trust security can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Tenet 1: Ensure all resources are accessed in a 
secure manner regardless of location. 
2. Tenet 2: Grant access to resources based on 
“need-to-know” and strictly enforce access 
control. 
3. Tenet 3: Monitor and audit all user activities. 
 
While extensive coverage of zero-trust security imple-
mentations for networks [3] and identity management sys-
tems [5] exists, very little coverage exists for database sys-
tems. We contend that zero-trust security implementations 
for database systems is equally important for three main 
reasons. First, database systems are the custodians of the 
enterprise most valuable data. This is the very data attack-
ers of all sorts are seeking. Secondly, the same data entrust-
ed with the database system can be accessed in a variety of 
distinct and independent ways, thus broadening the data-
base attack surface. Lastly, the database privileges model is 
inherently a double-edged sword, creating opportunities 
for privileges to be abused intentionally or unintentionally. 
2 DATABASE THREAT MODEL 
We assume that organizations are implementing user au-
thentication, auditing and Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
which are standard features on all major database systems 
today. We also assume that organizations are implement-
ing adequate operational policies such as operating sys-
tem and database software vulnerability patching. In this 
paper, we focus on direct and indirect means for accessing 
data in a database and the challenges they pose to adher-
ing to the three zero-trust security tenets outlined in sec-
tion 1. 
 
The same data in a database can be accessed in two dif-
ferent ways: Indirectly or directly. Indirect access occurs 
when a user bypasses the database system altogether. 
This is most dangerous because it completely bypasses all 
database access control and auditing. We distinguish be-
tween two use cases: 
 
1. File system access: This takes place when a 
user chooses to access the data directly on the 
file system using operating system com-
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mands. 
2. Storage media access: This takes place when a 
user recovers the data from the actual storage 
media such as a stolen or lost hard drive or 
tape. 
 
Failure to address these two use cases makes it impos-
sible to adhere to the first two tenets of zero-trust security 
outlined in section 1.  
 
Direct access takes place using standard database inter-
faces such as Structured Query Language (SQL). We dis-
tinguish between two use cases: 
 
1. Interactive database access: This is typically 
done by database administrators using an in-
teractive interface offered by the database sys-
tem. This is usually used to perform adminis-
trative tasks. 
2. Application database access: This is the most 
common use case where end users interact 
with an application which in turn interacts 
with the database system to execute requests 
on behalf of those end users.  
 
The issue with interactive database access is privilege 
abuse where, for example, a database administrator 
chooses to abuse their privileges to access sensitive data.   
The application database access poses two issues. The 
first one is application bypass where, for example, the ap-
plication administrator chooses to abuse the application 
database credentials to access sensitive data or make 
changes that are not permitted by the application’s busi-
ness logic. The second issue is the loss of user identity 
which diminishes the value of auditing to hold users ac-
countable for their actions. This stems from the fact that 
the application uses a generic user ID to access the data-
base on behalf of all users as opposed to the actual user 
identity. 
 
Fig. 1. Database threat model. 
Failure to address privilege abuse and application by-
pass makes it impossible to adhere to the first two tenets 
of zero-trust security outlined in section 1. Similarly, fail-
ure to address the loss of user identity makes it impossi-
ble to adhere to the third tenet of zero-trust security (aslo 
outlined in section 1). Fig. 1 summarizes our database 
threat model. 
3 CONCLUSION 
Database systems contain enterprises most valuable data 
and are often the primary target of both internal and ex-
ternal attacks. Implementing zero-trust database security 
starts with first understanding the database threat model. 
Table 1 summarizes these threats and how they relate to 
the basic tenets of zero-trust security. In Part Two of this 
series we outline solutions and best practices for address-
ing these threats and implement zero-trust database secu-
rity. 
 
TABLE 1 
ZERO-TRUST DATABASE SECURITY CHALLENGES 
Threat Threat 
type 
Fundamental zero-trust 
security tenet 
File system 
access 
Indirect Tenets 1 and 2 
Storage media 
access 
Indirect Tenets 1 and 2 
Privilege abuse Direct Tenets 1 and 2 
Application 
bypass 
Direct Tenets 1 and 2 
Loss of end 
user identity in 
multitiered 
environments 
Direct Tenet 3 
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Towards Zero-Trust Database Security –  
Part 2 
Walid Rjaibi, Mohammad Hammoudeh 
1 INTRODUCTION
N Part One, we have explored the direct and indirect 
means through which the same data in a database sys-
tem can be accessed and the challenges they pose to ad-
hering to the basic tenets of zero-trust security. Here, we 
outline the solutions that are most suitable to address 
these challenges and enable enterprises to implement ze-
ro-trust database security without negatively impacting 
core database tenets such as query performance. 
2 SEPARATION OF DUTIES 
Traditionally, database systems have been designed such 
that the Database Administrator (DBA) manages all as-
pects of the database, including security and auditing. 
Additionally, the DBA inherently had full access to all 
tables in the database. With the emergence of insider 
threats as a security concern equally important to external 
threats [1], this traditional model clearly hampers an or-
ganization’s ability to fully implement zero-trust database 
security.  
 
We contend that database systems must provide the 
capability to allow organizations to vest security admin-
istration and database administration into two non-
overlapping roles so separation of duties can be enforced. 
Separation of duties also ensures that the DBA does not 
have implicit access to all the data in the database. This 
separation of duties enables organizations to better ad-
here to zero-trust security. It may also dictate the type of 
database system to adopt as not all database systems nec-
essarily provide the capabilities to enforce separation of 
duties.   
3 DATA ENCRYPTION  
Indirect access is most dangerous as it completely bypass-
es all access control and auditing in the database system. 
A powerful countermeasure to protect against indirect 
access is data encryption as encrypted data is of no value 
to an attacker. However, data encryption for database 
systems comes in many forms and not all forms of en-
cryption address the indirect access threats outlined. 
There are also performance implications that need to be 
taken into account when selecting a database encryption 
solution.  
 
Fig. 1 contrasts the key database encryption options. 
Self-Encrypting Disks and file system encryption provide 
the broadest coverage (they encrypt entire disks or file 
systems), but they only protect against indirect access to 
storage media. Tablespace encryption, full database en-
cryption and column encryption protect against indirect 
access to both storage media and file system. Column 
encryption, however, is intrusive to applications and neg-
atively affects performance. Tablespace encryption may 
create a vulnerability when a DBA inadvertently moves 
data from an encrypted tablespace to an unencrypted one, 
or when data is held in temporary tablespaces. Therefore, 
full database encryption allows organizations to imple-
ment zero-trust security without having to compromise 
either on the database side or on the security side. The 
design of one such solution is discussed in detail in [2]. To 
give an example, consider a classical 3-tier banking appli-
cation which stores client data in its backend database. To 
protect this data against indirect access, the application 
would enable full database encryption for its backend 
database. Using the solution discussed in [2], this can be 
achieved using SQL as follows: 
 
CREATE DATABASE <db-name> ENCRYPT  
 
 
Fig. 1. Database encryption options. 
4 FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL 
Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) refers to the ability 
to control access to database tables at the row level, col-
umn level, or cell level. This level of granularity ensures 
users are granted only the privileges they need and is 
paramount for mitigating the direct access scenarios out-
lined in Part One. However, database FGAC comes in 
many forms and not all forms adequately address the 
direct access threats. There are also usability implications 
that need to be taken into account when selecting a data-
base FGAC solution. 
 
Fig. 2 contrasts the database FGAC options. Database 
views [3] and application-based FGAC provide most flex-
I 
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ibility in terms of expressing FGAC rules, but the security 
they provide is not data-centric and can be bypassed. La-
bel-Based Access Control (LBAC) [5] is a data-centric se-
curity model where the security policy is always enforced 
regardless of whether the table is accessed directly or in-
directly through a view. However, LBAC lacks in flexibil-
ity when it comes to expressing security rules outside of 
the rigid No Read-Up and No Write-Down rules of Multi-
level Security (MLS) [6]. Row permissions and column 
masks [4] combine the benefits of views and LABC. They 
are very suitable to implementing zero-trust security. To 
give an example, consider our banking application again. 
Suppose that client data is stored in a table called CLI-
ENT. Further, suppose that the bank’s security policy is 
such that only members of the TELLER role can see the 
full account number in table CLIENT. Anyone else can 
only see the last 4 digits. Using the solution discussed in 
[4], this can be achieved using SQL as shown below. The 
mask construct created is automatically evaluated by the 
database system each time the account number column is 
accessed and ensures the bank’s security policy is en-
forced. 
 
CREATE MASK ACCOUNT_ACCESS  
ON CLIENT 
FOR COLUMN account RETURN 
CASE WHEN  
  VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER (USER, ‘TELLER’) = 1 
  THEN account 
  ELSE 'XXXX-‘|| SUBSTR(ACCOUNT,5,4) 
END 
ENABLE; 
 
 
Fig. 2. Database FGAC options. 
5 USER IDENTITY PROPAGATION IN MULTITIERED 
ENVIRONMENTS 
In multitiered database environments, the application 
interacts with the database system using a generic user 
ID. This model does not contribute to implementing zero-
trust security because the database system does not see 
the actual end user identities. One major implication of 
this is diminished user accountability as the database au-
dit log will only show a generic user ID with no refer-
ences to the actual end users behind the application. 
 
Some database systems provide the notion of Applica-
tion Context to give applications the tools to propagate the 
end user identity to the database system where it can be 
used for auditing purposes [7]. In other solutions such as 
the Trusted Context concept introduced in [4], a more 
formal mechanism is used to allow the establishment of a 
trust relationship between the database system and the 
application and for the propagation of end user identities 
to the database system in a controlled and secure manner.  
 
Strategies for implementing zero-trust database securi-
ty must consider multitiered database environments to 
ensure that user accountability is maintained. This may in 
turn dictate the type of database system to adopt as not 
all database systems necessarily provide the capabilities 
to enable applications to propagate end user identities. To 
give an example, let’s continue with our banking applica-
tion. To ensure that the actual end user identities are 
propagated to the database, the application can leverage 
the trusted context concept introduced in [4]. This re-
quires the following steps: 
 
1. The administrator creates a trusted context 
object to define a trust relationship between 
the application and its backend database. 
2. The application establishes a trusted connec-
tion with its backend database. 
3. Before issuing any request to the database on 
behalf of an end user, the application switches 
the current user of the connection to the new 
user. This automatically propagates the end 
user identity to the database where it is used 
for all access control and auditing till the ap-
plication switches user again.   
6 CONDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION 
Traditional database authorization does not provide control 
around when a particular privilege can be exercised. One 
major use case where this model falls short is application 
bypass. An application administrator may choose to abuse 
the application credentials by accessing the database outside 
the scope of the application. 
 
Some database systems provide a capability to allow 
organizations to require the database system to verify 
more attributes before allowing a user to exercise their 
privileges. For example, the Trusted Context concept in-
troduced in [4] addresses application bypass by requiring 
the database system to authorize the application user ID 
only when additional attributes have been verified. 
Therefore, an application administrator who wishes to 
abuse the application credentials by accessing the data-
base outside the scope of the application will find it hard 
to do so. 
 
Strategies for implementing zero-trust database securi-
ty must consider enforcing conditional authorization to 
protect against privilege abuse scenarios. This may also 
influence the choice of the database system to adopt as 
not all database systems necessarily support conditional 
authorization. 
AUTHOR ET AL.:  TITLE 3 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Databases contain enterprises most critical data and are the 
subject of attacks by both insiders and outsiders. Implement-
ing zero-trust database security is therefore paramount to 
protect critical data. While user authentication, Transport 
Layer Security and auditing are standard practices and are 
usually implemented adequately by most organizations, the 
indirect and direct threats outlined in this paper require care-
ful thinking including the choice of the database system to 
adopt. Table 1 summarizes the indirect and direct threats we 
outlined together with the security best practices to address 
them and enable adherence to zero-trust security.  
 
TABLE 1 
IMPLEMENTING ZERO-TRUST DATABASE SECURITY 
Threat Threat 
type 
Security best practice 
File system 
access 
Indirect Full database encryption 
Storage media 
access 
Indirect Full database encryption 
Privilege abuse Direct - Separation of duties 
- Fine-Grained Access Con-
trol (FGAC) 
Application 
bypass 
Direct Conditional authorization 
Loss of end 
user identity in 
multitiered 
environments 
Direct User identity propagation 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Verizon, 
https://www.knowbe4.com/hubfs/rp_DBIR_2017_Report_exe
csummary_en_xg.pdf, 2017. 
[2] W. Rjaibi, “Holistic Database Encryption”, Proc. International Confer-
ence on Security and Cryptography, 2018.  
[3] R. Elmasri, S. Navathe, Fundamentals of Database Systems 6th. 
Addison-Wesley, 2010. 
[4] W. Rjaibi, M. Hammoudeh, " Fine-Grained Database Authoriza-
tion and User Identity Propagation in Multitiered Environ-
ments", IEEE Trans. On Knowledge and Data Engineering, submit-
ted for publication (Pending evaluation), 2019. 
[5] W. Rjaibi, P. Bird, “A Multi-Purpose Implementation of Mandatory 
Access Control in Relational Database Management Systems”, Proc. 
International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, 2004.  
[6] W. Rjaibi, “An introduction to multilevel secure relational da-
tabase management systems”, Proc. The conference of the Centre 
for Advanced Studies on Collaborative research (CASCON), 2004. 
[7] Oracle, “Defense-in-Depth Database Security for On-Premises 
and Cloud Databases”, 
https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/security/sec
urity-compliance-wp-12c-1896112.pdf., 2019. 
 
 
Walid Rjaibi is Distinguished Engineer and Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO) for Data Security with IBM in Toronto, 
Canada. Prior to his current role, Walid was Research Staff Member 
in network security and cryptography with IBM Research in Zurich, 
Switzerland. Walid’s work on Data Security has resulted 26 granted 
patents and several publications in journals and conference proceed-
ings such as the IDUG solutions journal, the international conference 
on security and cryptography (SECRYPT), the international confer-
ence on data engineering (ICDE), and the international conference 
on Very Large Databases (VLDB). 
 
 
Mohammad Hammoudeh is the Head of the 
CfACS IoT Laboratory and a Reader in Future Networks and Securi-
ty with the Department of Computing and Mathematics, Manchester 
Metropolitan University. He has been a researcher and publisher in 
the field of big sensory data mining and visualization. He is a highly 
proficient, experienced, and professionally certified cybersecurity 
professional, specializing in threat analysis, and information and 
network security management. His research interests include highly 
decentralized algorithms, communication, and cross-layered solu-
tions to Internet of Things, and wireless sensor networks. 
 
  101 
Appendix C: Mandatory Access Control Portfolio 
 
Table C.1 – Research Papers 
ID Publication Key Contributions 
1 A Multi-Purpose Implementation of 
Mandatory Access Control in 
Relational Database Management 
Systems  
Very Large Databases (VLDB) 
Conference 
- Design of a mandatory access control solution for 
database systems which addresses the limitations of 
traditional Multilevel Security (MLS).  
- Enable organizations to adhere to zero-trust security. 
- Implementation of the solution in IBM DB2 for Linux, 
Unix and Windows, and Informix. 
2 Inter-Node Relationship Labeling: 
A Fine-Grained XML Access 
Control Implementation Using 
Generic Security Labels 
International conference on security 
and cryptography (SECRYPT) 
- Design of a solution which improves over traditional 
node-based XML access control approaches, by 
considering inter-node relationships as the control 
granularity. 
- Enable databases to extend fine-grained authorizations 
to XML columns in database tables. 
- Enable organizations to meet privacy requirements and 
adhere to zero-trust security. 
3 An Introduction to Multilevel 
Secure Relational Database 
Management Systems  
 
International Conference on 
Computer Science and Software 
Engineering 
Survey and critique of traditional implementations of 
mandatory access control in database systems (i.e., 
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Abstract
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) implemen-
tations in Relational Database Management
Systems (RDBMS) have focused solely on
Multilevel Security (MLS). MLS has posed
a number of challenging problems to the
database research community, and there has
been an abundance of research work to ad-
dress those problems. Unfortunately, the use
of MLS RDBMS has been restricted to a few
government organizations where MLS is of
paramount importance such as the intelligence
community and the Department of Defense.
The implication of this is that the investment
of building an MLS RDBMS cannot be lever-
aged to serve the needs of application domains
where there is a desire to control access to ob-
jects based on the label associated with that
object and the label associated with the sub-
ject accessing that object, but where the label
access rules and the label structure do not nec-
essarily match the MLS two security rules and
the MLS label structure. This paper intro-
duces a flexible and generic implementation of
MAC in RDBMS that can be used to address
the requirements from a variety of application
domains, as well as to allow an RDBMS to ef-
ficiently take part in an end-to-end MAC en-
terprise solution. The paper also discusses the
extensions made to the SQL compiler compo-
nent of an RDBMS to incorporate the label
Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is
granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for
direct commercial advantage, the VLDB copyright notice and
the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is
given that copying is by permission of the Very Large Data Base
Endowment. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee
and/or special permission from the Endowment.
Proceedings of the 30th VLDB Conference,
Toronto, Canada, 2004
access rules in the access plan it generates for
an SQL query, and to prevent unauthorized
leakage of data that could occur as a result of
traditional optimization techniques performed
by SQL compilers.
1 Introduction
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a means of re-
stricting access to objects based on the sensitivity
(as represented by a label) of the information con-
tained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e.,
clearance) of subjects to access information of such
sensitivity[8]. A well-known implementation of MAC
is Multilevel Security (MLS), which, traditionally, has
been available mainly on computer and software sys-
tems deployed at highly sensitive government organi-
zations such as the intelligence community or the U.S.
Department of Defense. The Basic model of MLS was
first introduced by Bell and LaPadula[9]. The model
is stated in terms of objects and subjects. An object is
a passive entity such as a data file, a record, or a field
within a record. A subject is an active process that
can request access to objects. Every object is assigned
a classification, and every subject a clearance. Classi-
fications and clearances are collectively referred to as
labels. A label is a piece of information that consists of
two components: A hierarchical component and a set
of unordered compartments. The hierarchical compo-
nent specifies the sensitivity of the data. For example,
a military organization might define levels Top Secret,
Secret, Confidential and Unclassified. The compart-
ments component is nonhierarchical. Compartments
are used to identify areas that describe the sensitivity
or category of the labeled data. For example, a mili-
tary organization might define compartments NATO,
Nuclear and Army. Labels are partially ordered in
a lattice as follows: Given two labels L1 and L2,
L1 >= L2 if and only if the hierarchical component
of L1 is greater than or equal to that of L2, and the
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compartment component of L1 includes the compart-
ment component of L2. L1 is said to dominate L2.
MLS imposes the following two restrictions on all data
accesses:
• The Simple Security Property or “No Read Up”:
A subject is allowed a read access to an object
if and only if the subject’s label dominates the
object’s label.
• The *-Property (pronounced the star property) or
“No Write Down”: A subject is allowed a write
access to an object if and only if the object’s label
dominates the subject’s label.
1.1 Problem Statement
MAC implementations in Relational Database Man-
agement Systems (RDBMS) have focused solely on
MLS. MLS has posed a number of challenging prob-
lems to the database research community, and there
has been an abundance of research work to address
those problems. There has also been three commercial
MLS RDBMS offerings, namely, Trusted Oracle[16],
Informix OnLine/Secure[17], and Sybase Secure SQL
Server[20]. Unfortunately, the use of MLS RDBMS
has been restricted to a few government organizations
where MLS is of paramount importance such as the in-
telligence community and the Department of Defense.
In fact, very few commercial organizations need such
type of security. The implication of this is that the in-
vestment of building an MLS RDBMS cannot be lever-
aged to serve the needs of application domains where
there is a desire to control access to objects based on
the label associated with that object and the label as-
sociated with the subject accessing that object, but
where the label access rules and the label structure
do not necessarily match the MLS two security rules
and the MLS label structure (i.e., a hierarchical com-
ponent and a set of unordered compartments). The
question that begs to be asked is therefore the follow-
ing: Do such application domains exist and, if so, what
are they?
We contend that the answer to that question is an
unequivocal yes. Privacy[19] is one example of such
application domain. Generally, a privacy policy indi-
cates for which purposes an information is collected,
whether or not it will be communicated to others,
and for how long that information is retained before
it is discarded. For example, a user cannot access a
customer record for the purpose of sending that cus-
tomer marketing information if that customer did not
agree to receive such information. Access to privacy-
sensitive data can be regarded as analogous to access
to MLS data in the sense that in both cases there is
a tag associated with the object being accessed and
the subject accessing that object. The tag represents
a “purpose” in the case of the former and represents
a “security label” in the case of the latter. Unfor-
tunately, a MAC implementation in an RDBMS that
strictly implements MLS fails to address privacy re-
quirements for the following two main reasons. First,
MLS labels include a hierarchical component that is
not applicable in the case of privacy. Next, the MLS
security properties do not apply in the context of pri-
vacy. For example, to read an object in MLS, the
subject’s compartment component must include that
object’s compartment component (the simple security
property). In privacy, the rule is exactly the opposite.
That is, if an object is tagged with the purposes mar-
keting and purchase, then a user accessing that object
for the purpose of sending marketing information must
be allowed to access that object.
Another application domain is private banking. In
private banking, country laws and regulations often re-
quire to limit the amount of data that can be viewed
by a bank employee. For example, Swiss banking laws
do not allow a Swiss bank employee located in Toronto
to access account information for customers based in
Switzerland. Typically, banking applications code this
fine-grained access control in the application itself, as
opposed to delegating this task to the RDBMS. Un-
fortunately, this application-aware approach has made
enterprise security policies a laborious and complex
task. It also has the drawback of exposing the secu-
rity policies to the application programmers. If each
customer account is tagged with a label indicating the
geographical location of the customer and if each bank
employee can be assigned a label that also indicates
the geographical location of that employee (for exam-
ple, based on the system security context established
when that employee logs on to the database), then an
RDBMS that implements a form of MAC where the
database administrator could define the label struc-
ture and the label access rules could relieve the ap-
plications from implementing such fine-grained access
control policies.
Moreover, the ever increasing enterprise demands
for more security has led to the emergence of label
security products that provide the ability to set up
and control access based upon labels throughout an
entire network from end-to-end. For example, such la-
bel security products have the ability to control the
network to decide whether or not a particular labeled
data row can be transmitted on a particular channel
or be delivered to a particular workstation on that net-
work. An important advantage of such label security
products is their ability to offer a centrally managed
tool for defining label access policies and for assign-
ing access labels to users as well as to other entities
on the network. Traditional implementations of MAC
in RDBMS (i.e., MLS) do not offer the required flex-
ibility to efficiently integrate with such label security
products and to provide pervasive system coverage us-
ing a unified and centrally managed label access policy.
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Therefore, there is a need for a flexible and generic
implementation of MAC in RDBMS that can be used
to address the requirements from a variety of appli-
cation domains, including those of MLS, and to ef-
ficiently take part in an end-to-end MAC enterprise
solution.
1.2 Contributions
The contributions made in this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
1. A methodology to define labels and to set up a
database table such that access to a row in that
table is based upon the label associated with that
row and the label associated with the user access-
ing that row. More specifically, the methodology
introduces a number of extensions to SQL that
would allow a database administrator to:
• Define label types
• Define label access rules and exceptions to
them
• Assign labels and exceptions to database
users
• Attach a label type and a set of label access
rules to a database table
2. Extensions to the SQL compiler component of an
RDBMS to:
• Incorporate the label access rules in the ac-
cess plan it generates for an SQL query
• Prevent unauthorized leakage of data that
could occur as a result of traditional opti-
mization techniques performed by SQL com-
pilers
3. Extensions to the runtime processor component
of an RDBMS to enforce label access rules
4. A method to allow an RDBMS to efficiently take
part in an end-to-end MAC enterprise solution
1.3 Synopsis
Section 2 gives a brief survey of MAC implementations
in RDBMS. Section 3 introduces our methodology for
defining labels and for setting up a database table such
that access to a row in that table is based upon the
label associated with that row and the label associated
with the user accessing that row. Section 4 presents
our extensions to the SQL compiler component of an
RDBMS to incorporate the label access rules in the ac-
cess plan it generates for an SQL query, and to prevent
unauthorized leakage of data that could occur as a re-
sult of traditional optimization techniques performed
by SQL compilers. Section 5 describes our extensions
to the methodology introduced in section 3 in order to
allow an RDBMS to efficiently take part in an end-to-
end MAC enterprise solution. Lastly, section 6 sum-
marizes our results and discusses future work.
2 Related Work
MAC implementations in Relational Database Man-
agement Systems have focused solely on MLS, which
is of paramount importance to a few government or-
ganizations such as the intelligence community or the
Department of Defense. In fact, there has been an
abundance of research within the last two decades or
so in the area of multilevel secure relational databases.
The results of such research can be divided into three
broad areas as follows.
2.1 Multilevel Secure Relational Database
Models
The Sea View model[1] was the pioneering formal mul-
tilevel secure relational database designed to provide
mandatory access control. It extended the concept of
a database relation to include the security labels. A
relation that is extended with the security labels is
called a multilevel relation. The Sea View model also
coined the concept of polyinstantiation, which refers to
the simultaneous existence of multiple tuples with the
same primary key, where such tuples are distinguished
by their security labels. In order to avoid covert chan-
nels, subjects with different security labels are allowed
to operate on the same database relation through
the use of polyinstantiation[1]. The Jajodia-Sandhu
model[2] was derived from the Sea View model. It
was shown in [3] that the Sea View model can re-
sult in the proliferation of tuples on updates and the
Jajodia-Sandhu model addresses this drawback. The
Smith-Winslett model[4] was the first model to exten-
sively address the semantics of an MLS database. The
MLR model[5] is based on the Jajodia-Sandhu model,
and also integrates the belief-based semantics of the
Smith-Winslett model. It was shown in [7] that all the
aforementioned models can present users with some
information that is difficult to interpret. The BCMLS
model[6] addresses those concerns by including the se-
mantics of an unambiguous interpretation of all data
presented to the users.
2.2 Multilevel Secure RDBMS Architectures
Multilevel secure RDBMS architectures schemes can
be divided into two general categories: The Trusted
Subject architecture and the Woods Hole architec-
tures.
The Trusted Subject architecture[10] is a scheme
that contains a trusted RDBMS and a trusted oper-
ating system. The RDBMS is custom-developed to
include all the required security rules, but uses the as-
sociated trusted operating system to make actual disk
data accesses. A benefit of this scheme is that the
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RDBMS has access to all levels of data at the same
time, which minimizes retrieval and update process-
ing. However, this scheme results in a special purpose
RDBMS that requires a large amount of trusted code
to be developed and verified along with the normal
RDBMS features.
The Woods Hole architectures assume that an un-
trusted off-the-shelf RDBMS is used to access data and
that trusted code is developed around that RDBMS
to provide an overall secure RDBMS. They can be di-
vided into two main categories: The kernelized archi-
tectures and the distributed architectures[10, 11].
The kernelized architecture scheme uses a trusted
operating system and multiple copies of the RDBMS,
where each copy is associated with some trusted front-
end. Each pair (trusted front-end, RDBMS) is asso-
ciated with a particular security level. The trusted
operating system ensures that data at different secu-
rity levels is stored separately, and that each copy of
the RDBMS gets access to data that is authorized for
its associated security level. A benefit of this scheme
is that data at different security levels is isolated in
the database, which allows for higher level assurance.
However, this scheme results in an additional over-
head as the trusted operating system needs to separate
data at different security levels when it is added to the
database and might also need to combine data from
different security levels when data is retrieved by an
RDBMS copy that is associated with a high security
level.
The distributed architecture scheme uses multiple
copies of the trusted front-end and RDBMS, each as-
sociated with its own database storage. In this archi-
tecture scheme, an RDBMS at security level l contains
a replica of every data item that a subject at level l
can access. Thus, when data is retrieved, the RDBMS
retrieves it only from its own database. Another ben-
efit of this architecture is that data is physically sepa-
rated into separate hardware databases. However, this
scheme results in an additional overhead when data is
updated as the various replicas need to be kept in sync.
2.3 Multilevel Secure Transaction Processing
Although the two MLS security properties described
above prevent direct legal flow of information from a
security level to another nondominated security level,
they are not sufficient to ensure that security is not
compromised since it could be possible for leakage
of information to occur through indirect means via
covert channels. A covert channel can easily be es-
tablished with conventional concurrency control algo-
rithms such as two-phase locking (2PL) and times-
tamp ordering (TO). In both 2PL and TO algorithms,
whenever there is contention for the same data item
by transactions executing at different security levels,
a lower level transaction may be either delayed or sus-
pended to ensure correct execution. In such a scenario,
two colluding transactions executing at high and low
security levels can establish an information flow chan-
nel from a high security level to a low security level
by accessing the selected data item according to some
agreed-upon code[12].
Considerable effort has been devoted to the de-
velopment of efficient, secure algorithms for the ma-
jor schemes of RDBMS architectures described above.
In [13], Keefe et al. present a formal frame-
work for secure concurrency control in multilevel
databases. Lamport[14] offers solutions to the secure
readers/writers problem. While these solutions are se-
cure, they do not yield serializable schedules when ap-
plied to transactions, and they suffer from the prob-
lem of starvation, i.e., transactions that are reading
data items at a low security level may be delayed
indefinitely[18]. In [15], Ammann and Jajodia offer
two timestamp-based algorithms that yield serializable
schedules, but both suffer from starvation. On the
commercial secure RDBMS side, both Trusted Oracle
RDBMS[16] and Informix OnLine/Secure RDBMS[17]
offer concurrency control solutions that are free from
covert channels.
3 Methodology for Setting up MAC in
an RDBMS
The methodology we propose allows a database ad-
ministrator to define labels and to set up a database
table such that access to a row in that table is based
upon the label associated with that row and the la-
bel associated with the user accessing that row. More
specifically, the methodology allows the database ad-
ministrator to:
• Define label types
• Define label access rules and exceptions to them
• Assign labels and exceptions to database users
• Attach a label type and a set of label access rules
to a database table
We now introduce our extensions to SQL to imple-
ment this methodology. The goal of this exercise is
not to describe the blueprint for the implementation.
Rather, we will focus on the new SQL concepts that
must be implemented to support such methodology.
Also, we have chosen not to overload the paper with
the details of the exact syntax of the SQL extensions
proposed, as we believe that such level of details is
more appropriate for a standardization proposal to the
SQL standard committee. However, we will illustrate
the syntax and the concepts introduced via examples.
3.1 Label Component
A label component is a database entity that can be
created, altered and dropped. It is introduced as a
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building block for labels (i.e., a label is composed of
one or more label components). The label component
definition specifies the set of valid elements for that
label component. This set of elements can be either
ordered or unordered (the default). In an ordered set,
the order in which the elements appear is important:
The rank of the first element is higher than the rank
of the second element, the rank of the second element
is higher than the rank of the third element, and
so on. To allow database administrators to create,
alter and drop label components, we introduce the
CREATE, ALTER and DROP label component SQL
statements. The CREATE LABEL COMPONENT
SQL statement creates a label component that can
be used to define a label type. The ALTER LABEL
COMPONENT SQL statement permits to add or
drop an element to/from a label component. The
DROP LABEL COMPONENT SQL statement drops
a label component.
Example 1
The following SQL statement creates a label compo-
nent called level and specifies the set of valid values
for this label component.
CREATE LABEL COMPONENT level
OF TYPE varchar(15)
USING ORDERED SET
{“TOP SECRET”, “SECRET”, “CLASSIFIED”}
The following SQL statement creates a label com-
ponent called compartments and specifies the set of
valid values for this label component. Note that the
set specified is unordered.
CREATE LABEL COMPONENT
compartments OF TYPE varchar(15)
USING SET
{“NATO”, “NUCLEAR”, “ARMY”}
The following SQL statement adds a new ele-
ment to the level component and specifies the rank of
this new element within the ordered set.
ALTER LABEL COMPONENT level
ADD ELEMENT “UNCLASSIFIED”
AFTER “CLASSIFIED”
The following SQL statement drops the level
component.
DROP LABEL COMPONENT level
3.2 Label Type
The relationship between a label and a label type
is analogous to the relationship between a data row
and a table schema. As the table schema defines
the set of columns that make up a data row, so the
label type defines the set of label components that
make up a label. To allow database administrators
to create, alter and drop label types, we introduce
the CREATE, ALTER and DROP label type SQL
statements. The CREATE LABEL TYPE creates a
label type by specifying the label components that
make up such label type. The ALTER LABEL TYPE
alters the definition of a label type by adding or
dropping a label component to/from that label type.
The DROP LABEL TYPE SQL statement drops a
label type.
Example 2
The following SQL statement creates a label type
called MLS and specifies its label components.
Note the keyword MULTIVALUED next to the
compartments component. This indicates that the
compartments component can have more than a
single value at a time. This keyword can only be
specified for label components based on an unordered
set (section 3.4 explains the reason behind this choice).
CREATE LABEL TYPE MLS
COMPONENTS level,
compartments MULTIVALUED
The following SQL statement drops the level
component from label type MLS.
ALTER LABEL TYPE MLS DROP level
The following SQL statement drops the MLS la-
bel type.
DROP LABEL TYPE MLS
3.3 Access Labels and Row Labels
We distinguish two types of labels: Access labels and
row labels. Access labels are created and assigned to
database users, which, in conjunction with the label
access rules (section 3.4), determine which labeled
rows these users have access to. To allow database
administrators to create, drop, grant and revoke
access labels, we introduce the CREATE, DROP,
GRANT and REVOKE access label SQL statements.
The CREATE ACCESS LABEL SQL statement
creates an access label based on an existing label type.
The GRANT ACCESS LABEL SQL statement grants
an access label to a database user. The REVOKE
ACCESS LABEL SQL statement revokes an access
label from a database user. The DROP ACCESS LA-
BEL SQL statement drops an access label and revokes
it from any database user to whom it has been granted.
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Example 3
The following SQL statement creates an access
label.
CREATE ACCESS LABEL L1
OF LABEL TYPE MLS
level “SECRET”, compartments “NATO”
The following SQL statement grants access label
L1 to database user Joe.
GRANT ACCESS LABEL L1
TO USER Joe
The following SQL statement revokes access la-
bel L1 from database user Joe.
REVOKE ACCESS LABEL L1
FROM USER Joe
The following SQL statement drops access label
L1.
DROP ACCESS LABEL L1
A row label labels a data row in a database ta-
ble. To allow database users to provide a row label
when inserting or updating a row in a database table,
we introduce the ROWLABEL function. ROWLA-
BEL is a means of providing the label value of a data
row.
Example 4
The following INSERT SQL statement shows how the
row label can be provided using the ROWLABEL
function. The statement inserts a row into a database
table called T1 having two columns A and B both of
type integer. We assume that rows in table T1 are
labeled with a label of label type MLS defined above.
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES
(ROWLABEL(“SECRET”, “NATO”), 1, 2)
The following SQL statement shows how the
ROWLABEL function can be used to update the level
component of the row label for the row inserted above.
UPDATE T1 SET
ROWLABEL(level) = “TOP SECRET”
WHERE A = 1 AND B = 2
3.4 Label Access Policy
A label access policy defines the label access rules that
the RDBMS evaluates to determine whether or not a
database user is allowed access to a labeled data row in
a database table. Access rules can be divided into two
categories: Read access rules and write access rules.
Read access rules are applied by the RDBMS when
a user attempts to read a labeled data row (e.g., a
SELECT statement). The RDBMS applies the write
access rules when a user attempts to insert, update or
delete a labeled data row. In both cases, an access rule
is a predicate that puts together the same component
from an access label and a row label and an operator
as follows:
Access Label component-name
<operator>
Row Label component-name
The type of operator allowed depends on the
label component. For label components based on
an ordered set, the operator can be any of the
relational operators {=, <=, <,>,>=, ! =}. For label
components based on an unordered set, the operator
must be one of the set operators {IN, INTERSECT}.
Recall from section 3.2 that a label component based
on an unordered set can be multivalued. That is,
it can contain more than a single value at a time.
Thus, when comparing multivalued label components
we are actually comparing data sets. This is the
reason why the operators supported are set operators,
i.e., inclusion and intersection. Obviously, certain
RDBMS could choose to support additional operators
but we contend that the ones given above would
be the most commonly used. To allow database
administrators to create, alter and drop label policies,
we introduce the CREATE, ALTER and DROP
label policy SQL statements. The CREATE LABEL
POLICY SQL statement creates a label access policy
for a given label type by specifying one or more read
access rules and one or more write access rules. The
ALTER LABEL POLICY SQL statement permits the
addition or dropping an access rule to/from a label
access policy. The DROP LABEL SQL statement
drops a label access policy.
Example 5
The following SQL statement creates a label ac-
cess policy that implements the two MLS properties
introduced in section 1 above (i.e., “No Read Up”
and “No Write Down”).
CREATE LABEL POLICY mls-policy
LABEL TYPE MLS
READ ACCESS RULE rule1
ACCESS LABEL level >= ROW LABEL level
READ ACCESS RULE rule2
ROW LABEL compartments IN
ACCESS LABEL compartments
WRITE ACCESS RULE rule1
ACCESS LABEL level <= ROW LABEL level
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WRITE ACCESS RULE rule2
ACCESS LABEL compartments IN
ROW LABEL compartments
The following SQL statement drops read access
rule rule2 from label access policy mls-policy.
ALTER LABEL POLICY mls-policy
DROP READ ACCESS RULE rule2
The following SQL statement drops label access
policy mls-policy.
DROP LABEL POLICY mls-policy
3.5 Exceptions
Exceptions are introduced to provide the flexibility
for some database users to bypass one or more access
rules. For example, in an MLS context, it is often
the case that some special users are allowed to write
information to lower security levels even though
this is in contradiction with the *-security property.
Thus, exceptions are introduced to allow the database
administrator to grant a database user an exception
to bypass one or more access rules in a particular
label access policy. To allow database administrators
to grant and revoke exceptions, we introduce the
GRANT and REVOKE exception SQL statements.
The GRANT EXCEPTION SQL statement grants
a database user an exception to bypass one or more
access rules in a label access policy. The REVOKE
EXCEPTION SQL statement revokes a previously
granted exception from a database user.
Example 6
The following SQL statement grants an excep-
tion to database user Joe so that he can bypass the
write access rules in label access policy mls-policy.
GRANT EXCEPTION
ON WRITE ACCESS RULE rule1, rule2
FROM LABEL POLICY mls-policy
TO USER Joe
The following SQL statement revokes the above
exception from user Joe.
REVOKE EXCEPTION
ON WRITE ACCESS RULE rule1, rule2
FROM LABEL POLICY mls-policy
FROM USER Joe
3.6 Labeled Tables
A labeled table is a database table that contains
labeled data rows. When the database administrator
creates a labeled table he/she specifies the label type
and the label access policy to be used for that table.
The label type determines the structure of the label
to be used to label the table’s data rows and the label
access policy determines the access rules to be used
for enforcing access to that labeled table. To allow
database administrators to create labeled tables, we
extend the CREATE TABLE SQL statement by a
new optional clause to specify the label type and the
label access policy.
Example 7
The following SQL statement creates a database
table T1 and specifies the label type and the la-
bel access policy. Note that in our examples so
far we have used MLS-like label types and label
access policies because they are well understood
by the database research community. But it is
obvious that one can follow the methodology given
in this paper to define any label type and any la-
bel access policy, and attach them to a database table.
CREATE TABLE T1 (A integer, B integer)
LABEL TYPE MLS
LABEL POLICY mls-policy
When creating such table, the RDBMS internally
adds a third column to store the label associated with
each row in this table. The choice of the column’s
type depends on the label type. For example, if the
label type is made up of a single component of type,
say varchar(15), then the column’s type would be
varchar(15). If the label type is made up of more
than a single column then the column’s type must
be an Abstract Data Type (ADT). ADTs have been
introduced in SQL’99[21] and are supported by most
commercial RDBMS. Alternatively, the RDBMS
could choose not use an ADT and store the different
label components in separate columns.
4 Extensions to the SQL Compiler
Component in an RDBMS
When a labeled table is accessed, the RDBMS needs
to enforce two levels of access control. The first level
is the traditional Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
which is implemented by all commercial RDBMS[21].
That is, the RDBMS verifies whether the user at-
tempting to access the table has been granted the re-
quired privilege to perform the requested operation on
that table. A discussion of this level of access con-
trol is beyond the scope of this paper. The second
level is MAC. That is, for each data row accessed, the
RDBMS verifies whether the user is allowed access to
that row based on the label associated with the row
and the user’s access label.
1016
4.1 Enforcing MAC on Labeled Tables
There are two possible ways that MAC can be enforced
when a labeled table is accessed. The first possibility is
for the SQL compiler to modify any query that refers
to a labeled table in order to incorporate the access
rules from the label access policy associated with that
table in the form of regular predicates. Next, the SQL
compiler compiles the modified query and generates an
access plan for the query in the normal fashion. The
main advantage of such an approach is its simplicity.
However, it has a major drawback: The access plan
generated for a query that refers to a labeled table
cannot be reused by other users because it is depen-
dent on the access label of the user who issued the
query. Note that some commercial RDBMS cache the
access plan generated for an SQL query so that it can
be reused the next time the SQL query is submitted.
This has some performance benefits as it eliminates
the need to recompile the query. Another drawback of
this approach is that it could result in unauthorized
leakage of data if special care is not taken by the SQL
compiler. This will be detailed further in section 4.2.
The second possibility is to not modify a query that
refers to a labeled table. Rather, the SQL compiler
inserts logic into the access plan that implements the
access rules from the label access policy associated
with any labeled table referred to in the query. Thus,
when the access plan is executed, the access rules from
the label access policy associated with a labeled table
are evaluated for each data row when that labeled
table is accessed. The general processing algorithm to
be inserted in the access plan for a labeled table is as
follows.
Begin
Fetch the user’s access label (e.g., from a
system catalog table)
if (SELECT access)
{
for each row accessed
{
if (read access rules do not permit access)
{
Skip row
}
}
}
else
{
// INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE access
for each row
{
if (INSERT or UPDATE)
{
if (the row label provided is not valid with
respect to the label type associated with
the labeled table)
Reject INSERT or UPDATE
}
if (write access rules do not permit access)
Reject INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE
}
}
End
This second approach addresses the two shortcomings
of the previous approach (ı.e., query modification).
That is, it allows the cached access plan to be reused
because the access label of the user who issued the
query is acquired at runtime, and it is more secure as
it will be demonstrated in section 4.2.
4.2 Predicates Evaluation Sequence
SQL compilers have traditionally been guided by per-
formance reasons in selecting the order in which the
predicates contained in a query are evaluated. For ex-
ample, more selective predicates are often evaluated
first to narrow down the set of rows to be passed on to
a subsequent join because join operations are costly. If
the method chosen to enforce MAC on a labeled table
is based on query modification to incorporate the ac-
cess rules in the form of regular predicates, then special
care must be taken in selecting the order in which the
predicates on that table are evaluated to avoid unau-
thorized leakage of labeled data rows. For example,
suppose that a query has a predicate on a labeled ta-
ble that involves a User-Defined Function (UDF). Fur-
ther suppose that this UDF takes the whole data row
as an input parameter and that the UDF source code
makes a copy of the data row outside the database (or
sends it as an e-mail to some destination). Now, sup-
pose that some data row R cannot be returned to the
user who issued the query because this would violate
the access rules from the label access policy associated
with this labeled table. If the predicate involving the
UDF is evaluated prior to evaluating the predicates
that implement the access rules then data row R will
be consumed by the UDF and consequently leaked to
an unauthorized user.
If the RDBMS chooses the query modification
method to enforce MAC on a labeled table, then it
must ensure that the predicates that implement the
access rules are evaluated before any other predicate
so that no labeled row leakage could occur. The alter-
native approach that is not based on query modifica-
tion evaluates the access rules immediately after the
row is accessed, and before any predicate is evaluated.
It is therefore more secure than the query modification
approach. It also allows the SQL compiler to continue
to select the order in which predicates are evaluated
in the usual way.
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4.3 Index-Only Access Methods
When selecting an access plan, SQL compilers choose
between three methods of accessing the data in a
database table: Scanning the entire table sequentially,
locating specific table rows by first accessing an index
on the table, or accessing just an index on the table
if all the required columns are part of the index key.
This latter method is known as index-only access. SQL
compilers usually rely on the statistics available about
the table and the indices to choose between those three
access methods. If an index only plan is selected then
the label column is not available and therefore the ac-
cess rules from the label access policy associated with
the table cannot be evaluated. MLS RDBMS extended
the primary key on an MLS relation with the secu-
rity label column in order to allow the simultaneous
existence of multiple tuples with the same (non ex-
tended) primary key (i.e., polyinstantiation)[1]. We
borrow this idea from the MLS work to extend every
index created on a labeled table (including the primary
key) with the row label column(s). This would allow
SQL compilers to continue to choose index only access
methods when this is appropriate, and for the access
rules from the label access policy associated with the
table on which the index is created to be evaluated.
5 Methodology for an End-to-end
MAC Enterprise Solution
The ever-increasing enterprise demands for more secu-
rity has led to the emergence of label security products
that provide the ability to set up and control access
based upon labels throughout an entire network from
end to end. For example, such label security prod-
ucts have the ability to control the network to decide
whether or not a particular labeled data row can be
transmitted on a particular channel or be delivered to
a particular workstation on that network. Cryptek[22]
is an example of such a label security product. An
important advantage of such label security products is
their ability to offer a centrally managed tool for defin-
ing label access policies and for assigning access labels
to users as well as to other entities on the network.
We contend that a MAC implementation in RDBMS
should offer the flexibility to integrate with a label se-
curity product for the following reasons:
1. Eliminate the need for the system administrator
to define the label access rules in more than a
single location (i.e., both in the RDBMS and in
the label security product)
2. Eliminate the need for the system administrator
to assign access labels to users in more than a
single location
3. Allow the access to a labeled data row in the
database to be based on more sophisticated la-
bel access rules that a particular implementation
of MAC in an RDBMS may not allow to express
We will now show how the methodology described
earlier in this paper could be extended to allow an
RDBMS to take part in such an end-to-end MAC
scheme by providing the flexibility to integrate with
a label security product.
5.1 Integration Approach
Recall from section 3.6 that we have extended the
CREATE TABLE SQL statement with an optional
clause to specify the label type and the label access
policy. We further extend this SQL statement such
that the LABEL POLICY clause could either specify
the name of a label access policy defined within the
RDBMS, or a label access policy defined externally
to the RDBMS (i.e., within a label security product).
The keyword EXTERNAL is introduced to support
this latter possibility as shown below.
CREATE TABLE T1 (A integer, B integer)
LABEL TYPE some-label-type
LABEL POLICY EXTERNAL
When a data row in such a table is accessed,
the RDBMS needs to supply the ID of the user
making the access together with the data row label
and the table name to the label security product
through a well-defined interface. The label security
product evaluates the label access rules based on the
information received from the RDBMS and returns a
response to the RDBMS through that same interface.
The response could be a Boolean flag indicating
whether or not the access should be allowed.
The SQL compiler will now need to take into
account where the label access rules are defined when
inserting logic into an access plan to enforce MAC on
a labeled table. Thus, a more general description of
the algorithm to be inserted in the access plan for a
labeled table is as follows.
Begin
if (policy defined within RDBMS)
{
Fetch the user’s access label (e.g., from a
system catalog table)
}
if (SELECT access)
{
for each row accessed
{
if (policy defined within RDBMS)
{
if (read access rules do not permit access)
{
Skip row
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}
}
else
{
response = callLabelSecurityProduct(userid,
rowlabel, table-name)
if (response is No)
{
Skip row
}
}
}
}
else
{
// INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE access
for each row
{
if (INSERT or UPDATE)
{
if (the row label provided is not valid with
respect to the label type associated with
the labeled table)
Reject INSERT or UPDATE
}
if (policy defined within RDBMS)
{
if (write access rules do not permit access)
Reject INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE
}
else
{
response = callLabelSecurityProduct
(userid, rowlabel, table-name)
if (response is No)
{
Reject INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE
}
}
}
}
End
Clearly, the calls to the label security product,
which is external to the RDBMS, would cause a
performance degradation. In the next section, we
will show how this performance degradation could be
minimized.
5.2 Performance Improvement
To minimize the performance degradation that could
result from the calls to the label security product, a
caching technique could be used. Before making the
call to the label security product, the RDBMS would
first check the cache to see if a similar call was made
earlier, and if so fetches the response directly from the
cache. The cache structure could look as follows.
Userid RowLabel Table Access Resp.
Joe L T Read Yes
Bob L’ T Write No
Table 1: Label security product responses cache
To ensure that the cache entries are always valid,
the label security product must signal to the RDBMS
through a well-defined interface any changes to the la-
bel access rules associated with a database table, or to
the access labels assigned to a database user. When
such a signal is received, the RDBMS invalidates the
cache entries that are affected by the change in la-
bel access rules or user access labels. For example,
if the label access rules associated with table T have
changed, then all cache entries for table T must be in-
validated. Similarly, if the access label for user Joe has
changed or has been revoked, then all cache entries for
user Joe must be invalidated.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper has introduced a flexible and generic im-
plementation of MAC in RDBMS that can be used to
address the requirements from a variety of application
domains, as well as to allow an RDBMS to efficiently
take part in an end-to-end MAC enterprise solution.
This implementation differs from traditional MAC im-
plementations in RDBMS, which have focused solely
on MLS, and thus cannot be leveraged to serve the
needs of application domains where there is a desire
to control access to objects based on the label asso-
ciated with that object and the label associated with
the subject accessing that object, but where the label
access rules and the label structure do not necessarily
match the MLS two security rules and the MLS label
structure (i.e., a hierarchical component and a set of
unordered compartments). Moreover, such implemen-
tations do not offer the flexibility to integrate with an
external label security product and therefore cannot
take part in an end-to-end MAC enterprise solution.
There are a number of additional problems re-
lated to implementing a generic MAC solution in an
RDBMS that have not been addressed in this paper.
These will be the subject of our future work. For ex-
ample, triggers could cause labeled data rows to flow
from a labeled table to a nonlabeled table if the subject
of a trigger is a labeled table but the target of that trig-
ger is a nonlabeled table. Without proper flow control
measures, triggers could cause unauthorized leakage of
information to occur. Also, there needs to be a mech-
anism to accommodate views based on labeled tables.
For example, if a view is based on a join between two
labeled tables how would the row label of a join re-
sult row be selected. Should the RDBMS make the
decision about how to combine labels? or should the
RDBMS offer the flexibility that would allow database
administrators to provide the rules for combining two
labels from the same label type?
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Abstract: Most work on XML access control considers XML nodes as the smallest protection unit. This paper shows the
limitation of this approach and introduces an XML access control mechanism that protects inter-node relation-
ships. Our approach provides a finer granularity of access control than the node-based approaches(i.e., more
expressive). Moreover, our approach helps achieve the “need-to-know” security principle and the “choice”
privacy principle. This paper also shows how our approach can be implemented using a generic label in-
frastructure and suggests algorithms to create/check a secure set of labeled relationships in an XML document.
1 INTRODUCTION
XML has rapidly emerged as the standard for the rep-
resentation and interchange of business and other sen-
sitive data on the Web. The current trend of adding
XML support to database systems poses new secu-
rity challenges for an environment in which both re-
lational and XML data coexist. In particular, fine-
grained access control is even more necessary for
XML than for relational data, given the more flexible
and less homogeneous structure of XML data com-
pared to relational tables and rows. The additional
difficulty of controlling access over XML data com-
pared to relational data can be summarized as follows.
• The semi-structured nature of XML data, where a
schema may be absent, or, even if it is present, may
allow much more flexibility and variability in the
structure of the document than what is allowed by
a relational schema.
• The hierarchical structure of XML, which requires
specifying, for example, how access privileges to a
certain node propagate from/to the node’s ancestors
and descendants.
In almost all of the work on XML access con-
trol (Bertino and Ferrari, 2002; Damiani et al., 2002;
Fan et al., 2004), the smallest unit of protection is
the XML node of an XML document, which are
specified by XPath fragments. Access to ancestor-
descendant and sibling relationships among nodes has
not been considered. An access control policy con-
sists of positive (resp. negative) authorization rules
that grant (resp. deny) access to some nodes of
an XML document. The main difference between
XML access control models lies in privilege propa-
gation. Some (Bertino and Ferrari, 2002; Gabillon
and Bruno, 2001) forbid access to the complete sub-
tree rooted at an inaccessible node. Alternatively, if a
node is granted access while one of its ancestor nodes
is inaccessible, the ancestor node would be masked as
an empty node in the XML document (Damiani et al.,
2002). However, this makes visible the literal of the
forbidden ancestor in the path from the root to that au-
thorized node. This can be improved by replacing the
ancestor node literal by a dummy value (Fan et al.,
2004). However, this still does not solve the prob-
lem that different descendant nodes may require their
ancestor’s literal to be visible or invisible differently.
From the differences among the above models, it is
clear that defining a view that precisely describes the
path leading to an authorized node is difficult. The
question that begs to be asked is therefore the fol-
lowing: Is a node the most fine-grained entity within
an XML document upon which a fine-grained access
control model for XML is to be built?
We believe that the answer to this question is
an unequivocal NO. We contend that the path be-
tween nodes is a better alternative upon which a
fine-grained access control model for XML is to be
built (Kanza et al., 2006). In other words, we con-
Figure 1: A document that contains information on accounts, orders and items for an online seller.
tend that ancestor-descendent relationships and sib-
ling relationships should be considered as legitimate
elements to be protected. The main advantages of our
approach are as follows.
First of all, blocking access to a node can be ad-
dressed by blocking access to all the relationships re-
lating to the node. For example, in Figure 1, if we
want to block all access to the Account Node “202”,
we could simply block access to all the paths from
that node’s ancestors to the node and all the paths
from the node to its sibling and descendants.
Second, blocking access to relationships helps
achieve the “need-to-know” principle, one of the most
fundamental security principles. This principle re-
quires information to be accessed by only those who
strictly need the information to carry out their assign-
ments. The practice of “need-to-know” limits the
damage that can be done by a trusted insider who
betrays our trust. The hierarchical structure of an
XML document often reveals classification informa-
tion. For example, in Figure 1, the root of the left
subtree of the document represents a special account
type “VIP Accounts”. Knowing an account node, say
Node “201”, belongs to that subtree reveals the ac-
count type. If the smallest protection unit is a node,
once we let the root of the subtree accessible, we
may leak unnecessary information. For example, sup-
pose that the relationship between the Account Node
“202” and the account type “VIP Accounts” at the
root of the subtree should be protected, knowing the
account type of Node “201” in the subtree reveals
the account type of Node “202”. With relationship
protection, we identify that the ancestor-descendant
relationship between Node “101” and Node “202”,
and the sibling relationship between Node “201”
and Node “202” should be protected while we let
the ancestor-descendant relationship between Node
“101” and Node “201” be accessible.
Third, blocking access to relationships helps
achieve the “choice” principle, one of the most fun-
damental privacy principles. At its simplest, the prin-
ciple means giving clients options as to how any per-
sonal information collected from them may be used.
If the smallest protection element is a node, access
control over one node is propagated to its ances-
tor/descendant nodes (Murata et al., 2003), i.e., when-
ever access is denied to a node, access is denied to its
descendants; whenever access is granted to a node,
access is granted to all its ancestors. Hence, nega-
tive access control policies over ancestor nodes give
a common authorized view of the paths leading to
their descendants. This violates the “choice” princi-
ple: in Figure 1, a client may want to hide the ac-
count type but not the other account information for
the account with AID “A2398”. If the smallest pro-
tection element is a relationship between nodes in an
XML document, we could protect the relationships
between Node “101” and the nodes in the subtree
rooted at Node “201”, and the sibling relationship be-
tween Node “201” and Node “202”. Then all the ac-
count information except the account type is still ac-
cessible from the root of the document tree. More-
over, there is no way to know that the subtree rooted
at Node “201” is a subtree of Node “101”.
Last but not least, protecting relationships between
nodes in an XML document is more expressible in
terms of access control policy translation.
Contributions: The contributions made in this paper
can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose an authorization-transparent fine-
grained access control model that protects the
ancestor-descendant and sibling relationships in an
XML document. Our model distinguishes two lev-
els of access to relationships, namely the existence
access and the value access.
2. We propose a new semantics for concealing rela-
tionships in an XML document where a relation-
ship is defined by a path in the document.
3. We propose a generic and flexible label-based ac-
cess control mechanism to protect relationships.
Our mechanism allows DBAs to define label-based
access control policies.
4. We propose a new query evaluation mechanism to
enforce our access control model.
5. We develop algorithms to check/create a secure set
of labeled relationships of an XML document.
2 RELATEDWORK
XML access control has been studied on issues such
as granularity of access, access-control inheritance,
default semantics, overriding, and conflict resolu-
tions (Bertino and Ferrari, 2002; Damiani et al., 2002;
Gabillon and Bruno, 2001; Murata et al., 2003). In
particular, a useful survey of these proposals is given
in (Fundulaki and Marx, 2004), which uses XPath to
give formal semantics to a number of different mod-
els in a uniform way, making it possible to com-
pare and contrast them. Almost all the recent mod-
els (Bertino and Ferrari, 2002; Damiani et al., 2002;
Gabillon and Bruno, 2001) propose to restrict the
user’s view of a document by access control poli-
cies. In particular, authors in (Damiani et al., 2002;
Gabillon and Bruno, 2001) mark each node as “ac-
cessible” or “inaccessible” in an XML document and
apply conflict resolution policies to compute an au-
thorized pruned view of the document. An alter-
native approach (Miklau and Suciu, 2003) defines
access control policies as XQuery expressions. A
user is given a modified document with encrypted
data and queries are posed on this modified docu-
ment. They present a new query semantics that per-
mits a user to see only authorized data. In (Fan et al.,
2004), security is specified by extending the docu-
ment DTD with annotations and publishing a modi-
fied DTD. Similarly, work by Bertino et al. (Bertino
et al., 2001) and Finance et al. (Finance et al., 2005)
provides XML-based specification languages for pub-
lishing secure XML document content, and for spec-
ifying role-based access control on XML data (Bhatti
et al., 2004; Wang and Osborn, 2004). Restricting
access to nodes has also been used in XACL (IBM,
2001) and XACML (Oasis., 2005), two proposed in-
dustrial standards. Kanza et al. propose to restrict
access to ancestor-descendant relationships (Kanza
et al., 2006) and introduce authorization-transparent
access control for XML data under the Non-Truman
model (Rizvi et al., 2004).
3 DATA MODEL AND QUERIES
We consider an XML document as a rooted directed
tree over a finite set of node literals L with a finite
set of values A attached to atomic nodes (i.e., nodes
with no outgoing edges). Formally, a document D is
a 5-tuple (ND, ED, rootD, literal of D, value of D),
where ND is a set of nodes, ED is a set of directed
edges, rootD is the root of a directed tree, literal of D
is a function that maps each node of ND to a literal
of L, and value of D is a function that maps each
atomic node to a value of A. In order to simplify the
data model, we do not distinguish between elements
and attributes of an XML document. We also assume
that all the values on atomic nodes are of type PC-
DATA (i.e., String).
Example 3.1 Figure 1 shows a document that con-
tains information on accounts, orders, and items for
an online seller. Nodes are represented by circles with
ID’s for easy reference. Values in A appear below the
atomic nodes and are written in bold font.
In this paper, we use XPath (Clark and DeRose, 1999)
for formulating queries and specifying relationships.
XPath is a simple language for navigation in an XML
document. In XPath, there are thirteen types of axes
that are used for navigation. Our focus is on the
child axis (/), the descendant-or-self axis (//), the
preceding-sibling axis and the following-sibling axis
that are the most commonly used axes in XPath. Our
model, however, can also be applied to queries that
include the other axes.
4 RELATIONSHIP ACCESS
First, we consider what it means to conceal a relation-
ship. In general, a relationship is an undirected path
between two nodes in an XML document. A set of
relationships is represented by two sets of nodes. For
example, the pair (C,N), where C is the set of all
Customer Nodes and N is the set of all Name Nodes
in Figure 1, represents the set of relationships between
customers and their names. Concealing the relation-
ships (C,N) means that for every customer c and
name n in the document, a user will not be able to in-
fer (with certainty), from any query answers, whether
n is the name for c. We want this to be true for all
authorized query results. Note that we are concealing
the presence or absence of relationships, so we are
concealing whether any of the set of pairs in (C,N)
exists in the document.
Definition 4.1 (Concealing a Relationship) Given
an XML document D and a pair of nodes n1 and n2
in D, the relationship (n1, n2) is concealed if there
exists a document D0 over the node set of D, such
that the following is true.
1. Exactly one of D and D0 has a path from n1 to n2.
2. For any XPath query Q, the authorized answer set
of Q over D is equal to that of Q over D0.
We consider two kinds of relationships in an XML
document, namely the ancestor-descendant relation-
ships and the sibling relationships. Kanza et al. con-
sider ancestor-descendant relationships only (Kanza
et al., 2006). Sibling relationships are inferred by the
ancestor-descendant relationships. Hence, when ac-
cess to an ancestor-descendant relationship is blocked
in their model, access to the related sibling relation-
ships is automatically blocked.
Example 4.2 In Figure 1, suppose the relationship
between VIP Accounts Node “101” and Account
Node “201” is inaccessible, then the sibling relation-
ship between Node “201” and Node “202” is lost.
It could be necessary to preserve such sibling re-
lationship information. For example, one policy may
want to block access to the ancestor-descendant rela-
tionships between VIP Accounts Node and Account
Nodes while maintain access to the sibling relation-
ships between the Account Nodes.
On the other hand, it might be desirable to block
access to sibling relationships only. For example, one
policy may want to block access to the sibling rela-
tionship between Customer and his Order.
In order to express such access control policies,
we consider sibling relationships as well as ancestor-
descendant relationships.
We distinguish two levels of access to relationships,
namely the existence access and the value access. In
value access, information about a relationship indi-
cates a node whose ID is “va” and whose literal is
“A” is related to a node whose ID is “vb” and whose
literal is “B”. For example, the pair (C,N) is a value
access to the relationships between Customer Nodes
and Name Nodes. In existence access, information
about a relationship is basically the same as informa-
tion of value access but lacks at least one of the values
“va” and “vb”. In other words, existence access to a
relationship returns whether a node of some literal is
related to some node. For example, existence access
could indicate a node whose literal is “A” is related to
a node whose literal is “B”. Obviously, if a relation-
ship is not accessible under existence access, then the
relationship is not accessible under value access.
Example 4.3 Consider the relationship between the
account with AID “A2398” and its customer name in
Figure 1. The value access to this relationship returns
that Node “201” whose literal is “Account” is related
to Node “311” whose literal is “Name” and whose
value is “John”. The typical queries that will return
this information are:
Q1: //Account[AID=“A2398”],
Q2: //Account[AID=“A2398”]/Customer/Name.
Now consider an existence access to this relationship:
a query Q3 wants to return all the accounts’ AID’s
that have a customer name. The fact that “A2398”
is returned tells us that there exists a customer with
name under the account with AID “A2398”, but it
does not tell us what the customer’s name is, nor the
Node ID “311”. In other words, Q1 and Q3 reveal
that Node “201” whose literal is “Account” is related
to some node n whose literal is “Name”, where n is
a child of some node whose literal is “Customer” and
which is a child of Node “201”.
Q3: //Account[Customer/Name]/AID.
In the next section, we show how to specify
ancestor-descendant and sibling relationships and at-
tach access labels to them.
5 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
SPECIFICATION
Our access control model uses a generic, flexible la-
bel infrastructure (Rjaibi and Bird, 2004) where a la-
bel has only one component “access level”. The value
of the component can be “EXISTENCE”, “VALUE”,
or “NULL”. The ranks of these values are as fol-
lows: “EXISTENCE” > “VALUE” > “NULL”. We
distinguish two types of labels: Access labels and
Path labels. Access labels are created and assigned
to database users, roles, or groups along with the type
of access for which the access label is granted (i.e.,
Read/Write). For simplicity, we consider only users
in this paper. We call read (resp. write) access label
an access label associated with the Read (resp. Write)
access type. Path labels are created and attached to
paths of an XML document. When a user or a path
is not associated with a label, the “NULL” label is
assumed for that user or path.
Example 5.1 The following statement creates and
grants the “EXISTENCE” access label to a database
user Mike for the Read access type.
GRANT ACCESS LABEL EXISTENCE
TO USER Mike FOR READ ACCESS
The following statement revokes the “EXISTENCE”
read access label from Mike.
REVOKE ACCESS LABEL EXISTENCE
FROM USER Mike FOR READ ACCESS
Access to an XML document is based upon the la-
bels associated with the paths of the XML document
and the label associated with the user accessing the
document via the paths. A label access policy consists
of label access rules that the database system evalu-
ates to determine whether a database user is allowed
access to an XML document. Access rules can be
categorized as Read Access rules and Write Access
rules. The former is applied by the database system
when a user attempts to read a path in an XML doc-
ument; the latter is applied when a user attempts to
insert, update or delete a path in an XML document.
In both cases, a label access rule is as follows:
Access Label hoperatori Path Label
where the operator is one of the arithmetic compari-
son operators {=,∑, <,>,∏, 6=}.
Example 5.2 The following statement creates a label
access policy that (1) does not allow a user to read a
path unless his read access label is larger than or equal
to the path label, (2) does not allow a user to write a
path unless his write access label is equal to the path
label.
CREATE LABEL POLICY XML-FGAC
READ ACCESS RULE rule
READ ACCESS LABEL ∏ Path LABEL
WRITE ACCESS RULE rule
WRITE ACCESS LABEL = Path LABEL
Recall value access to a relationship returns more
information than existence access. An “EXIS-
TENCE” label protects existence and value access.
A “VALUE” label protects value access only. There-
fore, if a user with a “NULL” read access label wants
to existence access a path with a “VALUE” path label,
access should be allowed since this existence access
does not return the complete relationship information
from value access. We call this the DEFAULT pol-
icy. This policy only applies to Read Access since
any Write Access involves real node ID’s (i.e., exis-
tence access is impossible). This policy could coex-
ist with other policies such as XML-FGAC to give a
more complete authorized answer set of a query.
Example 5.3 Assume the relationship in Exam-
ple 4.3 has a “VALUE” path label. If a user with a
“NULL” read access label asks query Q3, the exis-
tence access to the relationship should be allowed.
Next, we introduce how the labels are attached to
paths in an XML document. First, attaching a label
to ancestor-descendant paths are specified by an SQL
statement in the following form:
ATTACH path label ANCS path1 DESC path2,
where path1 and path2 are two XPath expressions.Notice expression path2 is a relative XPath expressionw.r.t. path1. The two expressions specify pairs of an-cestor nodes (i.e., path1) and descendent nodes (i.e.,
path1/path2). Expression path label is a label.
Example 5.4 The following expression attaches
“EXISTENCE” path labels to the relationships be-
tween Account Nodes and their Customers’ Name
Nodes in Figure 1.
ATTACH EXISTENCE ANCS //Account
DESC /Customer/Name
The following expression attaches a “VALUE” path
label to the relationship between the Item Node with
Name “IPOD” and its Cost Node in Figure 1.
ATTACH VALUE ANCS //Item[Name = “IPOD”]
DESC //Cost
For sibling relationships, we consider the preceding-
sibling axis and the following-sibling axis in XPath.
Thus, attaching a label to sibling paths are specified
by XPath expressions in the following form:
ATTACH path label
NODE path1 PRECEDING-SIBLING path2FOLLOWING-SIBLING path3,
where path1, path2 and path3 are three XPath ex-pressions. Notice expressions path2 and path3are two relative XPath expressions w.r.t. path1.The expressions specify relationships between some
nodes (i.e., path1), and their preceding siblings (i.e.,
path1/preceding-sibling :: path2) as well as the rela-tionships between the nodes and their following sib-
lings (i.e., path1/following-sibling :: path3). No-tice the PRECEDING-SIBLING expression and the
FOLLOWING-SIBLING expression do not have to
appear at the same time.
Example 5.5 The following expression attaches a
“VALUE” path label to the relationship between the
Account whose Customer has Name “Barbara” and
its preceding sibling.
ATTACH VALUE
NODE //Account[Customer/Name = “Barbara”]
PRECEDING-SIBLING Account
Note that the SQL statement to detach a label from
an ancestor-descendant path or a sibling path is sim-
ilar to the SQL statement to attach a label to those
paths except that ATTACH is replaced by DETACH.
6 QUERY EVALUATION
In authorization-transparent access control, users for-
mulate their queries against the original database
rather than against authorization views that transform
and hide data (Motro, 1989). In (Rizvi et al., 2004),
authorization transparent access control is categorized
into two basic classes, the Truman model and theNon-
Truman model. In the Truman model, an access con-
trol language (often a view language) is used to spec-
ify what data is accessible to a user. User queries are
modified by the system so that the answer includes
only accessible data. Let Q be a user query, D be a
database and Du be the part of D that the user is per-
mitted to see, then queryQ is modified to a safe query
Qs such that Qs(D) = Q(Du). We call Qs(D) the
authorized answer set of Q over D. In contrast, in
the Non-Truman model, a query that violates access
control specifications is rejected, rather than modi-
fied. Only valid queries are answered.
Our model is an authorization-transparent Truman
model. We allow users to pose XPath queries against
the original labeled XML document. The evaluation
of an XPath query over a labeled XML document has
two parts. First, we change the usual XPath query
semantics as follows. If a child axis occurs, the eval-
uation follows a parent-child path; if a descendant-or-
self axis occurs, the evaluation follows an ancestor-
descendant path; if a preceding-sibling axis occurs,
the evaluation follows a preceding-sibling path; if a
following-sibling axis occurs, the evaluation follows
a following-sibling path.
Second, we need to make sure that for each path ac-
cessed, a user is allowed access to that path based on
the path label and the user’s access label. Suppose a
path P has a path label L1 and a user Mike has a read
access label L2. According to the XML-FGAC pol-
icy, (1) if L2 is “EXISTENCE”, Mike could read the
path P regardless of the value of label L1; (2) if L2
is “VALUE”, Mike could read the path P if L1 is not
“EXISTENCE”; (3) if L2 is “NULL”, Mike can only
access paths with “NULL” labels; if the DEFAULT
policy coexists, Mike could ask queries to existence
access the path P if L1 is “VALUE”. The discussion
for Write Access is similar. The above logic is in-
serted into the query access plan. When the access
plan is executed, the access rules from the label ac-
cess policy associated with the labeled XML docu-
ment are evaluated for each path accessed in the doc-
ument. This approach allows the cached access plan
to be reused because the access labels of the user who
issued the query are acquired during runtime.
For an XML document, there is an ordering, docu-
ment order (Clark and DeRose, 1999), defined on all
the nodes in the document corresponding to the order
in which the first character of the XML representa-
tion of each node occurs in the XML representation
of the document. This ordering information may leak
information as shown in the following example.
Example 6.1 Let us look at Figure 1 again. Sup-
pose one security policy wants to block public ac-
cess to the sibling relationships between the Customer
Nodes and their Order Nodes. Suppose the following
queries are allowed to return their answers in docu-
ment order: //Customer and //Order. Then the order
of Customer output might match the order of Order
output, hence leaks secret information. The situa-
tion becomes worse if the document has a registered
schema and the schema shows publicly that each cus-
tomer has a fixed number, say 2, of orders. In this
case, the association between a Customer and his Or-
ders is completely leaked.
To prevent an information leak based on document
order, we shuffle the output as follows. Each node
in the output will receive a random number. And the
nodes will be output based on the order of their as-
signed random numbers.
In sum, the processing algorithm to be inserted in
the access plan for a labeled XML document with
XML-FGAC and DEFAULT policies is as follows.
Algorithm: Insert Read and Write Access logic into
a query access plan for a labeled XML document.
1. Fetch the user’s Access Labels for Read and Write
actions (e.g., from a system catalog table).
2. For all paths accessed, do the following.
(a) If it is a Read Access and READ Access rules
do not permit access, skip the path unless (1) the
Read Access Label is “NULL”, (2) the Path La-
bel is “VALUE”, and (3) it is an existence access.
(b) If it is a Write Access and Write Access rules do
not permit access, skip the path.
3. Shuffle output.
Example 6.2 Suppose the document in Figure 1 has
two labels attached to its paths as specified in Exam-
ple 5.4 and the label access policies are XML-FGAC
and DEFAULT. Suppose a database user Mike with a
read access label “EXISTENCE” asks the query Q1:
//Account[Customer/Name]. The query access plan
checks the following paths:
1. the paths P1 from the root of the document to Ac-
count Nodes, i.e., //Account,
2. the paths P2 from Account Nodes to their descen-
dant Name Nodes via Customer Nodes, i.e.,
ANCS //Account DESC /Customer/Name,
3. the paths P3 from Customer Nodes to their children
Name Nodes, i.e., Customer/Name.
Paths P1 and P3 have “NULL” labels, hence, access is
allowed. Paths P2 have “EXISTENCE” labels. Mike
could read them since his read access label is “EXIS-
TENCE”. Read access to P2 is denied for any other
labels and the authorized answer set is empty.
Next, suppose another user John with a read access
label “VALUE” asks the query Q2: //Item//Cost. The
query access plan checks the following paths:
1. the paths P1 from the root of the document to the
Item Nodes, i.e., //Item,
2. the paths P2 from the Item Nodes to their descen-
dant Cost Nodes, i.e., ANCS //Item DESC //Cost.
Paths P1 have “NULL” labels, hence, access is al-
lowed. For P2, one path P21 has a “NULL” la-
bel; the other path P22 has a “VALUE” label as it is
ANCS //Item[Name=“IPOD”] DESC //Cost. John
could read P2 if his read access label is “VALUE”.
John could read P21 but not P22 if his read access la-
bel is “NULL”. Hence, the authorized answer set is
“450$”. However, even if John’s read access label is
“NULL”, the following query from John will still re-
turn the complete answer to Q3: //Item[Cost]. This
is because Q3 only existence accesses the paths P2,
i.e., the authorized answer set only indicates there ex-
ist Cost children Nodes for the Item Nodes “203” and
“204”, but no information about the values and node
ID’s of the Cost Nodes is leaked.
7 CREATE A SECURE SET OF
LABELED RELATIONSHIPS
Our goal is to allow users to label node relationships
and let them be sure that what they want to conceal
is truly concealed from the users whose access labels
do not satisfy the label access policy with the path la-
bels. Unfortunately, it is impossible to guarantee con-
cealment for any arbitrary set of relationships. Some-
times, it is possible to infer a concealed relationship
from the relationships that are not concealed.
Let us see an example of four cases where a re-
lationship could be inferred from a pair of non-
concealed relationship.
Example 7.1 In Figure 1, suppose it is known
that Account Node “201” is a descendant of
VIP Accounts Node “101” and Customer Node “301”
is a descendant of Account Node “201”. Then, there
is no point to conceal the ancestor-descendant rela-
tionship between VIP Accounts Node “101” and Cus-
tomer Node “301”.
Suppose it is known that Customer Node “301” is
a descendant of VIP Accounts Node “101” as well
as Account Node “201”. Since there is only one
path from the root of the document to Account Node
“201”, there is no point to conceal the ancestor-
descendant relationship between VIP Accounts Node
“101” and Account Node “201”.
Suppose it is known that Account Node “201”
and Account Node “202” are the children of
VIP Accounts Node “101”, then there is no point
to conceal the sibling relationship between Account
Node “201” and Account Node “202”.
Suppose it is known that VIP Accounts Node
“101” has a descendant Customer Node “301” and
the customer has a sibling Order Node “302”, then
there is no point to conceal the ancestor-descendant
relationship between VIP Accounts Node “101” and
Order Node “302”.
We say a set of labeled relationships/paths in an
XML document D is not secure w.r.t. a path label
L if one of the following four cases happens.
1. Case 1: D has three nodes, n1, n2 and n3 s.t. the
ancestor-descendant path from n1 to n2 and the
ancestor-descendant path from n2 to n3 have labels
L12 < L and L23 < L. The ancestor-descendant
path from n1 to n3 has a label L13 ∏ L.
2. Case 2: D has three nodes, n1, n2 and n3 s.t. the
ancestor-descendant path from n1 to n3 and the
ancestor-descendant path from n2 to n3 have labels
L13 < L and L23 < L. The ancestor-descendant
path from n1 to n2 has a label L12 ∏ L.
3. Case 3: D has three nodes, n1, n2 and n3 s.t. n1 is
the parent of n2 and n3, the parent-child path from
n1 to n2 and the parent-child path from n1 to n3
have labels L12 < L and L13 < L. The sibling
path from n2 to n3 has a label L23 ∏ L or the
sibling path from n3 to n2 has a label L32 ∏ L.
4. Case 4: D has three nodes, n1, n2 and n3 s.t. the
ancestor-descendant path from n1 to n2 has a label
L12 < L, and either the sibling path from n2 to n3
has a label L23 < L or the sibling path from n3 to
n2 has a label L32 < L. The ancestor-descendant
path from n1 to n3 has a label L13 ∏ L.
There is a simple test to verify that a set of labeled
relationships/paths in an XML document D is not se-
cure w.r.t. a path label L. The test starts by comput-
ing three ternary relations R1, R2 and R3. The first
two columns store the start/end nodes of paths. The
third column stores the label associated with paths (if
a label is missing, then it is a NULL value). In par-
ticular, R1 stores all ancestor-descendant paths in D,
R2 stores all parent-child paths in D, and R3 stores
all sibling paths in D.
1. Case 1 is true for a path label L iff the expression
º$1,$5(R1,L ./$2=$1 R1,L) ° R1,L is not empty
where R1,L is æ$3<L(R1).
2. Case 2 is true for a path label L iff the expression
º$1,$4(R1,L ./$2=$2 R1,L) ° R1,L is not empty
where R1,L is æ$3<L(R1).
3. Case 3 is true for a path label L iff the expression
º$2,$5(R2,L ./$1=$1 R2,L) ° R3,L is not empty
where R2,L is æ$3<L(R2) and R3,L is æ$3<L(R3).
4. Case 4 is true for a path label L iff the expression
º$1,$5(R1,L ./$2=$1 R3,L) ° R1,L is not empty
where R1,L is æ$3<L(R1) and R3,L is æ$3<L(R3).
Furthermore, we give intuitive conditions to con-
struct a secure set of labeled relationships for an XML
document. If we ignore the directions of ancestor-
descendant and sibling paths, all these paths form cy-
cles in an XML document. To assign a path label L
to a relationship between two nodes n1 and n2 in an
XML document D, we must make sure, for every cy-
cle that includes the path from n1 to n2, either there is
another path whose labelL0 ∏ L, or n1 and n2 are de-
scendants of some nodes in the cycle and n1, n2 are
not children of the same parent. Both cases ensure
there is uncertainty whether a relationship between
two nodes n1 and n2 exists: the first case by having
another path missing in the cycle, while in the second
case, the fact that n1 and n2 are descendants of some
nodes in the cycle introduces uncertainty except when
they are children of the same parent, in which case the
sibling relationship between n1 and n2 is leaked.
There is another possible information leak due to
singleton-source disclosure (Kanza et al., 2006). In
short, a user can infer that two nodes n1 and n2 are
related in a document D when (1) the path from the
root of document D to node n2 must go through a
node whose literal is A, (2) the only node with lit-
eral A in document D is node n1. An algorithm
to test singleton-source disclosure has been proposed
in (Kanza et al., 2006) and we will not repeat it here.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced a fine-grained access con-
trol model for XML data using generic security la-
bels. Our model is based on inter-node relation-
ship labeling and provides finer-grained access con-
trol than traditional node labeling approaches, hence
helps achieve the “need-to-know” security principle
and the “choice” privacy principle. We propose a new
semantics for concealing relationships in an XML
document under the Truman model. To enforce our
model, we provide a new query evaluation algorithm
and suggest algorithms to check/create a set of secure
labeled paths for an XML document.
Our future work includes implementing our model
and validating its effectiveness and performance using
real-life XML access control user cases. An impor-
tant challenge is adapting our mechanism to XQuery,
general XML document graphs and XML schemas.
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Abstract
Multilevel Security (MLS) is a capability that
allows information with different classifications
to be available in an information system, with
users having different security clearances and
authorizations, while preventing users from ac-
cessing information for which they are not
cleared or authorized. It is a security policy
that has grown out of research and develop-
ment efforts funded mostly by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) to address some of the
drawbacks of the single level mode of opera-
tion that was used at the DoD. The goal was
to build and deploy an MLS-compliant envi-
ronment (e.g., Networks, Operating Systems,
Database Systems) that would provide a much
needed efficiency in processing and distribut-
ing classified information by providing security
through computer security, communications se-
curity, and trusted system techniques instead
of using physical controls, administrative pro-
cedures, and personnel security. As Relational
Database Management Systems (RDBMS) are
at the heart of the DoD’s information sys-
tem, significant research and development ef-
forts have been put into building multilevel se-
cure RDBMS, which have led to the emergence
Copyright c© 2004 IBM Canada Ltd., 2004. Per-
mission to copy is hereby granted provided the original
copyright notice is reproduced in copies made.
of a number of multilevel secure RDBMS so-
lutions, including commercial ones. Over the
past few years and with the increase of secu-
rity concerns, MLS compliance has become a
major requirement from a number U.S. Fed-
eral Government agencies that appear to have
grown beyond the traditional agencies that re-
quire such type and level of security. This
paper introduces MLS, and outlines the chal-
lenges and complexities of building a multilevel
secure RDBMS. The paper also gives concrete
examples of both research and commercial mul-
tilevel secure RDBMS and describes how they
met the above challenges and complexities.
1 Introduction
Multilevel Security (MLS) is a capability that
allows information with different classifications
to be available in an information system, with
users having different security clearances and
authorizations, while preventing users from ac-
cessing information for which they are not
cleared or authorized[2]. It is a security pol-
icy that has been developed primarily for the
U.S. military and intelligence communities, but
has also been adopted by some civilian organi-
zations that store, process and distribute clas-
sified information (e.g., major aircraft manu-
facturers) as well as by a number of defense
departments around the world.
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Given the extremely high value of the infor-
mation that could be stored in a military or
intelligence database, and the potential dam-
age that could result from the unauthorized dis-
closure, alteration or loss of such information,
preventing users from accessing information for
which they are not cleared or authorized re-
quires much more than just implementing an
access control policy. In particular, security
guards must be put in place to prevent users
from gaining access to information for which
they are not cleared or authorized through in-
direct means.
Covert channels[5] are examples of such in-
direct means. A covert channel can easily
be established with conventional database con-
currency control algorithms such as two-phase
locking (2PL) and timestamp ordering (TO)[6].
In both 2PL and TO algorithms, whenever
there is contention for the same data item by
transactions executing at different security lev-
els, a lower level transaction may be either de-
layed or suspended to ensure correct execution.
In such a scenario, two colluding transactions
executing at high and low security levels can
establish an information flow channel from a
high security level to a low security level by ac-
cessing selected data items according to some
agreed-upon code[4].
Inference[7] is another indirect means by
which users can gain knowledge about infor-
mation for which they are not cleared or au-
thorized. For example, enforcing a primary key
constraint[6] across data from different security
levels could allow a non sufficiently cleared user
to gain knowledge about the existence of a data
row at a higher security level from the duplicate
key error message that is returned to that user
when he or she attempts to insert a data row
at a low security level but having the same pri-
mary key as the data row at the higher security
level.
Building a multilevel secure RDBMS has
thus posed significant challenges to the
database research community. For instance,
secure database transaction protocols had to
be developed, and a solution to reconcile the
conflicting requirements between data integrity
and confidentiality had to be found. MLS has
also posed significant challenges to database
vendors as building a multilevel secure RDBMS
often requires rebuilding major portions of an
existing commercial RDBMS.
There has been an abundance of research
within the last two decades or so in the
area of multilevel secure RDBMS. Such re-
search has addressed specific aspects of build-
ing a multilevel secure RDBMS such as secure
transaction protocols, system architectures, or
polyinstantiation[8], and there is a rich set of
publications about those specific aspects[8, 4,
9, 10]. However, the multilevel secure RDBMS
research literature surprisingly lacks the kind
of publication that would allow someone to get
a good understanding about what it takes to
build a multilevel secure RDBMS as a whole,
as well as to serve as a quick guide for those
who might be thinking about building such
RDBMS.
Moreover, the term multilevel security is
heavily overloaded across the Information
Technology (IT) industry and often means dif-
ferent things to people from different back-
grounds as there are not only multilevel secure
RDBMS, but also multilevel secure operating
systems, multilevel secure networks, multilevel
secure webservers, etc. In addition to being
heavily overloaded, MLS is often incorrectly
used interchangeably with emerging market-
ing terms such as Label-Based Access Control
(LBAC), Row-Level Security, and others. All
of this makes it extremely difficult for those
who have not been directly involved in design-
ing or building a multilevel secure RDBMS to
get a good understanding about what it really
takes to build a multilevel secure RDBMS.
In this paper, the author wishes to share
his expertize in database security and privacy
to try to clarify the mystery of multilevel se-
curity, as well as to outline the challenges
and complexities of building a multilevel secure
RDBMS.
1.1 Synopsis
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces MLS and describes the
MLS certification and evaluation process. Sec-
tion 3 presents and compares Multilevel Se-
cure RDBMS architectures. Section 4 de-
scribes the issue of polyinstantiation. Section
5 presents multilevel secure transaction pro-
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cessing. Section 6 gives concrete examples of
both research and commercial multilevel secure
RDBMS. Lastly, section 7 summarizes the con-
cepts introduced in this paper.
2 What is Multilevel Secu-
rity?
A good understanding of MLS would not be
complete without understanding its origins,
and what problems it was meant to solve.
The U.S. military and intelligence communities
have historically segregated data based upon
its security classification. Classified data must
reside and be processed on dedicated systems
that do not provide access to users outside of
the immediate community of interest and are
often separated by an air gap and connected
only by a sneaker net[2]. The main drawbacks
of such operational scheme can be summarized
as follows:
• Redundant databases: To store data with
different security levels (e.g., Top Secret
data and Unclassified data), a separate
database must be created and maintained
for each security level.
• Redundant workstations: A user who is re-
quired to access data with different secu-
rity levels (e.g., Top Secret data and Un-
classified data) would be required to use
a different workstation to access each type
of data.
• High cost of IT infrastructure: It is not
possible to share the computer and com-
munication system infrastructures, such
as cabling, network components, printers,
and workstations without risking to com-
promise security.
• Inefficiency: Staff members need to access
several systems to perform their duties.
The U.S. DoD has therefore funded signifi-
cant research and development projects across
various organizations to come up with a so-
lution that would allow classified information
to be stored, processed and distributed in a
secure way, but without the drawbacks listed
above. MLS was that solution[2]. MLS allows
information with different classifications to be
available in an information system, with users
having different security clearances and autho-
rizations, while preventing users from accessing
information for which they are not cleared or
authorized[2]. For example, an MLS system
might process both Secret and Top Secret col-
lateral data and have some users whose maxi-
mum clearance is Secret and others whose max-
imum clearance is Top Secret. Another MLS
system might have all its users cleared at the
Top Secret level, but have the ability to release
information classified as Secret to a network
consisting of only Secret users and systems. In
each of these instances, the system must im-
plement mechanisms to provide assurance that
the system’s security policy is strictly enforced.
MLS has resulted in a shift from providing se-
curity through physical controls, administra-
tive procedures, and personnel security to pro-
viding security using computer and communi-
cation security.
2.1 The Bell-LaPadula Multilevel
Security Model
The Basic model of MLS was first introduced
by Bell and LaPadula[11]. The model is stated
in terms of objects and subjects. An object is
a passive entity such as a data file, a record,
or a field within a record. A subject is an ac-
tive process that can request access to objects.
Every object is assigned a classification, and
every subject a clearance. Classifications and
clearances are collectively referred to as labels.
A label is a piece of information that consists
of two components: A hierarchical component
and a set of unordered compartments. The hi-
erarchical component specifies the sensitivity
of the data. For example, a military organi-
zation might define levels Top Secret, Secret,
Confidential and Unclassified. The compart-
ments component is nonhierarchical. Compart-
ments are used to identify areas that describe
the sensitivity or category of the labeled data.
For example, a military organization might de-
fine compartments NATO, Nuclear and Army.
Labels are partially ordered in a lattice as fol-
lows: Given two labels L1 and L2, L1 >= L2 if
and only if the hierarchical component of L1
is greater than or equal to that of L2, and
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the compartment component of L1 includes the
compartment component of L2. L1 is said to
dominate L2. MLS imposes the following two
restrictions on all data accesses:
• The Simple Security Property or “No Read
Up”: A subject is allowed a read access to
an object if and only if the subject’s label
dominates the object’s label.
• The *-Property (pronounced the star
property) or “No Write Down”: A sub-
ject is allowed a write access to an object
if and only if the object’s label dominates
the subject’s label.
2.2 Evaluation and Certification
Multilevel secure systems must complete an ex-
tensive evaluation and certification process be-
fore they can be used in military applications.
The evaluation and certification of a multilevel
secure system is usually conducted by an inde-
pendent testing laboratory and is based upon
a clearly defined set of criterion. One set of
criteria is called common criteria, which has
recently been adopted as an ISO standard[3].
Another set of evaluation criteria used by the
U.S. DoD is the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)[5]. Most multi-
level secure RDBMS have been developed be-
fore common criteria was adopted. TCSEC has
been the norm for evaluating such RDBMS.
TCSEC is divided into four divisions: D,
C, B, and A ordered in a hierarchical manner
with the highest division (A) reserved for sys-
tems providing the most comprehensive secu-
rity. Each division represents a major increase
in the overall confidence, or trust, that one can
place in the system. Successive levels of trust
build upon and incorporate the criteria of the
previous lower level of trust.
Within Divisions C and B there are a number
of subdivisions known as classes. The classes
are also ordered in a hierarchical manner with
systems representative of Divisions C and B
characterized by the set of computer security
mechanisms that they possess. For Division C,
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)[6] is pro-
vided, whereby users can grant or deny access
by other users and groups of users to the system
resources that the users control. For Division
B, Mandatory Access Control (MAC)[1] is pro-
vided. MAC employs the simple security prop-
erty and the *-property of the Bell-LaPadula
MLS model to protect data of different secu-
rity levels. Division A also provides the MAC
features.
Systems representative of the higher classes
in Division B and Division A derive their se-
curity attributes more from their design and
implementation structure than merely security
features or functionality. Increased assurance
that the required features are operative, cor-
rect, and tamperproof under all circumstances
is gained through progressively more rigorous
design, implementation, and analysis during
the development process. Division A requires
formal (e.g., mathematical) design and verifica-
tion techniques to provide increased assurances
over Division B.
Multilevel secure systems are associated with
TCSEC divisions B and A[2].
3 Multilevel Secure
RDBMS Architectures
Multilevel secure RDBMS architectures can be
divided into two general types, depending on
whether mandatory access control is enforced
by the RDBMS itself or delegated to a trusted
operating system. These two general types are
the Woods Hole Architecture and the Trusted
Subjects Architecture[9, 10].
3.1 Woods Hole Architectures
The Woods Hole architectures are the outcome
of a three-week study on trusted data manage-
ment sponsored by the U.S. Air Force at Woods
Hole, Massachusetts, USA in 1982[9, 10]. The
subject of this study was the following: Can we
build a multilevel secure RDBMS using existing
untrusted off-the-shelf RDBMS, with minimal
change?
The Woods Hole architectures assume that
an untrusted off-the-shelf RDBMS is used to
access data and that trusted code is developed
around that RDBMS to provide an overall se-
cure RDBMS. They can be divided into two
main categories: The kernelized architectures
and the distributed architectures[9, 10].
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3.1.1 Kernelized Architectures
The kernelized architecture[9, 10] uses a
trusted operating system and multiple copies
of an off-the-shelf RDBMS, where each copy is
associated with some trusted front-end. Each
pair (trusted front-end, RDBMS) is associated
with a particular security level. The trusted
operating system enforces its full access control
policy on all accesses by the RDBMS to the
RDBMS objects. It ensures that data at dif-
ferent security levels is stored separately, and
that each copy of the RDBMS gets access to
data that is authorized for its associated secu-
rity level. The latter is possible because the
multilevel database is decomposed into mul-
tiple single-level databases, where each repre-
sents a fragment of the conceptual multilevel
database. Each fragment is stored in a single-
level operating system object (e.g., a file) which
is labeled by the operating system at the cor-
responding security level, and thus can only be
accessed according to the MAC policy of the
operating system.
Figure 1 illustrates a kernelized architec-
ture where one RDBMS is associated with
the security level “High” and another RDBMS
is associated with the security level “Low”.
The RDBMS associated with the security level
“High” has access to both the fragment of the
database at the high security level and the frag-
ment of the database at the low security level.
But the RDBMS associated with the security
level “Low” has access only to the fragment of
the database at the low security level.
A benefit of this architecture is that data
at different security levels is isolated in the
database, which allows for higher level assur-
ance. Another benefit is that, assuming an al-
ready evaluated operating system, this archi-
tecture should minimize the amount of time
and effort to evaluate the RDBMS. However,
this architecture results in an additional over-
head as the trusted operating system needs to
separate data at different security levels when it
is added to the database and might also need
to combine data from different security levels
when data is retrieved by an RDBMS copy that
is associated with a high security level.
High RDBMS Low RDBMS
Trusted Operating System
Front End
High Trusted Low Trusted
Front End
High User Low User
High Data Low Data
Figure 1: Multilevel secure kernelized RDBMS
architecture.
3.1.2 Distributed Architectures
The distributed (or replicated) architecture[9,
10] is a variation of the kernelized architec-
ture. It uses multiple copies of the trusted
front-end and RDBMS, each associated with
its own database storage. In this architecture
scheme, an RDBMS at security level l contains
a replica of every data item that a subject
at level l can access. Thus, when data is re-
trieved, the RDBMS retrieves it only from its
own database. Another benefit of this archi-
tecture is that data is physically separated into
separate hardware databases. However, this
scheme results in an additional overhead when
data is updated as the various replicas need to
be kept in sync.
3.2 Trusted Subjects Architec-
tures
The trusted subject architecture[9] is a scheme
that contains a trusted RDBMS and a trusted
operating system. According to this architec-
ture, the mandatory access control policy is
enforced by the RDBMS itself. Database ob-
jects (e.g., a table) are stored in operating sys-
tem objects (e.g., a file) labeled at the high-
est security level. A database table can con-
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tain rows with different security levels. Such
rows are distinguished based on their security
level which is explicitly stored with each row.
This architecture is called “trusted subject” be-
cause the RDBMS is privileged to violate the
operating system’s MAC policy when access-
ing database objects. For example, when a user
with a low security level queries a database ta-
ble, the operating system’s object where that
table is stored ends up being accessed, which
is a violation of the operating system’s MAC
policy. But the RDBMS is trusted to return
to the users only those rows for which he or
she is authorized according to the MAC policy.
Figure 2 illustrates a multilevel secure trusted
subject RDBMS Architecture.
Trusted Operating System
Front End Front End
High User Low User
Untrusted Untrusted
Trusted RDBMS
Database
Figure 2: Multilevel secure trusted subject
RDBMS architecture.
A benefit of this architecture is that the
RDBMS has access to all levels of data at the
same time, which minimizes retrieval and up-
date processing. However, this architecture re-
sults in a special purpose RDBMS that requires
a large amount of trusted code to be developed
and verified along with the normal RDBMS fea-
tures. It also lacks the potential to be evalu-
ated to high TCSEC evaluation classes because
meeting higher levels of assurance requires the
ability to provide separation of mandatory ob-
jects by some form of hardware isolation. It is
also difficult to prove that the trusted software
used to isolate mandatory objects (e.g., data
rows with different security levels) is working
correctly without allowing for the flow of data
with high security level to users with low secu-
rity level.
4 Polyinstantiation
Multilevel secure RDBMS utilize mandatory
access control to prevent the unauthorized dis-
closure of high-level data to low-level users. It
is also necessary to guard against the threat
to confidentiality that can arise from enforcing
database integrity constraints[6] across data
from multiple security levels. To illustrate this
threat to confidentiality, consider the following
database table where the attribute “starship”
is the primary key, and the attribute “label”
represents the data row security level.
Starship Destination Label
Enterprise Mars High
Suppose that a user with a low security level
wishes to insert the tuple (Enterprise, Talos,
Low). From a purely database perspective, this
insert must be rejected because it violates the
primary key constraint. However, rejecting this
insert could be sufficient to compromise secu-
rity as the user with low security level could
infer that the starship Enterprise is on a mis-
sion with a higher security level.
Polyinstantiation[8] is a solution to this
problem. It expands the notion of primary key
to include the security level so that more than
one tuple may possess the same apparent pri-
mary key if they are at different security lev-
els. To continue with our example, a new row
with the same apparent primary key (i.e., En-
terprise) is added to the table.
Starship Destination Label
Enterprise Mars High
Enterprise Talos Low
From a security perspective, the newly added
row is simply a cover story for the real mission
of the starship enterprise.
6
In addition to protecting against inference,
polyinstantiation is also useful to prevent de-
nial of service to legitimate users as well as
to protect against storage covert channels[5].
Covert channels use system variables and at-
tributes to signal information. To illustrate
this type of threat to confidentiality, consider
the following database table where the at-
tribute “starship” is the primary key, and the
attribute “label” represents the data row secu-
rity level.
Starship Destination Label
Enterprise Talos Low
Now, suppose that a user with a high secu-
rity level wishes to update the destination to
be “Mars”. If the RDBMS rejects this update,
then the user may have been denied legitimate
privileges. If the update is allowed by changing
the row’s security level to “High” then a user
with a low security level will notice that the
data row has disappeared and will infer that its
security level has been increased. If the update
is allowed without changing the row’s security
level, then a storage covert channel will be cre-
ated. That is, the data row itself could be used
as a storage object for passing high level infor-
mation to users with low security level. Polyin-
stantiation allows the RDBMS to insert a new
data row with the same apparent primary key
(i.e., Enterprise) but with a high security level
as a result of such update.
Starship Destination Label
Enterprise Talos Low
Enterprise Mars High
From a security perspective, the old data row
is simply a cover story for the real mission of
the starship enterprise.
5 Multilevel Secure Trans-
action Processing
Multilevel secure RDBMS utilize mandatory
access control to prevent the unauthorized dis-
closure of high-level data to low-level users. It
is also necessary to guard against the threat
to confidentiality that can arise from employ-
ing conventional transaction protocols such as
two-phase locking (2PL)[4]. The 2PL transac-
tion protocol delays the execution of conflict-
ing operations by setting locks on data items
for read and write operations[6]. A transaction
must acquire a shared-lock (S-lock) on a data
item before reading it and an exclusive lock
(X-lock) before writing it. The 2PL transac-
tion protocol is inherently vulnerable to timing
covet channels which could be established to
leak confidential information. A timing covert
channel [5] varies the amount of time to com-
plete a task to signal information. To illustrate
this threat to confidentiality, consider the fol-
lowing example.
Let Ti denote a high security level transac-
tion, which is reading a low security level data
item A. Let Tj denote a low security level
transaction, which is trying to write to data
item A. If the 2PL transaction protocol is em-
ployed, then Tj must wait to acquire an X-lock
on data item A (i.e., wait until Ti releases its
S-lock on data item A). Suppose that Tj can
measure the time quantum q it has to wait to
acquire the lock on data item A: A quantum
of waiting time greater than a certain amount
represents ’1’, and a quantum of waiting time
less than that a certain amount represents ’0’.
Transaction Ti can exploit this knowledge to
send one bit of high security level information
to Tj , and by repeating this protocol, any in-
formation can be sent, creating a timing covert
channel.
2PL, and in general conventional transaction
protocols in RDBMS, are not secure against
timing covert channels.
6 Commercial and Re-
search Multilevel Secure
RDBMS
The research and development efforts in the
area of multilevel secure RDBMS have re-
sulted in a number of commercial and research
systems. The most noticeable of these sys-
tems are the following: Trusted Oracle[12],
Informix OnLine/Secure[13], Sybase Secure
SQL Server[14], DB2 for z/OS[15], Trusted
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Rubix[16], SEAVIEW[8], and Unisys Secure
Distributed DBMS[17].
Trusted Oracle can be configured to run in
one of two modes: DBMS MAC and OS MAC.
The former is an architecture where mandatory
access control is enforced by the RDBMS it-
self, and thus is a trusted subject architecture.
The latter is a kernelized architecture (i.e.,
mandatory access control is delegated to the
operating system). Informix OnLine/Secure,
Sybase Secure SQL Server, DB2 for z/OS, and
Trusted Rubix are examples of a trusted sub-
ject architecture. The SEAVIEW research sys-
tem is an example of a kernelized architecture
whereas the Unisys Secure Distributed research
RDBMS is an example of a distributed archi-
tecture.
Informix OnLine/Secure, Sybase Secure SQL
Server, Trusted Oracle, and Trusted Rubix all
support polyinstantiation. The key for a tu-
ple in Informix OnLine/Secure automatically
includes the tuple security label. Thus, polyin-
stantiation is always possible and cannot be
suppressed by the RDBMS.
The tuple security label in the Sybase Secure
SQL Server is part of all keys. Thus, polyin-
stantiation is always possible and cannot be
suppressed by the RDBMS.
Trusted Oracle can be configured to run in
one of two modes. When run in DBMS MAC
mode, a single Trusted Oracle database can
store information at multiple security levels. In
this mode, Trusted Oracle can turn polyinstan-
tiation on and off at the table level by requiring
key integrity which does not include the tuple
security label. When on, the primary key in-
cludes the tuple label, which allows polyinstan-
tiation to occur. When off, the key does not in-
clude the tuple security label, thus preventing
polyinstantiation.
When run in OS MAC mode, Trusted Oracle
is capable of storing data at only a single secu-
rity label, and the RDBMS is constrained by
the underlying operating system MAC policy.
Without any MAC privilege, the RDBMS can-
not suppress polyinstantiation because a low
RDBMS will not be aware of any tuple with
the same primary key at a higher security level,
and a high RDBMS cannot be trusted to mod-
ify data at a low security level. As such, polyin-
stantiation cannot be prevented when Trusted
Oracle is running in OS MAC mode.
Informix OnLine/Secure and Trusted Ora-
cle provide secure transaction processing pro-
tocols. Informix OnLine/Secure uses an ap-
proach by which a transaction at a low security
level can acquire a write lock on a low data item
even if a transaction at a high security level
holds a read lock on that data item. Thus, a
transaction at a low security level is never de-
layed by a transaction at a high security level.
The transaction at the high security level sim-
ply receives a warning that a lock on a low data
item has been “broken”. Trusted Oracle uses
a combination of locking and multiversioning
techniques.
7 Conclusion
This paper has given an overview of multilevel
security, the MLS evaluation and certification
process, and multilevel secure RDBMS. Build-
ing a multilevel secure RDBMS can be a chal-
lenging task. Depending on the architecture
followed, this might require rebuilding major
portions of an existing commercial RDBMS. It
also requires significant effort to evaluate and
certify, particularly if a high level of assurance
is sought. We are not aware of any commercial
RDBMS that has been evaluated higher than
B1 according to the Trusted Computer Secu-
rity Evaluation Criteria.
Mandatory access control, polyinstantiation,
and secure transaction processing are the key
aspects of a multilevel secure RDBMS. How-
ever, these are not sufficient to ensure that se-
curity cannot be compromised. Depending on
how stringent the requirements of the organi-
zation that wishes to deploy a multilevel secure
RDBMS, the RDBMS might have to imple-
ment additional security guards. For example,
SQL compilers have traditionally been guided
by performance reasons in selecting the order
in which the predicates contained in a query
are evaluated (i.e., more selective predicates
are often evaluated first to narrow down the
set of rows to be passed on to a subsequent
join because join operations are costly). If the
method chosen to enforce MAC when access-
ing a table is based on query modification to
incorporate the MLS two security properties in
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the form of regular predicates, then special care
must be taken in selecting the order in which
the predicates on that table are evaluated to
avoid unauthorized leakage of data rows. To il-
lustrate how leakage could occur, suppose that
a query has a predicate on a table that involves
a User-Defined Function (UDF). Further sup-
pose that this UDF takes the whole data row as
an input parameter and that the UDF source
code makes a copy of the data row outside the
database (or sends it as an e-mail to some des-
tination). Now, assume that some data row R
cannot be returned to the user who issued the
query because this would violate the MLS se-
curity properties. If the predicate involving the
UDF is evaluated prior to evaluating the pred-
icates that implement the MLS security prop-
erties then data row R will be consumed by the
UDF and consequently leaked to an unautho-
rized user.
Database triggers[6] are another example
where additional security guards could be nec-
essary. A trigger could cause labeled data row
to flow from a table on which mandatory ac-
cess control is enforced to another table on
which mandatory access control is not enforced.
Without proper flow control measures, triggers
could cause unauthorized leakage of informa-
tion to occur.
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CONTROLLING DATA ACCESS USING 
SECURITY LABEL COMPONENTS 
PRIORITY CLAIM 
The present application claims the priority of Canadian 
patent application, Serial No. 2,459,004, titled “Method and 
System to Control Data Access. Using Security Label Com 
ponents.” which was filed on Feb. 20, 2004, and which is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to access control of stored 
data, and more specifically to a method, a system, and a 
computer program product to control data access using Secu 
rity label components. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
In general, access control mechanisms based on labels do 
not address the requirements from application domains where 
the label structure and the label access rules do not necessarily 
match those specific to Multilevel Security (MLS). 
Access control regulates the reading, changing, and delet 
ing of objects stored on a computer system. Access control 
further prevents the accidental or malicious disclosure, modi 
fication, or destruction of Such objects. Fundamental types of 
access control comprise discretionary access control (DAC), 
role-based access control (RBAC), and mandatory access 
control (MAC). DAC permits the granting and revoking of 
access privileges to be left to the discretion of the individual 
users. RBAC does not allow users to have discretionary 
access to objects. Instead, access permissions are associated 
with roles; users are made members of appropriate roles. 
MAC, as defined in the Trusted Computer Security Evalua 
tion Criteria (TCSEC) is “a means of restricting access to 
objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of 
the information contained in the objects and the formal autho 
rization (i.e., clearance) of Subjects to access information of such sensitivity” 
One implementation of MAC is Multilevel Security (MLS) 
that has typically been available primarily on computer and 
Software systems deployed at sensitive government organiza 
tions such as the intelligence services or the military. 
An MLS model is stated in terms of objects and subjects. 
An object is a passive entity Such as a data file, a record, or a 
field within a record. A subject is an active process that can 
request access to objects. The object is assigned a classifica 
tion, and the Subject is assigned a clearance. Classifications 
and clearances are collectively referred to as access classes or 
labels. A label is a piece of information that comprises a 
hierarchical component and a set of unordered compart 
mentS. 
The hierarchical component specifies the sensitivity of the 
data. For example, a military organization might define levels 
top secret, secret, confidential, and unclassified. The com partments component is non-hierarchical and is used to iden 
tify areas that describe the sensitivity or category of the 
labeled data. For example, a military organization might 
define compartments NATO, nuclear, and army. Labels are 
partially ordered in a lattice as follows: given two labels L1 
and L2, L12=L2 if and only if the hierarchical component of 
L1 is greater than or equal to that of L2, and the compartment 
component of L1 includes the compartment component of 
L2. L1 is said to "dominate” L2. 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
2 
MLS restricts data accesses through a simple security 
property and a *-property (pronounce “the star property'). 
The simple security property allows a Subject read access to 
an object if and only if the subject’s label dominates the 
objects label. The *-property allows a subject write access to 
an object if and only if the objects label dominates the sub 
ject’s label. The *-property prevents subjects from declassi 
fying information. 
Even though MLS has traditionally been a requirement of 
Some sensitive government organizations. Such as the intelli 
gence services or the military, the ever-increasing customer 
demand for higher security has made MLS attractive for 
commercial software products. For example, in certain imple 
mentations, the DBMS controls access to database table rows 
based on a label contained in the row and the label associated 
with the database user attempting the access. The drawbacks 
of such implementations comprise a fixed label structure and 
fixed access rules. 
MLS fixes the label structure of a hierarchal component 
and a set of unordered compartments. Thus, the labels cannot 
be used for other types of applications to provide fine-grained 
access control to database table rows. For example, in certain 
banking applications, a label represents a geographical loca 
tion, which is a single component and is not hierarchal. MLS 
further fixes access rules. Access to database table rows is 
governed by the simple security property and the *-property. 
Thus, this form of access control based on labels cannot be 
used for other purposes. For example, banking applications 
have different requirements for the label structure and for the 
label access rules. 
Although this technology has proven to be useful, it would 
be desirable to present additional improvements. Existing 
access control systems based on labels strictly implement the 
MLS semantics. These conventional access control systems 
fail to address the label requirements from application 
domains where the label structure and the label access rules 
do not necessarily match those described in MLS. Moreover, 
these existing solutions cannot be used to enforce privacy 
policies. Generally, a privacy policy indicates for which pur 
poses an information is collected, whether or not the collected 
information will be communicated to others, and for how 
long the collected information is retained before it is dis 
carded. 
For example, a user should not be able to access a customer 
record for the purpose of sending that customer marketing 
information if that customer did not agree to receipt of Such 
information. Access to privacy-sensitive data can be regarded 
as analogous to access to labeled data. In both cases, a tag is 
associated with the object being accessed and the Subject 
accessing that object. The tag is a "purpose' in the case of the 
accessing privacy-sensitive data and a "label” in the case of 
the accessing labeled data. 
However, existing access control Solutions based on labels 
strictly implement the MLS semantics, and thus cannot be 
used to enforce privacy policies for the following reasons. 
Labels include a hierarchal component that is not applicable 
in the case of privacy. Furthermore, the MLS security prop 
erties do not apply in the context of privacy. 
What is therefore needed is a system, a computer program 
product, and an associated method for a label-based access 
control (LBAC) solution that is capable of implementing the 
MLS semantics and of addressing the requirements from a 
US 7,568,235 B2 
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variety of application domains, including MLS requirements. 
The need for such a solution has heretofore remained unsat 
isfied. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention satisfies this need, and presents a 
system, a service, a computer program product, and an asso 
ciated method (collectively referred to herein as “the system” 
or “the present system') for controlling data access using 
security label components. The present system provides, for a 
data processing system having memory for storing data ele 
ments, a method for directing the data processing system to 
control user access to the stored data elements. 
Each stored data element is associated with a set of data 
security label components. Each user is associated with a set 
of user security label components. The present system com 
prises receiving a user request to access the stored data ele 
ments, comparing the set of user security label components 
against the set of data security label components associated 
with the users, and determining whether to permit access to 
the stored data responsive to the received user request based 
on results of the comparison. 
The present system comprises a computer program product 
for directing a data processing system to control user access to 
data elements stored in memory of the data processing sys 
tem. Each stored data element is associated with a set of data 
security label components. Each user is associated with a set 
of user security label components. The computer program 
product comprises a computer readable transport medium for 
transporting computer executable code to the data processing 
system. The computer executable code comprises computer 
executable code for receiving a user request to access the 
stored data elements, computer executable code for compar 
ing the set of user security label components against the set of 
data security label components associated with the users, and 
computer executable code for determining whether to permit 
access to the stored data responsive to the received user 
request based on results of the comparison. 
The present system comprises an access control system to 
be operatively coupled to a data processing system having 
memory for storing data elements. The access control system 
directs the data processing system to control user access to the 
stored data elements. Each stored data element is associated 
with a set of data security label components. Each user is 
associated with a set of user security label components. The 
access control system comprises means for receiving a user 
request to access the stored data elements, means for com paring the set of user security label components against the set 
of data security label components associated with the users, 
and means for determining whether to permit access to the 
stored data responsive to the received user request based on 
results of the comparison. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The various features of the present invention and the man 
ner of attaining them will be described in greater detail with 
reference to the following description, claims, and drawings, 
wherein reference numerals are reused, where appropriate, to 
indicate a correspondence between the referenced items, and 
wherein: 
FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of an exemplary database management system installed on a data processing system 
having memory storing a database in which an access control 
system (ACS) of the present invention can be used; 
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FIG. 2 is a table illustrating types of access parameters 
implemented by the access control system of FIG. 1; 
FIG. 3 is a table illustrating data and table access param 
eters of the access control system of FIG. 1 for the database of 
FIG. 1: 
FIG. 4 is a table illustrating a user access table in which 
user access parameters are associated by the access control 
system of FIG. 1 with users of the database of FIG. 1; 
FIG. 5 is a table illustrating tests used by the access control 
system of FIG. 1 in comparing table access parameters 
against user access parameters for access to the database of 
FIG. 1: 
FIG. 6 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG. 1, in which the operation comprises determining user requirements; 
FIG. 7 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG. 1, in which the operation comprises defining access parameter types and 
associated tests; 
FIG. 8 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG. 1, in which the 
operation comprises creating a table contained in the database 
of FIG. 1; 
FIG. 9 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG. 1, in which the operation comprises assigning user access parameters; 
FIG. 10 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG. 1, in which the 
operation comprises writing data to a table contained in the 
database of FIG. 1; and 
FIG. 11 is a process flow chart illustrating a method of 
operation of the access control system of FIG.1, in which the 
operation comprises reading data from a table contained in 
the database of FIG. 1. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED 
EMBODIMENTS 
The following detailed description of the embodiments of 
the present invention does not limit the implementation of the 
embodiments to any particular computer programming lan 
guage. The computer program product may be implemented 
in any computer programming language provided that the OS 
(Operating System) provides the facilities that may support 
the requirements of the computer program product. A pre 
ferred embodiment is implemented in the C or C++ computer programming language (or may be implemented in other 
computer programming languages in conjunction with 
C/C++). Any limitations presented would be a result of a particular type of operating system, computer programming 
language, or data processing system and would not be a 
limitation of the embodiments described herein. 
FIG.1 portrays an exemplary overall environment in which 
a system and associated method for controlling data access 
using security label components (an access control system 
115) according to the present invention may be used. The 
access control system 115 comprises a software program 
ming code or a computer program product that is typically 
embedded within, or installed on a memory 112. Alterna 
tively, system 10 can be saved on a suitable storage medium 
such as a diskette, a CD, a hard drive, or like devices. 
A data processing system (DPS) 100 comprises a Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) 102 operatively coupled to a bus 104. 
Bus 104 is operatively coupled to I/O (Input/Output Interface 
Unit) 105 and coupled to memory 112. I/O 105 operatively 
couples bus 104 to a display unit 108, a keyboard/mouse 
(keyboard 110), a disc 111, and a network 109. Memory 112 
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may comprises a combination of many types of memory, Such 
as RAM (Random Access Memory), ROM (Read Only 
Memory), and hard disk (not illustrated). 
The memory 112 stores a database 116 and a database 
management system (DBMS) 114. The DBMS 114 com 
prises the access control system 115. However, the access 
control system 115 may operate independently of the DBMS 
114 and there may be system calls transferred between the 
DBMS 114 and the access control system 115. The DBMS 114 and the access control system 115 comprise computer 
executable code that is executed by the CPU 102. The com puter executable code is compiled from computer pro 
grammed instructions written in a high-level computer pro 
gramming language (such as, for example, C++ or Java). The 
computer executable code is loaded to memory 112 by trans 
ferring the computer executable code from disc 111. 
Disc 111 is a computer program product comprising a 
computer readable medium that is used to transport the com 
puter executable code to the DPS 100 via I/O 105. Alterna tively, the computer readable medium comprises a computer 
readable transport signal carried by network 109, the signal 
being used to transport the computer executable code to the 
DPS 100 via I/O 105. It will be appreciated that the computer 
executable code configures the DPS 100 (which is a general 
purpose machine) into a specifically configured machine that 
may be treated as comprising modules or mechanisms that 
achieve specific functions (these functions to be described 
below in more detail). 
Generally, the computer executable code included in the 
access control system 115 directs CPU 102 to define security 
labels for data and users. Data security label components are 
found in types of access parameters 118. The data security 
label components are associated with each data element 
stored in a classified table 120. The access control system 115 
also defines user security label components that are stored in 
a user access table 122. Each user security label component is 
associated with a user. The access control system 115 directs 
CPU 102 to determine whether the user, who submitted a 
request to access a data element, is granted access or is denied 
access to the data element based upon a comparison made 
between the user security label components and the data 
security label components. Tests 124 comprise these tests or 
rules for allowing user access to the data element. 
The access control system 115 is used to control user 
access to stored data shown in classified table 120. Associated 
with the stored data are security label components. Associ 
ated with the users are user security label components. The 
access control system 115 configures a configurable security 
label structure that describes the security label components 
associated with the stored data and the users (the security 
label structure is described below in greater detail). The 
access control system 115 also defines label access rules to be 
associated with the configurable security label structure. The 
access control system 115 executes the defined label access rules to compare the security label components associated 
with the stored data against the security label components 
associated with the users. The access control system 115 
determines whether to permit and to not permit user access to 
the stored databased on the outcome of the executed defined 
label access rules. 
FIG. 2 is a table illustrating the types of access parameters 
used by the access control system 115 of FIG. 1, access 
parameters 118. These types of access parameters are a col 
lection of security access parameters further referenced 
hereinas a security label set label set 118 or label set 118. The 
label set 118 is a security label structure that comprises types 
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of security access components (label components) 202, each 
associated with security access parameters such as labelcom 
ponent names 204. 
The label components label components 202 is a set of 
security access label components that are organized as a 
schema; the schema is the label set 118. As a table schema 
defines the set of columns that make up a data row, so the label 
set 118 represents a schema that defines a set of label com 
ponents 202 that make up a security access label. The security 
access label is either associated with a data element stored in 
classified table 120 or associated with a user—as indicated in 
user access table 122. The label set 118 comprises security 
access rules that the access control system 115 uses to deter 
mine whether a user who is associated with a label, L. 1, may 
be granted or may be denied access to a data element associ 
ated with a label, L 2. Further description for the access rules 
or tests is provided below. The security access rules (or tests) 
may be stored in a test table, tests 124 of FIG. 1. 
A type of access parameter may be treated as one of the 
label components 202, each of which is associated with one of 
the label component names 204. The set of label components 
202 is an entity that may be created, dropped, and altered by 
the access control system 115. The security label set 118 (to 
be associated with a data element or with a user) may include 
one or more of the label components 202. There may be types 
of the label components 202, such as for example a “set' type 
of the label components 202 and a “tree' type of the label 
components 202. There may be an ordered set type of the 
label components 202 and there may be an unordered set type 
of the label components 202. 
In an ordered set type of the label components 202, the 
order in which element in a component appears is important: 
for example, the rank of a first element is higher than a rank of 
a second element, a rank of a second element is higher than a 
rank of a third element and so on (for one of the label com ponents 202). An example of the types of components is 
indicated in row 206 of the label set 118, examples of ele 
ments of the label component 202. 
A tree type of the label components 202 represents a hier 
archy of an organization (Such as a company for example). 
The tree type of the label components 202 may be used to represent organizational charts and/or to identify departments 
within an organization that owns the data stored in the clas 
sified table 120. The label components 202 are stored in the 
label set 118, for example, or stored in a database system 
catalog if the access control system 115 is to be implemented 
in DBMS 114. 
FIG.3 shows the classified table 120 of FIG.1. A classified 
table is a database table that comprises labeled data rows. 
When a database administrator marks the classified table 120 
as classified, the database administrator specifies the label set 
118 to be used or associated with the classified table 120. The 
label set 118 determines the structure of the label components 
202 to be used to label the data rows of the classified table 120. 
The label set 118 further determines the label access rules 
(tests 124) to be used for enforcing access to the classified 
table 120. 
The classified table 120 comprises one or more classified 
data elements 303. The classified table 120 further comprises 
one or more row labels 306, one or more row labels 308, and 
one or more row labels 310. Each of the row labels 306, row 
labels 308, and row labels 310 are associated with a data 
element PLAN A, PLAN B, PLAN C, and PLAN D, 
respectively, and are indicated in respective table row 312, 
table row 314, table row 316, and table row 318. The access control system 115 generates and assigns security access 
labels; i.e., access labels and row labels 
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A row label is assigned to each data element stored in the 
classified table 120. The data element may be a picture, a test 
document, or combination thereof. It is understood that each 
row has its own row label (there cannot be duplicate row 
labels). It is possible that two rows in the classified table 120 
may have two row labels that are identical. 
The classified table 120 is a convenient organized storage 
of a plurality of data elements used to illustrate one embodi 
ment. The row label contains components that are used to 
express or indicate the access requirements of a data element. 
For example, row label of PLAN A (see table row 312) comprises security label components LEVEL-TOP 
SECRET, COMPARTMENT=ARMY. 
OWNER=MARINES. 
For example, for PLAN A of table row 312, if a user is a 
member of MARINES division of ARMY and that user has a 
classification clearance of at least TOP SECRET or better, 
that user may have read and/or write access to PLAN A. 
However, if that user is not a member of MARINES division 
but is instead a member of any other division of ARMY and 
that user also has a classification level of at least TOP 
SECRET or better, then that user may have only read access 
to PLAN A. For any other condition, that user may not have 
read or write access to PLAN A. 
For example, for PLAN B of table row 314, if a user is a 
member of RESEARCH division of NASA and that user also 
has a classification clearance of at least SECRET or better, 
that user may have read and write access to PLAN. B. How 
ever, if that user is not a member of RESEARCH division of 
NASA but that user is a member of some other NASA divi 
sion and that user has a classification level of at least SECRET 
orbetter, that user may have only readaccess to PLAN B. For 
any other condition, that user may not have read or write 
access to PLAN B. 
DBMS 114 may comprise a function that allows database 
users to refer to the security label associated with a row in a 
classified table in SQL statements. This function may, for 
example, be called “ROWLABEL”. ROWLABEL can be 
referenced in an SQL statement. ROWLABEL allows users 
to reference a row label in SQL statements for manipulating 
data contained in the rows of the classified table 120. 
For SELECT statements and WHERE clauses (to be 
included in an SQL statement), individual label components 
are referenced by providing the component name as a param 
eter to the ROWLABEL function. For example, a user who 
wishes to select only the level component of a label can issue 
the following SQL statement: 
SELECT ROWLABEL(level), ..., FROM T1 If the user wishes to express a predicate, the following SQL 
statement can be issued: 
SELECT ROWLABEL(level), ..., FROM T1 WHERE 
ROWLABEL(level)="Secret 
For INSERT and UPDATESQL statements, ROWLABEL 
is a means of providing the label value of a data row. For 
example, a user who wishes to insert a row into a classified 
table can issue the following SQL statement: 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES (ROWLABEL(SECRET', 
NATO), ...) A user who wishes to update the level component in the 
label of some data row can issue the following SQL state 
ment: 
UPDATE T1 SET ROWLABEL(level)=ROWLABEL 
(SECRET) WHERE C1=5 
FIG. 4 shows the user access table 122 of FIG.1. The user 
access table 122 comprises security access labels (having 
component 406, component 408, and component 410) asso 
ciated with user identifiers (column 402). An access label is 
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assigned to each user. It is possible that users may have 
identical access labels. Access labels may be granted and 
revoked by the database administrator (that is, an executive 
level user of the access control system 115) or by another 
database user who has sufficient authority to act as an admin 
istrator. Access labels may be stored, for example, in a data base catalog. The access label comprises components that 
express or indicate user ability to access data elements stored 
in the classified table 120 as predetermined by the adminis 
trator. 
For example, user WALID (row 412) has a LEVEL=TOP 
SECRET (that is, Walid has top secret classification clear 
ance). For WALID, COMPARTMENT=ARMY and NASA 
(that is, user Walid is a member of the ARMY and a member 
of NASA). Also, user Walid is indicated as an owner of 
documents that belong to the MARINES (a division of 
ARMY). These values indicate that user Walid may have only 
read and/or write access to data elements associated with a 
security label component MARINES provided that user 
Walid has the proper security clearance level (in this case, the 
security clearance of user Walid is TOP SECRET). Further 
more, user Walid may have only read access to any data 
element associated with a security label component ARMY 
or NASA, provided that user Walid has the proper security 
clearance level (in this case, the security clearance of user 
Walid is TOP SECRET). 
For example, if a data element is associated with a clear 
ance LEVEL that is greater than TOP SECRET (and associ 
ated with ARMY or NASA), user Walid may not have read 
access to that data element because the classification LEVEL 
of user Walid is not sufficient. 
User BIRD (row 414) may have read and/or write access to 
any data elements that are associated with RESEARCH divi 
sion of NASA provided the LEVEL classification of user Bird 
is sufficient to permit user BIRD access to those data element. 
User BIRD may have only read access to data elements 
associated with NASA that do not belong with the 
RESEARCH division of NASA (provided that the LEVEL 
classification of user Bird is sufficient to permit user BIRD 
read access to those sorts of data elements). 
FIG. 5 shows the tests 124 of FIG.1. The tests 124 are to be 
selected and the label set 118 may also specify the access 
rules or tests that the access control system 115 uses to deter 
mine whether a user who is associated with an access label 
(i.e., access label 1) may have access to a data element asso 
ciated with a row label (i.e., row label 1). 
Label access rules may be divided categories such as read 
access rules and write access rules. The read access rules are 
used by the access control system 115 when a user attempts to 
read a data element from the classified table 120 (for example, 
when the user Submits a SELECT Statement to the DBMS 
114). The access control system 115 uses the write access 
rules when a user attempts to write (such as, performing an 
insert, an update or a delete command) a data element. A label 
access rule may be a predicate that combines the same label 
components contained in an access label and a row label by 
using an operator as follows (for example): 
Access Label Component A <operators Row Label Com 
ponent A 
The type of operator to be used in the label access rules may 
depend on the type of label component. For ordered sets of 
label components, the operator may be any of the following 
relational operators {-, -, <, >, > , =}. For non-ordered sets of label components, the operator may be, for example, any 
one of the set operators {IN, INTERSECT. For trees of label components, the operator may be, for example, the INTER 
SECT set operator. The label set 118 and label access rules 
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may be stored in a database system catalogs when the access 
control system 115 is integrated with the DBMS 114. 
Exceptions to the label access rules here provide a flexibil 
ity to bypass one or more label access rules. For example, in 
an MLS context, it is often the case that some special users are 
allowed to write information to data elements associated with 
lower security levels even though this is in contradiction with 
the *-security property. Thus, exceptions are introduced to 
allow the database administrator to grant a database user an 
exception to bypass one or more rules associated with a 
particular label set. 
FIG. 6 illustrates a method 600 of operation of the access 
control system 115 of FIG. 1, in which the method 600 com prises determining user commands and requirements. The 
access control system 115 of FIG. 1 begins operation at step 
602. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
desires to create the label set 118 of FIG. 2 or create the tests 
124 of FIG. 5 (decision step 604). If the user desires to create 
label set 118 or tests 124, the access control system 115 
creates access parameter types and tests (step 606). If the user 
does not desire to create label set 118 or tests 124, operation 
continues to decision step 608. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
desires to create the classified table 120 of FIG. 3 (decision 
step 608). If the user desires to create the classified table 120, 
the access control system 115 creates the classified table 120 
(step 610). If the user does not desire to create the classified 
table 120, operation continues to decision step 612. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
desires to assign security access labels to users as shown in 
user access table 122 of FIG. 4 (decision step 612). If the user 
desires to assign security access labels, the access control 
system 115 assigns user access parameters (step 614). If the 
user does not desire to assign security access labels, operation 
continues to decision step 616. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
desires to write data to classified table 120 of FIG.3 (decision 
step 616). If the user desires to write data to classified table 
120, the access control system 115 writes data to the classified 
table 120 (step 618). If the user does not desire to write data 
to classified table 120, operation continues to decision step 
620. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
desires read data (that is, data elements 303) from the classi 
fied table 120 of FIG.3 (decision step 620). If the user desires 
to read data from the classified table 120, the access control 
system reads data from the classified table (step 622). If the 
user does not desire to read data from the classified table 120, 
operation continues to decision step 624. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user desires to re-perform any of operations of decision step 604, 
decision step 608, decision step 612, decision step 616, or 
decision step 620 (decision step 624). If the user desires to 
re-performany of these operations, the access control system 
115 returns to decision step 604 and repeats steps 604 through 
622 as required. If the user does not desire to perform these 
operations, access control system 115 halts any further opera 
tions (step 626). 
FIG. 7 illustrates a method of operation of step 606 of the 
method 600 of the access control system 115 of FIG.1. Step 
606 comprises defining the label set 118 of FIG. 2. The label 
set 118 is a set of types of access components. Step 606 
further comprises defining the label access rules (tests 124 of 
FIG. 5) to be associated with the label set 118. 
The access control system 115 helps the database admin 
istrator (an executive user of the access control system 115) to 
5 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
10 
define the security label components (indicated in row 202 of 
label set 118) and their types. For example, the access control 
system 115 permits the database administrator to define secu 
rity a label component referenced as LEVEL (oftype integer) 
and a label component referenced as COMPARTMENT (of type string). 
The access control system 115 permits the database admin 
istrator to define the label set that comprises the security label 
component 202. The relationship between the security label 
component 202 and the label set 118 is analogous to the 
relationship between a data row of a table and a table schema. 
As the table schema defines the set of columns that make up 
a data row, so the label set 118 set defines the set of security 
label components that make up the label set 118. The label set 
118 may also be associated with a test table, tests 124 of FIG. 
5. The test table, tests 124, comprises a set of access rules that 
the access control system 115 uses to determine whether a 
user who is associated with a security access label, L. 1, may 
or may not access a data row associated with a security label, 
L 2. The label access rules may be divided into categories 
Such as read access rules and write access rules. 
The access control system 115 transfers control from deci 
sion step 606 of FIG. 6 because a user has indicated a desire 
to define the components to be included in the label set 118 of 
FIG. 2 and the tests 124 of FIG. 5 (step 702). 
The access control system 115 defines the components of 
label set 118 of FIG. 2 (step 704). The components 202 of 
label set 118 indicate the types of access parameters 306, 208, 
310 to be associated with data elements 303 of FIG. 3. 
The access control system 115 defines the tests 124 of FIG. 
5 to be associated with the components 202 of label set 118 
(step 706). The access control system transfers control back 
to decision step 608 of FIG. 6. 
FIG. 8 illustrates a method of operation of step 610 of the 
method 600 of the access control system 115 of FIG.1. Step 
610 comprises creating the classified table 120 of FIG. 1. 
A database administrator (an executive user of the access 
control system 115) attaches the label set 118 to the classified 
table 120. When the label Set 118 is attached to the classified 
table 120, the table 120 is considered classified; i.e., the data 
elements may only be accessed depending on the execution 
outcome of the tests 124 of FIG. 5. 
When the user desires to access data elements contained in 
the classified table 120, the access control system 115 applies 
the access rules defined and associated with the label set 118 
of FIG. 2. The label set 118 is attached to the classified table 
120 to determine whether or not a user may have or may not 
have access to a row containing a data element within the 
classified table 120. 
The access control system 115 transfers control from deci 
sion step 610 of FIG. 6 because a user has indicated a desire 
to create the classified table 120 of FIG. 3 (step 802). The 
access control system 115 sets up the classified table 120 (step 
804). 
The access control system 115 generates a column 302 to 
contain the data element identifiers (step 806). Each of these 
identifiers identifies a specific data element contained in table 
120. The access control system 115 generates a column 303 to 
contain the data elements (step 808). 
The access control system 115 generates a column for each 
row label component 306, 308 and 310 (that is, each user 
Access Label component 306.108, 310) (step 810). Each 
component 306, 308, 310 indicates the data element access 
requirements to be compared against user access label com 
ponents at a later time (the comparison is further described 
below). The access control system transfers control back to 
decision step 612 of FIG. 6 (step 812). 
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FIG. 9 illustrates a method of operation of step 614 of the 
method 600 of the access control system 115 of FIG.1. Step 
614 comprises assigning user access labels to users. Each 
access label (security Access Label) comprises user access components, each component indicating an ability of a user to 
access data elements stored in the classified table 120 of FIG. 
3. 
The access control system 115 permits a database admin 
istrator (who is an executive level user of the access control 
system 115) to grant access labels (security Access Labels) to 
specific database users. The access control system 115 uses 
the access labels in conjunction with the label set access rules 
to determine user access rights with respect to rows (that is, 
data elements associated with a row) contained in the classi 
fied table 120. The access control system 115 may permit the 
database administrator to choose to grant one or more excep 
tions to a database user to allow them to bypass one or more 
access rules associated with the label set 118. 
The access control system 115 may be integrated into an 
SQL (Structured Query Language) compiler component (not 
illustrated) of the DBMS 114 such that when an SQL query 
references the classified table 120, the SQL compiler incor 
porates the access rules of the label set associated with the 
classified table 120 in an access plan. The SQL compiler 
generates the access plan). The access plan is used to execute 
the compiled user SQL query. When the access plan is 
executed, the access rules may be evaluated for each row (that 
contains the data element) in the classified table 120 to deter 
mine whether access to a specific row should be allowed or 
disallowed. 
The access control system 115 transfers control from deci 
sion step 614 of FIG. 6 because a database administrator 
indicated a desire to assign user access parameters to a user 
(step 902). 
The access control system 115 determines whether the user 
request is a request to generate the user access table 122 
(decision step 904). If the user request indicates a desire to 
generate the user access table 122, the user access table 122 is 
generated (step 906) and processing continues to decision 
step 908. If the user request indicates no desire to generate the 
user access table 122, processing continues to operation deci 
sion step 908. 
The access control system 115 determines whether the 
received user request indicates a desire to assignaccess labels 
(security Access Labels) to a specific user (decision step 908). 
If it is determined that the user wishes to assign an access 
label to the specific user, the access control system assigns an 
access label to a user (step 910) and components of the access 
label are selected or filled in for the access label assigned to 
the specific user (step 912). If it is determined that the user 
does not wish to assign an access label to the specific user, the 
access control system 115 transfers control to decision step 
616 of FIG. 6. 
FIG. 10 illustrates a method of operation of step 618 of the 
method 600 of the access control system 115 of FIG.1. Step 
618 comprises writing data elements to the classified table 
120 of FIG. 1. The access control system transfers control 
from decision step 618 of FIG. 6 step 1001). 
The access control system 115 determines whether the 
access control system 115 received a user request for writing 
(that is, a write access command) data to a data element stored 
in the classified table 120 (decision step 1002). If the user request is not a write request, the access control system 
returns to step 616 of FIG. 6. If the user request indicates a 
write access request, the access control system 115 proceeds 
to step 1004. The access control system 115 receives a row to 
be written (step 1004). 
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The access control system 115 validates row security label 
components associated with the row (that is, the data element) 
to be written to the classified table 120 (decision step 1006). 
If the row security label components are not valid the access 
control system returns an error to the user (step 1012) and 
then transfers control to decision step 620 of FIG. 6 (step 
1018). The row security label components are not valid if the 
row security label components are not composed of the exact 
same components defined in the label set associated with the 
classified table 120 or if the values of each row security label 
component are not valid with respect to their type. 
If the row security label components are valid (decision 
step 1006), the access control system evaluates write access 
rules associated with the label set of the classified table 120 
(step 1008). 
The access control system 115 determines whether the 
access may be allowed (decision step 1010). If it is deter 
mined that access may be allowed, the access control system 
115 writes the row into the classified table 120 (step 1014). If 
it is determined that access may not be granted or not be 
allowed, the access control system 115 returns an error indi 
cation to the user (step 1012) and returns to decision step 620 
of FIG. 6 (step 1018). 
The access control system 115 determines whether there 
are more rows to process (decision step 1016). If it is deter 
mined that more rows are to be processed, the access control 
system returns to step 1004 and repeats step 1004 through 
step 1010 for the next row received. If it is determined that 
there are no more rows to be written to the classified table 120, 
the access control system returns to decision step 620 of FIG. 
6 (step 1018). 
FIG. 11 illustrates a method of operation of step 622 of 
method 600 of the access control system 115 of FIG.1. Step 
622 comprises reading one or more rows that were written 
into the classified table 120 of FIG. 1. The access control 
system 115 transfers control from decision step 622 of FIG. 6 
(step 1101) 
The access control system 115 determines the type of 
access request requested by a user (decision step 1102). If the 
type of user access being requested is a read access, the access 
control system 115 proceeds to step 1104. If the type of user 
access being requested is not a read access, operation is 
transferred to decision step 624 of FIG. 6. 
The access control system 115 fetches the next row in the 
classified table 120 (step 1104). The access control system 
115 evaluates the read access rules associated with the label 
set 118 (step 1106). 
The access control system 115 determines whether user 
access may be granted or allowed (decision step 1108). If the 
determination is made that user access may be allowed, the 
access control system 115 returns the fetched row to the user 
(step 110). If the determination is made that the user may not 
be allowed or may not be granted access, the access control 
system 115 skips the fetched row (i.e., the fetched row is not 
returned to the user) (step 1112). 
The access control system 115 determines whether there 
are any more rows in the classified table 120 to be fetched. If 
there are no more rows to be fetched, the access control 
system 115 returns to decision step 624 of FIG. 6. If there are 
more rows to be fetched, the access control system 115 
returns to step 1104 in which case the next row in the classi 
fied table 120 is fetched and step 1104 to step 1114 may be 
repeated as needed. 
In one embodiment, the access control system 115 uses security access labels to provide fine-grained access control 
in the DBMS of FIG.1. Generally, fine-grained access control 
refers to a method of providing row-level security for a table 
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as known to those skilled in the art. In private banking, coun try laws and regulations often require limitation of the amount 
of data that can be viewed by a bank employee. For example, 
Swiss banking laws do not allow a Swiss bank employee 
located in Toronto to access account information for custom 
ers based in Switzerland. A bank employee can only access 
account information for customers who are based in the same 
location as the bank employee. 
Typically, the bank addresses this access control problem 
as follows. When a bank employee is authenticated, a security 
context is assigned to him/her based on the authentication type, location, geography, etc. When that bank employee 
issues a request, the request goes through a number of sys 
tems up to a mainframe system where an application picks it 
up and adds an appropriate predicate based on the employee 
location (e.g., WHERE location="Toronto') before it is sub 
mitted to the DBMS. This solution is error prone and exposes security policies directly to the application programmers. It 
also requires many code reviews to ensure correctness. 
The problem stated above can be easily solved using the 
control access system 115 by associating a label with each 
customer account that specifies its location and by associating 
a label with each bank employee that specifies where that 
employee is located. The DBMS can then ensure that bank 
employees can only access account information for the cus 
tomers located in their geographical location. 
Referring to FIG. 7, the following SQL statement creates a 
label component called location: 
CREATE LABEL COMPONENT location OF TYPE Var 
char(15) 
USING SET (“Zurich”, “Toronto”, “London”, “Paris') 
The following SQL statement creates a label set based on the component defined above: 
CREATE LABEL SET Set1 COMPONENTS location 
READ ACCESS RULE rule1 ACCESS LABEL location 
IN ROW LABEL location 
WRITEACCESS RULE rule2 ROW LABEL location IN 
ACCESS LABEL location 
Referring to FIG. 8, the following SQL statement creates a 
classified table T1 to store customer account information and 
associates this table with label set set1: 
CREATE Table T1 (CustomerID int, CustomerName char 
(30), CustomerBalance) 
LABEL SET Set 1 
Referring to FIG. 9, the following SQL statements create 
two access labels and grant them to bank employee emp A and empl3: 
CREATE ACCESS LABEL label1 IN LABEL SET Set 1 
Location “Toronto' 
CREATE ACCESS LABEL label2 IN LABEL SET Set 1 
Location “Zurich' 
GRANT LABEL label1 FOR USER empA FOR ALL 
GRANT LABEL label2 FOR USER empB FOR ALL 
Referring to FIG. 10, when a user issues an SQL statement 
against the classified table T1 that reads or modifies a data 
row, the label access rules defined above are evaluated to 
determine whether or not the user can read/modify the data 
row. Below are exemplary INSERT SQL statement examples 
for user emp A. 
SQL Command Status 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES (1, 
Hans, 100, ROWLABEL 
(Zurich)) 
This command is rejected because 
user empA is not allowed to write 
account information for customers 
located in Zurich (rule2). 
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-continued 
SQL Command Status 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES (2, 
“PBIRD,100,ROWLABEL 
(Toronto)) 
This command is accepted because 
rule2 is satisfied. 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES This command is accepted because 
(3, WRJAIBI, 10, ROWLABEL rule2 is satisfied. 
(Toronto) 
Below are exemplary INSERT SQL statement examples 
for user empl3: 
SQL Command Status 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES This command is accepted because 
(1, Hans,100, ROWLABEL rule2 is satisfied. 
(Zurich)) 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES This command is accepted because 
(4, Urs,100, ROWLABEL rule2 is satisfied. 
(Zurich)) 
Referring to FIG. 11, the following are exemplary 
SELECT SQL statement examples for user emp.A. 
SQL Command Status 
SELECT * FROM T1 This command returns only rows 
PBIRD and WRAIBI. The other 2 roWs 
are not returned because rule 1 is not 
satisfied. 
The following are exemplary SELECT SQL statement 
examples for user empFB. 
SQL Command Status 
SELECT * FROM T1 This command returns only rows Hans 
and Urs. The other 2 rows are not 
returned because rule 1 is not satisfied. 
In the example described above, Urs is a first name com 
monly used in the German part of Switzerland. In this case, 
the access control system 115 is inserting a record for the 
customer called Urs. 
In a further example, a bank executive (exec1) located in 
Zurich holds access label label1 and is permitted read access 
to account information for customers located in Toronto. The 
administrator can grant a label exception to this executive to 
bypass rule 1 as follows: 
GRANT LABEL, EXCEPTION ON RULE rule1 IN Set 1 
TOUSER exec1 
If the executive issues the SELECT * FROM T1 query, 
he/she will be able to see all the rows above. 
In a further embodiment, the access control system 115 
uses security access labels for providing MLS capability in 
the DBMS 114 of FIG. 1. An application wishes the DBMS 
114 to provide MLS semantics. In MLS, a label comprises 
two components: a hierarchical component a set of unordered 
compartments. The hierarchical component is referenced as a 
level. In an example, the valid values a level comprises are 
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Top Secret, Secret, Classified, and Unclassified. Similarly, a 
compartment can take any of the following values: NATO, 
Nuclear and Army. 
Referring to FIG. 7, the following two SQL statements can 
be used to create the two components. 
CREATE LABEL COMPONENT level OF TYPE Varchar 
(15) 
USING ORDERED SET (TOP SECRET, “SECRET', 
“CLASSIFIED", “UNCLASSIFIED") 
CREATE LABEL COMPONENT compartments OF 
TYPE varchar(15) 
USING SET (“NATO”, “Nuclear”, “Army”) 
The keyword ORDERED in the definition of the first com 
ponent indicates that the order in which the elements appear 
in the set is significant. 
Referring to FIG. 7, the access control system 115 uses the 
following SQL statement to create a label set 118 where each 
label is composed of the two components defined above. The 
statement also permits the access control system 115 to 
specify the label access rules. These label access rules imple ment the simple security property and the *-property previ 
ously described. 
CREATE LABEL SET set1 COMPONENTS level, com 
partments 
READ ACCESS RULE rule1 ACCESS LABEL 
levels=ROW LABEL level 
READ ACCESS RULE rule2 ROW LABEL compart 
ments IN ACCESS LABEL compartments 
WRITE ACCESS RULE rule3 ROW LABEL 
levels=ACCESS LABEL level 
WRITEACCESS RULE rule4 ACCESS LABEL compart 
ments INROW LABEL compartments 
Referring to FIG. 8, the application wishes to create a table 
where each data row is to be labeled using a label from set1 
above. The access control system can use the following SQL 
statement can be used to generate such a table. 
CREATE Table T1 (C1 char(3), C2 int) 
LABEL SET Set 1 
Referring to FIG. 9, the access control system 115 gener 
ates the access labels and assigns the access labels to database 
users using the following SQL statements: 
CREATEACCESS LABEL label1 IN LABEL SET Set1 
Level “TOP SECRET', compartments “Nuclear” 
CREATEACCESS LABEL label2 IN LABEL SET Set1 
Level “CLASSIFIED", compartments “Army” 
GRANT LABEL label1 FOR USER Walid FOR ALL 
GRANT LABEL label2 FOR USER paul FOR ALL 
Referring to FIG. 10, when a user issues an SQL statement 
against the classified table T1 that reads or modifies a data 
row, the label access rules defined above are evaluated to 
determine whether or not the user can read/modify the data 
row. Below are exemplary INSERT SQL statements for user 
walid. 
SQL Command Status 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES 
(abc,1,ROWLABEL(TOP 
SECRET, NATO)) 
This command is rejected because the 
compartment of user walid (Nuclear) is 
not included in the compartments of the 
row being inserted (rule4). 
This command is accepted because 
both rule3 and rule4 are satisfied. 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES 
("def 2,ROWLABEL(TOP 
SECRET, Nuclear)) 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES 
('ghi,3,ROWLABEL 
(UNCLASSIFIED, Nuclear)) 
This command is rejected because 
user walid is attempting to write a row 
at a lower security level (level 3). 
10 
15 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
16 
Below are exemplary INSERT SQL statements for user paul. 
SQL Command Status 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES 
(k1.4.ROWLABEL 
(“CLASSIFIED, Army)) 
INSERT INTO T1 VALUES 
(mino,5,ROWLABEL 
(SECRET, Army)) 
This command is accepted because 
both rule3 and rule4 are satisfied. 
This command is accepted because 
both rule3 and rule4 are satisfied 
Referring to FIG. 11, the following are exemplary 
SELECT SQL statements for user walid. 
SQL Command Status 
SELECT * FROM T1 This command returns only row: 
(def.2, TOP SECRET, Nuclear}). 
The other 2 rows are not returned 
because rule 2 is not satisfied. 
The following are exemplary SELECTSQL statements for 
user paul. 
SQL Command Status 
SELECT * FROM T1 This command returns only row: 
(k1.4. CLASSIFIED, Army}). 
The other 2 rows are not returned 
because rule 1 is not satisfied. 
The access control system 115 may be included in a data 
base management system (DBMS) 114 or information 
retrieval system (IRS). Further, the access control system may 
be included in many types of Software applications, such as, 
for example (the following represents a non-exhaustive list of 
Such applications): 
a DBMS adapted to provide fine-grained access control to 
database table rows; 
a DBMS adapted to provide MLS: 
a DBMS adapted to enforce privacy policies: 
an operating system (OS) stored in the memory of a DPS, the 
OS being adapted to implement a policy where access to 
systems files is based on security labels and label access 
rules; 
a Publish/Subscribe system adapted to implement a policy 
where the matching process also take into account the 
security labels associated with a subscription and an event 
as well as the label access rules; and 
an XML system adapted to control access to the nodes in an 
XML document based on the security labels and label 
access rules. 
The access control system 115 is an improvement over 
known LBAC solutions in the sense that the access control 
system 115 is not restricted to MLS semantics. The access 
control system 115 may be used in various application 
domains and for various purposes. The access control system 
115 may also be used to provide. 
It is to be understood that while specific embodiments have 
been described to illustrate certain applications of the prin 
ciple of the present invention. Other modifications are pos 
sible without departing from the spirit and scope of the 
present invention. 
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What is claimed is: 
1. A computer-implemented method of controlling user 
access to stored data elements, comprising configuring one or 
more computer processors to perform an operation compris 
ing: 
defining, based on user input, an ordered plurality of secu 
rity levels that describe sensitivity of the stored data 
elements; defining, based on user input, a plurality of categories that 
categorize the stored data elements; 
associating each user with a security level from the ordered 
plurality of security levels and a category from the plu 
rality of categories, thereby defining a security clearance 
for each respective user; and 
defining, based on user input and for each of the stored data 
elements, a read access rule for the respective stored data 
element, wherein the read access rule comprises a con 
dition for granting read access to the respective stored 
data element, the condition specifying a security level of 
the plurality of security levels and a category from the plurality of categories. 
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein 
the operation further comprises: 
receiving a user request to access a stored data element; 
evaluating, by operation of the one or more computer pro 
cessors, the read access rule for the stored data element 
to which access is requested; and 
Selectively permitting read access to the stored data ele 
ment in response to the access request, based on the 
evaluation result for the read access rule. 
3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2, wherein 
the operation further comprises: 
defining, based on user input and for each of the stored data 
elements, a write access rule for the respective stored 
data element, wherein the write access rule comprises a 
condition for granting write access to the respective 
stored data element, the condition specifying a security 
level of the plurality of security levels and a category 
from the plurality of categories; wherein the condition 
for granting write access to one of the stored data ele 
ments differs from the condition for granting read access 
to the one of the stored data elements; evaluating, by operation of the one or more computer pro 
cessors, the write access rule for the stored data element 
to which access is requested; and 
Selectively permitting write access to the stored data ele 
ment in response to the access request, based on the 
evaluation result for the write access rule. 
4. The computer-implemented method of claim3, wherein 
the condition for granting write access further specifies an 
exception for a user, whereby the exception allows write 
access to be granted to the user even if the condition is not 
satisfied. 
5. The computer-implemented method of claim3, wherein 
the condition of the write access rule is satisfied only if (i) the security level of the user meets the security level specified by 
the write access rule for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user matches the category specified by the 
write access rule for the stored data element. 
6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein 
the condition for granting read access further specifies an 
exception for a user, whereby the exception allows read 
access to be granted to the user even if the condition is not 
satisfied. 
7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein 
the condition of the read access rule is satisfied only if (i) the 
security level of the user meets the security level specified by 
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the read access rule for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user matches the category specified by the 
read access rule for the stored data element. 
8. A computer program product for controlling user access 
to stored data elements, the computer program product com 
prising a computer usable medium having computer usable 
program code configured to: 
define, based on user input, an ordered plurality of security 
levels that describe sensitivity of the stored data ele 
ments; 
define, based on user input, a plurality of categories that 
categorize the stored data elements; 
associate each user with a security level from the ordered plurality of security levels and a category from the plu 
rality of categories, thereby defining a security clearance 
for each respective user; 
define, based on user input and for each of the stored data 
elements, a read access rule for the respective stored data 
element, wherein the read access rule comprises a con 
dition for granting read access to the respective stored 
data element, the condition specifying a security level of 
the plurality of security levels and a category from the 
plurality of categories; 
receive a user request to access a stored data element; 
evaluate the read access rule for the stored data element to 
which access is requested; and 
selectively permit read access to the stored data element in 
response to the access request, based on the evaluation 
result for the read access rule. 
9. The computer program product of claim 8, wherein the 
computer usable program code is further configured to: 
define, based on user input and for each of the stored data 
elements, a write access rule for the respective stored 
data element, wherein the write access rule comprises a 
condition for granting write access to the respective 
stored data element, the condition specifying a security 
level of the plurality of security levels and a category 
from the plurality of categories; wherein the condition 
for granting write access to one of the stored data ele 
ments differs from the condition for granting read access 
to the one of the stored data elements; 
evaluate the write access rule for the stored data element to 
which access is requested; and 
selectively permit write access to the stored data element in 
response to the access request, based on the evaluation 
result for the write access rule. 
10. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the 
condition for granting write access further specifies an excep 
tion for a user, whereby the exception allows write access to 
be granted to the user even if the condition is not satisfied. 
11. The computer program product of claim 9, wherein the 
condition of the write access rule is satisfied only if (i) the 
security level of the user meets the security level specified by 
the write access rule for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user matches the category specified by the 
write access rule for the stored data element. 
12. The computer program product of claim 8, wherein the 
condition for granting read access further specifies an excep 
tion for a user, whereby the exception allows read access to be 
granted to the user even if the condition is not satisfied. 
13. The computer program product of claim 8, wherein the 
condition of the read access rule is satisfied only if (i) the 
security level of the user meets the security level specified by 
the read access rule for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user matches the category specified by the 
read access rule for the stored data element. 
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14. A system, comprising: 
a processor; and 
a memory containing an access control program, which 
when executed by the processor is configured to perform 
an operation for controlling user access to stored data 5 
elements, comprising: 
defining, based on user input, an ordered plurality of 
security levels that describe sensitivity of the stored 
data elements; 
defining, based on user input, a plurality of categories 
that categorize the stored data elements; 
associating each user with a security level from the 
ordered plurality of security levels and a category 
from the plurality of categories, thereby defining a 
security clearance for each respective user; 
defining, based on user input and for each of the stored 
data elements, a read access rule for the respective 
stored data element, wherein the read access rule 
comprises a condition for granting read access to the 
respective stored data element, the condition specify 
ing a security level of the plurality of security levels 
and a category from the plurality of categories; 
receiving a user request to access a stored data element; 
evaluating the read access rule for the stored data ele 
ment to which access is requested; and 
Selectively permitting read access to the stored data ele 
ment in response to the access request, based on the 
evaluation result for the read access rule. 
15. The system of claim 14, wherein the operation further 
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defining, based on user input and for each of the stored data 
elements, a write access rule for the respective stored 
data element, wherein the write access rule comprises a 
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condition for granting write access to the respective 
stored data element, the condition specifying a security 
level of the plurality of security levels and a category 
from the plurality of categories; wherein the condition 
for granting write access to one of the stored data ele 
ments differs from the condition for granting read access 
to the one of the stored data elements; 
evaluating the write access rule for the stored data element 
to which access is requested; and 
selectively permitting write access to the stored data ele 
ment in response to the access request, based on the 
evaluation result for the write access rule. 
16. The system of claim 15, wherein the condition for granting write access further specifies an exception for a user, 
whereby the exception allows write access to be granted to the 
user even if the condition is not satisfied. 
17. The system of claim 15, wherein the condition of the 
write access rule is satisfied only if (i) the security level of the 
user meets the security level specified by the write access rule 
for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user 
matches the category specified by the write access rule for the 
stored data element. 
18. The system of claim 14, wherein the condition for 
granting read access further specifies an exception for a user, 
whereby the exception allows read access to be granted to the 
user even if the condition is not satisfied. 
19. The system of claim 14, wherein the condition of the 
read access rule is satisfied only if (i) the security level of the 
user meets the security level specified by the read access rule 
for the stored data element, and (ii) the category of the user 
matches the category specified by the read access rule for the 
stored data element. 
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1. 
METHOD FOR MODIFYING A QUERY BY 
USE OF AN EXTERNAL SYSTEM FOR 
MANAGING ASSIGNMENT OF USER AND 
DATA CLASSIFICATIONS 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
The present invention relates to the field of database man agement systems, and more specifically, to a system, method 
and a computer program product for modifying a query by use 
of an external system for managing assignment of user and 
data classifications. 
BACKGROUND 
Information can be obtained from tables in a database 
using queries expressed in a database query language, such as 
Structured Query Language (SQL). The query is translated 
into an internal representation by a compiler of a database 
management system. This internal representation is inter 
preted by a runtime processor of the database management 
system to execute the query. Access to information in the 
database may be controlled according to a classification of 
both the tables and the user attempting to access the tables. 
For example, a user can only gain access to a specific table if 
the user's classification is such that access to the specific table 
is permitted based on the table's classification. The table's 
classification may be based on the entire table or on individual 
elements in each table (e.g. rows) with elements being clas 
sified to provide access to elements and not the entire table. 
The additional classifications produce complexities in classi 
fication management and tracking which may be governed by 
a system external to the database management system. 
Compilers use various optimization techniques to mini 
mize the time and computer resources used for execution of 
the internal representation of the query. The compiler deter 
mines an efficient access plan to satisfy the query by exam 
ining table information and related Statistics. Controlling 
access to elements based on user and table classifications may involve integrating with an external system. Such integration 
during execution of the query often increases execution time, 
especially if such information is not readily available. 
SUMMARY 
In accordance with one aspect there is provided a data processing-implemented method for directing a data process 
ing system to modify a query during compilation of the query, 
the query including a request for an element of data from a 
table in a database and parameters identifying the requested 
element, the data processing-implemented method including 
determining available information from parameters for locat 
ing a classification of the requested element and a classifica 
tion associated with the query, the requested data classifica 
tion controlling access to the requested element according to 
the query associated classification, requesting a Suggested 
action from an external system for obtaining a comparison of 
the requested data classification and the query associated 
classification based on the available information, receiving 
the Suggested action from the external system responsive to 
the sent request, and incorporating the Suggested action into 
the query, the Suggested action effecting comparison of the 
requested data classification with the query associated clas 
sification. 
In accordance with another aspect there is provided a data processing system for modifying a query during compilation 
of the query, the query including a request for an element of 
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data from a table in a database and parameters identifying the 
requested element, the data processing system including a 
query analysis mechanism for determining available infor 
mation from parameters for locating a classification of the 
requested element and a classification associated with the 
query, the requested data classification controlling access to 
the requested element according to the query associated clas 
sification, a request mechanism for preparing a request to the 
external system, the request asking the external system to 
provide a suggested action for obtaining a comparison of the 
requested data classification and the query associated classi 
fication, the request comprising the available information, an 
external system interface for requesting a Suggested action 
from an external system for obtaining a comparison of the 
requested data classification and the query associated classi 
fication based on the available information, and receiving the 
Suggested action from the external system responsive to the 
sent request, and a modification mechanism for incorporating 
the Suggested action into the query to effect comparison of the 
requested data classification with the query associated clas 
sification. 
In accordance with a further aspect there is provided an 
article of manufacture for directing a data processing system 
to modify a query during compilation of the query, the query 
including a request for an element of data from a table in a 
database and parameters identifying the requested element, 
the article of manufacture including a program usable 
medium embodying one or more executable data processing 
system instructions, the executable data processing system 
instructions including executable data processing system 
instructions for determining available information from 
parameters for locating a classification of the requested ele 
ment and a classification associated with the query, the 
requested data classification controlling access to the 
requested element according to the query associated classifi 
cation, executable data processing system instructions for 
requesting a suggested action from an external system for 
obtaining a comparison of the requested data classifications 
and the query associated classification based on the available 
information, executable data processing system instructions 
for receiving the Suggested action from the external system 
responsive to the sent request, and executable data processing 
system instructions for incorporating the Suggested action 
into the query, the Suggested action effecting comparison of 
the requested data classification with the query associated 
classification. 
Other aspects and features of the present invention will 
become apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art upon 
review of the following description of specific embodiments 
of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying fig 
U.S. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
The present invention will be described in conjunction with 
the drawings in which: 
FIG. 1 is an exemplary computing environment in which a 
database management system (DBMS) may be actualized; 
FIG. 2 illustrates operations of a compiler of the DBMS of 
FIG. 1 for modifying a query based on information from an 
external system; and 
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FIG.3 illustrates functional components of the compiler in 
the DBMS of FIG. 1 for modifying a query based on infor 
mation from the external system. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS 
The following detailed description of the embodiments do 
not limit the implementation of the embodiments to any par ticular computer programming language. The computer pro 
gram product may be implemented in any computer program 
ming language provided that the operating system provides 
the facilities that Support the requirements of the computer 
program product. A preferred embodiment is implemented in 
the C or C++ computer programming language (or may be 
implemented in other computer programming languages in 
conjunction with C/C++). Any limitations presented would 
be a result of a particular type of operating system, computer 
programming language, or data processing System and would 
not be a limitation of the embodiments described herein. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a configuration of a computing environ 
ment 100 comprising a data processing system 126 in which 
an embodiment of a database management system 122 may be implemented. 
The data processing system 126 includes a central process 
ing unit (CPU) 102, a memory 104, an input/output interface 
106 and a bus 108. The CPU 102, the memory 104 and the 
input/output interface 106 are connected with one another via 
the bus 108. The input/output interface 106 is configured so 
that it can be connected to an input/output unit 112 in the 
computing environment 100. 
The CPU 102 can be a commercially available CPU or a 
customized CPU suitable for operations described herein. 
Other variations of the CPU 102 can include a plurality of 
CPUs interconnected to coordinate various operations and 
functions. The data processing system 126 serves as an appa 
ratus for performing the present method by the CPU 102 
executing the present invention. 
Data and instructions that are to be executed by the CPU 
102 reside in the memory 104. The memory 104 contains a 
database management system (DBMS) 122 and a database 
110 with multiple tables 116 (only one table is shown for 
illustration purposes) that hold information. The instructions 
are internal representations of programs that run on the data 
processing system 126. Such as the database management 
system 122. The programs operate on the data. For example, 
if the program is the database management system 122, the 
data can be rows in the table 116. The database management 
system 122 comprises a compiler 118 and an external system 
interface 124. The database management system 122 retains 
an indication of operating conditions, such as an identifier for 
the user who submitted the query 114, when compiling and 
executing the query 114. 
The information in the tables 116 may be accessed by a 
query 114 that is received by the input/output unit 112 and is 
retained in the memory 104. The query 114 may be presented 
in an SQL format that is compiled by the compiler 118 to form 
an internal representation that is interpreted for execution. 
The present invention may be embodied in the compiler 118. 
Alternatively, the present invention may be provided as an 
extension of the functionality of the compiler 118. The 
present invention may be embodied in a program stored in, for 
example, the memory 104. Alternatively, the present inven 
tion may be recorded on any type of recording medium Such 
as a magnetic disk or an optical disk. The present invention 
recorded on Such a recording medium is loaded to the memory 104 of the data processing system 126 via the input/ 
output unit 112 (e.g. a disk drive). 
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The compiler 118 recognizes statements in the query 114 
including keywords that represent commands and relevant 
arguments. During the formation of the internal representa 
tion from the query 114, the compiler 118 modifies the query 
114 to improve performance during execution. 
The external system interface 124 is in communication 
with an external system 120 while modifying the query 114 to 
improve performance. The external system 120 may be a 
system external to the database management system 122 but 
residing in the data processing system 126 or it may be exter 
nal to the data processing system 126. In the latercase the 
external system 120 may communicate with the data process 
ing system 126 via a direct link or through a communications 
network. 
The external system 120 manages the assignment of clas 
sifications to users and sections of data in the tables 116. For 
example, given a user identification and a table name, the 
external system 120 knows how to obtain the classification of 
that user. The external system 120 contains a classification 
that is associated with the query 114 which may be a classi 
fication for a user identification from which the query 114 was 
submitted, a classification of the location from which the 
query 114 was submitted or some other such similar classifi 
cation basis. The external system 120 may also contain access 
rules that govern when a user with a particular classification 
can access an element from the table 116. An interface in the 
external system 120 accepts questions from the compiler 118 
providing available information and desired information. 
Through this interface the external system 120 is able to either 
provide the information requested by the compiler 118 or 
provide a course of action for obtaining the information. 
As a result, the query 114 may be modified to include 
information on a user's classification or table classification or 
a comparison of the two classifications. Such information 
might be determined by interfacing with the external system 
120 during execution or such interfacing may be performed in 
advance by the compiler 118 and the results incorporated into 
the query 114. 
FIG. 2 illustrates operations of the compiler 118 that 
modify the query 114 based on information from the external 
system 120. The query 114, containing at least one request for 
information, is read in step 202. Each request is analyzed in 
step 204 to extract parameters of the request and a target of the 
request. The type of information of each of the parameters is 
determined in step 206. The parameters may also include an 
identification associated with the query 114 Such as a user 
who submitted the query 114 or a location of the submission. 
The type of information requested from the target is deter 
mined in step 208. 
The table 116 in the database 110 contains information that 
is classified. In order for a user who submitted the query 114 
to obtain the requested information from the table 116, access 
rules for the table 116 in the external system 120 might 
indicate that the user have a classification that corresponds to 
the classification of the requested information. Based on the 
types of parameters included in the request, the user's iden 
tification (as contained in the database management system 
122) and the type of information requested, step 210 deter 
mines what information regarding the user's classification 
and the information’s classification is unknown. 
Since this unknown classification information is deter 
mined prior to completing execution of the query 114, the 
compiler 118 determines how the classification information 
can be determined in conjunction with the external system 
120. A request for a strategy to obtain the unknown classifi 
cation information is generated in step 212. This request is 
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based on the determined types of the parameters and the 
determined type of the requested information. 
Suggested course(s) of action for obtaining the unknown 
classification information are received in step 214 from the 
external system 120. If there are multiple types of unknown 
classification information then there may be multiple courses 
of action that will be received. Each course of action received 
may be directed to obtaining one of the types of unknown 
classification information. 
If there is more than one course of action received, as 
determined in step 216, then an order for the courses of action 
is determined in step 218. This order may depend on infor 
mation required by each course of action. For example, if one 
course of action uses information dependent on a second 
course of action then the second course of action is imple 
mented first. The order for implementation of the courses of 
action may optionally be supplied with the Suggested courses 
of action 
The course(s) of action are inserted into the query in step 
220 Such that they can be easily implemented during execu 
tion. 
FIG. 3 illustrates functional components of the compiler 
118 in the DBMS 122 for modifying the query 114 based on 
information from the external system 120. The external sys 
tem 120 includes a request interface 300 and a request pro 
cessing mechanism 302. The compiler 118 includes a con 
troller 304 in communication with a query analysis 
mechanism 306, a management interface 308, an information 
analysis mechanism 314, a query classification mechanism 
310 and a request formation mechanism 312. 
The controller 304 in the compiler 118 manages compiling 
the query 114 in order to form an internal representation 
thereof. During compiling, the controller 304 coordinates 
modification of the query 114 to improve execution perfor 
mance. When the controller 304 detects a request in the query 
114 that requires a check of a user's classification with the 
classification of requested information, the request is pro 
vided to the query analysis mechanism 306. 
The query analysis mechanism 306 includes a target type 
mechanism 316 and a parameter type mechanism 318 that 
collectively function to determine the information defining 
the request and the information sought from the request. The 
parameter type mechanism 318 extracts the type of informa 
tion of the parameters that define the request. The target type 
mechanism 316 determines the type of information that has been requested. The query analysis mechanism 306 provides 
the parameters and target types to the controller 304 where it 
is passed to the information analysis mechanism 314 and the 
request formation mechanism 312. 
The information analysis mechanism 314 receives the 
parameters and target types and assesses what information is 
available for determining the requested information classifi 
cation and user's classification. Based on the available infor 
mation, the information analysis mechanism 314 determines 
the information that is unknown that is to be used for com 
pleting data access qualification for the user. The determined 
unknown information is provided to the controller 314 from 
which it is passed to the request formation mechanism 312. 
The request formation mechanism 312 receives the param 
eters and target types as well as an indication of the unknown 
information to be used in determining the requested informa 
tion classification and user's classification. The request for 
mation mechanism 312 formulates a request on how to obtain 
the unknown information based on the parameters and target 
types. This request is provided to the controller 304 to be 
passed to the management interface 308. The external system 
interface 308 provides the request to the external system 
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interface 124 in the database management system 122 so that 
the request can be submitted to the external system 120. 
The request from the request formation mechanism 312 
may be one or a combination of for example: 
Q1: Given an user identification and a table name, how can 
the user classification be obtained? 
Q2: Given a set of data values and a table name, how can the 
element classification be obtained? 
Q3: Given a user classification and an element classifica tion, how can the two be compared? 
The request interface 300 of the external system 120 
receives the request from the compiler 118. The request is 
provided to the request processing mechanism 302 where a 
knowledge base may be drawn upon to produce Suggestions 
regarding the manner in which the unknown information can 
be obtained. If there are multiple courses of action then the Suggestion may involve multiple courses of action, each per 
taining to obtaining a different piece of unknown informa 
tion. The Suggestions from the request processing mechanism 
302are provided to the controller 304 via the request interface 
300 and the management interface 308 through the external 
system interface 124. 
Based on the above exemplary requests, the Suggested 
course(s) of action form the request processing mechanism 
302 may be one or a combination of, for example: 
A1: A Subquery which can be used to select a user classi 
fication or element classification from a table in the 
database 110 known to the external system 120. 
A2: A predicate which can be used to filter out the table's 
elements (rows or columns) that have a classification 
that do not match the user's classification. 
A3: A set of values presented directly or indirectly via a 
session variable or special register. These values can 
represent a set of user classification or a set or element 
classifications. 
A4: A query which can be used to generate an internal 
mapping table for use by the executable form of the 
query 114. For a given table, the mapping table enables 
identification of the classification of an element in the 
table. For example, the mapping table may consist of 
(n+1) columns where the first n columns represent the 
table columns from which to derive the element classi 
fications and the last columns represents a classification 
level. When Such a mapping table was not previously 
created, an internal mapping table for use by the execut 
able form of the query 114 can be generated for this 
purpose. 
A5: A request to call the external system at execution time 
of the query 114 for classification information. 
The above requests may produce the Suggested course(s) of 
action as indicated below: 
Action on Q1: 
A1: A Subquery that can be used to select the user classi 
fication for the user identification from a database table 
known to the external system 120. 
A3: A data value(s) that indicates the user classification for 
the user identification. 
A5: An indication that the external system 120 should be 
asked for this information at execution time. 
Action on Q2: 
A1: A subquery that can be used to select the element 
classification for the current element from a mapping 
table known to the external system 120. 
A4: A query that can be used to generate an internal map 
ping table for use by the executable form of the query 
114. 
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A5: An indication that the external system 120 should be 
asked for this information at execution time. 
Action on Q3: A2: A predicate that the compiler 118 can add to the query 
114 to filter out the table's elements that do not match the 
user's classification. The general form of predicates 
returned will be an IN predicate but inequality predi 
cates are also possible, particularly if the element clas 
sification or user's classification represent a hierarchy. 
This type of advice is most likely to be returned when the 
element classification is stored within the table itselfor 
when a mapping table has been created. If the element 
classification is stored within the element then the predi 
cate will refer to the table's column where the element 
classification level is stored, otherwise, the predicate 
will refer to the mapping table's column where the clas 
sification level is stored. 
A3: A set of values representing the element classification 
allowed for the given user's classification. Element level 
access control may then be enforced by, for example: 
1. The compiler 118 altering the query 114 to add a 
predicate using the set of values received. This choice 
is possible if the element classification is stored 
within the table itself or a mapping table has been 
created. 
2. If the element classification is not stored within the 
table and a mapping table has not been created then a 
predicate cannot be used. In this case, interaction 
between the DBMS 122 and the external system 120 
is used during execution of the query 114 to enforce 
element access control. For each element accessed, 
the data in the set of columns defining the element 
classification and the full table is submitted to the 
external system 120 with the result being the element 
classification. The result is compared against the set 
of values for the given user classification to determine 
if the element can be viewed or altered by that user. To 
reduce the number of times the DBMS 122 makes a 
call to the external system 120 to obtain the element classification a caching technique may be used. For 
example, the information that could be stored in the 
cache may be the full table name, the data defining the 
element classification and the element classification 
as returned by the external system 120. 
A5: An indication that the external system 120 should be 
asked for this information at execution time. 
The request provided by the request processing mechanism 
302 may also provide an indication of whether or not the 
Suggested course(s) of action can be used of all users or only 
for a provided user identification. 
The controller 304 provides the suggested course(s) of 
action to the query classification mechanism 310 where an 
order is determined for the course(s) of action based on 
dependence of the results of each course of action. Alterna 
tively, this order may be specified by the external system 120 
and received with the Suggested course(s) of action. After the 
order has been determined, the query classification mecha 
nism 310 modifies the query 114 to include the course(s) of 
action. 
The following are examples of modifying an SQL query to 
include obtaining classification information. 
A table T1 (C1, C2, C3, ..., Cn) represents a table where 
the classification level of an element and the user classifica 
tion is an element of the ordered set S={TOP SECRET, 
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFIED, UNCLASSI 
FIED}. The element level access control policy for this 
example states that an element with a classification r can be 
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viewed by a user with a classification u only ifud-r. Suppose 
that a user with a classification level CONFIDENTIAL 
issues a query SELECT * FROM T1. 
Scenario 1 
The compiler 118 sends a request corresponding with Q1 
from above to the external system 120 to obtain the user's classification. Suppose the external system 120 provides a 
Suggested course of action corresponding with A3 from 
above; that is, a data value representing the user's classifica 
tion. The compiler 118 then submits a second request to the 
external system 120 based on Q3 above by submitting the 
table name (T1) and the user's classification (CONFIDEN TIAL). Suppose the external system 120 returns a Suggested 
course of action corresponding with A2 from above. That is, 
in response to the second request the external system 120 
returned a predicate in, for example, “C1 IN (CONFIDEN 
TIAL, ° CLASSIFIED, UNCLASSIFIED). Based on the 
received courses of action the compiler 118 modifies the query 114 to incorporate the predicate providing a query Such 
aS 
SELECT * FROM T1 WHERE C1 IN (CONFIDEN 
TIAL, "CLASSIFIED, UNCLASSIFIED). 
Given that the set is ordered and represents a hierarchy, the 
predicate returned could also be “C1>''CONFIDENTIAL”. 
Scenario 2 
Suppose an element classification is determined based on 
the values in columns C1 and C2 as follows: 
C1 C2 Element Classification 
1 1 TOP SECRET 
2 2 SECRET 
3 3 CONFIDENTIAL 
4 4 CLASSIFIED 
5 5 UNCLASSIFIED 
The compiler 118 sends the external system 120 a request 
corresponding with request Q1 to obtain the user's classifi 
cation. Suppose the Suggest course of action is A3; that is, a 
data value represent the user's classification. The compiler 
118 submits a second request based on the table name (T1) 
and the set of column names defined in the classification 
mapping shown above (Cl and C2). The Suggested course of 
action in response to the second request depends on whether 
a mapping table exists. 
Response 1: A Mapping Table Exists 
A database table (T1MAP) storing mapping information 
has been created and is known to the external system 120. 
T1MAP consists of three columns, namely, C1, C2 and 
LEVEL. For each pair of values (C1, C2), the LEVEL column 
indicates an element classification. Based on this informa 
tion, the external system 120 can return A1 as the Suggested 
course of action; that is, a subquery to select an element 
classification from T1 MAP. The subquery would be as fol 
lows: 
SELECT LEVEL FROMT1MAP WHERE 
T1MAPC1 =T1C1 AND T1MAP2=T1C1. 
The compiler 118 then sends a request to the external system 120 corresponding with request Q3 by submitting the 
table name (T1) and the user's classification (CONFIDEN 
TIAL). If the external system 120 returns suggested action 
A2, then the predicate returned would be: 
“T1 MAPLEVEL>''CONFIDENTIAL. Based on the sug 
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gested course of action the compiler 118 modifies the query 
114 to incorporate the predicate and subquery. The modified 
query would be: 
SELECT * FROM T1, T1 MAP WHERE 
(T1.C1=T1MAPC1 AND T1.C2=T1MAP.C2) 
AND (T1 MAPLEVEL> *CONFIDENTIAL). 
Response 2: A Mapping Table DoesNotExist 
If a mapping table does not exist then the Suggested course 
ofaction provided to the compiler 118 might be action A5, an 
indication to Submit the same request during execution. The 
second request submitted by the compiler 118 corresponds 
with request Q3 and submits the table name (T1) and the 
user's classification (CONFIDENTIAL). The external sys 
tem may provide action A3, a set of data values representing 
the element classifications allowed for the user (i.e. all ele 
ments having CONFIDENTIAL, ° CLASSIFIED, and 
UNCLASSIFIED). Based on the suggestion course of 
action the compiler 118 does not modify the query 114 but 
inserts logic into the internal representation to perform the 
following tasks: 
For each element obtained, call the external system 120 by 
submitting the table name (T1) and the values (C1, C2). 
Obtain the element classification from the call to the exter 
nal system 120. 
If the element classification is an element of the set {CON FIDENTIAL, "CLASSIFIED, UNCLASSIFIED} 
then include the element in the result set; otherwise, 
discard the element. 
Although the classification of the user is used as the basis 
for obtaining the requested element of data, any classification 
associated with the query 114 may be used. Such other asso 
ciated classifications may include a classification of the loca 
tion from which the query 114 was submitted. 
The elements of data that are accessed may be the rows of 
the tables 116 or the columns of the tables 116 or some other 
delineation of portions of the tables 116. 
It will be appreciated that the elements described above 
may be adapted for specific conditions or functions. The 
concepts of the present invention can be further extended to a 
variety of other applications that are clearly within the scope 
of this invention. Having thus described the present invention 
with respect to preferred embodiments as implemented, it 
will be apparent to those skilled in the art that many modifi 
cations and enhancements are possible to the present inven 
tion without departing from the basic concepts as described in 
the preferred embodiment of the present invention. There 
fore, what is intended to be protected by way of letters patent 
should be limited only by the scope of the following claims. 
The invention claimed is: 
1. A data processing-implemented method for directing a 
data processing system to modify a query during compilation 
of the query, the query comprising a request for an element of 
data from a table in a database and parameters identifying the 
requested element, the data processing-implemented method 
comprising: 
determining, by a computer, available information from 
parameters for locating a classification of the requested 
element and a classification associated with the query, 
the requested data classification controlling access to the 
requested element according to the query associated 
classification; 
requesting a suggested action from an external system for 
obtaining a comparison of the requested data classifica 
tion and the query associated classification based on the 
available information; 
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receiving the Suggested action from the external system 
responsive to the sent request; and 
incorporating the Suggested action into the query, the Sug 
gested action effecting comparison of the requested data 
classification with the query associated classification, 
wherein if the external system knows the requested data 
classification and the query associated classification, the 
Suggested action is provided prior to execution of the 
query, and comprises at least one of the requested data 
classification, the query associated classification, a 
course of action for obtaining the requested data classi 
fication, a course of action for obtaining the query asso 
ciated classification, and a comparison of the requested 
data classification and the query associated classifica 
tion, and 
wherein if the external system does not know the requested 
data classification and the query associated classifica 
tion, the Suggested action comprises a request to call the 
external system at execution time of the query. 
2. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1 wherein the requesting the Suggested action com prises: 
determining unknown information used to obtain a com 
parison of the requested data classification with the 
query associated classification; and 
sending a request to the external system for the Suggested 
action, the Suggested action pertaining to obtaining the 
unknown information. 
3. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1 wherein the requesting the Suggested action com prises: 
selecting a request from one of a plurality of formulated 
requests based on the available information; and 
sending the selected request to the external system to 
obtain the Suggested action. 
4. The method according to claim 3 wherein the selecting comprises: 
selecting the request from the plurality of formulated 
requests consisting of: 
a request for the query associated classification based on 
providing an identifier for the table and an identifier 
associated with the query, and 
a request for the requested data classification based on 
providing an identifier for the requested element and 
the table identifier, and a request for a comparison of 
the requested data classification with the query asso 
ciated classification. 
5. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 2 wherein the incorporating the Suggested action com prises: 
incorporating a subquery into the query to obtain unknown 
information from a table. 
6. The method according to claim 1 wherein the incorpo 
rating the Suggested action comprises: 
incorporating a predicate into the query to delimit sections 
of the table that can be obtained by the query according 
to the requested data classification and the query asso 
ciated classification. 
7. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1 wherein the incorporating the Suggested action com 
prises any one of 
incorporating a set of values into the query representing the 
unknown information; 
incorporating a second query into the query to generate a 
mapping table mapping classifications to elements of 
data in the table; and 
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incorporating a request to the external system to be sent 
during execution of the query. 
8. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1 wherein the comparison comprises: 
comparing the data classification with the query associated 
classification comprising the Suggested action and deter 
mining if the query associated classification is equal to 
or greater than the data classification. 
9. The data processing-implemented method for directing a 
data processing system according to claim 1, wherein the 
external system is external to and functions independently 
from the data processing system, and communicates with the 
data processing system through a communications network. 
10. The data processing-implemented method for directing 
a data processing system according to claim 1, 
wherein the external system contains classification infor 
mation and access rules that govern access to data according to a particular classification, and 
wherein the external system is separate of the data process ing System. 
11. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1, wherein the query associated classification is based 
on a classification of a user Submitting the query, and the 
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requested data classification is based on a permission level of 
a user authorized to view the requested data. 
12. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 11, wherein the Suggested action includes at least one of 
instructions for obtaining the requested data classification 
when the requested data classification cannot be obtained 
with information in the query, and instructions for obtaining 
the query associated classification when the query associated 
classification cannot be obtained with information in the 
query. 
13. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 12, wherein the requested data classification is obtained 
using the instructions for obtaining the requested data classi 
fication, and the query associated classification is obtained 
using the instructions for obtaining the query associated clas 
sification and are provided for the comparison of the obtained 
requested data classification with the obtained query associ 
ated classification. 
14. The data processing-implemented method according to 
claim 1, wherein when the external system is called at the 
execution time of the query, the query is modified during 
execution of the query. 
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FINE-GRAINED, LABEL-BASED, XML 
ACCESS CONTROL MODEL 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
0001 1. Field of the Invention 
0002. This invention relates to XML access control and 
more particular to fine-grained, label-based, XML access 
control models. 
0003 2. Description of the Related Art 
0004 XML has rapidly emerged as the prevalent standard 
for representing and exchanging business and other sensitive 
data over the Internet. The current trend to add XML support to database systems, however, poses new security challenges 
in an environment where both relational and XML data coex 
ist. In particular, fine-grained access control methodologies 
may be even more important for XML data than for relational 
data, given the more flexible and less homogeneous structure 
of XML data compared to relational tables and rows. 
0005 Controlling access to XML data may be more diffi 
cult than controlling access to relational data for several rea 
sons. First, the semi-structured nature of XML data, where a 
schema may be absent, or, even if present, may allow signifi 
cantly more flexibility and variability in the structure of the 
document than is allowed by a relational Schema. Second, the 
hierarchical structure of XML may require specifying how 
access privileges to certain nodes propagate to and from the 
nodes ancestors and descendants. 
0006. In almost all models for controlling access to XML, 
the smallest unit of protection is a node of an XML document, which is typically specified using an XPathfragment. Access 
to ancestor/descendant and sibling relationships among 
nodes has typically not been considered. In general, an access 
control policy consists of positive or negative authorization 
rules that grant or deny access to selected nodes of an XML 
document. The main difference between most XML access 
control models lies in privilege propagation. For example, 
some models forbid access to entire sub-trees that are rooted 
at inaccessible nodes. 
0007. In other models, an ancestor node for which access 
is denied may be masked as an empty node if access is granted 
to a descendant node. However, this model may make the 
literal of the forbidden ancestor visible in the path from the 
root node to the authorized node. In some cases, this situation 
may be improved by replacing the literal of an ancestor node 
literal with a dummy value. However, this still does not solve 
the problem that different descendant nodes may require their 
ancestor's literal to be visible or invisible in a different man 
ner. Accordingly, each of the above models makes it difficult 
to define a view that precisely describes the path leading to an 
authorized node. 
0008. In view of the foregoing, what is needed is an access 
control model for XML that provides a more fine-grained 
level of control. Ideally, such a model would be able to protect 
relationships between nodes as opposed to the nodes them 
selves. Further needed is a model that utilizes security labels to protect these relationships. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
0009. The present invention has been developed in 
response to the present state of the art, and in particular, in 
response to the problems and needs in the art that have not yet 
been fully solved by currently available methods for control 
ling access to information in XML documents. Accordingly, 
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the present invention has been developed to provide a fine 
grained, label-based model for controlling access to XML 
documents that remedies various problems in the art. 
0010 Consistent with the foregoing and in accordance 
with the invention as embodied and broadly described herein, 
a method for controlling access to an XML document 
includes referencing a schema definition comprising a path 
security label definition associated with a path of an XML 
document. As used herein the term "path’ in an XML docu 
ment refers to an ancestor-to-descendent path, a sibling-to sibling path Such paths, edges, and relationships between 
nodes of an XML document. An XML document with secu 
rity labels may then be validated by comparing it with the 
schema definition. This validation may include Verifying that 
the XML document has a path security label associated with 
a path that is at least as restrictive as that specified by the path 
security label definition. Similarly, an access security label 
may be defined for a user seeking to access a sibling-to 
sibling path. In one embodiment, the security administrator 
may define the access security label for a user. The path 
security label and the access security label may be compared, 
using pre-determined access rules, to determine whether the 
user is authorized to access the sibling-to-sibling path. Access 
to the sibling-to-sibling path may then be granted or denied 
according to the access rules. 
0011. In a second aspect of the invention, a computer 
program product may be provided to control access to an 
XML document comprising a plurality of nodes and a plural 
ity of paths, or relationships, between the nodes. The com 
puter program product may include a computer-readable 
medium storing a program of computer-readable instruc 
tions. When executed, these instructions may cause a com puter to generate a schema definition comprising a path Secu 
rity label definition associated with a sibling-to-sibling path 
ofan XML document. The instructions may further enable an 
XML document to be validated by comparing it with the 
schema definition. This validation may include Verifying that 
the XML document has a path security label associated with 
a sibling-to-sibling path that is at least as restrictive as that 
specified by the path security label definition. These instruc 
tions may further cause the computer to reference an access security label to a user seeking to access the sibling-to-sibling 
path of the XML document and compare, using pre-deter 
mined access rules, the path security label to the access Secu 
rity label to determine whether the user is authorized to access the sibling-to-sibling path. In one embodiment, these instruc 
tions may cause the computer to assign an access security 
label to an XML document that fails to comply with a given 
Document Type Definition (DTD) or XML Schema Defini 
tion (XSD). The access security label assigned may beat least 
as restrictive as a path security label designated in the DTD or 
XSD. Finally, the instructions may cause the computer to grant or deny access to the sibling-to-sibling path according 
to the access rules. The present invention provides novel 
methods for controlling access to XML documents. The fea 
tures and advantages of the present invention will become 
more fully apparent from the following description and 
appended claims, or may be learned by the practice of the 
invention as set forth hereinafter. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
0012. In order that the advantages of the invention will be 
readily understood, a more particular description of the inven 
tion briefly described above will be rendered by reference to 
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specific embodiments illustrated in the appended drawings. Understanding that these drawings depict only typical 
embodiments of the invention and are not therefore to be 
considered limiting of its scope, the invention will be 
described and explained with additional specificity and detail 
through use of the accompanying drawings, in which: 
0013 FIG.1 illustrates one embodiment of an XML docu 
ment tree structure that includes multiple nodes and paths 
between the nodes; 
0014 FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of an SQL/XPath 
extension, or statement, to attach a path security label to a parent-to-child path; and 
0015 FIG.3 illustrates one embodiment of an SQL/XPath 
extension, or statement, to attach a path security label to a sibling-to-sibling path. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
0016. It will be readily understood that the components of 
the present invention, as generally described and illustrated in 
the Figures herein, could be arranged and designed in a wide 
variety of different configurations. Thus, the following more 
detailed description of the embodiments of systems and 
methods in accordance with the present invention, as repre 
sented in the Figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the 
invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of certain 
examples of presently contemplated embodiments in accor 
dance with the invention. The presently described embodi 
ments will be best understood by reference to the drawings, 
wherein like parts are designated by like numerals through 
Out. 
0017 Referring to FIG. 1, one embodiment of an XML 
document tree structure 100 is illustrated to provide a basic 
understanding of the invention. Here, the document tree 
structure 100 stores account and item information associated 
with an online seller. As shown, the document tree structure 
100 includes a plurality of nodes 102 arranged in a hierarchi 
cal tree structure. The relationship between the nodes 102 may be represented by a plurality of paths 104 traveling 
between each of the nodes 102. As mentioned previously, the 
Smallest unit of protection in most conventional XML access 
control models has been the node 102. This method of pro 
tection, however, may violate various security principles Such 
as the “need-to-know’ and “choice' security principles by 
leaking unnecessary or confidential information. 
0018 For example, consider the sub-tree rooted at node 
102a and represented by the literal “VIP Accounts.” Suppose 
that the security policy is such that access to node 102b is 
authorized while access to node 102c is unauthorized. Using 
a node-based security approach, granting access to node 102b 
will normally require granting access to the root node 102a. 
Once access is granted to the root node 102a, access will 
normally be automatically granted to the child node 102c. 
Thus, it may be very difficult to implement a node-based 
security approach that can grant access to node 102b while 
simultaneously denying access to node 102c. As a result, 
many node-based security approaches violate the “need-to 
know’ or “choice' security principles because they leak 
information about the node 102c. 
0019. In selected embodiments in accordance with the invention, a path- or relationship-based security approach 
may be used to provide a more fine-grained, expressive, and 
effective access control model to protect information in the 
XML document 100. In such a model, ancestor/descendant 
and sibling relationships 104, or paths 104, may be consid 
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ered legitimate elements to be protected. Such a model may 
also better comply with security principles such as the “need 
to-know’ and “choice' security principles. 
0020. In certain embodiments, one or more of the paths 
104 may be protected with a “security label' associated with 
a label-based access control (LBAC) implementation. In such an implementation, the path security label may be compared 
to an access security label granted to a subject (e.g., a user) 
attempting to access or traverse the path. Whether access is 
authorized may be determined based on pre-determined set of 
label access rules. Access to the path may then be denied or 
granted based on the label access rules. 
0021 For example, consider again the sub-tree rooted at 
node 102a. If the security policy is such that access to node 
102b is authorized while access to node 102c is unauthorized, 
a security label 106a may be attached to the parent-to-child 
path between the root node 102a and the child node 102c. A second security label 106b may be attached to the sibling-to 
sibling relationship between node 102c and node 102b. As a 
result, access may be granted to the path between the root 
node 102a and the child node 102b while simultaneously 
denying access to all paths leading to the child node 102c. 
0022. In selected embodiments, an SQL extension, also 
referred to herein as a command or statement, may be pro 
vided to enable an access security label to be granted to a user. 
Such an extension may already be available in various data 
base management systems, such as IBM's DB2 version 9. For 
example, one embodiment of an extension may be imple 
mented using the following SQL statement: 
GRANTACCESS LABEL label-name 
TOUSER user-name FOR READ ACCESS 
Here, label-name designates the name of the access security 
label and user-name designates the name of the user who is 
granted the access security label. Similarly, the phrase “FOR 
READ ACCESS' may be replaced with the phrase “FOR 
WRITEACCESS’’’ or “FOR ALL ACCESS to grant either 
read access, write access, or both types of access to the user. 
(0023 Referring to FIGS. 2 and 3, various SQL/XPath 
extensions may also be provided to enable security labels to 
be attached to paths 104 between nodes 102. For example, 
FIG. 2 shows one embodiment of an SQL statement that may 
be used to attach a security label to an ancestor/descendant path (including a parent-to-child path) of an XML document. 
In this embodiment, path1 and path2 are XPath expressions 
designating the nodes at each end of the path, with path2 
being an XPath expression relative to path1. Path-label may 
be used to designate the name of the security label that is 
attached to the path. 
0024 For example, the following statement may be used 
to attach a path security label having the name “EXIST 
ENCE' to the relationship between the node 102a and the 
node 102c of FIG. 1: 
ATTACHEXISTENCE 
ANCS VIP Accounts 
DESC (AccountCustomer/Name = “Barbara 
0025 FIG.3 shows one embodiment of an SQL statement that may be used to attach a security label to a sibling-to 
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sibling path of an XML document. In this embodiment, path1. path2, and path3 are XPath expressions, with path2 and path3 
being XPath expressions relative to path1. Path2 and path3 
specify relationships between the node specified by path1. 
and the node's preceding and following siblings. If the node 
does not have preceding siblings, the PRECEDING-SIB 
LING expression may be deleted from the statement. Simi 
larly, if the node does not have following siblings, the FOL 
LOWING-SIBLING expression may be deleted from the 
statement. Like the extension illustrated in FIG. 2, path-label 
may designate the name of the security label attached to the sibling-to-sibling path. 
0026. For example, the following statement may be used 
to attacha path security label with the name “VALUE' to the 
sibling-to-sibling relationship between the node 102b and the 
node 102c of FIG. 1: 
ATTACHVALUE 
NODE AccountCustomer? Name = “Barbara 
PRECEDING SIBLING Account 
0027. In addition to providing support for the above SQL/ 
XPath statements, an extension may be provided to the SQL 
compiler. This extension may ensure that the access plan 
generated to fetch a column of type XML in a database table 
also includes the access rules for evaluating a user's access 
rights with respect to the content of the XML column. The 
goal is to allow users to label node relationships and let them 
be sure that what they want to conceal is truly concealed from 
the users whose access labels do not satisfy the label access policy with the path labels. Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
guarantee concealment for any arbitrary set of relationships. 
Sometimes, it is possible to infer a concealed relationship 
from the relationships that are not concealed. 
0028 Let us consider an example of four cases where a 
relationship could be inferred from a pair of non-concealed 
relationship. Referring to FIG. 1, suppose it is known that 
Account Node 102b is a descendant of VIP Accounts Node 
102a and Customer Node 102d is a descendant of Account 
Node 102b. Then, there is no point to conceal the ancestor 
descendant relationship between VIP Accounts Node 102a 
and Customer Node 102d. Suppose it is known that Customer 
Node 102d is a descendant of VIP Accounts Node 102a as 
well as Account Node 102b. Since there is only one path from 
the root of the document to Account Node 102b, there is no 
point to conceal the ancestor-descendant relationship 
between VIP Accounts Node 102a and Account Node 102b. 
0029 Suppose it is known that Account Node 102b and 
Account Node 102c are the children of VIP Accounts Node 
102a, then there is no point to conceal the sibling relationship 
between Account Node 102b and Account Node 102c. Sup 
pose it is known that VIP Accounts Node 102a has a descen 
dant Customer Node 102d and the customer has a sibling 
Account ID 102e, then there is no point to conceal the ances 
tor-descendant relationship between VIP Accounts Node 
102a and Account ID 102e. We say a set of labeled relation 
ships/paths in an XML document D is not secure with respect 
to a path label L if one of the following four cases occurs. 
0030) 1. Case 1: D has three nodes, n, n, and n s.t. the 
ancestor-descendant path from n to n and the ancestor 
descendant path from n to n have labels L-L and L2-L. 
The ancestor-descendant path from n to n has a label 
Lisa L. 
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0031 2. Case 2: D has three nodes, n, n and n s.t. the 
ancestor-descendant path from n to n and the ancestor 
descendant path from n to n have labels LCL and L2-L. 
The ancestor-descendant path from n to n has a label 
L122L. 
0032. 3. Case 3: D has three nodes, n, n and ns.t. n is the parent of n and n, the parent-child path from n to n and 
the parent-child path from n to n have labels L-L and 
L-L. The sibling path from n to n has a label L.2L or the 
sibling path from n to n has a label L.2L. 
0033 4. Case 4: D has three nodes, n, n and n s.t. the 
ancestor-descendant path from n to n has a label L-L, and 
either the sibling path from n to n has a label LCL or the 
sibling path from n to n has a label L.-L. The ancestor 
descendant path from n, to n has a label L.2L. 
0034. There is a simple test to verify that a set of labeled 
relationships/paths in an XML document D is not secure with 
respect to a path label L. The test starts by computing three 
ternary relations R, R and R. The first two columns store 
the start/end nodes of paths. The third column stores the label 
associated with paths (if a label is missing, then it is a NULL 
value). In particular, R stores all ancestor-descendant paths 
in D. R. Stores all parent-child paths in D, and R. Stores all 
sibling paths in D. 
0035 1. Case 1 is true for a path label L if and only if the 
expression Isiss(R*$2–$1R)-R is not empty where 
R is Oss-(R1). 
0036 2. Case 2 is true for a path label L if and only if the 
expression Tussa ($2–$2R)-R is not empty where 
R1 is Oss- (R). 
0037 3. Case 3 is true for a path label L if and only if the 
expressionals, ss (R*S1=S1 R2)-Rs is not empty where 
R2 is Oss-t (R2) and Rs is Oss-t (Rs). 
0038 4. Case 4 is true for a path label L if and only if the 
expression Isiss(R*$2–$1 Rs.)-R is not empty where 
R1 is Oss- (R) and Rs is Ossi (Rs). 
0039. Furthermore, we give intuitive conditions to con 
struct a secure set of labeled relationships for an XML docu 
ment. If we ignore the directions of ancestor-descendant and sibling paths, all these paths form cycles in an XML docu 
ment. To assign a path label L to a relationship between two 
nodes n and n in an XML document D, we must make sure, forevery cycle that includes the path from n, to n, either there 
is another path whose label L.2L, or n and n are descen 
dants of some nodes in the cycle and n, n are not children of 
the same parent. Both cases ensure there is uncertainty 
whethera relationship between two nodes n and in exists: the 
first case by having another path missing in the cycle, while in 
the second case, the fact that n and n are descendants of Some nodes in the cycle introduces uncertainty except when 
they are children of the same parent, in which case the sibling 
relationship between n and n is leaked. 
0040. In certain embodiments, a DTD may be used to 
Verify that certain security labels are assigned to paths of an 
XML document 100. In the event one or more paths of an 
XML document 100 do not include the security labels speci 
fied in the DTD, these security labels may be added to the 
XML document 100 to make it conform to the DTD. This 
feature may be provided to ensure that protected information 
in an XML document 100 is truly concealed from users lack 
ing the required authority. This feature may also reduce the 
chance that users will infer the existence of a concealed 
relationship from other relationships that are not concealed. 
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0041. For example, in certain embodiments, security 
labels may be validated in an XML document 100 using an 
attribute declaration in a DTD having the following form: 
<! ATTLIST N SecurityLabel (Path1 Label1 | Path2 Label2 |...), 
#REQUIRED/#IMPLIEDs 
0042. Here, N can be instantiated to be a set of nodes in an 
XML document 100 (e.g., VIP Accounts), Path1, Path2, etc. 
identify instantiated paths relative to each of the nodes to be 
protected by a security label, and Label1, Label2, etc. identify 
security labels to be attached to the instantiated paths of 
Path1, Path2, etc., respectively. In selected embodiments, N. 
Path1, Path2, etc. may be identified using XPath expressions. 
Similarly, Path1. Path2, etc. may designate ancestor/descen 
dant, sibling-to-sibling, or other desired paths in the XML 
document 100. The #REQUIRED/#IMPLIED syntax may be 
used to designate whether the security labels identified in the 
attribute declaration are required (e.g., #REQUIRED) or are 
merely optional (e.g., iiIMPLIED). 
0043. In operation, when validating an XML document 
100 with the DTD, the above-identified attribute declaration 
may be checked against the attributes in the XML document 
100. This may be performed to verify that the XML document 
100 has path security labels at least as restrictive as those 
designated in the DTD. If the XML document 100 does not 
include path security labels that are at least as restrictive as 
those designated in the DTD, path security labels may be 
inserted into the XML document 100 to make it conform to 
the DTD. Conversely, path security labels of the XML docu 
ment 100 that are more restrictive than those designated in the 
DTD may be left alone. Thus, 
the DTD may be used to impose a set of minimum security 
requirements on paths of the XML document 100. 
0044. In certain embodiments, when attempting to access 
an XML document 100, a user's security label may be com 
pared to the path security labels designated in the DTD as 
opposed to comparing it with the path security labels of the 
XML document 100. This may improve efficiency because a 
DTD is typically much smaller than the XML document 100 
it is associated with. If the user is not authorized to access the 
paths specified in the DTD, the user will not be authorized to 
access the corresponding instantiated paths in the XML docu 
ment 100. This is because the XML document 100 will have 
security labels that are at least as restrictive as those specified 
in the DTD. 
0045. On the other hand, if the user is authorized to access paths designated in the DTD, the user is not necessarily 
authorized to access the corresponding paths in the XML 
document 100. This is because the XML document 100 may 
have security labels that are more restrictive than those speci 
fied in the DTD. If this is the case, the user's security label may also be compared to the path security labels of the XML 
document 100 to determine whether the user is authorized to 
access the paths. 
0046. It should be recognized that the features and advan 
tages discussed above with respect to a DTD may also be 
applied to other languages for describing the schemas of 
XML documents, such as the XSD language. 
0047. The present invention may be embodied in other 
specific forms without departing from its spirit or essential 
characteristics. The described embodiments are to be consid 
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ered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The 
scope of the invention is, therefore, indicated by the appended 
claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes 
which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of 
the claims are to be embraced within their scope. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A computer program product comprising a computer 
readable medium having: computer usable program code 
executable to perform operations to control access to an XML 
document comprising a plurality of nodes and a plurality of 
paths between each of the nodes, the operations of the com puter program product comprising: 
referencing a schema definition comprising a path security 
label definition associated with a sibling-to-sibling path 
of an XML document; 
receiving an XML document to be validated by compari 
son with the schema definition; 
comparing the XML document to the schema definition; 
verifying that the XML document has a path security label 
associated with a sibling-to-sibling path that is at least as 
restrictive as that specified by the path security label 
definition of the schema definition for the nodes associ 
ated with the sibling-to-sibling path; 
determining an access security label assigned to a user 
seeking to access the sibling-to-sibling path protected by 
the path security label; 
comparing, using pre-determined access rules, the path 
security label to the access security label to determine 
whether the user is authorized to access the sibling-to sibling path; and 
controlling access to the sibling-to-sibling path in accor 
dance with the access rules. 
2. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein the 
sibling-to-sibling path is specified in the schema definition 
using at least one XPath expression. 
3. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein the 
schema definition is selected from the group consisting of a 
document type definition (DTD) and an XML schema defi 
nition (XSD). 
4. The computer program product of claim 1, wherein the 
access security label assigned to a user is assigned by a user 
issuing an SQL command utilizing an SQL extension to 
assign the access security label. 
5. A computer program product to control access to an 
XML document comprising a plurality of nodes and a plural 
ity of paths between each of the nodes, the computer program product comprising a computer-readable medium storing a 
program of computer-readable instruction that when 
executed on a computer causes the computer to: 
generate a schema definition comprising a path security 
label definition associated with a sibling-to-sibling path 
of an XML document; 
receive an XML document to be validated by comparison 
with the schema definition; 
compare the XML document to the schema definition; 
verify that the XML document has a path security label 
associated with a sibling-to-sibling path that is at least as 
restrictive as that specified by the path security label 
definition; 
assign an access security label to a user seeking to access the sibling-to-sibling path protected by the path security 
label; 
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compare, using pre-determined access rules, the path Secu 
rity label to the access security label to determine 
whether the user is authorized to access the sibling-to sibling path; and 
control access to the sibling-to-sibling path in accordance 
with the access rules. 
6. The computer program product of claim 5, wherein the 
sibling-to-sibling path is specified in the schema definition 
using at least one XPath expression. 
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7. The computer program product of claim 5, wherein the 
schema definition is selected from the group consisting of a 
document type definition (DTD) and an XML schema defi 
nition (XSD). 
8. The computer program product of claim 5, wherein 
assigning an access security label comprises utilizing an SQL 
extension to assign the access security label. 
c c c c c 
